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ABSTRACT
Continuity as Crisis: Two Traditions of Theorizing about Animal Minds
by
Adam See
Advisor: John Greenwood
Contemporary philosophers and scientists remain largely resistant to attributing
humanlike capacities to non-human animals, particularly great apes, for reasons that are
not based on compelling empirical or theoretical grounds. Mental faculties such as
reason, agency, and theory of mind are widely seen as differing in kind from functionally
analogous abilities in other extant species. This dissertation appraises the current state of
the animal minds literature by means of a critical genealogy charting the development of
skepticism about animal cognition throughout the history of philosophy. In doing so, this
project addresses the sedimentation of epistemic, linguistic, ontological, and
methodological impasses that continue to shape debates over human uniqueness and limit
comparative discussions of human and animal cognition.
Since antiquity, discourse about animal minds has broadly followed two
traditions, both of which are representative of positions in the recent philosophical and
scientific literature. The dominant path has been to defend fundamental discontinuities
between the human mind and the rest of the animal kingdom. I show how this tradition is
bound up with common patterns of argumentation and evasive rhetoric that prejudge
debates in comparative cognition in favor of discontinuity. Representative figures range
from Aristotle, Descartes, and Wallace to modern primatologists such as Daniel Povinelli
and Michael Tomasello. This tradition, I argue, is largely defined by the tenacity and
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adaptability of “exceptionalism claims,” i.e., claims evoking a cognitive hierarchy in the
animal kingdom. It has also been historically preoccupied with so-called “logical
problems” suggesting, for example, that decades of experimental research on
mindreading in chimpanzees cannot provide evidence for this ability even in principle.
Revealing this problem’s underlying ontological, epistemic, and procedural assumptions
explains why this tradition repeatedly fails to solve the problems it poses for itself, e.g.,
does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?
In addition to this unhealthy skepticism, I show how the dominant tradition relies
on a problematic form of rhetoric whereby animals are said to act “as if” possessing X (a
presumably uniquely human faculty) but lack “genuine,” “true,” or “real” X, where X is
defined at the highest level of human ability. This has long been, and remains, a common
strategy used by discontinuity theorists in reaction to evidence of boundary-threatening
abilities in animals. This rhetoric has tacitly encouraged antiquated “all or nothing”
accounts of human mental faculties that have no place in the contemporary literature.
The critical genealogy this dissertation develops is dialectical — the claims of the
dominant tradition are continuously challenged by voices from within a marginalized
tradition that take seriously the possibility of cognitive explanations of animal behavior.
In illuminating this alternative tradition, my project brings together thinkers as diverse as
Plutarch, Lucretius, Montaigne, La Mettrie, Hume, Darwin, Margaret Washburn and
Kristin Andrews, who articulate and defend naturalistic approaches to cognition that do
not presuppose a cognitive hierarchy with human abilities situated at the top. This
tradition has been particularly sensitive to anthropocentric double standards in denying
mental capacities to animals, and is home to the original defenders of “minimal” accounts
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of rationality. This project selectively draws from this marginalized tradition to promote a
healthy skepticism toward animal cognition, culminating in a chapter undercutting the
force of modern discontinuity arguments regarding the socio-cognitive capacities of
humans and chimpanzees.

vii
Acknowledgements
My deepest appreciation is owed to the efforts of John Greenwood. John encouraged this
project from the beginning and was very helpful in narrowing its content. His immense
knowledge of the history of psychology was an invaluable resource at every step. John’s
presence at the helm was a constant sense of comfort to me. I looked forward to our
meetings in the way that one looks forward to seeing a good friend. He was always
affable, heartening, and constructive, and I feel privileged to have him as my advisor.
Thank you, John.
I am immensely grateful to Philip Kitcher, Peter Godfrey-Smith, and Catherine
Wilson for acting on my committee. This project turned out to be much longer than
anticipated, and the early stages were quite rocky for me. Philip, Peter, and Catherine:
Thank you. Philip in particular has been a formative figure in my intellectual, moral, and
professional development. Philip advised me during my Masters degree at Columbia, and
I am very thankful that he signed onto this project. Philip was instrumental in helping me
through some of my lowest points this past decade, which he always did with grace and
compassion. It was Philip who turned me onto John Dewey, my favorite philosopher, and
who changed the way I thought about philosophy. The structure of this dissertation owes
much to Dewey, and in that way owes much to conversations with Philip that stretch back
to 2009. More importantly, Philip encouraged my efforts to put Dewey’s ideas into extracurricular action. I would not have joined the then-new Philosophy Outreach Program at
Teacher’s College, and thus became enamored by the idea of teaching, were it not for
Philip. Years later, I have fond memories of returning to Democracy and Education while
planning and teaching my first courses at Brooklyn College. Philip was the first to impart

viii
upon me that teaching can be more significant and rewarding than research. Philip also
inspires me a public intellectual. The last time I saw him he was giving a speech on
climate change at the Brooklyn Public Library. That’s my kind of philosopher.
Outside of academia my greatest supporter has been my girlfriend Caroline
Macfarlane. She’s heard me struggle to explain this project hundreds of times, in various
states of sobriety, over many years. Most importantly, Caroline was strong enough to
provide encouragement and emotional support to me during the darkest year of her life,
and I am forever grateful. Thank you Chilla.
Mom and Dad, you should be at the top but if you knew John you’d understand.
My parents, Myra and George See, have worked as hard or harder than anyone I’ve
personally known. The stress they selflessly endure has been difficult for my family. My
parents worked themselves up from nothing in rural Ontario, and they put me through
three college degrees debt free, studying philosophy of all damn things, in New York
City. And they never, ever made me feel a burden. It’s incredible, the faith they have in
me, and the respect they’ve always shown to my projects and causes. I don’t know how
to love anything more than I love my mom and dad. Nothing I’ve accomplished here is
commensurate with what you accomplished to make it possible.
A few words for Caitlin Hurst, my most meaningful friend and closest confidante
on grad school drama since the beginning. She’s never read this thing, but she was there
at every step, having a beer with me, talking about David Berman (RIP) lyrics, helping
me to carry on. Thanks Pine.
Cody Ross and Taylor Christoffel, my brothers in Otro Lado who’ve seen me in
the ugly depths of it. Our band started around the time I began this dissertation. Making

ix
and performing music with you guys has opened up innumerable non-academic spaces in
my life, helping me to complete this project in more ways than I can say. I can’t tell you
how important it is for this philosopher to create and argue about music.
I also want to acknowledge, in no particular order, the following lovely people.
My close friend Jon Lawhead for introducing me to D&D (among other things), for being
an inspiring teacher, and for being one of the best philosophers that I know; Jon always
had my back and encouraged this project. Jeremy Forster for our deeply personal
relationship, and for always being down to play NES till 4am and listen to The Clash.
Chris Whalen for making NYC feel like home (those nights on Riverside looking out at
the GWB listening to ATCQ were therapy), and for emotional support throughout writing
this dissertation and in life generally. I owe thanks to Mateo Duque for helping me
understand Aristotle (who I was more anxious to write about than anyone in the history of
philosophy) and for being my best friend in my CUNY cohort. In retrospect, the Aristotle
chapter is one of the best, I think.
I would like to briefly thank those professors who who inspired me to pursue
philosophy: Jay Newman (1948—2007) who oddly enough did his B.A. at Brooklyn
College, Andrew Bailey, Karen Friedman, and especially my friends Michael Keefer and
Antonio Calcagno, who have written more letters of recommendation over the years than
seems reasonable to ask for (ditto for Philip Kitcher!).
Finally, no one spent more time with me during this project than Hannah. When
you spend nearly every day thinking about animal minds, you inevitably consider the cat
you share the apartment with. You’re writing about phantasia, for instance. You pause.
Does Hannah have phantasia? Does that squawk-thing she does carry anything akin to

x
propositional content? Hannah, having finished the project, I say with humility that I
know no more about the workings of your damned alien mind than I did at the start. We
even tried our own versions of the chimpanzee “folk physics” experiments (adjusted and
controlled for cat and laser pointer). Mostly we just hang out, and it’s the best.

Lake Clear, Ontario
August 2019

xi

Continuity as Crisis:
Two Traditions of Theorizing about Animal Minds
Chapter One
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Animal Minds: A History of Crisis

General Introduction
The Logical Problem, Historically Considered
Cognitive Hierarchies, As-If Rhetoric, and Semantic Anthropocentrism
Exceptionalism Claims and Uniqueness Claims
Human Exceptionalism as a Degenerating Research Tradition
Overview of Project: A History of Crisis

Chapter Two

Ancient Origins of the Dominant Tradition

1.
2.
3.
4.

Historic Overview
Origins of the Dominant Tradition in Pre-Socratic Philosophy
Plato, Xenophon, and the Man Alone of Animals Commonplace
Introducing Aristotle
I. Tensions Between Aristotelian Psychology and Biology
5. Aristotle in Crisis
I. Aristotle’s Denial of Belief to Animals
II. Phantasia: Propositional Perception without Belief
III. Phantasia Problematized
6. The Crisis Naturalized: Traces, Resemblances, and Analogies
7. Final Thoughts on Aristotle
Chapter Three

Stoicism and Christianity:
Dominant Voices of the Dominant Tradition

1. Historic Overview
2. Stoic Worldviews
I. Singularity of Causation in the Animal Kingdom
II. Assent and Constitution
3. Stoic Strategies
I. Expanding the Province of Reason
II. Semantic Anthropocentrism
III. As if Rhetoric and Early Opposition to Arguments from Analogy
4. Animal Consciousness: Born of Explanatory Crisis
5. Concluding Thoughts

1
6
12
15
19
23
34
36
40
45
52

70
79

82
84
97

118
121

xii

Chapter Four
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Historic Overview
Plutarch Denies the Crisis: Gradations of Rationality
Oikeiosis: Illustration of a Progressive Foundation for Exceptionalism Claims
Natural Ontologies of the Early Marginalized Tradition
Concluding Thoughts

Chapter Five
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Enter the Marginalized Tradition: Rejecting the Crisis

Renaissance Origins of Animal Minds Skepticism

Historic Overview
The Rise of Epistemic Crises of Human Exceptionalism
Semantic Anthropocentrism in the Renaissance
Animal Language: A Case Study in Healthy Skepticism
Poisoning the Well: Theriophily and the Argument from Analogy
Doorway to Descartes

Chapter Six

Crisis and Comparative Anatomy
Animal Minds in the Scientific Revolution

1. Historic Overview
2. The Bête machine Hypothesis and the Evolution of Stoic Strategies
I. Descartes, Epistemic Parsimony, and the Roots of the Logical Problem
II. Gassendi’s Challenge (and other responses to Descartes)
3. Hobbes: Origins of Associative Psychology
4. Locke contra Descartes: Rekindling the Aristotelian Strategy
5. La Mettrie: The Crisis Naturalized
I. Biological Functionalism, Scala Natura, and the Origins of Mind
6. Concluding Thoughts on the Enlightenment
Chapter Seven
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Anthropomorphism & Analogy:
Methodological Crises in the 19th Century

Historic Overview
The Logic of Analogy
Hume’s Analogical Argument about Animal Minds
The Argument from Analogy: From Hume to Huxley
Attacking the Citadel: In Defense of Indirect Knowledge of Mind
The Logical Problem and Tabular Representation
Evolution and Arguments from Analogy
Darwin as Marginalized Figure
Theories of Associative Learning and the Dominant Tradition

123
123
131
138
146
148
151
157
163
166
170

174
176
199
203
208
220

223
226
228
233
237
240
244
246
249

xiii
10. Anthropomorphism and Clever Hans Errors
11. Morgan’s Challenge and Huxley’s Challenge
12. General Conclusions

252
260
267

Chapter Eight

Theory of Mind: A Degenerating Research Program

270

1. Historic Overview
2. Human Exceptionalism as a Research Tradition: Problem-Determining Role
3. Human Exceptionalism as a Research Tradition: The Constraining Role
I. Ontological Constraints
II. Epistemic Constraints
III. Linguistic Constraints
IV. Methodological Constraints
4. Human Exceptionalism as a Research Tradition: The Heuristic Role
5. Progressive Strategies for the Dominant Tradition
6. General Conclusions

273
279
280
285
291
293
297
304
312

References

315

1
Continuity as Crisis:
Two Traditions of Theorizing about Animal Minds
Chapter One
Animal Minds: A History of Crisis
1. General Introduction
This dissertation is motivated by the question as to why contemporary
philosophers and scientists remain widely resistant to attributing human-like cognitive
capacities to non-human animals, particularly great apes, for reasons that do not appear to
be based on compelling empirical or theoretical grounds. In recent years, the field of
comparative cognition has seen a “virtual epidemic of new theories of human cognitive
uniqueness,” in the form of “sweeping characterizations of the differences between
humans and other species” (Shettleworth 2012: 2794). With respect to the current state of
this literature, Rollin (2013: 15) questions the tendency of “empirically-oriented
philosophers and biological and psychological scientists to be agnostic if not downright
atheistic about animal mind.” Indeed, decades worth of experimental and ethological
research has failed to mitigate widespread skepticism under the guise of the so-called
“logical problem” (pages 4-8 below) the proponents of which state that all approaches—
past and present—that have been used to evaluate cognitive capacities in animals such as
the presence of a theory of mind “cannot provide evidence for this ability even in
principle” (Halina 2015: 474).
What’s more, a problematic form of rhetoric (pages 9-11 below) has long been a
fixture in arguments for human uniqueness wherein it is claimed that apes and other
“higher” taxa behave as if they possessed X, (where X is a cognitive capacity long
thought to be exclusive to our species), but only humans exhibit behavior that is “truly”
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indicative of “genuine” or “real” X. In the philosophy of animal minds, rhetoric of this
nature historically comes part and parcel with what Cameron Buckner (2013: 861) calls
“semantic anthropocentrism,” namely, “precisifying vaguely-defined psychological terms
to the highest human-level ability,” thereby influencing perspectives on human
uniqueness in this literature. My contention is that both these skeptical and rhetorical
means of reinforcing traditional boundaries between the cognitive capacities of humans
and other species owe less to naturalistically-minded approaches to inquiry, and more to
underlying normative assumptions that have deep, appreciable histories prejudging the
grounds for a rigid human-animal division in comparative cognition research and the
philosophy of mind.
In any scientific, philosophical, or cultural context, unwavering skepticism about
specific claims in spite of increased evidential support in their favor is a phenomenon
worthy of investigation. My project appraises the current state of the animal minds
literature by way of a critical genealogy charting the development, accretion, and
sedimentation of these contemporary attitudes in order to understand why it is that
hypotheses suggesting cognitive continuity have been marginalized and met with
skepticism for centuries despite vast improvements in the available evidence—especially,
I argue, in a post-Darwinian intellectual climate where we would expect less opposition
to continuity-hypotheses, rather than increased opposition. 1 While Rollin (2013) and
Boakes (1984) attribute current “agnostic” and “atheistic” trends to the sedimentation of
positivistic values propagated by behaviorism, the following chapters demonstrate that
there is a great deal more to this story, casting new light on historic and philosophical
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This has been widely commented on, e.g., Thorpe 1979; Dewsbury 1985; Wasserman 1981; Boakes 1984;
Burghardt 1985; Richards 1987; Singer 1994; Griffin 1976; 2001; Rollin 1989, 2013.
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bases for (1) enduring skepticism about continuities between human and animal cognitive
capacities, and (2) the tenacity and adaptability of what I call “exceptionalism claims,”
i.e., claims evoking a cognitive hierarchy in the animal kingdom wherein certain human
capacities are seen as not merely unique, but also more advanced, complex, or otherwise
superior to those of other extant species.
Exceptionalism claims have long been—and remain—a dominant fixture of
animal minds philosophy. A critical genealogy of the origins and historical developments
of exceptionalism claims in the face of steady empirical and philosophical challenges
reveals a trajectory of questionable epistemic, ontological, and linguistic assumptions and
argumentative strategies employed in their defense. The aim of this project is to explore
the evolution of dominant conceptual frameworks that have dictated the terms for debates
over human uniqueness and exceptionalism in cognitive ability; specifically, why
contemporary scholars such as Penn, Povinelli, Heyes, Vonk, and Lurz place a great deal
of emphasis on the so-called logical problem,2 which, I argue has existed in various forms
since antiquity. I also trace the history of how problematic forms of rhetoric—prominent
today in the writings of Tomasello’s Leipzig group—have been traditionally used to
undergird discontinuity arguments wherein the most complex of human faculties are used
as the “gold standard” (Bekoff and Peirce 2009) to define the “true” or “real” meanings
of core cognitive concepts, thereby denying their application to the behavior of nonhuman species. For instance, an argument repeatedly touted by the Tomasello group is
that humans are the only species that “truly” cooperates (e.g., Tomasello 2006, 2008,
2009), or that engages in “truly joint joint attention” (Carpenter and Call 2013) because

2

E.g., Heyes 1998; Povinelli and Vonk 2003; Penn and Povinelli 2007, 2013; Penn et al., 2008; Lurz 2011.
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all acts of joint attention are defined exclusively in terms of recursive mindreading.3 In
Chapter Eight, I argue that this approach to joint attention is guilty of semantic
anthropocentrism, i.e., “cooperation often involves various kinds of feedback
mechanisms, but recursive mind reading, higher-order intentions, and mutual belief
are only relevant concepts in very special cases” (Skyrms 2009: 145). The presence of a
healthy, responsible skepticism about animal minds is necessary, but modern debates
over chimpanzee social cognition expose the prevailing approaches to defending
uniqueness and exceptionalism claims about the human mind as neither healthy nor
responsible.
The critical genealogy that comprises the body of this project shows that, since
antiquity, discourse over animal minds has broadly followed two paths, both of which are
representative of positions in the recent philosophical and scientific literature. By far the
more dominant path has been to defend a fundamental discontinuity between features of
the human mind and the rest of the animal kingdom. I argue that this dominant tradition
is bound up with certain kinds of arguments, rhetoric, and values that prejudge debates in
comparative cognition in favor of discontinuity, and that we seem to be in this position at
the moment—particularly with respect to debates over mindreading in chimpanzees,
which reveal degenerative characteristics at work, i.e., the tradition’s (in)ability to
effectively solve the problems it poses (Laudan 1977), e.g., does the chimpanzee have a
theory of mind? (Premack and Woodruff 1978).
I also present a genealogical account of an alternative, marginalized tradition that
takes the possibility of cognitive explanations of animal behavior very seriously. These

3

E.g., Tomasello and Rakoczy 2003; Tomasello et al. 2005; Moll and Tomasello 2007; Tomasello and
Carpenter 2007; Schmidt and Rakoczy 2016.
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figures articulate and defend conceptions of a fundamental continuity between human
cognitive capacities and those of other species, embracing—I argue—a more openminded and empirically grounded approach to evaluating evidence from a wide variety of
sources and toward a wide variety of taxa. Unlike the trajectory of views embodied in the
dominant tradition, then, the writings from this alternative history of ideas are indicative
of a naturalistic approach to cognition (or, as Frans de Waal [2016] stresses, cognitions)
that does not presuppose a cognitive hierarchy with human abilities situated at the top.4
This project explores potential explanations for why this tradition has not received due
attention in the current literature, and, again by means of a critical genealogy, I utilize
attitudes and arguments from these figures to outline and promote a healthy skepticism
toward animal cognition. The project culminates in a chapter undercutting the force of
contemporary discontinuity arguments regarding—and generalized skepticism about—
the socio-cognitive capacities of chimpanzees (theory of mind and joint attention).
This reconstructive project is a timely one. Cecilia Heyes (2015: 313) claims that
while the animal minds literature from 1978 to 2000 showed “considerable promise,”
more recent debates have been mired with theoretical and methodological problems
indicative of a “declining research program” that now “seems to be in trouble.” By way
of setting the stage for grasping the main issues stalemating the current literature, and
thus the impetus for digging into to the origins of these issues in the first place, some
introductory remarks on contemporary animal minds skepticism are necessary.

4

Key players here include Plutarch, Porphyry, Lucretius, Montainge (1580), Charron (1601), Gassendi
(1646), La Mettrie (1748), Hume (1739, 1777), Darwin (1859, 1871), Romanes (1883), Mills (1898; 1905),
Yerkes (1905), and Washburn (1908, 1917) to—more recently—Griffin (1976, 2001), Savage-Rumbaugh
(1993), Gruen (2011), Boesch (2007, 2008), Allen and Bekoff (1997), Bekoff and Peirce (2009, 2017),
Andrews (2012, 2015), and de Waal (2006, 2016).
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2. The Logical Problem, Historically Considered
Discussions amongst philosophers and primatologists have long taken place under
the influence of what has, in recent years, been referred to as the logical problem (Hurley
and Nudds 2006) or Povinelli’s problem (Lurz 2011). In its basic form, the logical
problem states that since all we can observe is an animal’s behavior, it is difficult (if not
impossible) to determine whether an animal is predicting the behavior of others by means
of mental state attribution, e.g., of their underlying intentions and beliefs, or by means of
associative or conditioned response-mechanisms. As Andrews (2012) describes this
impasse, “given that mindreaders use observable cues to infer the existence of mental
states, how can we experimentally distinguish a predictor who uses only those observable
cues from a predictor who also attributes mental states?” In the chimpanzee mindreading
literature, the logical problem rests upon the demanding task of designing experiments
that can convincingly distinguish between “two very general and opposing theories”
(Lurz et al. 2014) of the mechanisms underlying social cognition: behavior-reading
hypotheses and mindreading hypotheses. With respect to the former, agents make
predictions about others’ behavior solely on the basis of non-mentalistic representations
formed by past experience with various societal cues...
Some of these cues and relations can be rather specific (realized by a restricted range of
bodily movements and gestures) such as ‘torso facing forward’ or ‘hair bristling’. Others
can be more abstract (realized by a wide variety of bodily movements and gestures) such
as ‘threat display’, ‘orienting toward an object’, or ‘manipulating an object in the most
efficient way within the constraints of the setting.’ (Lurz et al. 2014: 428)

According to the behavior-reading hypothesis, animals navigate their environments
without representing these social cues being caused by—or in any way associated with—
underlying mental states in themselves or others (this is what makes them “nonmentalistic”). For instance, it is well documented that subordinate chimpanzees engage in
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a wide variety of deceptive tactics in order to mate when dominants are nearby,5 e.g.,
subordinate males (and willing females, e.g., Matsumoto-Oda [1999]), are far more likely
to engage in mating behaviors when the gaze of dominant chimps is obstructed. For
mindreading skeptics, the question is whether apes perform these deceptive behaviors on
the basis of their prior successes and failures based the bodily-orientation of the
dominants (what Lurz [2011] calls direct line of gaze), or, whether they are attributing
perceptual mental states such as seeing or attention to the dominants. A closely related
question recurring throughout the history of the dominant tradition—from Aristotle and
Seneca to Tomasello and Povinelli—is to challenge whether certain “rational faculties”
(such as mental-state attribution) are required for a given behavior to be called “truly”
deceptive, collaborative, and so forth.
Behavior-reading hypotheses do not necessarily amount to a stimulus-bound
conception of the causes of animal behavior. Penn and Povinelli (2013: 63), for instance,
argue that while chimpanzees are “fully cognitive creatures with a rich suite of
representations at their disposal,” nonetheless, the “comparative evidence strongly
suggests that nonhuman animals possess a variety of top-down heuristics, ploys, and
biases for picking out the causal features of other agents’ occurent behaviors and for
reasoning about other agents’ future behavior in terms of their goal-directed relation to
the world.” Having set up the debate on these terms, a fair challenge is to demand
clarification as to precisely what “causal features” and “reasoning” are meant to refer to
in this context (Fletcher and Carruthers 2013). Nonetheless, there exist a number of
distinct behavior-reading hypotheses,6 and there is no reason to assume these accounts

5
6

See Roberts and Roberts (2015) for a review.
E.g., Povinelli and Vonk 2003; Perner 2008; Gergely and Csibra 2003.
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are mutually exclusive; it is evident that chimpanzees and other species may utilize a
variety of non-mentalistic strategies when interacting with others (Lurz et al. 2014: 429).
In contrast to explanations of this nature, mindreading hypotheses state that
certain animals are capable of predicting behavior on the basis of a theory of mind.
According to Premack and Woodruff (1978: 515), “An individual has a theory of mind if
he imputes mental states to himself and others. A system of inferences of this kind is
properly viewed as a theory because such states are not directly observable, and the
system can be used to make predictions about the behavior of others.” To infer another’s
mental states means that one is interpreting that individual’s behavior in terms of their
underlying intentions, beliefs, doubts, knowledge, as well as perceptual states such as
hearing and seeing. Mindreading hypotheses likewise come in various forms 7 and, as
with alternative conceptions of the behavior-reading hypothesis, it entirely possible that
mindreading animals—including, of course, humans—utilize multiple mechanisms, e.g.,
mental simulation, to predict the behavior of others (Mitchell 2009: 1309).
With this distinction in mind, consider a specific example of the logical problem.
Liebal et al. (2004) found that, when gesturing to both humans and conspecifics,
chimpanzees will reliably act as follows: Attempt one gesture, monitor the receiver’s
response, and if no reaction, walk around the receiver and repeat the gesture or try a
different one. The fact that chimpanzees appear to employ “practical reasoning” in
gestural communication strongly suggests that they possess a theory of mind, i.e., that
they attribute mental states such as attention and inattention to others (Tomasello 2008).
The skeptic would then respond that there is no need to posit a mindreading hypothesis in
the form of the chimpanzee attributing these mental states to humans and conspecifics.
7

See Lurz et al. (2014) and Spaulding (2011) for reviews.
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Their behavior can just as well be explained in terms of conditioned learning from
previous experiences in like-situations where they formed “behavioral rules” based on the
success and failure of certain gestures to achieve their goals. Whether attention-getting
behavior can be adequately explained primarily in terms of identifying and acting upon
observable regularities is a hotly debated topic. Nevertheless, it is widely assumed that
these two explanations, i.e., theory of mind and behavioral rules, are “functionally
equivalent” (Cheney and Seyfarth 2005: 138). In other words, both interpretations
provide equally plausible means by which an actor can achieve the same goal, which, in
Liebal’s study, is receiving food.
Andrews (2011) claims that, “The logical problem is a descendent of Skinner’s
worry about intervening variables: if we can predict future behavior based on
environmental stimuli, there is no need to postulate a mental state in order to predict that
behavior.” While there is some truth to this, I contend that the epistemic framework for
the logical problem first came into vogue in 16th and 17th centuries, first, with the
influential revival of Pyrrhonian skepticism as applied by Montaigne, Charron, and
Gassendi (among others) to the then-novel question what can actually be known about
animal minds, and second, with the contemporaneous propagation of the bête machine
doctrine, including its applications to human cognition, thereby offering an empirical
backbone to animal minds skepticism.
The history goes deeper still. While the logical problem is fundamentally
epistemic, its central, often dualistic, framework derives from (1) ancient ontological
assumptions about carving up the respective capacities of human and animal minds into
severe rational and perceptual domains (Chs. 2-4); (2) 16th and 17th century arguments to
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the effect that “other minds” skepticism should be categorically stronger when applied to
non-human animals (Chs. 5-6); (3) perennial disagreement—beginning with Plutarch and
Porphyry—over the extent to which anthropomorphic language is justifiable (Chs. 4-7);
(4) disagreement over what qualifies as a parsimonious explanation, e.g., how Wundt’s
Law of Parsimony (1863) and Morgan’s Canon (1903) should be interpreted and applied
(Ch. 7-8); and finally, (5) methodological constraints about the type of evidence and
research capable of discerning disparate behavioral causes (Chs. 6-8). Throughout this
genealogy, I contend that all of these factors have influenced the logical problem as it is
understood and evoked today.
This problem is widely considered the most formidable impasse in not only
comparative social cognition, but also—as first seen in Montaigne (1580) and Descartes
(1641)—for questions regarding the appropriateness of applying cognitive explanations
to animal behavior more generally. It has only been in recent years that some have
seriously engaged the question as to whether the logical problem needs to be “solved” at
all (Buckner 2013; Andrews 2015; Halina 2015). In my estimation, the key reasons for
this general lack of discussion are as follows: (1) the import of overcoming the logical
problem is emphasized in most—if not all—primers and readers on animal minds, 8
marginalizing deflationary accounts as to the very question as to whether it can and/or
should be dismissed; (2) the logical problem is representative of long-standing concerns
over anthropomorphism in the history of discussions over animal minds and is therefore
deeply engrained in the discourse; (3) since the logical problem is commonly conceived
as unique to comparative cognition research, rarely has the question arisen as to whether
it may be indicative of more general issues in the natural sciences wherein progress has
8

Kristin Andrew’s (2015) The Animal Mind is an admirable exception.
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arguably been made; (4) the two alternatives offered by the logical problem are widely
conceived as integral to the structure of mindreading debates, thereby raising the (perhaps
legitimate) concern that evading this epistemic and methodological problem will make
the very notion of animal mindreading empirically intractable. Finally, (5) the challenge
of solving the logical problem has generated—and continues to generate—a robust
literature of its own, not only among philosophic and scientific commentators, but also
amongst the myriad of laboratory researchers whose careers have been built upon the
challenge of crafting ingenious experiments to overcome it.
That said, the dominance of this problem has generated certain benefits.
Productive dialogue has emerged about the precise meaning(s) of core concepts, and
several creative experiments have been devised that attempt to resolve this epistemic
gridlock. On the 30th anniversary of Premack and Woodruff’s (1978) landmark paper,
“Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?,” Call and Tomasello (2008) published an
oft-cited companion-piece summing up much of the experimental research to that date.
They note that though there is still strong disagreement over whether the logical problem
will be overcome, “In a broad construal of the phrase ‘theory of mind’ […] the answer to
Premack and Woodruff’s pregnant question of 30 years ago is a definite yes.” By this
they mean that, despite the fact that chimpanzees have consistently failed non-linguistic
false belief tests,9 there is now overwhelming evidence that they understand others’ goals,
intentions, and perceptual states. Fletcher and Carruthers (2013) call this “stage 1
mindreading,” which they contrast with “stage 2 mindreading,” namely, the ability to
attribute “reality incongruent mental states” such as false beliefs to others.

9

Heyes 2015; See 2017b. As discussed in Chapter Eight, Krupenye et al. (2016) and Buttlemann et al.
(2017) designed false belief tasks that apes have passed.
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A natural question arises: given that we now know much more about chimpanzee
social cognition than researchers in the 1970s, why is it that widespread skepticism about
stage 1 mindreading not only still persists, but persists at such an extraordinary level of
intensity? Against the wealth of positive support for these abilities, Penn and Povinelli
(2013: 68), argue that there is a “lack of evidence for anything even remotely resembling
a theory of mind among nonhuman animals.”10 Oddly enough, they argue both that the
past twenty-five years of evidence suggestive of chimpanzee mindreading is insufficient,
while at the same time ostensibly denying that any evidence would likely suffice to solve
the logical problem.11 What is going on here? Crucial to this project is my contention that
the logical problem is not—as it is commonly conceived—a problem that emerged in the
late 20th century, 12 e.g., from responses to Premack and Woodruff’s iconic paper, but
rather from a multi-faceted intellectual milieu, or research tradition (Laudan 1977),
dedicated to the study of exceptionalism claims that has long placed conservative
constraints on what qualifies as acceptable theories about the animal mind.

3. Cognitive Hierarchies, As If Rhetoric, and Semantic Anthropocentrism
In defending their claim that the logical problem must be “solved” in order to
satisfy hypotheses about social cognition in chimpanzees, Penn and Povinelli (2009: 17)
write, “there has never been any dispute about the fact that chimpanzees act as if they
understand that others can see things.” Povinelli (2000: 39) likewise dedicates a section
of an earlier book to drawing distinctions between “‘as if’ understanding” and “‘genuine’
10

Also see Povinelli and Vonk 2003; Vonk and Povinelli 2006; Penn and Povinelli 2007; Penn, Holyoak,
and Povinelli 2008; Lurz 2011; Lurz et al. 2014.
11
Penn and Povinelli (2013: 10-11). While early Povinelli (e.g., Povinelli and Vonk 2004) seems to leave
open the door for new experimental paradigms to overcome the logical problem, later Povinelli (e.g., Penn
and Povinelli 2013) is very skeptical of this possibility.
12
See Hurley and Nudds (2006), Lurz (2011), and Andrews (2015).
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understanding” in chimpanzees, i.e., “our apes were behaving exactly as if they
understood…” This rhetoric is by no means isolated to the New Iberia researchers. Eileen
Crist (1999: 40) describes a common “‘as if’ trope” throughout the history of intellectual
discussions of animal minds, noting that a relatively clear line can be drawn between
those researchers who make concerted efforts to manipulate naturalistic language “under
the auspices of achieving ostensibly greater objectivity” and those concerned that such
descriptions of animal behavior inadvertently “validate the skeptical stance in their
careful avoidance or qualification of mental language” (96). Ingvild Gilhus (2006: 46, 62)
identifies the same rhetorical strategy in ancient defenses of human exceptionalism, e.g.,
the Stoics “had few problems in justifying their use of animals for humans purposes, but
they were not always able to maintain a sharp distinction between animals and humans
without introducing an ‘as it were’ [‘as if’] principle to explain how animals, who seemed
to act according to principles similar to those of humans, do not really do so.”
Use of terms like “real” and “true” to reinforce distinctions between human and
animal behavior is historically tied to semantic anthropocentrism, i.e., although species Y
behave as if they possess X, they do not possess “true” or “real” X, where X is
exclusively defined in terms of the highest-level human ability, e.g., apes do not engage
in “true cooperation” because they (presumably) lack the capacity for recursive
mindreading (Tomasello 2008). These “real”/“true”/“genuine” prefixes are regular
features in the writings of figures in the dominant tradition. Clearly, the tacit assumption
is of a cognitive hierarchy with humans at the top. In comparison, consider the following
statement from Peter Godfrey-Smith (2016: 50), which reflects a token perspective of the
marginalized tradition: “When we try to compare one animal’s brainpower with
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another’s, we also run into the fact that there is no single scale on which intelligence can
be sensibly measured. Different animals are good at different things, as makes sense
given the different lives they live.” An historic relationship exists between the tenacity of
this rhetoric of the “true” (i.e., human) in the philosophy and science of animal minds,
and the tenacity of scala natura language (i.e., “higher” and “lower”) more generally.
Despite the fact that Darwin’s account of common decent from an irregularly
branching tree of life heralded a rejection of Linnaean and Lamarckian rank-based
classifications of nature (thus problematizing the very idea of ‘higher’ and ‘lower’
capacities, since each organism evolves in adaptation to its particular environment), the
language associated with this research tradition persists and is still common today. In a
relatively recent paper, Rigato and Minelli (2013) survey the publications of 16 top
scientific journals between 2005 and 2010, totaling 67, 413 papers, and discovered that
“the unexpectedly high figure of 1,267 returned positive hits from our search for scala
naturae language,” meaning reference to “higher” and “lower” taxa that were “generally
expressed by contrasting lower with higher representatives of a larger or smaller branch
of the tree of life: for example, lower vs. higher vertebrates, lower vs. higher plants, and
so on.” The journals surveyed were both generalist publications and specialized journals
in evolutionary biology.
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With respect to degenerative characteristics of the

contemporary animal minds literature, de Waal and Ferrari (2010: 201) observe that,
These findings are mirrored in the philosophical literature. A search of the SpringerLink databases for
publications in philosophical journals in Epistemology, Philosophy of Science, and Philosophy of Biology
between 2005-2018 yielded 7,152 chapters and articles that contain the phrase “lower animals” and 9,966
chapters and articles that contain the phrase “higher animals.” Among the journals included in this search
were highly competitive publications such as Synthese, Nous, Biology and Philosophy, Mind and
Language, and Philosophical Studies. Given my rough search criteria there is evidently room for a
significant margin of error, if, for instance, the phrases were used in historical context one would expect
them to appear this frequently. To correct for this oversight I searched for these phrases alongside “scala
naturae” (which received only 56 results) and Aristotle (which received only 35 results). It seems fair to
assume that scala natura language is more pronounced in philosophical literature than scientific literature.
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“Scala Naturae assumptions remain prevalent enough that cognitive similarities between
distant taxa, such as birds and primates, are sometimes viewed as antithetical to
evolutionary theory.”

4. Exceptionalism Claims and Uniqueness Claims
In the animal studies literature it is typical for the phrase “human uniqueness” to
be reserved for debates in animal minds, while the “exceptionalism” modifier is reserved
for ethics debates. According to Lori Gruen (2011: 4), “There are two distinguishable
claims implicit in human exceptionalism. The first is that humans are unique, humans are
the only beings that do or have X (where X is some activity or capacity); and
the second is that humans, by doing or having X, are [morally and/or cognitively]
superior to those that don’t do or have X.” It may seem intuitive that debates about the
gap between human and animal minds (regardless of whether the term “uniqueness” or
“exceptionalism” is used) are reflected solely in the first claim, leaving the second claim
entirely to the ethicists. This intuition is misleading, as the disciplinary divide does
capture something right about this distinction as it bears on the animal minds literature:
there is a normative connotation to “exceptional” that is not present in the word “unique,”
and that connotation is not restricted to ethical inquiry. Uniqueness claims are solely
descriptive, e.g., humans have X and bats do not (or conversely, bats have X and humans
do not). On my account, exceptionalism claims involve descriptive statements of this
nature, but they also include an additional valuation, i.e., and X is a more advanced, more
complex, or more morally relevant capacity than those possessed by other species. In
comparative discussions about human and animal cognition, uniqueness implies an
absence of X in other species, whereas exceptionalism often implies a lack or deficiency,
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i.e., in relation to a particular (and perhaps functionally analogous) “higher” capacity that
humans alone possess.14 While the kinds of assumptions, rhetoric, and modes of inquiry
associated with the latter are more commonly at home in the ethics literature, they are
also indicative of dominant historic trends in the science and philosophy of animal minds.
I define “human uniqueness” as the first claim in Gruen’s two-point definition of
human exceptionalism: “Humans are the only beings that do or have X (where X is some
activity or capacity).” Taking this definition at face value, it is clear that it is not
indicative of the sort of claims that “human uniqueness” is typically attached to in the
animal minds literature. When philosophers and scientists use this phrase, they are
typically arguing for a much stronger conclusion than the claim that only humans have X;
it is, after all, “a veritable truism of modern biology” that “every species is unique”
(Povinelli 2000: 338). X in humans would be no more special or worthy of consideration
than the unique capacities possessed by other species, e.g., elephants communicate over
hundreds of miles by means of their unique ability to detect low frequencies with the
soles of their feet (Poole and Granli 2011). The dominant research tradition, which again
runs from Aristotle to contemporary figures such as Povinelli and Tomasello, is
concerned with the peculiarities of elephant communication only insofar as they
somehow challenge the exceptionalism of human communication, i.e., if the long-range
elephant rumbles also demonstrated syntax, they would be subject to rigorous debate
within this tradition. Compare this uncontroversial uniqueness claim about elephant
communication (presumably, elephants are unique in this ability) to the extremely
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For example, Tomasello (2008: 17, 294, 249) argues that chimpanzees have a “lack of flexibility in vocal
production” and “lack most of the structuring devices of modern language,” as evinced by the “lack” of
grammatical structure in their signed gestures; this is due, he says, to a uniquely human “socio-cognitive
infrastructure” for shared intentionality.
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controversial claims that bonobos, parrots, and squid employ elements of syntax and
grammar (e.g., Kirby 2000: 191-2; Pepperberg 1999, 2012; Moynihan and Rodaniche
1982) or the “compelling evidence” that dolphins comprehend the act of naming (King et
al. 2013). If true, this is not just communication, but language. There is undoubtedly
something more advanced or complex or otherwise impressive about understanding and
utilizing syntax and names than there is about signaling by means of low frequencies over
extreme distances. The issue at stake is not, then, the uniqueness of human
communication; it is the challenge posed to the long-standing exceptionalism claim that
any form of communication deemed “language” must be uniquely human. Consider
Chomsky’s (1966: 78) influential “defense” of the “Cartesian assumption that human
language is based on an entirely different principle” than non-human communication; his
proposed distinction in kind carries with it the additional normative assumption of more
advanced features of human communication. It is an exceptionalism claim.
The history of animal minds has not, by and large, been concerned with how
human minds and human societies are unique in the animal kingdom. Rather, in what are
often called “defenses of human uniqueness”—but which are actually, under my
terminology, defenses of human exceptionalism—X is seen as having special
significance or prestige in the animal kingdom because of X’s presumed role in the ageold tradition of defining “the gap” between humans and all other extant species on the
planet; X is what makes human abilities and societies special, extraordinary, exceptional
in the natural world; X explains why our species alone has invented electricity,
explosives, religion, jazz, the internet, and socio-cultural environments like New York
City. To describe our pronounced interest in X-like capacities merely as what makes
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humans “unique” is to misrepresent the assumptions and motivations underlying one of
the oldest research traditions in human history, i.e., in a number of ways, humans are
more cognitively advanced and do engage in more complex forms of social interaction
than other species; philosophers, scientists, and the general public alike want to know
how and why this is the case. The dominant view has been, and remains, that there are
qualitative differences to be uncovered here. It is exceptionalism claims, rather than
uniqueness claims, that have thus influenced the majority of null hypotheses within this
tradition, i.e., we begin with the assumption that humans alone have special capacity X,
and it is then an empirical question as to whether this exceptionalism claim is warranted.
Like uniqueness claims, exceptionalism claims need not be anthropocentric, but
when evoked in the dominant tradition they always are. I am using the word
“anthropocentric” in two senses: (1) inquiry instigated by capacities assumed to be
unique and exceptional in human beings (in the post-Darwinian world, such capacities
are often the proposed result of a “special” or distinctive adaptation granting humans
unique abilities15) and (2) interest in defending and/or redrawing categorical boundaries
between humans and other animals. My use of the term anthropocentric is by no means
pejorative; it is as an accurate description of the values that have historically dominated
discussions of other minds. Though philosophers and scientists could in principle posit
and defend claims that a non-human species is uniquely in possession of a superior or
“higher” cognitive capacity—absent even in humans—the dominant tradition discusses
animal minds in the context of the human mind. As Frans de Waal (2016: 157) describes
long-running trends in the literature, “What a bizarre animal we are that the only question
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we can ask in relation to our place in nature is ‘Mirror, mirror on the wall, who is the
smartest of them all?’” Of course, de Waal is exaggerating about these being the only
sorts of questions raised, but he is correct that, traditionally, this has been the dominant
attitude from which to approach and evaluate the cognitive capacities of other species.

5. Human Exceptionalism as a Degenerating Research Tradition
Although some have referred to human exceptionalism as a “paradigm” (Klausner
1971; Catton and Dunlap 1979; Radner and Radner 1996), this not a productive lens
through which to understand and critically evaluate dominant trends in the animal minds
literature. By merging Imre Lakatos’s (1970) notion of progressive and degenerative
research programs with Larry Laudan’s (1977) broader idea of progressive and
regressive research traditions (discussed in Chapter Eight), I defend the thesis that
modern research programs such as those fueling the chimpanzee mindreading and joint
attention debates belong to a long-running research tradition concerned with inquiry into
human cognitive exceptionalism, including historic debates over the presumed
uniqueness of human language, reason, metacognition, morality, and “higher” emotions
such as shame. This is a tradition laden with obstructive empirical and conceptual (i.e.,
second order) problems, such as the logical problem, which are absent from the oftenprogressive problem-solving abilities of the marginalized tradition. Marginalized figures,
for instance, tend to consider a diversity of non-anthropocentric ecological contexts
where other species may use a theory of mind,16 and make concerted efforts to avoid
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acquire?’ and ‘When do they use it?’” (Boesch and Boesch-Achermann 2000: 243).
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epistemic double standards between human and animal psychology when investigating
this question.17
Unlike Kuhn (1962), both Lakatos (1970) and Laudan (1977) maintained that (1)
there are always multiple paradigm-like entities at a given time, (2) these larger units of
historical analysis evolve over time, (3) that the progressive and/or degenerative features
of related traditions could only be comparatively evaluated within the context of each
other’s successes and failures at problem-solving, thereby weighing in on the state of
current research as well as the promise of particular avenues for future research in a given
field of inquiry. In making use of both Lakatosian and Laudian terminology, I follow
Godfrey-Smith (2003: 106) in recognizing that the conceptual tools crafted by these
philosophers admit of “mixtures,” e.g., “of Kuhn-like and Lakatos-like stories,” as they
uniquely accommodate particular disciplines as “tools for describing a range of different
large-scale processes in science” and philosophy (ibid.). That said, while I make use of
terms and ideas from historiographic philosophers of science in this chapter and
(especially) the final chapter, my six genealogical chapters are not wedded to their
accounts and do not provide a Lakatosian or Laudanian analysis of the history of the
animal minds literature.
At least four legitimate concerns arise whenever one sets about the task of using
history to evaluate the present: (1) the risks involved in using anachronistic sources as
means to critique contemporary positions and debates, (2) the risk of reducing the
rationale behind discontinuity arguments to the relativistic “strong program” (Bloor
1976) in the sociology of science, i.e., just because socio-cultural values are
17

“In designing [mindreading] experiments for non-humans, humans are often anthropocentric in their
approach both when framing the question and interpreting the results” (Vonk and Galvin 2013: 31; see also
Rivas & Burghardt [2001] and Heyes [2015: 313]).
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anthropocentric, and these values influence science, this does not imply that the science
of the day is conservatively in line with those values, (3) the risk of committing the
genetic fallacy, i.e., that “the origin or historical career of a doctrine has anything
whatever to do with its cognitive well-roundedness” (Laudan 1977: 193), and (4) the risk
of distorting history (as well as present views) by forcing linearity into ‘the record,’ i.e.,
on my reading, the as if rhetoric of Aristotle and Tomasello is indicative of semantic
anthropocentrism, but this does not imply any particular history of influence.
With respect to the first risk, as Greenwood (2015: 15) writes, “Although it is
anachronistic to talk about early science and scientists and early physiology and
physiologists, it is justified to the degree that many early thinkers developed theories
about the structures and processes that still form part of the subject matter of
contemporary sciences…” This is the case in the animal minds literature (Dierauer 1977;
Sorabji 1993; Steiner 2005). As for the second criticism regarding the “strong program,”
Laudan (1977: 102-3) observes that the zeitgeist of an era does not always (or even often)
play the expected conservative role in suppressing theories at odds with traditional
science. To argue so would be “bad philosophy and false history” (103). While religious
sensibilities undoubtedly influenced early, dogmatic theories of the animal mind, this was
not the case for all influential figures in the dominant tradition (Aristotle being a case in
point); what’s more, for many figures in this tradition, religious beliefs informing animal
ethics can—I argue—be separated from their explanations for the causes of animal
behavior (Descartes being a case in point).
Turning to potential criticisms about the genetic fallacy and forcing false linearity
into the record, my use of phrases like “traceable to X” should not be mistaken to mean
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“because of X.” Laudan (1977: 194) rightly suggests that statements like “logical
positivism has run out of steam,” or “the New Criticism is no longer a promising device
for literary analysis,” or “psychoanalysis is becoming increasingly ad hoc and
doctrinaire,” are part of normal discourse in philosophy and science. Accordingly, these
“characterizations already exploit the insight that a tradition’s history is relevant to an
appraisal of its current cognitive status” (ibid.). The now-classic question “does the
chimpanzee have a theory of mind?” (Premack and Woodruff 1978) is facing a similar
problem, with skeptical arguments becoming increasing ad hoc and empirical problems
remaining unsolved (or even thought to be unsolvable). I am far from alone in this
evaluation of the current state of the literature.18 As Heyes (2015: 317) observes…
…the social structure of research on animal mindreading has changed. In earlier years
there were a number of active research groups, each publishing a significant volume of
empirical work and voicing their own theoretical perspectives. More recently, […] these
researchers now express doubts (Seyfarth & Cheney 2012; Whiten 2013) or outright
scepticism (Penn & Povinelli 2007, 2013). […] So, in these respects, research on animal
mindreading has declined.

My project should be interpreted as both an attempt to explain this phenomenon, as well
as a means to provide avenues for mitigating it.
Mindreading debates are a small part of a much larger story. Theory of mind is
only the most recent iteration of a long series of human capacities traditionally subject to
skepticism when applied to other species, e.g., culture, language, ethics, reason,
consciousness, etc. My overarching claim is that the mindreading research program
started out promising but has turned into yet another chapter in a long-running research
tradition chiefly concerned with investigating human exceptionalism. This historic claim
is no doubt controversial, but as Laudan (1977: 86) writes, “we should not be misled by
the fact that a theory, taken abstractly, does not have its ‘parent’ research tradition
18
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stamped all over it.” The aim of my critical genealogy is to uncover and constructively
critique this “parent” research tradition to draw attention to, and ameliorate, undue
skepticism in the modern literature.
6. Overview of Project: A History of Crisis
With the exception of the present and final chapters, the bulk of this dissertation is
structured as a critical genealogy exploring the tangled and retaliatory discourses of the
dominant

and

marginalized

traditions.

Epistemic,

ontological,

linguistic,

and

methodological arguments in defense of exceptionalism claims are shown to develop (for
better or worse) through (1) an historic panoply of dissenting voices, in tandem with (2)
new empirical discoveries and (3) shifting attitudes toward appropriate levels of
philosophical and scientific skepticism. My project concludes by applying the content of
the genealogical chapters to critique the current state of debates over mindreading in
chimpanzees. I defend two theses: the rhetoric of “real X” or “true X” has no place in
comparative psychology, and the logical problem does not need to be solved in order to
attribute cognitive capacities such as a theory of mind to non-human animals. I argue that
this problem is not unique to discussions of animal minds, and that its tenacity in this
literature is indicative of degenerative characteristics of its parent research tradition.
Chapter Two begins the critical genealogy of the dominant tradition. I start by
elucidating and expanding upon Sorabji’s (1993) claim that a “crisis” occurred in ancient
philosophy, which arose in response to the difficulty of reconciling pre-existing notions of
human exceptionalism with empirical evidence and/or reasoned arguments suggestive of
species continuity. Animals often behave in ways symptomatic of higher cognition, yet
their behavior is rarely explained as such, e.g., active teaching from elder to infant
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chimpanzees (Pruetz 2010; Boesch 2012). The “crisis” to which Sorabji refers is the
following: if we deny cognitive capacities to animals, we must then find another way to
convincingly explain the presence of cognitive-looking behavior without evoking
cognition. In the case of Aristotle, for instance, “To compensate for the denial of reason
and belief to animals, perceptual content must be expanded” (Sorabji 1993: 17). This was
no easy task. Aristotle’s explanations of complex animal behavior in terms of positing as
much cognitive continuity with humans as he thought responsible are often in tension
with his general claims about human uniqueness.
I retain Sorabji’s use of the word “crisis” throughout this project. Unlike Sorabji, I
extend the application of the term beyond antiquity to label a recurring phenomenon in
history of the dominant tradition: (1) empirical challenges are posed to exceptionalism
claims, to which (2) argumentative patterns emerge showing how cognitive-looking
behavior can be explained without evoking cognitive—or otherwise complex or
“higher”—faculties. (3) Figures in the marginalized tradition then problematize these
strategies, e.g., in order to deny X to animals, X is defined too exclusively to capture all
instances of X in humans (infants, the elderly, marginal cases, and “everyday” instances
where X operates in the background of conscious experience). Tensions of this sort are
indicative of explanatory crises, which are as integral to understanding the history of the
dominant tradition as any particular claims of human uniqueness and/or exceptionalism
defended therein, e.g., “the problem of conceptualizing animal consciousness in terms
that do not require recourse to propositional attitudes” or the “puzzle of […] how animals
can engage in acts of discrimination that are sometimes enormously complex, without
employing concepts or intentional states” (Steiner 2005: 27-8).
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Terms like “problem” or “puzzle” would suffice to identify this historic
phenomenon, and “crisis” may sound excessive, but there are two reasons for my
decision to retain Sorabji’s language. First, while words like “problem” or “challenge”
always demand qualification, “crisis” directly evokes the specific phenomenon that I am
referring to without needless re-elaboration each time. Second, there is a useful—though
very loose—relationship to be drawn between my use of Sorabji’s term in the history of
animal minds and the basic idea behind Thomas Kuhn’s (1962) famous use of the term
“crisis” to identify periods of scientific research where empirical anomalies pile up in
such a way that long-standing theories, e.g., exceptionalism claims, must be either
rejected, defended, or reinforced. In the sense that new, often surprising, discoveries
about animal intelligence were common fixtures of the Roman Empire (Gilhus 2006;
Toynbee 2013) and the Scientific Revolution (Boas 1966) just as they are today, much of
the intellectual history of human exceptionalism can be viewed as a history of crisis,
wherein long-standing exceptionalism claims undergo frequent modification as a result of
recurrent challenges. Importantly, my use of Kuhnian terminology in tandem with
Sorabji’s portrait of a “crisis” in the history of animal cognition should be taken with a
grain of salt; my historical project is not wedded to—or influenced by—Kuhn’s approach
to the history of ideas.
The critical genealogy that follows is tethered by four interrelated periods of crisis
in the philosophy and science of animal minds. (1) The crisis in antiquity was primarily
ontological as it arose from challenges associated with explaining complex animal
behavior in the absence of categories originally reserved for human minds and souls;
epistemic questions were largely sidelined in favor of debates about whether the human-
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like appearances of certain animal behaviors warrants the ascription of human mental
causes. There are strong parallels between the crisis to which Aristotle, the Stoics, and
their intellectual progeny were responding and (2) the primarily epistemic crisis in the
16th and 17th centuries brought about by the revival of ancient skepticism in tandem with
the rise of the bête machine hypothesis (which applies to humans and animals alike).
Beginning in the Renaissance, de facto ontological bases for debate and inquiry about
animal minds deteriorate in favor of far-reaching epistemic questions about what can be
known (if anything) about animal minds. (3) The birth of modern evolutionary biology
brought about another period of crisis, underlying the “controversial milieu” (Murray
1990) from which the scientific discipline of comparative psychology emerged—
particularly the reaction of those sympathetic to behaviorism to the attribution of
cognition to animals (Amsel 1989). Thorndike, Pavlov, and Watson responded to the
anecdotal anthropomorphism of Darwin and Romanes by taking up the “challenge” of
Morgan’s Canon “to develop explanations of animal behavior without reference to
mentality or consciousness” (Greenwood 2015: 225). This has been the aim of the
dominant tradition since its inception. (4) Finally, respect for Thorndike’s (1898) puzzle
boxes coupled with widespread criticism of the “anecdotalist school” mark the first
methodological crisis in the philosophy and science of animal cognition (Boakes 1984:
72). Skepticism following from the Clever Hans debacle helped cement the view that
conclusions on animal cognition must only be arrived at from experiments conducted in
controlled human environments on captive animals.19 At the same time, figures from the
marginalized tradition argue that field studies are as integral to methodologically sound
research as laboratories are (Timberlake 2002).
19
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The state of crisis that the discipline is currently struggling with—defined broadly
by long-standing epistemic and methodological challenges now referred to as the logical
problem—was instigated by the re-emergence of widespread skepticism in response to
the founding of cognitive ethology in the 1970s, where cynical responses to the work of
Donald Griffin (1976), for instance, bore striking resemblance to the overriding skeptical
attitudes that followed from the writings of Darwin and Romanes roughly a century
earlier (Burghardt 1985: 906).
With this broad overview in mind, I return to the content of individual chapters.
Following my discussion of Aristotle’s attempt to navigate the crisis, Chapter Three
shows how his relatively progressive approaches to inquiry (e.g., identifying “traces,”
“resemblances,” and “analogies” of human traits in other animals) will not come to define
the origins of the dominant tradition. Aristotle had the most progressive ancient strategies
for engaging explanatory crises, but not the most influential—a dubious honor that goes
to the Stoics and Early Christians. Confronted with human-looking behavior in animals,
the Stoics promote a worldview where all non-human behavior is caused by the same
cosmic principle, arguing for a singularity of causation in the animal kingdom explained
by reflexive interplay of perceptual faculties and the central nervous system. I explore a
variety of Stoic strategies to defend uniqueness and exceptionalism claims, such as their
reliance on semantic anthropocentrism when defining key terms, their (often legitimate)
attacks on arguments from analogy from opponents credulously believing that likebehavior implies like-causes, and their contention that animals possess different kinds of
“perception” and “instincts” than those present in humans.
Spanning antiquity to the 17th century, Chapters Four and Five detail the origins
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of a second, more naturalistically minded research tradition in the study of animal
cognition. Figures in this tradition do not recognize any challenge or “crisis” inherent in
the fact that non-human animals behave in ways indicative of cognitively complex human
behavior. The worldview promoted by Plutarch, Porphyry, Lucretius, Montaigne, and
Charron (among others) marks a return to the most progressive, yet least influential,
aspects of Aristotle’s contributions to debates over animal minds. Most significantly,
these chapters explain the roots of the epistemic basis for the logical problem, as well as
the first debate over theory of mind in the history of philosophy.
Beginning with Chapter Four, the remaining chapters emphasize the curious fact
that the figures from these two traditions very often spoke past one another—a point
which applies to the contemporary literature as well, e.g., Penn and Povinelli (2013: 62)
describe the recent theory of mind debates as “an exercise in shadow-boxing.” Drawing
from both Lakatos (1970) and Laudan (1978), I suggest that placing their attitudes and
ideas into critical dialogue is imperative for identifying the strengths and weaknesses of
both traditions. In this sense, I conceptualize the remaining two-thirds of the critical
genealogy as somewhat of a dialectic, wherein each tradition may be understood as
keeping the other in check, and from which a more judicious approach to inquiry into
animal cognition and human exceptionalism emerges in the process.
Chapter Six details clashes between the dominant and marginalized traditions as
they enter the Scientific Revolution. Front and center are debates over the bête machine
doctrine as expressed by Descartes and La Mettrie. Descartes’ empirical arguments that
animals are automata, wholly lacking in mental lives (and perhaps consciousness), are
explored in context of the rise of comparative anatomy in the 16th century. I offer a more
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nuanced portrait of Descartes than is typical in the animal studies literature. On one hand,
there is conceptual continuity between Descartes’ argumentative strategies for defending
human exceptionalism and those of the Stoics and Christians. On the other hand, there is
a lesser-known side of Descartes indicative of what may be the first scientifically
informed argument from epistemic parsimony in the history of animal minds. In contrast,
despite being the most progressive member of the marginalized tradition to date, La
Mettrie fails to effectively address what will become the major problem in 19th, 20th, and
21st centuries: the problem of inferring psychological analogies from behavioral and/or
material analogies. While uniqueness and exceptionalism claims are promoted during this
time, they are defended by the likes of Hobbes and Locke in the vein of the Aristotelian
strategy of first identifying as much mental continuity between humans and other animals
as is empirically responsible, rather than the Stoic strategy—adopted, I argue, by
Descartes—of providing an “all or nothing” view of mental faculties.
In Chapter Seven, I maintain that the approaches to comparative cognition at the
beginning of the 20th century from figures such as Wesley Mills (1898, 1905), Robert
Yerkes (1905), and Margaret Washburn (1908) facilitated more productive questions
about the similarities and differences between humans and other species, and offered
better grounds for a responsible skepticism about animal minds than was the norm during
their time.20 Indeed, at the turn of the century, Washburn (1917: 16-7) was concerned
with what she described as the “opposite tendency” to the optimistic, open-minded—
though, due to anecdotal anthropomorphism, admittedly flawed—approaches of Darwin
Animal minds skepticism in the early to mid 20th century generally took three forms: (1) Global
skepticism about the total inaccessibility of the contents of animal minds (Boakes 1984; Dewsbury 1984),
(2) skepticism pertaining to interpretations of animal behavior made in non-technical language (Crist
1999), and (3) skepticism pertaining to the conclusions of research conducted in environments outside of
complete experimental control (Timberlake 2002).
20
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and Romanes to animal cognition, namely, the reactionary “tendency to make purely
biological concepts suffice as far as possible for the explanation of animal behavior and
to assume the presence even of consciousness in animals only when it is absolutely
necessary to do so.” The parallels to the initial “crisis” described by Sorabji are, I
suggest, quite clear. The multitude of discontinuity hypotheses presented throughout the
late 19th and 20th centuries were defended in the face of rapidly increasing evidence for
“higher” or more complex forms of animal cognition.
Washburn, for instance, was troubled by a rise in opposition to non-behavioristic
forms of animal psychology at a time when knowledge of other species had “wonderfully
advanced within the last twenty-five years” (24). This evidence came from the work of
naturalists such as Jean-Henri Fabre (1823—1915) and George and Elizabeth Peckham
(1845—1914; 1854—1940), early comparative psychologists such as Washburn herself,
Karl Lashley, and Robert Yerkes (e.g., 1905, 1929, 1940), and later comparative
psychologists such as Henry Nissen (1933)21 and C. R. Carpenter (1942).22 As Dewsbury
(1984: 24) notes, “Examination of the leading textbooks of comparative psychology
written during this period […] reveals a considerable breadth of approach with respect to
the range of species and behavioral patterns studied.”23 Despite the fact that comparative
psychology “was already a successful discipline at the time,” opposition to studying the
mental lives of animals remained widespread (Crist 1999: 89). Even a cursory view of
this divided history shows that this steady influx of field and laboratory studies
suggestive that other species are “thinking and feeling” were no match for the dominant
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Nissen was amongst the first to study great apes in the field, as well as to run experiments on their
problem-solving abilities (Dewsbury 1984: 24).
22
Carpenter studied a wide variety of monkey and ape species around the world (Dewsbury 1984: 24).
23
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view that they are merely “existing and reacting” (Griffin 2001: 234).
The overarching aim of Chapter Seven is to consolidate the most attractive
features of this critical genealogy into a responsible, multi-faceted attitude toward the
study of animal cognition. I discuss, for instance, how Washburn (1917) and Yerkes
(1905) professed views indicative of de Waal’s (2016: 158) recent call for “a moratorium
on human uniqueness claims” in favor of a “unitary theory that covers all the various
cognitions found in nature” (see also Bekoff and Pierce [2009]). Marginalized figures
have long emphasized the necessity of drawing from a variety of evidential sources and
multiple forms of criteria (including field data and, occasionally, anecdotal evidence),
rather than focusing on crucial experiments and single populations as representative of an
entire species (a common criticism of the Tomasello and Povinelli groups 24 ). This
attitude is suggestive of what Washburn (1917) called the “ideal method” and what
Andrews (2015) recently called the “calibration method.”
With this critical genealogy in place, Chapter Eight streamlines the foregoing
historical content by providing a philosophical framework for conceptualizing human
exceptionalism as a degenerating research tradition (Laudan 1977). After defining key
terms (e.g., degenerative, progressive), I argue that problems such as those discussed
above, e.g., the logical problem, semantic anthropocentrism, and as if rhetoric, are not
endemic to exceptionalism claims themselves—which are worthy of investigation—but
rather to long-standing background assumptions, research constraints, and conservative
epistemic values that have engendered undue skepticism by informing the means by
which researchers have posited and defended claims of this nature.
The final chapter reveals how sedimentations of the dominant tradition are
24
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currently shaping the structure, skepticism, and prevailing discontinuity hypotheses
embodied in debates over mindreading in chimpanzees. In defending the thesis that the
rhetoric of “real X” or “true X” it has no place in comparative psychology, I show how
this rhetoric has been used to draw important, unbiased, distinctions in human
psychology, e.g., there is a reasonable discussion to be had between what constitutes
altruism vs. altruistic-looking behaviors. In comparative psychology, however, something
markedly different is going on. In this context, when adjectives such as true, real,
genuine, etc. are attached to cognitive capacities, it is evident that the intent of the prefix
is to be synonymous with the expression of a given behavior as humans perform it. This
chapter thus critiques the implicit normativity that has entered the picture when similar
rhetoric is used—particularly in the writings of the Tomasello camp—in arguments
which draw distinctions in kind between the human-looking behavior of other species and
the like-behavior of our own.
Chapter Eight concludes by building upon naturalistic attitudes drawn from
figures from the genealogy to stake a claim on the necessity of “solving” the logical
problem. As in any field of study, we need not be concerned that “complementary”
hypotheses exist to explain a given phenomenon; we should expect it. What we should be
concerned with is “which hypothesis best accounts for the overall body of data”
(Andrews 2015: 150) such that we might provide reasonable arguments to the best
explanation. Rather than focus solely on crucial experiments as the basis for optimism
about the future of the mindreading research program (e.g., Lurz et al. 2014), researchers
should pull congruous evidence from a wide variety of sources and develop what
Whewell (1840) called a “consilience of inductions.”
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As Edward Tolman (1938: 41) concluded a famous address to the American
Psychological Association, “It is time that animal workers of all persuasions join with
developmental, physiological, and cognitive human psychologists to address the entire
issue of mentalism in psychology. If the problem is worth all the words spilled, it is worth
a concentrated effort to address it correctly.” In a similar vein, my project concludes with
the suggestion that there is room for optimism here. The 20th and 21st century literature
on animal behavior is comprised of many disciplines and research programs—including
field research often-maligned by the dominant tradition—that, in their own ways, weigh
in on debates such as those pertaining to mindreading in great apes. Crucially, what side
they weigh in on is entirely beside the point, which is that (1) there are worthwhile
questions about what makes the human mind exceptional in the animal kingdom, (2) the
research tradition dedicated to addressing these questions has proven to be degenerative,
and (3) the philosophical tools to revitalize this tradition—though marginalized—are
already present in the animal minds literature.
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Continuity as Crisis:
Two Traditions of Theorizing about Animal Minds
Chapter Two
Ancient Origins of the Dominant Tradition
1. Overview
There is disagreement amongst historians of psychology as to whether the origins
of their discipline should be traced to the ancients, and few books on the subject tread
back that far (Greenwood 2015: 15). The same is largely true of those—far fewer in
number—who have written histories of what is now known as comparative psychology,
animal psychology, or simply the science and philosophy of animal minds. In the preface
to his sourcebook, Animals in Greek and Roman Thought, Stephen Newmyer (2011: xi)
notes, correctly, that while there exist a number of anthologies highlighting “historical
antecedents of modern debates on animal issues,” the term “classic”—as used in these
texts—most often refers to writings from the 19th and 20th centuries, “perhaps with an
occasional excerpt from Descartes.” Newmyer continues:
Greek and Roman “classics” are either emitted entirely or drastically underrepresented,
despite the fact that virtually every subject encompassed in post-classical thought on
human-animal relations was treated already in Greco-Roman authors, and that the
Aristotelian and Stoic formulations of these arguments were instrumental in shaping
much of subsequent thought. (ibid.)

Though not anthologies, the two most notable exceptions to this gap in the historical
literature are Richard Sorabji’s highly regarded Animal Minds and Human Morals: The
Origins of the Western Debate (1993) and Urs Dieraurer’s Tier und Mensch im Denken
der Antike: Studien zur Tierpsychologie, Anthropologie und Ethik (1977). Gary Steiner
(2005) has also contributed a valuable book dedicated to tracing the development of
philosophical ideas about animals from antiquity to the present. Despite featuring
impressive scholarship on ancient debates about animal minds—which I appreciatively
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make use of below—what Steiner’s and Dierauer’s texts have in common is an emphasis
on historic sedimentations of contemporary debates in the animal ethics literature. Very
often it is impossible to bracket or otherwise ignore the fact that exceptionalism claims
about human cognition frequently arise as means to support arguments for human
exceptionalism in moral status. What I am interested in below are the philosophical and
argumentative strategies used by the ancients for denying human cognitive capacities to
other species, rather than the (usually moral) impetus for their doing so.
This chapter provides a critical and conceptual history of philosophical arguments
in defense of uniqueness and exceptionalism claims from the 8th century BCE to the mid
15th century CE. To varying degrees, both Aristotle and the Stoics deny animals reason,
memory, speech, conceptual knowledge, as well as mental states such as beliefs,
intention, attention, and anger, while at the same time acknowledging that many animals
appear to possess “traces” of these capacities. As defenders of uniqueness claims, this
recognition forces figures in the dominant tradition to confront the challenge—what
Sorabji (1993) has influentially called a “crisis”—of explaining complex animal behavior
without attributing them the requisite features of human cognition. While ancient
philosophers often make the same uniqueness and exceptionalism claims, the ways that
they defend these claims by way of navigating this crisis differ considerably in both form
and quality. For example…
For memory, preparation, and emotion, the Stoics mounted a whole programme to show
how these are replaced in animals by counterfeit versions which do not require belief.
They saw this as essential to their case, because all these capacities had been cited as
proofs of animal reason. Aristotle’s strategy was different. He did not seek to downgrade
animal capacities, but rather to argue that even human memory is not a function of
reason. […] Whereas Aristotle divorces even human voluntary action from reason, the
Stoics downgrade animal behavior, to make it all non-voluntary. (Sorabji 1993: 50)
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While Aristotle’s strategy of “downgrading” human abilities to account for animal
behavior—thus restricting the total number of uniqueness claims that he ultimately
makes—was explanatorily superior to the strategy adopted by the Stoics, the intricacies
of Aristotle’s account lead to interpretive issues where it is difficult to tell exactly where
his continuity arguments end and his uniqueness claims begin. In what follows, I build
upon Sorabji’s idea of a “crisis” arising in ancient philosophy of animal minds—a notion
developed in later chapters as a central feature of the dominant tradition to this day.
2. Origins of the Dominant Tradition in Pre-Socratic Thought
Western conversations about human/animal relations can be traced to the 8th
century BCE with the epic poetry of Homer and Hesiod. The first exceptionalism claim in
Western literature occurs in Hesiod’s Works and Days (700 BCE), when Zeus grants
justice to humans alone among the animals. Hesiod states—like Aristotle,25 the Stoics,26
and Kant27 after him—that justice is not only uniquely human, but the most exceptional
quality that any animal can possess: “Here is the law as Zeus established it for human
beings; / as for fish, and wild animals, and the flying birds, / they feed on each other,
since there is no idea of justice among them; / but he gave justice to humans, which is
proved the best thing of all by far” (Works and Days 276-79). This passage arises in the
context of Zeus convincing his deceitful brother that that he should listen to his innate
capacity for justice, lest he act like an animal, i.e., beneath himself. Newmyer (2011: 82)
claims that this line of verse constitutes “the earliest extant Greek attempt to differentiate

Newmyer 2011: 74-5; Sorabji 1993: 108-112; Nicomachean Ethics 1161a30-b2; Politics (1253a9-18).
Newmyer 2011: 73-4; Sorabji 1993: 142-3.
27 Lectures on Ethics 1963: 239-41.
25

26
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human beings from other animals on philosophical grounds, and may be considered to be
the first Greek example of the ‘man alone of animals’ commonplace.”28
While it is widely recognized that the earliest musings on the philosophy of mind
likely occurred in the 5th century BCE,29 it is less known that these fragments coincided
with—and occasionally corresponded to—the first musings on the philosophy of animal
minds. 30 In addition to introducing the concept of mind (nous) into philosophy, 31
Anaxagoras (c. 510—428 BCE) makes perhaps the first claims of human cognitive
uniqueness and exceptionalism, i.e., we “master animals through our unique experience,
memory, expertise (sophia) and technical knowledge (tekhnê).” 32 By far the most
historically significant uniqueness claim from this era is attributed to Alcmaeon of Croton
(c. 5th century BCE): “For [Alcmaeon] says that man differs from other creatures in that
he alone has understanding (xuniēsi), while the other creatures have perception
(aisthanetai), but do not have understanding.”33 This distinction between understanding
and perception has arisen in various iterations that, combined, make it the most
influential philosophical device for drawing categorical boundaries between humans and
animals, including among contemporary philosophers and animal researchers.
Although this second-hand fragment is all that survives of Alcmaeon’s views on
human uniqueness, Alcmaeon likely “inaugurated the belief” that human beings are the
only rational creatures on earth (Newmyer 2011: 3), meaning the only species capable of
self-awareness,

deliberation,

and

reflection—among

other

cognitive

For more on Hesiod’s influence, see Dierauer (1977: 15-18) and Steiner (2005: 43).
Burckhardt 2002: 290; Searle 2005: 66
30 Dickerman 1911; Dierauer 1977; Sorabji 1993; Newmyer 2011.
31 Burckhardt 2002: 290
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unexplainable by the five senses alone, i.e., perception. Humans are capable of
understanding facets of their actions, beliefs, and environments, whereas the behaviors of
other species are performed entirely on the basis of their perceptual faculties without any
thoughts, beliefs, or awareness of what they are doing.
It is unclear how Alcmaeon would have defined understanding and perception,
which is precisely the sort of interpretive obstacle that would form the backbone of the
dominant tradition, particularly the explanatory crisis Sorabji attributes to the writings of
Aristotle. The basic problem that arises from denying rationality to animals is evident in
Alcmaeon’s fragment, though there is no evidence that he recognized it. When the
perceptual faculties—however defined—are forced to account for the full gamut of
animal behaviors, including those that seemingly demand cognitive explanations, one is
stuck with two options: (1) Expand the meaning of term “perception” to allow the
perceptual faculties—in animals and humans—to encompass terms such as belief,
memory, concepts, and intention, thereby creating more overlap between human and
animal mentality by downplaying the cognitive nature of everyday functions of the
human mind, while still allowing for categorical distinctions at higher levels, e.g., both
humans and animals have memory, but only humans possess willful recollection (this
was Aristotle’s strategy); or, (2) bite the bullet and argue—as the Stoics did—that the
terms we commonly use to discuss the functioning of human mind have no clear analog
in the animal mind; animals may appear to possess memories, intentions, and beliefs, but
these terms are defined such as to belong strictly within the province of the rational mind,
while all animal behavior is explainable by recourse to impulse and appearance.
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It is unclear whether Alcmaeon considered the explanatory repercussions of
restricting all animal behavior to the perceptual faculties. There is, however, some reason
to believe that the categorical distinction Alcmaeon drew between humans and animals
had more in common with Aristotle than it did the Stoics. According to a description of
Alcmaeon’s philosophy of mind found in Plato’s Phaedo (96b), he is said to argue that,
“understanding (epistêmê) comes from a stabilization of memory and belief (doxa), while
memory and belief come from the hearing, sight and smell provided by the brain”
(Sorabji 1993: 9 [emphasis added]). As a scientist, Alcmaeon “established that the brain
is the center of perception and cognition” by “tracing the optic nerves from the retina to
the brain”—a theory later reinforced by Hippocrates (Greenwood 2015: 27-8 [emphasis
added]). Although Alcmaeon maintained that all the faculties of the mind can be divided
into two types, and that this distinction reflects the main difference between humans and
animals, he nonetheless went against the grain in ancient philosophy by situating the
perceptual faculties alongside the rational faculties in the brain, rather than the heart, as
was the dominant view (ibid.). With this connection in mind, one way to interpret Plato’s
description that “memory and belief come from the hearing, sight and smell provided by
the brain” is that Alcmaeon—like Plato after him—did attribute memory and belief to
animals, and that he did so by situating them within the province of perception. This
reading still allows for the denial of cognitive capacities to animals, as it is only with the
“stabilization of” (perhaps: self-awareness of or reflection upon) these perceptual states
by the rational faculties unique to humans that they alone have unique kinds of memory
(e.g., recollection) and belief (e.g., conceptual knowledge).
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While Alcmaeon plays a relatively minor role in Sorabji’s (1993) discussion of
the ancients, both Steiner (2005: 54) and Dierauer (1977: 41) tell grander stories of
influence. Dierauer goes so far as to suggest that Alcmaeon’s original distinction between
perception and understanding as it applies to humans and animals signaled “the
emergence of a new scale of values that assigns to the intellectual moment an
unequivocal priority over pure physical force” (43). This distinction, he argues, paved the
way for the unique rational capacities of humans to be used by later thinkers as tools to
justify human superiority over all other creatures. Dierauer (1997: 5-6) also suggests that
Alcmaeon’s influence on Aristotle was considerable, going so far as to venture that the
very notion of a Great Chain of Being was born in Alcmaeon’s thought that humans
alone transcended the level of sense experience to that of understanding.
What all of these theorists have in common is that the origins of comparative
cognition can be traced to the dissatisfaction of ancient philosophers with the idea that
animals navigate their environments entirely by instinct; “in antiquity, as today, notions
such as instinct appear to have struck many in the philosophical community as question
begging” (Steiner 2005: 54)—a point addressed later in this chapter. The ancients wanted
“more precise answers” for how perception is related to the intellectual faculties, such as
whether the former can function as an interpretive faculty in addition to fulfilling its
common-sense role collecting data from the five senses (8-9).
3. Plato, Xenophon, and the Man Alone of Animals Commonplace
While the pre-Socratics were more prone to making uniqueness claims than
exceptionalism claims, beginning with Socrates’ follower Xenophon (c. 430—354 BCE)
and culminating in the membership of the Stoic school founded by Zeno of Citium (c.
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334-262 BCE) which extended well into the Roman Empire, it quickly became rare for
uniqueness claims not to be accompanied by claims of human exceptionalism. It is in
Xenophon’s Memorabilia (Recollections of Socrates), written during the late 5th or early
4th century BCE, that Newmyer (2011: 12, 54) first identifies what he calls the “man alone
of animals commonplace” that is “repeated in almost endless forms in classical
discussions of animals” in ancient Greek, Roman, and Christian thought, and that would
remain popular throughout history.
Speaking as Socrates, Xenophon provides a lengthy list of ways in which humans
are superior to animals, with no concessions to animal abilities: humans alone stand
upright, are sexually active all year round, have excellent hands, uniquely possess the
capacities for meaningful speech, happiness, rational thought, exceptional memory,
“fighting off illness,” “promoting good health,” “working toward knowledge,” and—
most important to Xenophon—possess a superior soul, the presence of which reflects an
intimate relationship to the gods, whom humans alone know to worship (Memorabilia
1.4. 11-14). This scattershot approach to downplaying the characteristics of the animal
mind—essentially arguing that humans are superior in every desirable way—“would in
time become standard arguments in the arsenal” of the Stoics (Newmyer 2011: 53).
Seneca (c. 4 BCE—65 CE), for instance, notes in one paragraph that animals lack reason,
love, hate, friendship, enmity, discord, harmony, wisdom, foresight, diligence, and
reflection, all of which “have been granted to no creature but man” (On Anger 1.3.4-7).
As discussed below, other popular exceptionalism claims to be added to this list by the
ancients include humans alone possessing the capacity to feel emotions, form beliefs, use
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tools, count, grasp concepts, establish moral codes, and organize into cultured societies—
all of which remain relevant in the 21st century.
Unlike Alcmaeon and Xenophon, the precise contributions of Plato (c. 428—347
BCE)

to ancient discussions of animal minds are more difficult to pin down. While

uniqueness and exceptionalism claims appear occasionally throughout his body of work,
nowhere do they arise in the form of the man alone among the animals commonplace.
Plato claims, for instance, that among animals, “man […] is superior to the rest in
understanding, and alone has justice and religion” (Menexenus 237d), that only humans
possess reason (Cratylus 399c; Laches 197a-b), while other animals perform likeactions—such as caring for infants—wholly by instinct (Symposium 207b-c). Elsewhere,
however, Plato offers a very different picture. He has Socrates claim that the souls of all
living organisms possess intelligence (Laws 961d), that both children and animals can
develop rational calculation later in life (Republic 441a-b), that “thought, intelligence,
memory, and things akin to these, right opinion and true reasoning” are present in “all
animate beings” (Philebus 11b-c), and that bees, wasps, and ants may rightly be called
“political beings” (Phaedo 82b). Plato also argues that animals (and slaves) are capable
of forming rudimentary beliefs in the non-rational parts of their souls, but this point is
followed by the uniqueness claim that maturation in human infants involves replacing
irrational beliefs with rational beliefs (Republic 430b, 573d).
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Because Plato’s

philosophy of mind does not isolate beliefs to the rational part of the soul, he is able to
grant beliefs to animals. That said, animals “are incapable of stepping back from these
beliefs and scrutinizing them with an eye toward assessing their suitability to the higher
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concerns of the soul. Animals are imprisoned in a life of sheer physicality, and their
beliefs are restricted to considerations of material welfare” (Steiner 2005: 57).
It was likely Plato who inspired Aristotle to dedicate intellectual energy to the
distinction between understanding and perception in animals.35 Sorabji (1993: 9) restricts
the import of Plato in ancient discussions of animal minds to his role as stepping stone to
the crisis he sees breaking out with Aristotle: “Plato’s most important contribution lay in
his dramatic narrowing of the content of perception, and his corresponding expansion of
the content of belief.” According to Plato’s philosophy of mind, raw sense data is
practically useless for getting around the world without the aid of basic beliefs gained
through repeated experiences, which is another reason why Plato feels the need to
attribute beliefs (doxa) to all animals, though not plants (Timaeus 77a-c). In what has
become a familiar picture in the history of philosophy, the abilities to do stuff with raw
sense data is attributed to different capacities altogether: reasoning (sullogismos) and
belief (doxazein). Aristotle would react strongly against Plato here. Whereas Plato
“narrowed” the role of the perceptual faculties to such a degree that animals had to be
granted certain cognitive capacities to explain their behavior (inevitably “expanding” the
content and scope of what qualifies as a “belief”), Aristotle grants propositional content
to perceptual faculties (like phantasia) so they could play the same functional role of
beliefs. This way Aristotle can deny beliefs to animals by keeping them in the rational
part of the soul, thereby reinforcing Alcmaeon’s original claim that the distinction
between humans and animals rests with the distinction between reason and perception.
There are two main reasons why the crisis that emerges in Aristotle, i.e., that of
explaining complex behavior without recourse to rational capacities, does not emerge in
35
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Plato.36 First, Plato was not a significant contributor to the philosophy of mind, and as
such, he very rarely concerns himself with the cognitive boundary between humans and
animals. Although he often writes about battling the “animality” in the soul, occasionally
equating irrational humans with animals, he rarely draws sharp lines between the two.
Animals arise in Plato’s text as instruments to show why the cultivation of reason is
necessary and attractive. Second, Plato’s comparatively liberal views on animal minds
stem from his commitments to reincarnation, i.e., the transfer of the rational soul from
humans to animals and—in a rare move for the ancients—from animals to humans
(Phaedrus 249b). Since Plato believed that some animals literally contain the souls of
humans, “the psychic space between them was reduced” (Gilhus 2006: 38); “animals
cannot be viewed as essentially inferior to human beings; at best the difference is one of
degree” (Steiner 2005: 55). This is one reason why the diet in Plato’s kallipolis from the
Republic (372a-c) is vegetarian.
The crisis recognized in Aristotle, then, owes a great deal more to the content of
Alcmaeon’s single fragment that denies reason and belief to animals, than it does to
Plato’s various comments on the subject. One way to read this history is to view Aristotle
as taking up a challenge suggested in different ways by both Alcmaeon and Plato. I
conceive of Aristotle as thinking that Alcmaeon was largely right about the basic
difference between human and animal minds, but that Alcmaeon did not recognize that
this broad distinction left animals with very few resources to execute the complex
behaviors Aristotle observed them performing. On the other hand, while Plato could
account for complex animal behaviors since he attributes them beliefs, it is almost certain
that Aristotle saw his teacher as being far too tender-minded here. Alcmaeon’s distinction
36
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created a serious problem that none of Plato’s discussions of animals dealt with: how can
perceptual content alone account for complex behavior in animals? Instead of taking
Plato’s cue by narrowing of the role of perception in navigating the world and allowing
animals some cognitive capacities, Aristotle took it upon himself to defend Alcmaeon’s
distinction, “compensating” animals by allowing them “a rich enough perceptual content
to deal with the world” (Steiner 2005: 55).
4.1 Introducing Aristotle
Despite his ideas rarely being featured in contemporary readers on the philosophy
and science of animal minds, Aristotle (c. 384—322 BCE) is inarguably amongst the most
influential philosophers to write on the subject. In the spirit of Whitehead’s (1979: 39)
oft-cited assertion that much of Western philosophy can be read as footnotes to Plato,
sedimentations of conceptual distinctions and lines of argumentation introduced by
Aristotle in support of now-classic uniqueness and exceptionalism claims remain present
not only throughout the Western philosophical tradition, but the philosophy and science
of animal cognition in the 20th and 21st centuries.37
Aristotle was the most knowledgeable of ancient philosophers on topics of animal
biology, anatomy, and behavior—a distinction that he continued to hold for over a
millennium in contrast to canonized philosophers who touched upon topics in animal
minds. The philosophical tradition predating and including Plato held a particular interest
in astronomy over the life sciences; Aristotle broke from this tradition with his
naturalistic attitude that one can learn more about human nature by keeping one’s
intellect bound to the earth, rather than the stars (Newmyer 2011a: 7). Aristotle’s works
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on animals featured a “wealth of careful observations of flora and fauna,” which, in many
cases, led to early psychological and biological theories with a “strong empirical bent”
that remains impressive to this day (Greenwood 2015: 30).38 Greenwood likewise notes
that Aristotle was the first philosopher to dedicate an entire work to psychology (De
Anima), and “was also the first theorist to reflect critically on the nature of psychological
explanation, and the subtlety and sophistication of his account has scarcely been rivaled
since” (29-30). I will argue in this multi-part section that a comparable claim can be made
for many of Aristotle’s musings on animal psychology.
Aristotle composed four works on animals: History of Animals (nine books),
Parts of Animals (four books), On the Generation of Animals (five books), and
Movements of Animals (one book). Most of Aristotle’s sources of these books stem from
his privileged position as friend and mentor of Alexander the Great (c. 356—323 BCE),
who consistently had animal specimens sent back to Greece from his military conquests
and expeditions. Aristotle seemed to have been aware of the fact that his research on
animals was both important and novel, as he noted that other philosophers—and humans
generally—should not downplay the import of studying smaller or otherwise “ignoble”
creatures, for great intellectual rewards follow from their close study.39 In a statement
reminiscent of the basic tenor of Darwin’s scientific attitude, Aristotle defends his objects
of study as follows: “we ought not to hesitate nor to be abashed, but boldly to enter upon
our researches concerning animals of every sort and kind, knowing that in not one of
them is nature or beauty lacking. […] If, however, there is anyone who holds that the
study of animals is an unworthy pursuit, he ought to go further and hold the same opinion
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about the study of himself.”40 Very few ancient philosophers (from either tradition) held
this bold and contemporary attitude. Aristotle was fascinated by the classification of
animals, the intellectual capacities of animals, and—most crucial here—the modern
question as to how humans are to be understood as animals while at the same time
possessing unique and exceptional capacities that distinguish us from other members of
the animal kingdom.
4.2 Biological Context for Aristotelian Psychology: Advantages and Disadvantages
The majority of Aristotle’s uniqueness and exceptionalism claims—and claims
about animal minds more generally—stem from his more foundational biological
theories. In modern science it is often a virtue to ground explanation in biology. Here, I
suggest that Aristotle’s progressive approach to addressing crises of human
exceptionalism was both aided by, and hampered by, various tenets of Aristotelian
biology. First, Aristotle’s mammoth History of Animals popularized what would later be
known as the Great Chain of Being (Lovejoy 1936)—a worldview that would inform the
ideas of innumerable thinkers, Christian and otherwise, until the late 19th and early 20th
centuries. Relatedly, Aristotle’s scientific worldview is also outmoded in being
comprehensively teleological, i.e., all development in nature is explained in terms of
realizing a pre-determined end state.
Aristotle believed that all things are composed of matter, which develops
purposively into different pre-configurations across the natural world. These
configurations are predetermined by a universal teleological principle (entelechy), which
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essentially defines “development” as the actualization of potential over time.41 Perhaps
the most central uniqueness claim in Aristotle’s work is that, unlike all other animals,
humans alone have considerable freedom to actualize their potential in a myriad of
different ways; humans possess this freedom by virtue of—and in line with—their
uniquely rational faculties, which allow for self-determination and self-improvement.
Humans alone possess abilities to master skills of their choosing as well as to learn
virtues and exercise moderation, which leads to the supreme good: happiness
(eudaimonia). On the heels of Alcmaeon’s assertion that humans were uniquely rational
animals, Aristotle made uniqueness and exceptionalism claims of understanding, belief,
deliberation, recollection, tool use, happiness, and many others—all of which are made
possible by the de facto potential of the human soul or psyche.
As the only pre-Aristotelian philosopher “to recognize higher and lower soul
parts” with the rational parts situated at the top (Solmsen 1955: 160), it was Plato who
first sketched hierarchies of ensouled organisms.42 The Aristotelian Great Chain of Being
is directly attributable to Plato’s project. However, it “fell to Aristotle to ‘naturalize’ the
scale of beings” (162, 164). Against Plato, Aristotle rejected metamorphosis as well as
the notion of an immortal soul, independent of material instantiation; Aristotle was an
anti-dualist through and through.43 He understood the soul as “substance in the sense of
the form of a natural body having life potentiality within it.”44 Combined, the parts of
soul function as an embodied, animating force whose capacities for outward expression
are determined by the physical limitations of the body through which it manifests itself.
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The reason why various species (including humans) differ from one another in their
perceptual and rational abilities boils down to facts about the complexity of their physical
or material constitution.
Though the word “mind” (nous) does not refer to anything metaphysical, it
nonetheless holds an awkward place in Aristotle’s animal psychology as an activity of the
rational soul, which is argued to be uniquely human. Animals do not lack minds so much
as they lack the ability to perform minded or mindful actions. For Aristotle, “knowledge
is an action of the body understood as a compound of form and matter: we say
that knowledge and understanding comes into existence as an act of the body’s
form. Mind is therefore what body does in an epistemic situation” (Mesaros 2014). The
technical question as to whether or not Aristotle attributes “mind” to animals probably
sounds more important than it actually is. First, the term did not have the same
connotations for the ancients as it does today;45 second, Aristotle himself says nothing
explicit about the presence or function of nous in animals, and, most importantly, third,
Aristotle did say a lot about the sense in which animals possess specific parts of the
human psychological framework, i.e., intentionality, memory, attention, and imagination.
All of these faculties are associated with parts of the soul shared with animals, and are
contrasted with those capacities denied to animals, i.e., belief (doxa),46 intellect (nous),47
and speech and reason (logos).48
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likely did not possess a term equivalent to modern notions of consciousness (Hamlyn 1968). There is a
wordy passage from Nicomachean Ethics (1170a29-b5) describing processes of self-awareness.
46 On the Soul 3.3, 428a19-24
47 Ibid. 1.2, 404b4-6.
48 On the Soul 3.3, 428a24; Eudaimon Ethics 2.8, 1224a27; Politics 7.13, 1332b5; Nicomachean Ethics 1.7,
1098a3-4; Parts of Animals 3.10, 433a12. I owe these footnotes to the meticulous research of Richard
Sorabji (1993: 14).
45

50
Aristotle distinguishes three types of souls or psyches, 49 which account for
different types of behaviors in human and non-human species. The nutritive psyche,
which is possessed by plants and animals alike, allows for metabolic, self-sustaining
functions of the body. Unlike plants, human and non-human animals also possess a
sensitive psyche, which allows for sentience, memory, desire, locomotion, and
imagination. Finally, only humans are said to possess the cognitive, rational psyche,
which—in addition to all the capacities granted by the lower parts of the soul—also
allows for belief, deliberation, understanding, speech, recollection, and so forth.
Occasionally, concepts in Aristotelian psychology are scaffolded in terms of this
hierarchy, i.e., imagination (phantasia) is a necessary condition for memory, but while
phantasia is very widespread in the animal kingdom,50 memory itself comes in degrees of
potency depending on the species in question, 51 and is a necessary condition for
recollection (mental time travel), which is uniquely human.52
It is clear, then, that Aristotle’s theories of animal psychology are largely predetermined by his overarching biological claim that humans are the only species to
possess the rational soul, which comes pre-packaged with a set of capacities that are de
facto off limits to all other species, regardless of whether their behavior appears strongly
indicative of those capacities. Contrary to Aristotle’s admirable stress on the role of
observation and open-mindedness in natural science, the basis of his views—which are in
this context closer to the Stoics—arguably begs the question, i.e., mental faculties are
determined a priori by Aristotle’s big-picture carving of the joints in nature.
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Aristotle’s commitment to drawing categorical distinctions between humans and
animals stems from the place where his psychology overlaps with his biology: his
hierarchical theory of the soul or psyche. Aristotle’s writings on animals are replete with
“his eagerness to classify states of mind on one side or the other of the perception/reason
frontier” (Sorabji 1993: 51). While Aristotle inherited this distinction from Alcmaeon and
Plato, its ubiquity within his discussions of animal psychology is attributable—at least in
part—to his a priori biological and psychological commitments about human uniqueness
in the animal kingdom. In Aristotelian biology, “different species had always been
separate from each other: there was no point in prehistory when their lines of
development converged” (Gilhus 2006: 39). Such is the case, of course, for human beings
in relation to other species. Similar to Plato’s worldview, the Aristotelian hierarchy of
souls is the foundation for Aristotle’s hierarchy of living beings, with rational animals
situated above non-rational animals and plants by virtue of their potential to achieve
happiness and lead a life of the mind.53
In spite of the fact that Aristotelian biology is antithetical to practically every
tenet of evolutionary theory (Greenwood 2015: 33), Aristotle’s account of biological
gradualism can sometimes come across as admirably contemporary. Aristotle relished in
the identification of continuities throughout nature, and he promoted scientific openmindedness by acknowledging (a) the existence of spaces where presently unseen
continuities may yet be found, and (b) that the size of gaps between different organisms
can appear differently depending on the point of comparison:
Hence nature passes from inanimate beings to animals little by little, so that, as a result of
the continuity (sunecheia), that which constitutes the border between them and the
middle of them escapes our notice. After inanimate beings come first the classes of
53
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plants. Among these, one differs from another in seeming to have more of a share of life,
and the entire class, compared with other bodies, seems almost animate, but compared
with animals, it appears inanimate. For the change from them to the animate is, as was
stated before, continuous.54

For Aristotle, as for contemporary thinkers, there are complex creatures and there are
relatively simple creatures; the physical differences in complexity between different
species are often so slight as to be imperceptible, and Aristotle is arguably instructing us
to keep an open mind because infinitesimal borders between species can often “escape
our notice.” Although this progressive approach to inquiry is in tension with Aristotle’s a
priori denial of a rational soul to animals, it explains why Aristotle had little interest in
positing exceptionalism claims about what other species lack, instead focusing on
uniqueness claims about how functionally similar behaviors in humans and animals can
have different causes, i.e., that “the possession of a rational soul does not set us radically
apart from animals, but simply reflects a difference in the ways in which our bodies
function in the world” (Steiner 2005: 76).
5.1 Aristotle in Crisis
Aristotle’s fascination with feats of animal behavior has rarely been rivaled in
intellectual history. In one of the most remarkable passages in History of Animals,
Aristotle anticipates Cheney and Seyfarth’s (1990) much-discussed studies of the
discriminatory alarm calls of vervet macaques—a species that produces distinctive vocal
signals to conspecifics in the presence of ground, tree, and aerial predators. Aristotle,
likewise, observes that pigeons vocalize differently when hawks attack from the sky and
hawks closer to ground, and elsewhere he describes avian communication in terms of
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“conveying information.”55 Aristotle also goes into some detail describing inky acts of
deception in cuttlefish and octopuses, as well as how cephalopods change color when
hunting.56 It is because of such observations that Aristotle felt it to be a monumental and
arduous philosophical exercise to deny rational faculties to animals.
Aristotle’s discussions of animal behavior began with a seemingly small,
idiosyncratic problem: how to account for the lack of belief and reason in animals
capable of intelligent behaviors. This problem snowballed into an issue of epic
philosophical proportions, namely, the need to thoroughly refine definitions not only of
belief and reason, but also of terms such as memory, concept, thought, intention,
attention, perception, and emotion. Sorabji’s (1993:7) claim that Aristotle provoked a
“crisis” is apt to describe this phenomenon; all concepts in the philosophy of mind were
“subject to shifting.”
Rather than treating animal minds as an eccentric subfield—as it was for much of
history, and largely remains so today—Aristotle believed that the philosophy of animal
minds needed to play an integral part in defining basic concepts and problems in the
philosophy of mind, ‘proper.’ Aristotle maintained that all instances of animal behavior
could be explained by means of a philosophical tool kit containing only two intimately
related instruments: imagination (phantasia) and sense perception, both belonging to the
general domain of the perceptual faculties, which must “compensatingly expanded” to
account for the denial of reason (7). Aristotle goes about his task of “expanding
perceptual content” by arguing—at times tacitly and other times explicitly—that humans
also largely navigate their environments by non-cognitive means, so we should not be
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terribly surprised that other species do as well. Aristotle was thus the first philosopher to
focus on the problem of distinguishing behaviors that are cognitively motivated from
behaviors motivated by non-cognitive means—the general impetus for what is now
referred to as the logical problem in contemporary animal minds research.
In critically evaluating this project, I explore the successes and failures of
Aristotle’s denial of belief to animals, the argumentative strategies implicit within his
complicated accounts of sense perception and phantasia, and his recognition of “traces”
and “resemblances” of rational capacities in some non-human animals.
5.2 Aristotle’s Denial of Belief to Animals
Unlike his account of reason,57 the discussion of belief in Aristotle’s philosophy
of mind uncharacteristically does not admit of any different kinds or types. The resulting
effect on his approach to comparative psychology is not positive. Similar to the Stoics,
Aristotle defines belief in terms of the highest of human abilities: assent (or persuasion)
and deliberation.58 For Aristotle, all individuals, including adult and infant humans, who
are unable to deliberate and consciously assent to propositional attitudes—or, more
specifically, consent to one propositional attitude over others—are likewise incapable of
forming beliefs. While surely many beliefs are formed this way, it follows that any
proposition arrived at without internal deliberation and assent would not rightly be called
a “belief” at all. Of the many differences between Aristotle and Plato, their definitions of
belief are among the most pronounced. Plato’s merging of perception and belief was so
inclusive that practically all animals could satisfy it; Aristotle’s definition, on the other
hand, is so exclusive that it is a reasonable critique to suggest that not even all humans
57
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can satisfy it,59 and even the most reflective of us hardly satisfies it very often. Perhaps it
should be the case that every belief that one possesses was originally—or at some point—
the subject of deliberation and persuasion, but this does not accurately account for
common sense ideas about how people often come to hold the beliefs they do.
Buckner (2013: 5) has dubbed this general criticism semantic anthropocentrism,
which “involves precisifying vaguely-defined psychological terms to human-level
ability.” Sorabji (1993: 6-8) likewise argues that if humans can form beliefs without this
deliberative process, then—permitting that some species navigate the world by means of
propositional attitudes, which Aristotle allows60—it seems that those animals should be
granted some minimal “unreflective” sense of belief, too. Hardly isolated to ancient
authors, this remains a relatively common critique of how concepts are too narrowly
defined in the contemporary animal minds literature. 61 Andrews (2002; 2015), for
instance, criticizes Donald Davidson’s (1982) popular argument that animals lack beliefs
along precisely these lines.
Davidson’s stance bears some resemblance to Aristotle’s own. Davidson argues,
first, that “in order to have a belief, it is necessary to have the concept of belief,” and
second, “that in order to have the concept of belief one must have language” (324).
According to Davidson, it is impossible to hold a single belief without also holding many
interrelated beliefs—a belief in X also means that one has beliefs about that belief, and
other beliefs about those beliefs, and so forth—which ultimately leads to uniquely human
situations in which beliefs clash with one another and must be worked out in deliberation.
Davidson contends that to have a concept of belief entails that one has more foundational
i.e., human “marginal cases,” such as those with severe mental disabilities from age or circumstance.
Described in the following section.
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concepts such as truth and falsity, as well as knowledge of the underlying existence of an
objective state of affairs that supersedes any false beliefs about the world. The way that
rational agents come to understand this state of affairs is through sharing a language.
Davidson also notes that when beliefs clash with one another, a sense of “surprise”
follows, and that animals also lack this feeling (326).
Like Davidson, Aristotle claims that animals lack language and speech, that
language is necessary for deliberation and assent/persuasion, and, although Aristotle does
grant a minimal sense of conceptual knowledge to animals, both Davidson and Aristotle
deny them the ability to form abstract concepts like belief. But the overlap is not nearly
as interesting as their differences, of which one is particularly significant in attempting to
explain complex animal behavior without rational faculties. Criticisms to the effect that
Davidson’s account of belief is too exclusive and/or guilty of semantic anthropocentrism
likewise apply to Aristotle,62 but Aristotle has another concept waiting in the wings—
which he assumes capable of serving the same function—to take its place: phantasia.
5.3 Phantasia: Propositional Perception without Belief
When Aristotle chose to deny belief to animals, he needed to create an account of
the perceptual faculties that differed radically from those before him. First, Aristotle
understood that when humans and other animals are engaging in the myriad of activities
that make up their daily lives, e.g., hunting, playing, fearing, nursing, and so forth, these
experiences are not made up a series of isolated, singular perceptions. Unlike Plato,63
Aristotle writes of perception in multi-modal terms wherein several senses function
concurrently to discern salient features of the environment thus making a “unity out of
62
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several images.” 64 Second, in Aristotle’s philosophy of mind “perception” does not
merely refer to the classic five senses, but also to memories of previous experiences and
the unconscious ability to discriminate between types and qualities, e.g., different colors,
speeds, amounts, weights, distances, and temperatures. 65 Consider, for example, the
macaque that uses his four limbs and prehensile tail to rapidly brachiate through the
forest, skillfully avoiding unsupportive branches and perilous jumps that exceed his
strength. Third, as Sorabji (1993: 12) puts it, for Aristotle, animals do not merely
perceive; they always perceive that such and such in the case; sense data is always
“connected” to—or “predicated” by—a given “subject or a direction” in the environment.
Whereas Plato and the Stoics ascribe properties such as “likeness” and “difference” to the
realm of reason, these properties are “consciously treated by Aristotle as yet further
objects of perception” (17).66 Steiner (2005: 64) elaborates: “sensation has the character
of intentionality, that is, it does not simply receive pixels of color, discrete bits of sound,
and the like, but is directed toward objects of attention, and is directed toward them as
such.” The associative nature of perception grants this web of perceptual capacities a
propositional component, i.e., animals and humans alike perceive that X is larger than Y,
and—crucially—they do not require the belief that X is larger than Y in order to
experience and navigate the world that way.
Aristotle thus recognizes animals and humans alike as constantly engaging in a
form of “propositional perceiving” (Sorabji 1993: 18). This is not a radical or uncommon
interpretation. Martha Nussbaum (1978: 42) likewise makes note of Aristotle’s
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willingness to describe all forms of perception as a fundamental means of “saying” to the
perceiver that objects or conspecifics are frightful or desirable, etc.67 In the Nicomachean
Ethics, for instance, Aristotle has no trouble ascribing the proposition “it is near” to a lion
that is about to make dinner of an ox: “Nor does the lion delight in the lowing of the ox,
but in eating it; but he perceived by the lowing that it was near, and therefore appears to
delight in the lowing; and similarly he does not delight because he sees a stag or a wild
goat, but because he is going to make a meal of it.”68 Propositional perceiving, then,
appears to involve some functionally analogous capacity for anticipation, allowing
certain species a marginal ability to expect future events—not quite by foresight (which
Aristotle waffles on but ultimately denies to animals69) but perhaps by feeling hungry and
associating the mental image (phantasma) of an “absent perceptible” (Moss 2012), such
as the taste of flesh, with the image of live prey in their field of vision. This
“anticipatory” process need not be as complicated as it sounds, e.g., consider the “psychic
secretions” of Ivan Pavlov’s (1849—1936) dogs in his pioneering experiments in
classical conditioning (1927), where association is viewed as a basis for anticipation.
The notion of propositional perceiving is controversial.70 More important than the
details themselves, however, is Aristotle’s rationale for attributing propositional attitudes
to animals in the first place. Why does Aristotle not take the simpler, Davidsonian
position—shared by the Stoics—that propositional content requires belief? Presumably
because he felt that doing so would exacerbate rather than ameliorate explanatory crises
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of human exceptionalism. Aristotle’s robust account of perception does, after all, avoid
the gap in Davidson’s paper: if animals do not have the ability to form beliefs, then what
comparable (or, as Aristotle prefers, analogous) capacity do they possess? On this point, I
share the sentiment behind Victor Caston’s (2011: 34) rhetorical question in support of
Aristotle: “If animals perceive particulars without perceiving them as anything, how are
we to explain how animals pursue or avoid the sorts of things they should?”
Having sketched the basics of Aristotle’s notion of propositional perceiving, I turn
now to the key perceptual capacity granted to animals: phantasia.71 Phantasia is amongst
the most debated terms in Aristotle’s works, so needless to say the intent of the following
discussion is narrow. My focus is restricted to critically discussing one interpretation of
why Aristotle introduced the notion of phantasia to begin with, which is to deal with the
explanatory crisis evoked by denying belief to animals. Despite Aristotle’s outmoded
insistence that all capacities must be neatly divided into the perceptual and the rational
(with phantasia belonging in the former), on my view, phantasia is nonetheless intended
to fill the gap between perception and reason by stretching the limits of the former as far
as possible, not only for animals, but for humans as well. Much of the nuance in
Aristotle’s animal psychology absent in later philosophers ultimately boils down to the
immense burden that Aristotle places on this term—instead of instinct—to account for
intelligent-looking behaviors in the animal kingdom.
Aristotle introduces the term phantasia to explain how propositional perceiving is
possible, not only in humans, but in other species. Phantasia should be thought of as the
capacity responsible for transforming raw sense data into a “noncomposite sense of
71
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something as something” (Steiner 2005: 67). The notion of phantasia thus carries with it
a pronounced phenomenological quality, which gives perception an intentional dimension
that is subjective and/or relative to the biology and prior experiences of the species or
individual in question. Aristotle sometimes writes that phantasia is a capacity that all
animals possess72 (though he sometimes wavers on this point73), that capacities directly
associated with phantasia such as memory and concept formation arise in degrees
(Lorenz 2007: 175), and that—as a phenomenological concept—phantasia manifests
itself differently across the animal kingdom due to the subjective character that it grants
to experience (Duque 2013:16). I propose that one of the most frustrating and natural
questions about phantasia: what are its precise roles in (animal) cognition? may be
indicative of Aristotle’s progressive attitude that there is much that remains obscure and
mysterious about the content of animal minds. 74 While phantasia is without doubt a
puzzling and problematic concept, it was not the brainchild of a dogmatist.
It is common to translate phantasia as “imagination” or “impression,” though
Sorabji (1993: 15, 18) prefers “perceptual appearance,” which is “a sort of thinking
(noêsis, noein)” that “covers both […] perceptual and post-perceptual appearance”—with
the latter entailing both memories and dreams. In my estimation, none of these
translations are particularly helpful. The best way to introduce the idea is that, like Plato
before him,75 Aristotle associates phantasia with the verb “to appear” or “to bring to
light,”76 as in, the perceptual appearance that the sun is extremely small.77 Arguably the
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main reason that Aristotle introduces the concept is to account for how errors in
perception such as this are possible (Caston 1996: 21), but in addition, phantasia likewise
purports to explain how animals successfully navigate the world without beliefs. Simply
put, when a human or animal perceives a given object P that has been the subject of
previous experience, the qualities originally associated with P (e.g., tasty, slow, docile)
automatically become part and parcel of future perceptions of P, i.e., rather than the
predator holding beliefs about these things, the ox appears as tasty, slow, and docile to
the predator. That is, unless this perception comes to be challenged by a fast and
powerful ox, whereby the appearance is deceptive.
Aristotle thus attempts to draw a functional equivalence between (a) the role
played by phantasia in perception and (b) the role of true and false beliefs in practice—
the main difference being that “every belief implies conviction, conviction implies being
persuaded, and persuasion implies reason; some beasts have imagination (phantasia), but
none reason.” 78 According to Aristotle, “imagination [phantasia] is different from
assertion and denial” because “truth and falsity involve a combination of thoughts,”79 of
which animals are incapable. Aristotle is thus in agreement with Davidson that belief
requires an interrelated network of propositional attitudes whose veracity can be
confirmed. By attempting to provide a tertium quid between perception and reason,
Aristotle’s notion of phantasia offers somewhat of a compromise between the
Stoic/Davidsonian view and Plato’s proposal for merging perception and belief.
It is evident that phantasia can ameliorate some the concerns raised above with
respect to Aristotle’s uncharacteristically parochial definition of belief. Sorabji (1993: 68)
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perhaps has a point that, “ideally,” Aristotle “should have identified a lower class of
unreflective beliefs” in dealing with animal minds—surely such a distinction would have
been natural for him. Aristotle does, after all, distinguish calculative phantasia from
sensitive phantasia,80 the point being “that rationality has downward effects on how the
faculty of phantasia functions” (Duque 2013). Both forms play the central role of
creating propositional content out of sense perception, but only in its uniquely human
calculative variety is this content subject to truth conditions and deliberation. Humans
and animals both navigate the world and make perceptual mistakes by virtue of
phantasia, but only humans possess the additional cognitive equipment to reflect upon
these appearances, consciously compare them with past appearances, and form beliefs as
to whether they are properly true or false representations of the world, uniquely
understood as a space of objectivity.81
Another crisis or challenge to be addressed in denying belief to animals is that,
like many philosophers, Aristotle claims that beliefs play a significant role in motivating
(human) behavior. Since Aristotle never claims that, in the absence of belief, all
motivations for animal behavior stem from a single “general principle” such as instinct
(the Stoic view), what motivates the behavior of animals? Phantasia is made to fill this
role as well, for it is the source of all desires and mental images (phantasmata) in sentient
beings.82 In addition to describing the biological functions of phantasia as distinguishing
beneficial features of the environment from threatening ones, or, pleasurable things from
painful things, Moss (2012: 62) notes how it also makes possible the ability by which,
with the aid of mental images, animals are motivated to go out in search of desirable
Ibid. 3.3, 433b27-30
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82 On the Soul 3.8, 432a11-13
80

81

63
objects not presently in view. Despite the fact that animals cannot form or recognize false
beliefs, they very often learn from errors in perception and then use that information to
modify latter behavior by means of memory (which also fall under the domain of
phantasia). Think of the learning curve mastered by brachiating monkeys or, for an even
better example, consider learned tool use in wild chimpanzees (Goodall 1971). The
chimpanzee may not have beliefs about hammers, anvils, or nuts, but she can learn that
not all rocks make desirable tools, discern the rocks that will fulfill this function, and then
seek out these objects beyond her immediate perception to satisfy her desires to eat and
feed her young.
According to Aristotle, practically all animals possess memory to a basic degree,
“some” animals have better capacities for memory than others, and in the smaller number
of species for whom memories “remain” over long periods, the rudiments of concept
formation arise, which are also not unique to humans.83 Aristotle is able to argue this
because, recalling his general strategy for dealing with the crisis, Aristotle “downgrades”
several human abilities to the realm of perception in order to grant them to animals, while
still supporting the many uniqueness claims that follow from the idea that only humans
are rational beings. This is especially evident when Aristotle argues that memory is not
part of the rational psyche:
Hence not only human beings and the beings which possess opinion or intelligence, but
also certain other animals, possess memory. If memory were a function of the thinking
parts, it would not have been an attribute of many of the other animals, but probably, in
that case, no mortal beings would have had memory; since, even as the case stands, it is
not an attribute of them all, just because all have not the faculty of perceiving time.84

This is an example of Aristotle at his most nuanced when distinguishing human and
animal minds. Note how carefully Aristotle considers the line between whether memory
83
84
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is a rational faculty or not. It seems intuitive to him that memory appears to be a rational
faculty belonging only to humans, but if this were the case—Aristotle reasons—and
every single use of memory involved sophisticated recollection, then such a theory would
falsely grant humans cognitive powers beyond what he thinks capable of them, as well as
overlook the fact that memory seems to function in relatively unsophisticated ways in
humans and animals alike, e.g., in distinguishing healthy from poisonous fruits from past
experience. Because animals cannot “perceive time” and recall memories at will, all of
their memories appear as phantasma triggered by one’s present experience, and thus
constitute the sorts of mental states that stimulate behavior and make learning by
experience possible. There is a mentalistic difference between Aristotle’s account of
experiential learning and, for instance, stimulus-response views of trial-and-error learning
held by the Stoics and popularized in later centuries (Boakes 1984: 71).
Although recollection is uniquely human due to the physical constitution of our
species, Aristotle does seem to be suggesting that, just as humans use phantasia more
often than beliefs in their daily lives, so too do humans use the phantasma of “simple
memory” more often than they do active recollection; neither phantasia (as a stand-in for
belief) nor phantasma (as a basic component of recollection) are categorically different
from their expression in other species. To the contrary, the various functions of phantasia
exist on a spectrum with most other species on earth. Aristotle claims, for instance, that
the intelligence of animals varies in relation to their differing capacities for memory,85
i.e., that the better an animal’s memory, the “more intelligent and apt at learning” they
are,86 not only because it aids discriminatory abilities, but also because memory comes
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part and parcel with “the faculty of perceiving time.”87 Elsewhere, Aristotle comments on
degrees of vivacity of memories between humans and other species, making the first
uniqueness claim for episodic memory in the history of philosophy, i.e., only humans
possess memories akin to “a single experience.”88 This seems to imply a deep reflective
ability to recall vivid experiences (i.e., “autonoetic consciousness” [Tulving 2005: 5])
involving multiple senses in specific life-contexts. This point further attests to the
subjective experiences granted by phantasma.
Phantasia is therefore not just another capacity functioning alongside reason;
phantasia is an essential prerequisite for the “development” of the rational faculties such
as technical skill and understanding, which are described as only possible at the peak of
perceptual scaffolding.89 Aristotle is not a continuity theorist; this development only takes
place in human beings because, by virtue of entelechy, we are the only species in
possession of the requisite physical potential. Nonetheless, it is obvious that many of the
building blocks of the rational faculties are found within phantasia (memory and concept
formation being the most prominent). While this does not entail cognitive continuity,
Aristotle finds genuine continuity between humans and animals in perceptual and
physical capacities, and almost certainly viewed some non-human species as possessing
“higher” capacities than others, i.e., cognitive variation in nature.
5.4 Phantasia Problematized
Of phantasia, Aristotle writes the following: “We must then have some capacity,
but not such as to be superior to [understanding] in accuracy. And it evidently belongs to
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all animals. For they have an innate discriminative capacity which is called
perception.”90 The explanatory potential of phantasia is progressive insofar as Aristotle
offers reasonable grounds for complicating the barrier between perceptual and rational
faculties; recognition that parts of the former can bear functional relationships with parts
of the latter is essential in discussions of uniqueness claims. Yet there is good reason to
be skeptical as to how successful Aristotle’s attempt to mitigate explanatory crises of
human exceptionalism by these means really is.
Aristotle’s claim that propositional perception is near-ubiquitous in the animal
kingdom is difficult to accept. There is good reason to challenge the view that the
“ability to represent absent perceptibles” (Moss 2012) is as common among non-human
species as Aristotle believes. The same can be said of what Lorenz (2007) argues to be
one of the fundamental roles of phantasia: “envisaging prospective situations.” Like
Moss, Lorenz believes that—according to Aristotle—in order for locomotion to be
possible, animals need an imaginative capacity to motivate that behavior. The obvious
problems with Lorenz’s view are, first, that locomotion can be readily explained without
positing the use of mental imagery to envision a desired future situation,91 and second,
that it is almost certainly a stretch to attribute this capacity to the vast majority of species
in the animal kingdom. As noted above, Aristotle himself claims that having a
“perception of time”—which is presumably necessary to envisage prospective
situations—is extremely rare in the animal kingdom, likely belonging only to humans.
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For all the explanatory virtues of Aristotle’s account, it is ironic that the greater
number of species whose behavior can be explained in terms of phantasia, the more
nebulous this idea ultimately becomes. Simply put, phantasia is Aristotle’s way for
accounting for all (or most) animal behavior in all (or most) animals, however the fact
that Aristotle never tells us where to draw the line between those species that possess
phantasia and those that do not (e.g., do insects have phantasia?) has great bearing on the
meaning of the term itself. 92 If spiders have phantasia, then Aristotle is stuck in a
situation where he must use the rudiments of arachnoid cognition to explain the behavior
of dolphins and great apes.
In what is arguably the best modern interpretation of phantasia, Victor Caston
(1996, 1998, 2011) casts his interpretive net more broadly, emphasizing the subjective
nature of phantasia and arguing that it should be conceived in terms of how “echoes”
(phantasmata) of prior experiences aid in the formation of what Aristotle calls “primitive
universals” 93 thus motivating behavior on the basis of how certain features of an
environment stand out as X. According to Caston (1996: 292), phantasia gives Aristotle
“a plausible psychology for animals, who are capable of learning from past experience
and misrepresentation even without a conceptual apparatus like our own.” This too
invites a problem. The idea that phantasia involves the “unification of many images,”
both past and present, to identify kinds of things in the world from which to generate
propositional attitudes toward, does seem to come close to asserting that animals can
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form concepts (even if they are not aware of them). But the ability to form concepts is a
capacity that, at least on one occasion, Aristotle explicitly denies to animals.94
Aristotle’s struggles to attribute a rudimentary conceptual apparatus to animals is
yet another example of the crisis that Sorabji writes of, i.e., how can one come to
recognize all Ps as Qs (e.g., rocks as hard) or all Rs as better than Ns (grapes taste better
than cucumbers) without the seemingly cognitive capacity to form concepts like P, Q, R,
and N? Caston (1998) believes that it is through phantasia that humans and animals like
can identify “kinds and types” without possessing concepts of those general categories,
but by grasping what he calls indefinite singular content:
A phantasma, then, would be about a token of determinate sensible type, without being
about any token in particular, in much the same way I can promise you a horse, without
there being any horse in particular which I am promising you. (289-290).

Thus, on Caston’s interpretation of phantasia, this is how Aristotle can explain the means
by which a cat—for instance—can set about hunting rats without the direct experience of
any particular rat (290-291). The hungry, hunting cat is experiencing similar mental states
as if the rat was right in front of her, but despite the cause of these phantasma not being
any particular rat, the mental state nonetheless has a comparable effect as if this was
actually the case (this is why Aristotle also lumps dream states in with phantasia). The
phantasmal “echoes” of the rat image do not have to be actively brought to mind (as only
humans are capable of doing); instead, phantasia functions passively (or unconsciously)
on the basis of previous experiences with particular rats. Joel Yurdin (2009: 81) offers a
similar account of phantasia based on what he calls “non-specific representations.”
A reasonable critique of interpreting phantasia in this way is that such accounts
are both unnecessary and too vague to perform their explanatory roles.95 The challenge
94
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for evoking “indefinite” or “non-specific” representations to explain animal behavior lies
in providing an account of how images can function as proxies when categorizing objects
as parts of a common class. As George Berkeley (1685—1753) critiqued John Locke’s
(1632—1704) notion of “abstract general ideas,”96 it is unclear whether a mental image
can be anything but a particular; images possess definite content, and it is far from
obvious whether (or how) an image of a particular rat can serve as a mental
representation of all rats.97 To explain the cat’s hunting behavior, associative learning
might suffice, i.e., the feeling of hunger triggers a specific rat image, without anything
approximating abstract classification or conceptualization going on.
Caston’s account of phantasia ultimately suffers the same fate as those of Moss
and Lorenz: Aristotle wants phantasia to apply across the vast majority of the animal
kingdom, and there is no reason to believe—in Aristotle’s time as in our own—that all
(or most) animal minds are capable of conceiving of the world in terms of primitive
universals comprised of indefinite singular content. There is another option. If phantasia
is simply a form of induction based on association, then mollusks might be said to
possess it, as they can be classically conditioned.98 Yet while defining phantasia as a
capacity that arises in degrees “all the way down” to relatively simple animals might get
us closer to the breadth of application that Aristotle had in mind, doing so might also be
to abandon the phenomenological aspect so crucial to his account, i.e., phantasma arise
as traces or echoes of sensations. Perhaps not, however, as the contemporary literature on
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animal consciousness is becoming open-minded to ascribing subjective experiences to
insects and even the ancient sea creatures in possession of the first nervous systems.99
The lesson to be adopted from these critiques of Lorenz, Moss, and Caston, is that
whatever the “defining feature” of phantasia is, it cannot be too sophisticated, but in its
relative simplicity it must nonetheless be robust enough to account for the presence of
sophisticated abilities. Phantasia must at once underlie practically all animal behavior,
somewhat like the core of a Russian Doll, however—continuing this metaphor—the
definitions offered by Moss and Lorenz seem more at home among the doll’s outer
layers. Unlike later philosophers and scientists after him, including the Stoics, Aristotle
should be commended for not resorting to some vague notion of instinct to fill this role,
choosing instead to work within a conceptual framework—puzzling as it may be—that
highlights foundational intersections between human and animal minds.
6. The Crisis Naturalized: Traces, Resemblances, and Analogies
Another strategy that Aristotle uses to deal with explanatory crises arising from
denying reason and belief to animals is to grant “traces” (ichnē) of human temperaments
to other species and, in a surprising turn, “resemblances of understanding (suneseōs)”
which “are in many [animals], just as we spoke of with respect to bodily parts.” 100
Intellectual capacities such as sagacity and understanding are said to have “likenesses”
(homoiotētēs) in the animal kingdom in the sense that other species can possess them “by
analogy”101 with human understanding (Sorabji 1995: 12-14). In this section, I defend the
following two points, both of which testify to Aristotle’s relatively progressive approach
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to defending discontinuity hypotheses. (1) Grasping why Aristotle prefers the phrase “by
analogy with” is illuminating with respect to explaining why there are very few
exceptionalism claims in Aristotle, despite his many uniqueness claims. (2) “By analogy”
is Aristotle’s way of asserting that human and animal intellectual capacities can differ in
kind while still being functionally analogous. Combined, these points are indicative of
Aristotle’s naturalism: although Aristotle defends a Great Chain of Being among species,
his worldview of mental capacities in the animal kingdom is one of great variation and
overlap, dictated by the ecological demands of species, rather than natural superiority.
Instead of claiming that—despite appearances to the contrary—animals lack
rational capacities, Aristotle claims that, in such cases, human and non-human species
“differ by being analogous,” since “just as there are in humans technological skill
(technê), wisdom (sophia) and understanding (sunesis), so there is some different (hetera)
natural capacity (dunamis) of the kind in some of the animals.”102 In my estimation, this
is one of the most remarkable and telling sentences in History of Animals. The key phrase
here is “of the kind,” which I take to refer to unknown capacities that fill analogous
functional roles to the uniquely human capacities just listed. Mesaros (2014) shares this
interpretation, suggesting that this sentence “means that there could be other capacities
that count for animals as mind [...] to the same extent that count as mind to humans.” If
this reading is correct, then Aristotle is acknowledging that other animals have their own
unique capacities that are appropriate to navigate the problems of their own
environments—often in ways analogous to problems that we face in our own, i.e., “as A
is to B so some other C is to D” (Sorabji 1993: 14). That other species possess capacities
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functionally analogous to reason is a rare claim for an ancient philosopher, and is clearly
provoked by the explanatory crisis motivating this dissertation.
The underlying idea is quite subtle. Aristotle employs the same philosophical
attitude present in his discussions of phantasia, namely: the fact that animals lack these
human capacities is not as interesting or important as the fact that they possess other
capacities that are analogous, i.e., that serve the same general function. As such, I posit
that while both “kind” and “by analogy” are similarly used to deny human capacities to
animals, the latter allows the important connotation that human capacities are not
exceptional in relation to like-abilities of animals; they just serve different purposes.103
This reading is given additional weight by the fact that Aristotle believed—in contrast to
the “all or nothing” account of mental faculties defended by the Stoics, Christians, and
Cartesians—that “some characteristics differ in a ‘more or less’ relationship with human
beings, as does man in comparison with animals (for some of these characteristics are
present in a greater degree in humans, and some in other animals).”104
Indeed, Aristotle rarely makes claims to the effect that human capacities are
superior to those found in other species, and when he does make exceptionalism claims,
he most often does so in a spirit far removed from that of his contemporaries. To
demonstrate this, consider the following example of an exceptionalism claim in Aristotle:
Nature does nothing to no end, and man alone of the animals has speech. Now, the voice
is the indicator of the painful and the pleasurable, because of which it exists in the other
animals as well, for their nature is advanced to the point that they have the sensation of
pain and pleasure and signal these to one another. Speech, however, exists to indicate the
advantageous and the harmful, and thus likewise the just and the unjust: this is one
special characteristic of human beings, in contrast to the other animals, that they alone
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have perception of the good and the bad and the just and the unjust, as of other things as
well, and the common possession of these things creates a household and a state.105

Aristotle is drawing a distinction between “signals” and “speech” (or elsewhere,
“voice”106) the latter being not only unique, but “special” to humans, while the former is
nonetheless a fairly advanced insofar as other species can usefully communicate a range
of emotions to conspecifics. The basis of this exceptionalism claim is Aristotle’s
naturalism, wherein “theories of psychological functions must be constrained by theories
of their material instantiation” (Greenwood 2015: 36), rather than an overarching belief
in human exceptionalism.
This is clear in Aristotle’s discussions of linguistic abilities across the animal
kingdom. Aristotle’s distinctions between those species that only “hear sounds” and those
that “distinguish the differences between the signs,”107 as well as those that are capable of
“voice” versus those capable of “speech” (only humans), are matched by descriptions of
the physical capacities of the animals in question, e.g., the human tongue “is the freest,
the broadest, and the softest of all” thereby granting humans the ability to “articulate the
various sounds and to produce speech.” 108 Likewise, whereas birds are capable of
“conveying information” to one another—the parrot in particular being “humantongued” 109 —cows lack this level of articulation. 110 Elsewhere, Aristotle claims that
animals do not possess speech because they lack the cognitive ability to understand
symbols.111 The capacity for speech “does not rise, in Aristotle’s view, to the level of
language because words are not involved in the process. Words must arise from an
Politics 1253a9-18 [emphasis added]
Parts of Animals 2.17, 660a35-660b2.
107 History of Animals, 8, 608a20-21.
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agreement on the part of those who use them as to their meanings—that is, words are a
matter of convention, and such agreement lies outside the scope of non-human intellect”
(Newmyer 2011: 61 [emphasis added]).
Aristotle sees fit to add an exceptionalism claim to this uniqueness claim because
human societies are, in his view, capable of more advanced forms of communication and
organization than the social units of other animals (who, lacking language, have no idea
of justice). Contrast the tone of this exceptionalism claim with Stoic philosopher Philo
the Jew (c. 20 BCE—50 CE) who argues that while various species of birds produce
“different kinds of utterances” they are “meaningless and insignificant” and, as such, “are
not so much real expressions […] as they are chirps.”112 For the Stoics, animals lack
speech due to “an imperfection identified in the animal soul” (Newmyer 2011: 60). The
contrast between this attitude and the passage cited above from Parts of Animals where
Aristotle attributes “some information conveyed”113 in bird communication is stark.
Even the exceptionalism claim underlying Aristotle’s appreciation of human
social life, i.e., “is a characteristic of man that he alone has any sense of good and evil, of
just and unjust, and the like,” 114 must be taken in context with the points I’ve been
making all along. While Aristotle grants unique capacities to humans, (1) not all humans
develop these capacities, (2) many animals have “resemblances” and “traces” of them,
and (3) even in their simple forms, these capacities should be understood as scaffolding
for more developed human abilities, rather than radically different from them. While
Aristotle does claim that humans alone possess the moral competence to form just
societies, in the same text, he also claims that social instinct comes in gradations across
On Animals 98
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the animal kingdom 115 and that many animals possess degrees of practical wisdom
(phronesis) and the ability to learn from others. 116 So while Sorabji is correct that
“Aristotle’s gradualism in biology is carefully qualified so that it allows for a sharp
intellectual distinction between animal and man,” I am suggesting that there are reasons
to complicate—though not deny—Sorabji’s (1993: 13) additional claim that Aristotle
“carefully applies his gradualism to temperaments, not to intellect.”117
Unlike what I later describe as the token “singularity of causation” endemic to
Stoic and Christian attitudes toward animal behavior, by using the phrase “by analogy,”
Aristotle may be suggesting that each animal should be compared with humans
individually and in relation to their own unique set of skills, the causes of which not
always being evident to human observers. Consider Aristotle’s curiosity about the
“calculations” of dolphins in contrast to those of human divers:
[The dolphin] appears to be the fleetest of all animals, marine and terrestrial, and it can
leap over the masts of large vessels. This is chiefly manifested when they are pursuing a
fish for food; then, if the fish endeavours to escape, they pursue him in their hunter
down to deep waters; but, when the return swim is getting too long, they hold in their
breathe, as if (hôsper analogisamenoi) calculating the length of it, and then draw
themselves together and shoot up like arrows, trying to make the long ascent rapidly in
order to breathe. […] The same phenomenon is observed in divers, when they have
plunged into deep water; that is, they pull themselves together and rise with a speed
proportional to their strength.118

Why as if (hôsper analogisamenoi) the dolphins are calculating? Presumably
because the relationship between Aristotle’s biological claims (regarding human
uniqueness) and his psychological claims (about the parts of the soul) provide
unsatisfactory a priori answers to intriguing questions such as these. Unfortunately, these
de facto assumptions are the only grounds Aristotle has to argue that dolphins do not
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make rudimentary calculations. There is a silver lining to this criticism. Note Aristotle’s
claim that the “same phenomenon” is observed in human divers. Although only humans
truly make calculations, Aristotle is suggesting that the dolphins are doing something
analogous, presumably by means of a combination of phantasia and practical wisdom
(phronesis), and that the behavioral result is essentially identical.
Aristotle thus conceives the Great Chain of Being as consistent with cognitive
variation in nature that is not neatly hierarchical. Most often, the form taken by
Aristotle’s uniqueness and exceptionalism claims is the following: animals possess X and
Y, but only humans have Z (which owes its presence to X and Y); however, animals may
possess perceptual faculty Q (typically some function of phantasia) which is functionally
analogous to Z. Rational capacities are not only scaffolded atop perceptual capacities; the
latter can occasionally (to use Aristotle’s words) “more or less” perform the functions of
the former. The lines he draws between species typically boil down to animals possessing
some (or most) of these layers, but not the top one, which is the result of the material
constitution of human beings which gives them heightened potential for a wider range of
behaviors. As a result of his naturalism, Aristotle “implicitly recognizes that the
possession of rational soul in human beings does not distinguish them in a cosmically
absolute sense from animals, but distinguishes them only be degree” (Steiner 2005: 76).
Aristotle is not claiming that all humans are superior to all non-humans by virtue of some
cosmic privilege they have been granted in the universe. Aristotle thought that some
humans are less intelligent than animals, despite their physical potential of the rational
part and types of behaviors in the animal kingdom.119 Aristotle’s views on ontogeny can
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thus hardly be called speciesist.120 Not only each species—but also each member of each
species—has its own physical potential that can either live up to or fail to do so.121
Aristotle’s theories are not always scientifically motivated; nor are they free of
dogmatic assertions and problematic forms of argumentation that, ironically, close off
empirical solutions to questions about potential continuities between animal and human
capacities that Aristotle himself was in a privileged position to investigate. Returning to
the dolphin example, this criticism is most applicable to Aristotle’s consistent use of as if
rhetoric to deny cognitive capacities to animals whose behavior suggests either that (a)
they do possess the capacity in question, or, (b) that in the absence of explanations to the
contrary, the claim that they possess the capacity to some degree may be a reasonable
hypothesis for empirical and/or philosophical investigation.
As if rhetoric can be found throughout much of Book 6 of History of Animals.122
Of course, there is nothing inherently wrong with as if claims of this sort; it is clear that it
can be useful, for instance, to guard against hasty anthropomorphic attributions. The
problems only start arising when the rhetoric itself does all the heavy lifting and closes
off open-minded attitudes towards the possibility that a given capacity may not be
uniquely human after all. For instance, in an evocative discussion of emotional
expression in animals, Aristotle describes a scene of adult dolphins behaving “as if” they
are mourning a dead infant—a passage that bears resemblance to observations in recent
books on animal emotions.123 My point is not that Aristotle is wrong to be skeptical, but
that it is difficult to tell whether he is skeptical or if he is dogmatically rejecting the very
120
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idea that dolphins are capable of this human behavior. There is some reason to believe
that the latter view is Aristotle’s position here. As with Aristotle’s de facto denial of
calculation to all animals, he also denies animals some human emotions entirely. For
instance, Aristotle claims that, “we call the lower animals neither temperate nor selfindulgent except by a metaphor” due to the fact that “these have no power of choice or
calculation.”124 As with the Stoic Seneca after him, Aristotle believed that animals were
incapable of fear, which requires belief,125 so when we observe animals that appear to be
in fear—like being courageous—we can only say they are “except by a metaphor.”126
Perhaps Aristotle felt the same way about apparent instances of mourning in dolphins. In
any event, there is no reason to believe that Aristotle is suspending judgment on the
question. The difference between instances where Aristotle uses “by analogy” and those
where he uses “by metaphor” 127 is that, in the former, Aristotle is granting that the
species in question possesses a capacity that fills the same basic function as the one
possessed by humans, where in the later, Aristotle seems to be suggesting a strict
difference in kind with no “traces” of the human capacity being present.
Taking stock, there are times when Aristotle makes progressive use of rhetorical
tropes such as trace, resemblance, and by analogy to deal with the problems of
anthropomorphism, but Aristotle’s rhetoric can be problematic in a number of ways. At
its most innocent, Aristotle “repeatedly employs phrases such as ‘just as’ and ‘somewhat
like’ to compare human and animal capacities, which tends to blur meaning” (Newmyer
2011: 8). At its most detrimental, in spite of his willingness to downplay the cognitive
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nature of human capacities in order to explain animal behavior, Aristotle was the first of a
long line of philosophers to rely upon rhetorical tropes to claim that although some
animals act as if they possess capacity X, they are not really behaving how they appear
to be behaving, because X is strictly defined in relation to a set of behaviors indicative of
X when humans do X (Sorabji 1993: 14; Newmyer 2011: 7; Steiner 2005: 72). I critiqued
this strategy alongside Aristotle’s rationale for claiming that beliefs are uniquely human
on the basis of confabulating the criteria necessary to satisfy the concept “belief” to a
level higher than seems necessary.
7. Final Thoughts on Aristotle
At his best, Aristotle remains a model of how to how to responsibly posit and
defend uniqueness claims. This is because he appreciated—and consciously wrestled
with—the challenges that arise from doing so, in particular: the more capacities we deny
to animals, the harder it becomes to explain complex behaviors in animals that, when
performed by humans, might be deemed cognitively motivated. I have paid particular
attention to Aristotle’s forward-thinking strategy for dealing with these challenges, i.e.,
that of downplaying the cognitive nature of human capacities such as belief, memory, and
conceptual and propositional knowledge, in order to more readily explain how there is
considerable overlap between human and non-human behavioral repertoires. Phantasia
and rhetorical tropes such as trace, resemblance, and analogy, are indicative of
Aristotle’s “sensitivity to the complexity of animal behavior, the difficulties involved in
thinking the boundary [sic] between human and animal, and perhaps even the potential
inadequacy of seizing upon rationality as the dividing line between human beings and
animals” (Steiner 2015: 75).
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Aristotle rarely professes to have concrete answers to what, for instance, is really
going on inside the mind of the dolphin who seemingly calculates the timing of her dives,
and while he claims that the human diver has the capacity to calculate his remaining
breath, Aristotle never claims that the diver always does this. The phrase “by analogy”
seems to function as Aristotle’s way of suspending judgment on such matters. While it is
unlikely that the dolphin and the human are doing quite the same thing when they
perform the complex behaviors necessary for successful deep-sea dives, and while
Aristotle does say that calculation is a uniquely human faculty, crucially, Aristotle is also
suggesting that just because the human can calculate her behaviors, (1) the “experienced”
diver—like the dolphin—may not need to calculate them, (2) the human diver is not the
superior diver to the dolphin (quite the contrary, recall, as Aristotle himself claims), and
(3) nor is the implication that dolphins do nothing like calculating when they dive.
Aristotle never explicitly states that dolphins lack an ability to calculate, he states that
dolphins lack the human ability to calculate.
Though often outmoded and flawed, the singular means by which Aristotle
grappled with uniqueness claims set a high watermark that very few philosophers until
the 19th and 20th centuries were able to match. Due to his naturalistic convictions and
general scientific attitude, “Aristotle kept an open mind on most theoretical matters. He
emphasized that his own theoretical contributions were provisional and based upon the
limited development of the sciences of his day and that the last court of appeal for any
theory was observation” (Greenwood 2015: 30). I have argued that Aristotle’s attitudes
toward animal minds in his zoological works also generally fit this description. The
tragedy of the dominant tradition is that while the Stoics and Christians adopted the worst
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qualities of Aristotle’s approach to animal minds, their arguments nonetheless held a far
more dominant influence in the centuries that followed (Sorabji 1993: 2; Steiner 2005: 3).
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Continuity as Crisis:
Two Traditions of Theorizing about Animal Minds
Chapter Three
Stoicism and Christianity: Dominant Voices of the Dominant Tradition
1. Overview
In the opening pages to his classic work Origins of the Western Debate, Richard
Sorabji (1993: 2) reflects upon his initial surprise when realizing “how bad were the
arguments designed to show that animals were very different from us.” Nowhere in
ancient philosophy is this more evident than with the Stoics and early Christians. For all
the nuance, detail, and ambiguity present in Aristotle’s account of animal cognition, these
qualities only rarely describe the argumentation of these groups. To a certain extent, Stoic
and Christian thinkers cherry-picked Aristotle’s texts when forging their own dogmatic
explanations regarding the causes of animal behavior. For the most part, however, their
thoughts on animals have their own discernable line of influence. There are novel,
stimulating and even progressive ideas about animal minds in the Stoic canon. The Stoics
were arguably the first philosophers with an account of animal consciousness (Toivanen
2013), a well-developed theory of the emotions, and a proto-evolutionary account of the
historical and ontogenetic development of ethical decision-making that offers substantive
grounds for uniqueness and exceptionalism claims. Such examples add nuance to my
greater contention that Stoic philosophy, alongside medieval Christian thought,
represents a prolonged low point in the history of animal psychology.
Even before Christianity became the formal religion of the Roman Empire in 380
CE,

there was far more overlap between the relevant ideas of Stoics and Christians than

either group had with Aristotle. Part of this had to do with the fact that the texts
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comprising Aristotelian zoology—known during the Middle Ages as De animalibus,
which contained History of Animals, Parts of Animals and On the Generation of
Animals—were amongst the last works of Aristotle translated into Latin, which reflects
the lowly importance attributed to animals by Christian thinkers (Beullens 2011). Even
the exceptionalism claims of the most “Aristotelian” of medieval philosophers, Saint
Thomas Aquinas (1225—1275), have more in common with Stoic arguments than
anything found in the works of the medieval zoologists who studied Aristotle. For
instance, Albert the Great (c. 1200—1280) produced the most widely read commentary
on Aristotle’s De animalibus (Beullens 2011: 146), and was “the first scholar since
Theophrastus [c. 371—287 BC] to show any interest in Aristotelian zoology as a research
discipline” (Tkacz 2007: 31). However it is notable that neither Albert nor any of his
more scientifically minded contemporaries expresses interest in engaging with the
dominant tradition of positing and defending uniqueness and exceptionalism claims. Like
Aristotle, Albert understood the entire sensible world as worthy of study (Beullens 2011:
148); unlike Aristotle, the sole reason for Albert’s empirical investigations was to better
understand God’s creation. The placement of humanity within that creation is never
questioned, nor do Albert’s researches lead him to comment on the causes of animal
behavior. My point being: Stoic approaches to the philosophy of animal minds were far
more dominant throughout Hellenistic, Roman, and medieval philosophy than those of
Aristotle, even once De animalibus became widely available.
It is commonplace to refer to the Hellenistic philosophers such as Zeno of Citium
(c. 3rd century BCE), Cleanthes of Assos (330—232 BCE) Chrysippus (280—204 BCE),
Seneca (c. 4 BC–65 CE), Epictetus (c. 50—135 CE), Marcus Aurelius (121—180 CE), and
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others collectively as “the Stoics.” This is a convention that I adopt in this chapter,
though Stoic thought spans four centuries across both Greek and Roman civilizations, as
well as Christian, Jewish, and pagan systems of thought.128 My aim is not to trace the
development of Stoic thought about animals.129 Rather, following Chapter Two, I reveal
and critique influential ontological assumptions and philosophical/rhetorical strategies
that Stoic philosophers rely upon to evade explanatory crises arising from defending
categorical differences between human and animal minds in the face of evidence to the
contrary. The influence of Stoicism on the dominant tradition is supplemented with
discussions of animal psychology in the works of Christian philosophers such as Origen
of Alexandria (184—253), Augustine of Hippo (354—430), Basil the Great (330—379),
Saint John Chrysostom (c. 349—407), and Saint Thomas Aquinas.
2.1 Stoic Worldviews: Singularity of Causation in the Animal Kingdom
While it is far from unusual for ancient philosophers to paint the world in terms of
rigid distinctions lacking a discernable middle ground (Malina and Neyrey 1996: 102-3),
the degree to which this type of thinking informs Stoic philosophy is more pronounced
than any of the figures discussed previously. Much of what the Stoics have to say about
animals apparently stems from their general “argument of oppositions,” which assumes a
de facto division between everything “human” and everything “animal” (Newmyer 2011:
46). No friend of the Stoics, Plutarch (46—120 CE) describes this argument as follows:
“just as the immortal is opposed to the mortal and the imperishable to the perishable, and,
of course, the incorporeal to the corporeal; just so, if there is rationality, the irrational
must exist as its opposite and counterpart. This alone, among all these pairings, must not
128
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be left incomplete and mutilated.”130 The reason for the heightened significance of the
final division is, of course, its presumed authority in reinforcing human uniqueness across
the board. Plutarch critiques this “material objection from the Stoa” to all claims in favor
of animal intelligence for what it is: an ontological chopping block rather than anything
akin to a substantive reply.
It is because of this ontological worldview that Aristotle’s contention that humans
are animals is absent in Stoic thought. Like Alcmaeon, Plato and Aristotle, the Stoics
summed up all the capacities that animals lack as those that are rational, and all the
capacities that animals possess as irrational. Yet unlike Aristotle, for the Stoics there is no
question as to whether any capacities overlap between humans and animals; they do not.
Even at the level of perception, humans have rational perception while animals have nonrational perception (Steiner 2005: 78-9), where “perception” in animals is often referred
to with another word entirely: appearances. The Stoics deny animals beliefs, emotions,
attention, primitive universals, and propositional attitudes of any kind, even going so far
as to endorse the wholesale denial of memory to animals. These views follow from the
shared contention that animal behavior is motivated entirely by impulse and appearances;
even at the level of impulse, humans are said to have rational impulses while animals
have irrational impulses (Gourinat 2007: 222-3). The aims of this section are to (1)
explain the philosophical basis for these distinctions, (2) trace their conceptual history
from ancient to medieval thinkers, and (3) argue that the human/animal distinction is
axiomatic for the Stoics due to their collective acceptance of an influential principle
informing all their discussions of animal behavior.
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In the philosophy of science, this principle is referred to broadly as the singularity
of causation, whereby, “the same casual explanation applies to each and every instance of
a class of events, regularities, or structures” (Greenwood 2015: 9). Variations on this
explanatory principle are commonplace in historic and contemporary discussions of
animal minds alike. Beginning with the Stoics, the actions of animals boil down to the
same causal explanation: an irrational “governing principle” (hegēmonikon) utilizing preprogramed impulses to react accordingly to the presence of meaningless (“turbid and
confused”131) appearances in their respective environments. The Stoics never question the
fact that their explanandum for animal behavior has one and only one explanation, which
is far from obvious in the case of human behavior or physical motion. 132 Indeed, the
hegēmonikon does a lot of explanatory lifting for the Stoics in terms of their refusal to
acknowledge variation in cognitive capacities from one species to the next, or that an
animal’s environment and developmental history can influence behavioral repertoires.
Following Plato and Aristotle, the Stoics drew categorical distinctions between
humans and animals relative to unique parts of the soul. The human soul, accordingly,
has eight parts: the five senses, speech, reproduction, and a central “governing principle”
(hegēmonikon). There is considerable disagreement about the precise function of the
hegēmonikon, but it is clear that it acts as a sort of central processing unit that is the
ultimate cause of organic behavior and—in humans alone—thought. A. A. Long (1996:
243), for instance, describes the hegēmonikon as somewhat analogous to the relationship
between the brain and the central nervous system. Whereas the hegēmonikon serves a
wide variety of unique functions in human beings, i.e., reason, language, speech,
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phantasia, calculation, practical wisdom, thought, and assent (Baltzly 2013), in animals,
the hegēmonikon consists entirely of self-interested “impulses” (hormē) stimulated by
environmental “appearances” (aesthesis).133 This unsophisticated, yet widely applicable,
function of the animal hegēmonikon readily allows a singularity of causation for nonhuman behavior. The animal hegēmonikon remains forever in its most elemental state: an
instinctual instrument for self-preservation.
This idea has been present in Stoic thought since its inception around 300 BCE.
Zeno of Citium (c. 334—262) believed that all beings are born self-interested and
impulsive, but “when reason has been added to those creatures that are rational, life for
them lived in accord with reason becomes the natural life.”134 If Diogenes’ reading is
accurate, then for Zeno, reason functions as an “add-on” to the hegēmonikon, granting
unique abilities in humans. Newmyer, however, paints a different picture of the standard
Stoic view, suggesting that the hegēmonikon itself “develops into the faculty of reason”
(2011: 164 [my emphasis]). In any event, it is clear that the Stoics believed humans have
basic impulses for self-preservation too, but unlike animals, they can control and evaluate
them by means of unique functions of their hegēmonikon—most notably, the capacity for
meaningful speech (which disallows moral contracts with animals) and the crucial role of
assent in allowing for rational phantasia.
2.2 Stoic Worldviews: Assent and Constitution
For Zeno, in order to exercise even a modicum of freewill, one must possess the
ability to assent (sunkatathesis) to certain sense perceptions over others; without this
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power, animals cannot form beliefs or experience community (oikeiosis), nor can they
make decisions of any kind. 135 There are four degrees of understanding in Zeno:
perception, assent, grasping, and knowledge, 136 and animals are not granted any of
these—not even perception. While this sounds bizarre to modern ears, the argument upon
which this uniqueness claim rests is that while the Stoics grant animals appearance, they
choose to define each and every example of perception (aesthesis) as “an assent to
appearance” (Sorabji 1993: 41). Without the ability to assent to appearances, animals are
“carried away with their appearances,”137 and this makes the content of animal minds
“turbid and confused” (turbidas et confuses). 138 The notion of assent at play here is
vague, but the underlying claim is that to assent to X means to reflect or pass judgment
on X. Even though humans themselves are not always reflecting and judging, their ability
to do so makes even their most basic perceptual experiences radically different from
those of other species. Due to the ad hoc nature of this assumption, an important question
is how one could tell the difference between assenting to appearances and not rejecting
appearances.139 I provide examples below, for instance, where it is very difficult, if not
impossible, to explain certain animal behaviors (e.g., identifying deceptive tactics in
predators, or ignoring unreliable signalers) as not involving a rejection of appearances,
or, as not assenting to how the world appears.
It was on this foundation that the Stoics deny belief, language, concepts, and
rationality to animals—all of which require the capacity to assent (Sorabji 1993: 42).
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Since animals lack memory as well, they exist in an eternal present.140 These arguments
took hold in the 2nd century BCE, when the third head of the Stoic school, Chrysippus,
took “particular interest in the intellectual capacities of animals” and, as a result, may be
the figure most responsible for the Stoic’s hard-lined denial of reason to animals
(Newmyer 2011: 3). While Aristotle said little about animal volition, the Stoics were the
first in a long tradition to base the majority of their uniqueness and exceptionalism claims
in this area; assent is necessary to exercise the slightest control over one’s actions or
make even the simplest of choices. As Steiner (2005: 78) notes, “Animals cannot
interrogate or hold back from appearances, but are moved immediately by them, whereas
rational beings are capable of scrutinizing appearances and either assenting or
withholding assent from them.” It seems to follow from Steiner’s interpretation that the
appearances perceived by humans and animals alike are basically the same, but that
humans alone can epistemically assent to (or reject) them.
The Stoics, however, offer good reason to believe that their account is more
complicated. They also seem committed to the view that the capacity for reason (and thus
assent) changes the way the world appears to animals. Unlike Aristotle, the Stoics
maintained that humans and animals have different kinds of appearances. In line with
their argument from oppositions, the difference between basic human perceptual faculties
and basic animal perceptional faculties is categorical: irrational appearances and rational
appearances. With respect to the former, the Stoics treat animals as receptacles for
sensory impressions; they have no control over how to think or feel about them, or what
actions to perform in response to them. Against Aristotle’s view of animal perception,
E.g., According to Seneca, “animals perceive only the time which is of greatest moment to them within
the limits of their coming and going—the present. Rarely do they recollect the past—and only when they
are confronted with present reminders” (Moral Letters 445).
140
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sensory impressions elicit behaviors that are automatic, “pre-conceptual,” and lacking
entirely in propositional content.141 Humans, on the other hand, are the only animals that
have rational or cognitive appearances; namely, appearances that they can choose assent
to. Sextus Empiricus (c. 160—210), many of whose works function as interlocutors with
Stoic ideas, describes this position as follows: “One who has the cognitive appearance
fastens on the objective difference of things in a craftsman-like way, since this kind of
impression has a peculiarity which differentiates it from other impressions,”142 i.e., from
the “turbid and confused” perceptions of non-human species. Similarly, the Christian
Stoic Origen (184—253 CE) argued that “Ensouled things are moved by themselves when
an impression occurs within them which calls forth an impulse. […] A rational animal,
however, in addition to its impressionistic nature, has reason which passes judgment on
impressions, rejecting some of these and accepting others, in order that the animal may be
guided accordingly.”143
Two issues arise. First, rational appearances seem in danger of being infallible;144
and second, if humans and animals alike have appearances, but humans alone can assent
and reject them, then it would seem—again—that appearances are common to both. If
true, then the “irrational appearances” vs. “rational appearances” dichotomy is again put
on shaky explanatory ground. These challenges compel the Stoics walk a thin line
between granting some continuity between human and animal perception, while at the
same time stating that these apparatuses generate appearances that are different in kind.
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Recall that Aristotle’s definition of phantasia readily allows for propositional
content in animal perception, and, in doing so, he sees no problem granting perception a
cognitive element. The Stoics, however, arguably see phantasia as exclusively human
(Sorabji 1993: 22-25). Unlike the function of phantasia in Aristotle (i.e., that which
“unifies” multiple impressions into single images and/or primitive universals with which
animals navigate their environments145 ), for the Stoics, it is only in humans that “the
mind’s stock of conceptions is immediately activated when a sense-impression is
received, with the result that the impression presents its object in conceptualized form”
(Long and Sedley 2002: 1.140). How, then, do the Stoics explain complex animal
behavior? Entirely with “appearance and impulse,”146 the latter of which arise part-andparcel with species-typical constitutions (discussed below). But automaticity of response
does not in itself mandate that animals perceive the world solely by means of vague,
“turbid and confused” sensory impressions. Unlike Aristotle, the Stoics seem incapable
of explaining not only the issue of how objects and events in their environments actually
appear to non-human animals, but also how they reappear in the same way to them when
triggered by associated impulses and environmental stimuli.
The most common translation for the Stoic use of phantasia is “presentation.”
Humans alone have rational phantasia, whereby the world is “presented” in terms of
propositional content that takes on meaning due to language—which is also necessary for
thought. Following Plato, the Stoics define “thought” as “internal speech,” thereby
denying it to animals.147 The capacity for language is hugely important for the Stoics, as
it not only “serves to spell out in linguistic form the content of the object perceived”
145
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(Inwood 1985: 57), but—more fundamentally—allows propositional perception in the
first place. When humans perceive the world, (1) their hegēmonikon automatically
translates perception into propositional content, which (2) the human is then able to
evaluate by means of her rational faculties, i.e., one chooses to assent to the presentation,
reject it, or suspend judgment. In a radical turn from Aristotle, lions do not perceive oxen
as prey or as food; in Stoic nomenclature, animals do not even “perceive,” because
perception requires language to have meaning. As Epictetus claims, “the use of external
impressions” is adequate for animals “to eat and drink and rest and procreate, and
whatever else of the things within their own province the animals severally do.”148 When
Plutarch argues that this true of humans as well, the Stoics have nothing to say in reply.149
Another explanatory challenge arises from the fact that surely children perceive before
they develop language, and linguistic deficits (e.g., aphasias) do not lead to perceptual
defects. 150 Despite showing early interest in the similarities and differences between
infant and animal cognition,151 the Stoics never address this point.
Phantasia is rarely discussed in Stoic animal psychology, and when it is, it is
described as irrational phantasia, or phantasia hormetikê (“impulse-generating
presentation”). 152 According to the Stoics, “Animals can be activated (energein), but
cannot act (prattein), evidently because there is no possibility of reason withholding
assent” (Sorabji 1993: 53).153 This pared down hegēmonikon functions as the singular
cause of behavior in the animal kingdom. In contrast with Aristotle, there is no evidence
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that the Stoics discriminate between degrees or variations in mental capacities underlying
the behaviors of insects, dogs, or dolphins. “Dumb beasts, sluggish in other respects, are
clever at living,”154 writes Seneca, but they can hardly be called “clever” because they
cannot develop skills, think, or exercise the slightest control over their actions.
Central to Stoic animal psychology is the belief that “immediately at birth” all
animals “are born full-trained” with their complete behavioral repertoires, as well as an
innate impulse for self-preservation that quickly becomes manifest in behavior due to an
intuitive sense of their bodily “constitution.”155 The notion of constitution (constitutionis)
is vague, but its purpose is clear: it is the singular means by which the Stoics explain how
animals instinctively know how to breath, reproduce, use their limbs, flee from predators,
and find food, “for it is not likely that nature would make an animal alienated from
itself.”156 All spiders spin perfect webs from their first attempt and “the openings in all
honeycomb cells are identical in shape;” these “arts are born, not taught; and for this
reason no animal is more skilled than any other.”157 Note that Seneca does not distinguish
between the constitutions of insects and mammals; individuals of all non-human species
are born not only with their entire behavior repertoire, but also with constitutions that
pre-dispose them to automatically perform appropriate behaviors in appropriate contexts.
The same psychological worldview is present in Augustine’s Confessions (c.
397—400), where animals are said to be born, “each in his own province,” with “instant
intelligence.”158 Nearly a millennium later, it can also be found in Aquinas’ Quaestiones
disputatae de veritate (c. 1256—1259). Aquinas’s view is that while “Reason is found
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fully and perfectly only in man,” it is nonetheless only through the rational decisions of
an external being—God—that “Brutes have a certain semblance of reason inasmuch as
they share in a certain natural prudence.”159 In a similar fashion to Seneca’s contention
that animals are “clever at living,” Aquinas writes of “the well-regulated judgment which
[animals] have about certain things. But they have this judgment from a natural estimate,
not from any deliberation, since they are ignorant of the basis of their judgment.”160 My
contention is that Aquinas’ vague notion of a “natural prudence” or “natural estimate”
lying behind all animal behavior shares a conceptual history with Augustine’s reference
to the “natural intelligence” indicative of each animals’ “province;” both clearly originate
from the Stoic notion of constitution.
Remarkably, it follows that animals are incapable of learning from experience.
Seneca claims that the ability for animals to deal with predators is “not reached […] by
experience” because “the teachings of experience are slow and irregular, but whatever
Nature communicates belongs equally to everyone, and comes immediately.”161 Since the
Stoics held this radically counter-intuitive view, it makes no sense to speak of “skills”
outside of human beings; animals are no more “skilled” in their movements than are
plants. From this it follows that “animals of the same species would always act in a
similar way, even if they were isolated from other examples of their species” (Gilhus
2006: 39). Since “nature’s assignments are always uniform,” 162 the capacities of
“animals” can be discussed without recourse to individual or species (with the exception
of species-typical constitutions).
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Stoic explanations for animal behavior thus assume a singularity of causation in
the animal kingdom. Environment and developmental history are wholly unrelated to
behavior, which never varies from a species’ innate repertoire, i.e., the behavior of
individuals in species and/or environment X are explained by the same principle or
mechanism as is used to explain the behavior of individuals in species and/or
environment Y.163 While it is would not be inconsistent with this account to grant that the
same behaviors could have distinct causal explanations given diverse environmental
triggers, the Stoics are seemingly uninterested in expanding their explanatory apparatus
beyond simply evoking key terms such as constitution, irrational appearances, and
irrational impulses—all of which, under the auspices of the irrational hegēmonikon—
boil down to one and same explanatory principle for animal behavior.
A strong case can be made that whatever little behavioral variation the Stoics do
grant to the animal kingdom is largely a chimera, since the “subjects” of those behaviors
are not properly subjects at all. For pagan and Christian Stoics alike, animals are
ultimately a class of objects—their collective purpose on earth is to be used by humans,
and analogous to the growth of crops, their movements and fates are entirely dictated by
the will of God—a long-running panacea to explain away apparently complex animal
behaviors that arguably begins with the Stoics. Of course, since everything is presumably
the will of God, this is hardly an explanation at all.
This line of thought reached its apex in the late medieval thought of Saint Thomas
Aquinas, where it also took a bizarre turn. Like his predecessors, Aquinas evokes as if
rhetoric in claiming that while animals act “as if endowed with reason” and often show
“certain marks of sagacity,” all appearances of animal intelligence are deceptive; the
163
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movements of animals are comparable to the movements of clocks [in motibus
horologiorum], since God’s creation of irrational animals is analogous to the uniquely
human ability to likewise bring irrational things into the world. 164 Unlike the Stoics,
however, Aquinas held that because animals are the creations of a rational being (God),
the behaviors of animals are rationally motivated. The claim that animals are “moved by
reason” despite being “without reason” is undoubtedly a clever response to the crisis that
emerged from Aristotle’s writings on animals; for this reason alone, “certain animals are
called prudent or sagacious; and not because they reason or exercise any choice about
things. This is clear from the fact that all that share in one nature invariably act in the
same way.” 165 Contrary to the Stoics, then, animals have “imperfect volition,” which
means that while they behave “without making any choice,” there is a sense of choice or
judgment resting somewhere behind animal behavior by virtue of their natural
constitution ordained by a rational being.166 Just as there is reason behind the movements
of clocks, so too is their reason behind the movements of animals.167
Several centuries before Aquinas was born, explanations of animal behavior in
terms of the will of God were mainstream in the cultural milieu of Roman times. It is not
surprising, then, that some Stoic and Christian philosophers worked this idea into a
strategy for denying cognition to animals. Throughout the Roman Empire it was
commonplace to interpret a wide variety of animal behaviors in terms of “forces that
were external to the animals” who were “not conceived of as acting freely” but rather “as
little more than vehicles of meaning” and “instruments of superior powers” (Gilhus 2006:
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28). When instinct proved to be an unsatisfactory casual explanation, augury was an
immensely popular means to interpret anomalous behaviors of animals. For instance,
Aquinas cites Syrian monk John of Damascus (c. 675—749) in stating his contention that
“animals do not themselves have the mastery over their own inclination. Hence ‘they do
not act but are rather acted upon’ [non agunt sed magis aguntur].”168 Whether or not
animals are vehicles for God’s messages is irrelevant here; the point is that it was
commonplace for nearly two thousand years to view animals as vehicles of forces
external to their bodies. To this end, the early pagans and the late Christians—from Zeno
to Aquinas—are in agreement in positing something akin to a singularity of causation
throughout the animal kingdom. This overarching worldview undoubtedly influenced the
dominant perception for much of recorded history that animals are incapable of
exercising control over their own actions.
3. Stoic Strategies: Expanding the Province of Reason
By making assent a necessary condition for perception, and thereby restricting
content in animal minds to their vague notion of irrational appearances, the Stoics have
left themselves very little room not only for explaining seemingly complex behaviors like
deception, but also relatively simple ones. For instance, ancient zoologists knew that
alarm calls are important features of the daily lives of most social animals.169 Very often
animals react to these calls by fleeing, of course, but it is also typical for individuals to
ignore them, such as when issued from infants, new group members, or unreliable
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signalers, or when the threat is perceived to be far away and/or marginal. 170 Stoic
philosophers may not have known this, but that is irrelevant with respect to their inability
to explain these behaviors. At least three critical points can be raised.
First, varied reception of alarm calls makes little sense without granting animals
some ability to assent to, and withhold assent from, appearances. Regardless of the degree
of control that, say, baboons, vervet monkeys, and mongooses may have over their
behaviors, members of these species perceive the alarm calls of conspecifics
contextually, selectively responding to some vocalizations while refusing to respond to
the identical vocalizations in others.171 Similarly, the ability to avoid deception requires
some capacity to discern misinformation between very similar appearances, e.g., a dead
animal and an animal feigning death; this form of deception is very common across the
animal kingdom (Miyatake et al. 2004). Another common form of deception as a defense
mechanism can be observed in cephalopods. A particularly good example is the IndoMalayan “mimic octopus” that changes colors to imitate the appearance of more
dangerous predators (Norman et al. 2001; Norman and Hochberg 2005). What the alarm
call cases and the deception cases have in common is that, to avoid becoming lunch, a
great many animals need some capacity to withhold assent to appearances. According to
the Stoics, assent is uniquely human because it involves rational judgments, however by
defining the requisite conditions for “perception” as such, their theory lacks the
explanatory power to explain why the vervet receiver does not act when the unreliable
sender elicits the same stock alarm call that a reliable sender does. What’s more, the very
notion of an “unreliable sender” makes absolutely no sense without granting animals the
170
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ability to learn from experience. The ability to withhold assent is presumably also
necessary to pass a “delayed gratification” experiment, and many studies in recent years
have shown that chimpanzees and capuchin monkeys can learn to resist acting upon their
desires for an immediate reward in favor of waiting for a bigger reward (Beran 2013).
Second, our hypothetical Stoic explanation becomes weaker still when we
incorporate their claim that the content of alarm calls must be non-propositional, arising
in the form of irrational appearances that humans can say nothing about. Sorabji observes
that, for the Stoics, “A lekton [proposition] is defined as corresponding to a rational
appearance, and rational appearances are apparently confined to rational animals,”
implying that the “non-rational appearances” of “non-rational animals” are “not
conceptualisable at all, and a fortiori not conceptualisable as propositions” (24-5). In
short, it is common to read the Stoics as saying that the content of animal minds is so
chaotic and fuzzy that it could not possibly be translated into concepts and propositions.
As a result, it is wrong to attribute to animals propositional content of any kind.
Recall Aristotle’s acute observation that the signals of certain birds communicate
both the location and/or type of the predator. As Aristotle recognized, animal signals
“convey information”172 and while he agreed with the Stoics in denying language and
speech to animals, Aristotle did not then claim that language is necessary to perceive
features of one’s environment as X or Y. While Aristotle attributed propositional content
to perceptual experience in both humans and animals, the majority opinion among
ancient scholars is that none of the long line of Stoics adopted this general strategy.173
This dominant interpretation is based on two points: (1) the fact that the Stoics denied
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anything akin to primitive universals to animals, which Aristotle saw as necessary to
perceive things as X or that X, and (2) the Stoic assumption that propositional attitudes
and thoughts of any kind must be capable of being put into language in order to have
meaning. As a result, not only can humans adduce nothing about what such calls
communicate, but the calls themselves are not strictly communicative, i.e., they carry no
discernable content. This is obviously extreme, as successful signaling systems of this
sort require at least that the receiver attain information about where to flee from. Not only
would the Stoics struggle to explain how we can be certain of this fact, they would also
struggle to explain why different animals intuit the same call differently, e.g., if they are
safe in a tree or unconvinced of the call’s accuracy. Further, even if we grant that alarm
calls are inflexible and strictly impulsive, it is surely unreasonable to add that we cannot
make informed statements about the content of these calls. The Stoics reject the accuracy
of inferences from markedly simple observations, e.g., signal X is used in the presence of
predator type Y, and signal P is used in the presence of predator type Q, therefore, in
some sense, the receiver interprets the calls as XàY and PàQ.
One might be tempted to view the Stoic position as a nascent version of
contemporary discontinuity theories by Stephen Stich (1978), Donald Davidson (1982),
and Daniel Dennett (1996), all of whom—like the Stoics—deny propositional content to
animals on the basis of lacking language. Stich, for instance, argues that attributing
specific content to animal minds is epistemically irresponsible, i.e., if we cannot access
the content of animal minds, to what extent can we call it propositional? This is no doubt
an intriguing question, but—unlike Aristotle’s detailed discussion of phantasia—there is
no evidence that the Stoics considered it to be worthy of much consideration. The Stoics
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were uninterested in epistemic issues about animal minds. To the contrary, it seems clear
that they conceived the subject as too simplistic to provoke issues of that nature, thus
further attesting to their general close-mindedness.
In contrast, Stich (1978) offers a more flexible position by granting that there may
exist explanatory contexts in which animals can be attributed propositional attitudes such
as beliefs, namely, if the sole purpose of this attribution is pragmatic, i.e., to help explain
how animals navigate their environments.174 Stich makes this claim despite remaining
firm in his personal contention that attributing beliefs requires access to the content of
those beliefs and “nothing we could discover would enable us to attribute content to an
animal’s belief” (23). Even next to Stich’s global skepticism, 175 the Stoic view is
distinctively hard-lined: nothing underlying animal behavior has meaningful content. The
same can be said of comparisons between Stoics and the classic ethologists and
behaviorists, who agreed that the content of animal minds is inaccessible. Unlike the
Stoics, though, “[t]he ethologist does not want to deny the possible existence of
subjective phenomena in animals, he claims it is futile to present them as causes, since
they cannot be observed by scientific methods” (Tinbergen 1951: 5). The difference,
then, is that 20th and 21st century thinkers make this claim on epistemic grounds (i.e., we
cannot access the content of animal minds), whereas the Stoics are straight dogmatists:
the content of animal minds, gestures, utterances, etc. is actually meaningless.
Taking stock, the Stoics forward an unattractive uniqueness claim about human
perception: the capacity to assent to appearances is required to perceive the objects and
events in world as token members of previously experienced kinds or as reliable
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indicators of future events, e.g., certain types of branches as stable, and other types of
branches as unstable, or, the alarm call as indicative of an aerial predator and the need to
find shelter. Without rational assent functioning somewhere in the background of
everyday perception, the world appears as “turbid and confused” bundles of sense data,
which function as triggers for pre-conditioned, instinctive responses to, presumably,
particular washes of color, sounds, movements, smells, tastes, and tactile sensations. This
theory of perception lacks the explanatory power to account for common behaviors in the
animal kingdom. What’s more, it is by virtue of defining perception so exclusively that
the Stoics find themselves committed to the unnecessarily strong claim that animals do
not learn from experience.
4. Stoic Strategies: Semantic Anthropocentrism
Defining perception in terms of rational assent is therefore a gross exaggeration of
the requisite cognitive apparatus needed to perceive objects in the world.

176

Unfortunately, determining the definitions and criteria for cognitive capacities at the
highest human ability in order to deny them to animals remains a common strategy to
defend uniqueness claims. Cameron Buckner (2013) and Kristin Andrews (2015) refer to
this issue as anthropofabulation in cross-species comparisons, i.e. an “overestimation” or
“confabulation of our own typical cognitive abilities,” that can preclude the discovery of
potential continuities with other species (Andrews 2015: 44). Anthropofabulation is a
cognitive bias whereby researchers overestimate facets of human cognition and
underestimate facets of non-human cognition; crucially, the former often bears a close
relationship with the latter. For instance, by defining “memory” as “recollection” the
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Stoics find themselves in the thorny situation of explaining how what looks like memory
in animals is not really memory at all (a situation Aristotle avoided by arguing that
memory arises in different kinds and degrees of strength across the animal kingdom). By
overestimating facets of human memory (clearly, not all functions of memory involve
recollecting past events), the Stoics implicitly underestimate the capacity for memory in
other species.
When this is the case, anthropofabulation can lead to semantic anthropocentrism,
i.e. “precisifying vaguely-defined psychological terms to the highest human-level ability”
(Buckner 2013: 861). This critique is becoming common in the contemporary
literature.

177

The intimate relationship between semantic anthropocentrism and

anthropofabulation is highlighted by Donald Griffin (1981: 11-2), who identifies a
“double standard” in comparative psychology wherein definitions for concepts are often
derived from “the most complex levels of understanding known to human thinkers,”
however “meeting these requirements would eliminate many members of our own
species.” Likewise, Sorabji (1993: 22-3) notes that if the Stoics deny propositional
attitudes and primitive universals to animals because they cannot verbalize their thoughts,
then they must also be committed to the view that infants and many adult humans
likewise lack these rudimentary capacities. I explain below how at least one Stoic was
self-critical of their school for precisely this reason, as well as how contemporaries such
as Plutarch explicitly denounced the Stoics for confabulating their cognitive terminology
to unfairly promote human exceptionalism.

E.g., in theory of mind debates, Hutto et al. (2011: 15) claim—correctly, in my opinion—that,
“…mindreading proposals overly intellectualize what is involved in our basic encounters with others.”
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Though progressive in being the first to discuss comparative psychology,178 the
Stoics ironically define the terms “memory” and “emotion” such that human infants
cannot satisfy them. Beginning with the former, recall Aristotle’s belief that most
everyday acts of memory are the result of perceptual, rather than rational, faculties. This
follows from Aristotle’s general strategy of reducing the complexity of common human
cognitive abilities as far as possible in order to use them to explain the behavior of other
animals. The Stoics, on the other hand, argue that all memory involves both
recollection179 and assent180 effectively defining memory such that it cannot be attributed
to non-human animals. The idea that memory always entails acts of recollection is
extreme, and it is difficult to think of an impetus for this decision other than the desire to
promote human exceptionalism. As with emotions, intention, and preparation, the Stoic
approach to memory “consists of redefining what animals can do. They lack genuine
memory; what they have is only perceptual recognition,” i.e., appearances (Sorabji 1993:
52). Perhaps a better way of putting this is that the Stoics took it upon themselves to
redefine what animals cannot do, since granting memory to animals was commonsense to
Plato, Aristotle, and even Xenophon, originator of the “man alone among the animals
commonplace.”
Seneca explains the Stoic view of memory as follows: “The dumb animal grasps
what is present by its senses. It is reminded of the past when it encounters something that
alerts its senses. Thus the horse is reminded of the road when it is brought to where it
starts. But in its stable it has no memory of it, however often it has been trodden. As for
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the third time, the future, that does not concern dumb animals.”181 Note the ontological
invariance in Seneca’s reference to all animals possessing precisely the same cognitive
apparatus for memory. In contrast, recall the various degrees (“traces”) and kinds of
memory that Aristotle grants throughout the animal kingdom, as well as the varying
influence memory-power exerts on other capacities, such as phantasia and phronesis.
Also note that Seneca’s claims here are not incompatible with granting animals memory.
The fact that animals can be “reminded” of things presumes that those things were stored
somewhere within them for use in guiding future behavior, which is all Aristotle meant
when he defines basic memory as a perceptual capacity. The difference, ultimately, boils
down to a matter of semantics and hardheaded anthropocentrism on behalf of the Stoics.
The Stoic definition of emotion is also counter-intuitive and overly intellectual.
According to the “official Stoic view,” “genuine emotion” is a voluntary process by
which rational beings “assent” to moral beliefs issued forth by means of a “rational will”
(voluntas) (Sorabji 1993: 58-61). There are at least two counter-intuitive claims here: (1)
emotions are voluntary phenomena, and (2) only beings capable of moral deliberation can
experience emotions. Combined, the implication is that the mere experience of pleasure
or fear is not rightly called an emotional experience; the experience only becomes
emotional when accompanied by the additional judgment that the pleasure is good or the
fear is justified. By defining emotions as “judgments,” Stoic thought anticipates 20th and
21st century views, such as C. D. Broad’s (1954) description of emotions as “affect-laden
judgments” as well as cognitivist theories of emotions such as those of Robert Solomon
(1980), Jerome Neu (2000) and Martha Nussbaum (2001). But as Aristotle’s follower
Aspasius (c. 80—150 CE) rightly critiques the Stoic doctrine, apprehension may not be a
181

Moral Letters 124, 16

106
necessary condition to possess emotions; humans (and presumably animals) can feel that
something is “pleasant or distressing, even before there has been assent and
apprehension.”182 This is a fair point. Chrysippus, for instance, defined “emotions” as
“certain judgments about the presence of good or harm,”183 and, interestingly, seems to
have later realized that this definition was easy bait for his opponents, not only because it
was too broad to account for all human emotions, or because mental states can satisfy that
definition without necessarily being emotional, but also because animals appear to be
emotional beings, so it seems to follow that they might then also be rational. As a result,
Chrysippus had to “had to modify his definition” of emotion as a particular kind of
judgment indicative of a more immediate or urgent manifestation of the rational faculties
(Sorabji 1993: 60). As Sorabji tells the history, the Stoics’ opponents…
…seized on the unfortunate consequence of Chrysippus’, and even Zeno’s, view that
animals can no longer be assigned emotions. Conversely, Plutarch reports the argument
that, since animals obviously do have emotions, they might have reason. Once again if
the Stoics were to answer the problem, they would have to redefine the mental capacities
of animals, just as they had done for memory and preparation.184

Opposition to the Stoic view of emotions can also be found within the extant
fragments of one Stoic philosopher: Posidonius, who was no stranger to criticizing Stoic
dogma (Newmyer 2011: 166). Adopting a similar line of reasoning as Aspasius,
Posidonius critiques Chrysippus on the basis that (1) Stoic criteria for emotions are too
high since, on this view, “most Stoics agree that not even children possess emotions since
they too are obviously not yet rational,” and (2) it is “in conflict with clear observable
fact” to deny emotions to animals and infants; as a result, Posidonius calls his own
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school’s doctrine “manifestly false.” 185 Posidonius’s reasoning follows from what he
takes to be common sense comparative psychology: just as certain behaviors of human
children can clearly be motivated by emotions, e.g., anger, this is also “clearly observed”
in animals. Elsewhere, Posidonius again attacks the Stoic leader directly: “Chrysippus
does not think that the emotional aspect of the soul is distinct from the rational, and so
deprives irrational animals of emotions, although it is obvious that animals are governed
by desire and anger.”186 While I do not agree that it is “obvious” that all human emotions
can be attributed to animals, Posidonius’ theory of the emotions is amongst the most
progressive of ancient philosophers.
According to Posidonius, “the emotional aspect of soul” slowly changes over the
course of ontogeny, from being irrational (in children and animals alike) to rational (only
in human adults). He compares the development of the emotional faculty to a “run-away
horse carried off its rider by force, but then as it both tires and in addition becomes sated
with its desires, the rider regains control”—which, Posidonius writes, “is a common
observable practice” as humans grow up, yet “on such matters Chrysippus was stuck,
because he was unable to refer their causes to an emotional faculty of mind.” 187
Posidonius is right to challenge the explanatory ability of the Stoic doctrine to account for
the discernable grey area between the emotional cries of infants and animals and the
(often) more reasonable manifestations of emotional behavior in adulthood. Note how the
type of explanation Posidonius demands is causal; the closest analog in modern science to
an “emotional faculty of mind” is the amygdala of the limbic system, which—though
now controversial as the principle source of homologies between human and non-human
185
186
187

The Fragments, 157
Ibid. Fragment 33
Ibid. Fragment 227

108
emotional experiences 188 —is presumably the sort of isolated emotion center that
Posidonius found lacking in Stoic dogma. Unlike Aristotle, who identified certain
emotions with the perceptual faculties and others with the rational faculties,189 and the
Stoics, who saw all emotions as rational, Posidonius evidently created a third option.
Indeed, Posidonius even performs some early comparative psychology in arriving at his
stance about human and animal emotions being continuous due to their sharing “natural
affinities” for similar behaviors traceable to this common “emotional faculty of mind.”190
Posidonius seems to be the only Stoic whose theory of the emotions was driven by
empirical concerns.
The important point is not merely that Posidonius held progressive views for an
ancient Stoic, but that he was acutely aware of the same “distinct bias that loads the deck
against animal mentality” that Buckner, Andrews (2015), and Boesch (2007, 2008)
recognize in the contemporary literature, namely, “our tendency to tie the competence
criteria for cognitive capacities to an exaggerated sense of typical human performance”
(Buckner 2013: 853). According to Stoic dogma, to experience emotions one must be
capable of making rational judgments, and to have memory one must possess the capacity
for recollection. Posidonius the Stoic, Aspasius the Aristotelian, and—as I will show in a
moment—Plutarch the Neoplatonist, belonged to rival schools, yet all recognized that not
even humans satisfy these criteria when having emotional experiences or using memory.
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This frustration with the Stoics was clearly felt by their contemporaries. Plutarch,
for instance, lodges the following critique, which demonstrates that he was well aware of
(1) the explanatory crisis of accounting for all animal behavior strictly by means of the
perceptual capacities, and (2) that one of the Stoics’ key strategies for dealing with this
crisis involved “repeatedly defining” terms related to human cognitive abilities such as
memory, emotion, preparation, and conceptual knowledge (among others) in order to
reinforce traditional claims of human exceptionalism:
But suppose it true that perception does not need intellect for its work. Still, when
perception has finished engendering in the animal the distinction between what is foreign
to it and what properly belongs, what is it that then remembers and fears the painful and
longs for the beneficial, contriving, if that is not present, to secure its presence among
them, preparing lairs and refuges, and again traps for prey and escape routs from
attackers? And yet those very authors [the Stoics] rasp our ears by repeatedly defining in
their Introductions “purpose” as “an indication of intent to complete,” “design” as “an
impulse before an impulse,” “preparation” as “an act before an act,” and “memory” as
“an apprehension of a proposition in the past tense of which the present tense has been
apprehended by perception.” For there is not one of these terms that does not belong to
logic; and the acts are all present in all animals as, of course, are cognitions which, while
inactive, they call “notions,” but when they are once put into action, “concepts.” And
though they admit that emotions one and all are “false judgments and seeming truths,” it
is extraordinary that they obviously fail to note many things that animals do and many of
their movements that show anger or fear or, so help me, envy or jealousy. They
themselves punish dogs and horses that make mistakes, not idly but to discipline them;
they are creating in them through pain a feeling of sorrow, which we call repentance.191

Plutarch’s sensitivity to the power of language to influence theories is impressive. Like
Posidonius, Plutarch is critiquing the Stoics not only on the inability of their overintellectualized approach to animal behavior to provide satisfactory explanations for
animal behavior (i.e., if not X, then what?); he is also attacking their strategy of defining
terms in such a way that the capacities they represent are de facto denied to animals.
Remarkably, Plutarch challenges the Stoics on their refusal to use mentalistic language to
discuss animal behavior, e.g., there is no “preparation” in animals, but rather “an act
before an act,” and animal behavior lacks “purpose” but displays “an indication of intent
191On
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to complete.” Critiques of this nature would be at home amid the backlash against
behaviorist terminology during the cognitive revolution of the mid-20th century.192
Sorabji (1993: 26) focuses on Seneca in particular as a figure that often employs
the “method” of “downgrading the mental capacities of animals by a process of
redefinition.” Seneca claims that although animals often appear to be angry, they are not
really capable of this emotion because they are irrational, and “anger involves rational
assent to the appearance of injustice” (ibid.).193 He does recognize that this interpretation
is contrary to popular belief about animals,194 but Seneca is adamant that genuine (i.e.,
human) emotion is not “unintelligible, disorderly and incapable of words,” but rather—in
the case of anger—it is “the subsequent striving which not only receives the appearance
of injustice but approves it that is anger; [anger is] the incitement of a mind proceeding to
vengeance by will and judgment.”195 It is not clear why approval is a necessary condition
for anger (and, furthermore, what exactly this means).
In contrast, Aristotle did not find it necessary to include approval or reflection
upon the specific pain, harm, or injustice that triggers an emotional response for that
emotion to qualify as “anger;” according to Aristotle, the “appetite for returning pain for
pain” is a formal, final, and efficient cause for anger (with boiling blood around the heart
as the material cause).196 Furthermore, when Aristotle writes of cases where “faint or
feeble stimulations produce these emotions, viz. when the body is already in a state of
tension resembling its condition when we are angry,”197 he is conceiving of anger as
E.g., in the technical idiom of classic ethology, “to say a goose is ‘alarmed’ only means that it has
‘perceived a flight-eliciting stimulus’” (Crist 2000: 122).
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arising within a spectrum of distinctive emotional contexts—an interpretation not unlike
his pluralistic definitions of phantasia and phronesis (Steiner 2005: 74). Perhaps Aristotle
grants that animals experience “states of tension” analogous to human anger, or, perhaps
his final word on the matter excludes animals because they cannot experience injustice.
To Seneca’s point, there is an important distinction to be made between the
feeling of injustice that he is referring to under the name “anger” and the ferociousness
underlying animal behaviors, and perhaps the former is uniquely human. 198 The main
problem is not that Seneca denies animals the capacity to experience anger. There is a
legitimate philosophical and scientific discussion to be had there. James Averill (1983,
2012) has, for example, written eloquently of the distinction between anger and
aggression and, indeed, Seneca himself argues that animals do not get angry; they
become aggressive.199 Seneca’s semantic sensitivity, again, bears resemblance to what
were perceived by behaviorists and cognitive ethologists of the early 20th century as
scientifically responsible means of avoiding anthropomorphic rhetoric. The problem is
that when it comes to the broader term “emotion” this sensitivity is entirely absent.
Seneca assumes that all emotions should be defined in the same way. Just as
Seneca “redefined animal memory,” he also redefined emotion as a four-stage process
(Sorabji 1993: 60). The first stage involves the perceptual appearance of something as
good or bad; the second involves an impetus (involuntary reaction) of the mind; the third
involves voluntary and rational assent or judgment of the mind; and the fourth involves
“an uncontrollable surge that carries us away” (ibid.). According to Seneca, animals
cannot experience the third stage and therefore cannot experience emotions; their
Though note the ingenious experiments on fairness behaviors in rhesus macaques by Brosnan and de
Waal (2003) and Heinrich (2004).
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experiences are, presumably, resigned to stage four. Animals do not have emotions, but
“certain impulses similar to these emotions,” since emotions are “born only where reason
dwells.”200 Returning to Plutarch’s critique of the Stoics: if not X, then what? Seneca’s
reply is clearly lacking. Redefining all instances of what appears to “anger” in animals as
“aggression” is one thing, but redefining all instances where animals appear to show
“emotion” as not really emotions, but “certain impulses similar to emotions,” evokes the
same general strategy only to frustratingly vague effect. Sorabji (1993: 61) thus rightly
claims that this view is “entirely implausible,” because “it is uneconomical to suppose
that human anger always involves the extra act of assent.” The same criticism applies to
Seneca’s claim that animals do not experience “fear” because one needs to understand
why one is afraid in order to feel genuine fear—arguably another case of semantic
anthropocentrism.201 Like anger, this example highlights a counter-intuitive element of
the Stoic view: there is no such thing as irrational emotions (only irrational impulses).
While Aristotle and the Stoics alike argue that the difference between humans and
animals can be conceived along the dichotomy between rational and perceptual faculties,
their approaches to this end are very distinct. Nowhere does Aristotle employ the Stoic
strategy anthropocentrically gerrymandering the definitions of cognitive capacities to
create as many discontinuities in nature as possible by redefining human capacities to a
level unattainable to animals (as well as some humans and infants).
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5. Stoic Strategies: As if Rhetoric and Early Opposition to Arguments from Analogy
In the previous chapter, I noted how the phrase as if (hôsper analogisamenoi) is a
common fixture of Aristotle’s discussions of animal minds,202 and is somewhat indicative
of open-mindedness on his part. Here, I show how the Stoics use the same rhetoric to a
very different end: to emphasize that appearances can be deceptive, since like-behaviors
do not necessarily follow from like-causes.203 Aristotle, of course, recognized this too,
but the Stoic response to their opponents’ uses of “the argument from analogy” (Povinelli
2000) is a model of epistemic extremism. An amusing passage from Plutarch’s On the
Cleverness of Animals (c. 100 CE) reveals how frequently the Stoics employed as if
rhetoric to do the heavy lifting in their arguments. The book opens in medias res as the
main character asks a group of hunters to recall a conversation they had the previous day
about whether “all animals partake in some manner of thought and reason” like humans
do—the very reason that hunting requires such skill.204 The text itself is structured as a
staged debate between a Platonist and a Stoic. At one point, the judge Autobolus
challenges the ubiquity of “as if” thinking in Stoic rhetoric:
As for those who foolishly affirm that animals do not feel pleasure or anger or fear or
make preparations or remember, but that the bee ‘as if’ remembers and the swallow ‘as
if’ prepares her nest and the lion ‘as if’ grows angry and the deer ‘as if’ is frightened—I
don’t know what they will do about those who say that beasts do not see or hear, but ‘as
if’ see or hear; that they have no cry but ‘as if’; nor do they live at all but ‘as if’. For these
last statements (or so I believe) are no more contrary to plain evidence than those that
they have made.205

Plutarch’s challenge to the Stoic’s use of as if rhetoric is to make reductio ad absurdum
claims out of their arguments, i.e., application of this rhetoric to all instances of animal
behavior is unfair because it leads to absurd conclusions that are either obviously true
Sorabji 1993: 14; Newmyer 2011: 7; Steiner 2005: 72
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(e.g., animals feel pleasure), or, conclusions that are not readily deniable (e.g., animals do
not prepare for future events). Since the Stoics are extreme in their denial of practically
all human capacities to animals, Plutarch’s response has teeth in this context. I do not,
however, think that this is an effective response in general.
The problem with Plutarch’s reply is that he himself comes across as dogmatic in
assuming that all arguments from analogy are equally strong in comparative cognition.
This hasty assumption gains notoriety in David Hume’s (1711—1776) contentious stance
on animal minds, i.e., because we see “other creatures, in millions of instances, perform
like actions, and direct them to like ends, all our principles of reason and probability
carry us with an invincible force to believe the existence of a like cause.”206 Continuity
theorists like Plutarch and Hume rely upon the assumption that since the behavior of
other animals often resembles our own, and behavior is always the effect of some act of
mental causation, we are justified in inferring that the mental lives of other animals
resemble the mental lives of our species because like-effects regularly follow from likecauses. This line of reasoning was later made infamous by Charles Darwin (1809—1882)
and George Romanes (1848—1894), but quickly became anathema to scientists and
philosophers alike in the early 20th century, and with good reason.
Right from the beginning of Plutarch’s response he equates the likelihood of the
claim that ‘animals appear to feel pleasure therefore, like humans, they feel pleasure’
with the likelihood of claim that ‘animals appear to get angry therefore, like humans, they
experience anger.’ Yet as discussed above, the Stoics and Aristotle may well be correct to
draw a uniqueness claim at the capacity for anger; there is at least a substantive argument
to be made there. What’s more, despite the fact that there is now strong evidence that
206
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some animals prepare for the future, 207 we can lodge a similar critique at Plutarch’s
unqualified assumption that animals obviously do this, too—as if analogies between
humans and animals feeling pleasure and preparing for the future are on similar or equal
evidential footing. So while Plutarch comes off as more open-minded than the Stoics
toward the possibility of animal mentality, he is equally dogmatic in his contention that
cognitive continuities are prevalent in the animal kingdom. The tenor of Plutarch’s
critique is similar to Hume’s claim that “no truth appears to me more evident, than that
beastes are endw’d with thought and reason as well as men.” 208 Both the Stoics and
Platonists falter in believing that all arguments from analogy are created equal, despite
being on opposite sides of the fence.
The proper response to clarifying instances of as if rhetoric is to challenge its
author on epistemic grounds, i.e., if the discontinuity proponent claims that animals are
not really doing X, despite acting as if they are doing X, her position should be evaluated
strictly in terms of the strength of her evidence. Taking two of Plutarch’s examples, the
argument from analogy that animals, like humans, “see and hear” is obviously stronger
than the analogical argument that animals, like humans, feel anger or fear. 209 Surely,
there is nothing irresponsible about making the general observation that while animals
appear to possess X, they do not really possess X, so long as one can then provide an
explanation for why appearances are likely deceptive in this context. Such an explanation
would ideally have three components:
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(1) a detailed description of the (“lower”) mechanism that they propose animals are using,
(2) a detailed description of the (“higher”) mechanism that they propose animals are not
using, and…
(3) a comparative discussion as to why the evidence (e.g., behavioral, physiological,
neurological, philosophical, etc.) for the former is stronger than evidence for the latter.

No analogy involving unobservables will be “perfect,” but positive and negative
analogies alike clearly come in varying degrees of strength (Hesse 1966). Far from the
dogmatism implicit in Stoic discussions of animals, I propose that Aristotle sometimes
tacitly evokes these criteria as a result of his naturalistic view that the potential of an
organism’s behavioral repertoire is restricted by the complexity of its physical
constitution. For instance, although Aristotle grants that bird songs can appear as if
analogous with human speech, 210 he defends his uniqueness claim about “speech” by
referencing the physical limitations of various types of tongue in the animal kingdom, as
well as the human capacity for symbolic communication.211 Similar to Lloyd Morgan’s
(1894) claim that appeals to neurophysiological similarities and differences can support
and undermine analogical arguments,
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Aristotle is able to evoke convincing

disanalogies between human and animal communication by defining speech as distinct
from signals or voice not only by philosophical definition, but also by means of citing
empirical observations pertaining to differences in communicative flexibility of humans
and birds.
The Stoics, on the other hand, use exactly the same argument behind every use of
as if rhetoric: regardless of how strong an analogy may appear to be between human and
animal behavior, animals lack the capacity to reason (and thus to assent to appearances)
and therefore are never doing genuine X. It is on this basis that the Stoics deny emotions

History of Animals, 8, 608a20-21.
Chapter 2, Section 6.
212 Thanks to John Greenwood for this reference.
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to animals because genuine emotions involved judgments,213 a strategy which they also
use when denying memory, intention, preparation, and attention to animals. In each case,
the Stoics “downgrade preparing in animals to a mere as-if preparing, and likewise as-if
intending and as-if (mentally) attending” (Sorabji 1993: 52-4). Sorabji is unimpressed by
the epistemic consequences of the Stoic reliance upon this rhetoric, writing, correctly,
that “if animals enjoy only ‘as if’ preparation we lose explanation of animal behavior”
(54). Gilhus (2007: 62) lodges a similar critique: the Stoics, she writes, “were not always
able to maintain a sharp distinction between animals and humans without introducing an
“as it were” [i.e., “as if”] principle to explain how animals, who seemed to act according
to principles similar to those of humans, do not really do so.”
When Aristotle raises examples of animals acting as if possessing a “higher”
capacity, his meaning is often that functional homologies exist across species-lines that
can explain how different animals confront similar problems in similar ways, so long as
we acknowledge that the underlying mechanisms may be different (or the same).214 This
is not always an attractive type of explanation, but it is at least an open-minded one. In
contrast, the Stoics were utterly dogmatic: “If animals seem to act as if by reason, it must
simply be a wrong impression, because animals always act according to nature,”215 by
which they mean impulse and appearance. When confronted with the appearance of
mental continuity, the Stoics rely upon stock, a priori responses lacking in nuance or
contextual subtlety.

213 This view is also present in Augustine’s City of God (8.17), and is critiqued at length in Plutarch’s
Sollertia (961D) and Porphyry’s On Abstinence from Animal Flesh (3.22).
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E.g., Aristotle’s comparative discussion of diving in dolphins and humans (Chapter Two, Section 4).
215 On Animals 43
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6. Animal Consciousness: Born of Explanatory Crisis
The most nuanced passages on animals in the Stoic canon are found in Seneca’s
Moral Letters (c. 65 CE), which is significant for two reasons. First, the book features the
first textual discussions of comparative psychology with human infants, and second, the
first glimmer of “consciousness” in the history of animal psychology, which would be
further developed by Saint Augustine (354—430) and Peter of John Olivi (c. 1248—
1298) during the Middle Ages (Toivanen 2013). Despite denying to animals faculties for
propositional perception and even the ability to learn from experience, Seneca
nonetheless attributes animals non-reflective interoceptive (e.g., pain, hunger, thirst),
extroceptive (e.g., visual, olfactory, tactile), and proprioceptive (e.g., posture, movement)
awareness, which, on my reading, is manifest in the context of perceiving and engaging
with environmental problems, e.g., evading predators or satisfying desires.
Importantly, Seneca’s discussions of constitution suggest that consciousness was
first postulated in the history of philosophy to help explain seemingly rational behavior of
animals and human infants. Indeed, Steiner (2005: 27) describes Sorabji’s claim of a
crisis in the ancient philosophy of animal minds as the “problem of conceptualizing
animal consciousness in terms that do not require recourse to concepts and propositional
attitudes.” 216 Letter 121 in Moral Letters features a lengthy passage where Seneca
ascribes to animals constitutionis suae sensus—an idea that is never adequately clarified,
but that is explained by aid of comparisons with human infants and turtles:
The child who is trying to stand […] falls and rises again and again with tears until
through painful effort he has trained himself to the demands of nature. And certain
animals with hard shells, when turned on their backs, twist and grope with their feet and
make motions side-ways until they are restored to their proper position. […] Thus all
Steiner’s interpretation is, to some extent, guilty of presentism—the anachronistic attribution of modern
ideas to historical figures, i.e., not even Aristotle thinks to mention consciousness in his many discussions
of animals (Greenwood 2015: 39; Hamlyn 1968).
216
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creatures are self-aware [conscious] of their own constitution and thus can use their
limbs so easily, and we have no greater proof that they come into life armed with
knowledge than the fact that no animal is clumsy in the use of its own self. Someone
objects, “The constitution, as you would argue, is the governing principle of the soul
which has a particular relationship with the body. How does an infant understand this
very complex and subtle notion that can scarcely be explained to you? All animals would
have to be born capable of understanding logic to be able to comprehend this
definition…” […] What you object would be true if I claimed that the definition of the
constitution was understood by animals, rather than the constitution itself. Nature is more
readily understood than explained. Thus an infant does not understand what a constitution
is, but he understands his own constitution. […] Thus both infants and animals possess a
consciousness of their primary element which is not too clearly distinct or exact.217

Seneca displays a rare sense of epistemic humility here. Much that is observable
does not admit of explanation, Seneca contends, and animal mentality—however little of
it there may be—falls into this category. Presumably because Seneca is unsatisfied with
explaining animal and infant behavior with impulse and appearance alone, he uses the
word “understanding” in two distinct ways: (1) to evoke a uniquely human faculty for
meta-cognition, and (2) to evoke a sense of bodily self-awareness that—when viewed in
tandem with the innate “knowledge” granted to each species from birth—is functionally
analogous with the type of epistemic knowledge that one might think necessary to satisfy
particular practical ends (e.g., climbing a tree, eating an apple, swimming). This practical
“knowledge” is non-reflective and common to humans and animals. Recall my discussion
brachiating monkeys who are capable of using all four limbs and their prehensile tale to
jump and swing rapidly through the treetops, adeptly avoiding unsound branches. This
behavior requires a certain sort of inferential background “understanding” in the sense
that branches that look like X, Y, and Z should be avoided, while branches of the sort P,
Q, and R are reliable platforms given both the monkey’s weight and the distance and/or
height of her leap. There is a legitimate dispute to be had over whether what I have just
called “understanding” really is understanding in an epistemic sense, but that is beside
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the point. I propose that this is precisely the type of thorny explanatory situation that
leads Seneca to opt for epistemic terms in his theory of animal constitution, which is at
odds with Stoic animal psychology as strictly perceptual.
If this reading is accurate, then Seneca does recognize a sense of continuity in
how humans and animals relate at a basic level to the potential and limitations of their
own bodies in everyday situations. The constitution of the monkey is different from the
constitution of the elephant, which is different from the constitution of the dog, and so
forth. Seneca never says this, but presumably constitution is his way of accounting for
behavioral variation in the animal kingdom, while at the same time arguing that all
animal behavior stems from the one-and-the-same causal principle. If the role that
constitution serves is analogous with thinking, understanding, and skilled behavior in
humans, then by allowing overlap between humans and animals here, Seneca—similar to
Aristotle before him—gets to have his cake and eat it too. Animals are largely automata,
but they also possess a certain kind of “knowledge;” animals are not skilled, but they
nonetheless “understand” how to use their bodies in ways that promote their self-interest.
Constitution is defined as a perceptual capacity, while at the same time identifying “the
special kind of perception” that “cannot easily be classified under any of [the five] sense
modalities” (Toivanen 2013: 356).
Seneca is thus wrestling with the traditional dichotomy between “perceptual” and
“rational” faculties as insufficient to explain the gamut of animal behaviors. Constitution,
like Aristotle’s discussion of phantasia, is neither rational nor perceptual, but somewhere
in between, edging toward the latter but not utterly devoid of the former.

121
8. Concluding Thoughts
The most progressive ancient philosophers of animal minds, whether Stoic (e.g.,
Posidonius), Aristotelian (e.g., Theophrastus, Aspasius), or Neoplatonist (Plutarch,
Porphyry), took observation seriously. All of these figures called out Stoic explanations
of animal psychology for being, in Posidonius’ words, “clearly in conflict with
observable fact” not only with respect to animal behavior, but also in terms of apparent
continuities between the cognitive abilities of animals and human infants. The latter
critique predates the emergence of the field of comparative psychology by two millennia,
and yet was a common fixture of challenges to Stoic views about animals.
The Stoics deserve credit for being the first to critique the argument from analogy
about animal minds. Their responses were dogmatic rather than responsibly skeptical, but
their rightly incredulous attitude nonetheless pre-dates critical responses to Hume,
Darwin, and Romanes by over a thousand years. In this sense, the Stoics can productively
be seen—similar to Descartes’ views of animals today—as important foils representing
overly radical, tough-minded positions, and thus as tacit encouragers of dissenting views.
The Neoplatonists were practically always responding to the Stoics, so it is fair to
postulate that works such as Plutarch’s On the Cleverness of Animals would not exist
were it not for Philo’s On Whether Dumb Animals Possess Reason.
Turning next to the marginalized tradition in the history of animal minds, the key
questions going forward are the following. (1) What are the most responsible ways to
posit uniqueness claims without underestimating animal cognition and/or overestimating
human cognition? (2) Do umbrella terms such as “rational faculties” benefit debates over
human uniqueness, or unnecessarily complicate them? (3) Building upon the simple
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criteria introduced in Section 5: what are the most responsible ways to posit arguments
from analogy with healthy skepticism? (4) What are the most responsible ways to
identify and avoid semantic anthropocentrism in comparative cognition and the
philosophy of animal minds? Most importantly, (5) when is carving the human/animal
dichotomy in nature a productive way of understanding the causes of animal behavior,
and when is it obstructive to that goal?
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Continuity as Crisis:
Two Traditions of Theorizing about Animal Minds
Chapter Four
Enter the Marginalized Tradition: Rejecting the Crisis
1. Overview
As discussed in Chapter One, explanatory crises of human exceptionalism arise in
four types: ontological, epistemic, empirical, and methodological. By introducing the
original figures from a marginalized tradition in animal minds philosophy, the present
chapter concludes my focus on the origins of ontological crises of human exceptionalism,
i.e., how complex behavior (animal and human) can be adequately explained within the
confines of strict dichotomies between rational/cognitive and perceptual/bodily faculties.
For almost as long as this dominant worldview has existed, so has a competing position
in favor of a pluralistic account of cognitive faculties tailored to the environmental
pressures of disparate species, rather than a hierarchical scale of mental capacities with
those of humans at the top. This approach to inquiry led Plutarch, Porphyry, and
Lucretius to reject the basis for explanatory crises of human exceptionalism of the sort
that dogged most ancient philosophers, making their writings the earliest precursors to
methods advocated by contemporary proponents of the marginalized tradition, such as
Frans de Waal (2016), Brian Hare (2017), Kristin Andrews (2012, 2015), and Colin Allen
and Marc Bekoff (1997), among others.

2. Plutarch Denies the Crisis: Gradations of Rationality
Plutarch was a member of the New Academy under Carneades (c. 189—129
BCE),

and “central to the New Academy’s stance was its opposition to doctrinaire

Stoicism with its emphasis on the primacy of the human being” (Newmyer 2011: 172).
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Next to Porphyry, Plutarch is the best-known Platonist to write on animals, as well as,
perhaps, “the most open-minded among the ancient philosophers and moralists” to
discuss the subject (Bodson 1983: 314). Plutarch’s massive work, Moralia (c. 100 CE)
contains three works dedicated to animals. On the Eating of Flesh and especially On the
Cleverness of Animals are direct attacks on the Stoic ideas that animals lack reason and
that membership in the moral community extends beyond the human species. The
dialogue Gryllus is a revisionary telling of the myth of Circe and Odysseus, where—after
having been transformed into a pig—one of Odysseus’ men (Gryllus) argues at length
that he would like to remain as such instead of being made human again. According to
Gryllus, for every capacity thought to be exceptionally human, there exists an equally
exceptional analogue in animals—often exercised more proficiently. All of these works
take doctrinaire Stoicism as their primary target.
More than any ancient philosopher, Plutarch argued that rationality (along with
imagination, learning, and sentience) arises in degrees within and between species.
Unlike Aristotle and the Stoics, Plutarch does not begin with an anthropocentric
definition of the types of human behaviors indicative of rationality before investigating
whether animals lack the ability to “truly” perform these behaviors;218 rather, he looks for
the lowest common denominator of rational behavior in humans with cognitive
deficiencies, and then uses these cases to identify continuities and overlaps with
seemingly rational behavior in other species, ultimately suggesting that gradations of
mental ability present a better model for accounting for cognitive variation in the animal
kingdom (including humans) than the standard “all or nothing” view of rationality central
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to Stoic philosophy. Plutarch reveals tensions in Stoic thought by arguing that so-called
“perceptual” capacities alone cannot sufficiently explain animal behavior without some
degree of knowledge or understanding also being present.
Plutarch’s first strategy when making this argument is to emphasize that not all
humans were created equal with respect to intelligence, and although humans are the
most intelligent creatures on earth, there exist non-human species that seem to display
capacities for reason, memory, and so forth better than, or equal to, some human beings.
Take, for example, the following exchange from On the Cleverness of Animals…
SOCLARUS. Yet it is astonishing how greatly man surpasses the animals in his capacity
for learning and in sagacity and in the requirements of justice and social life.
AUTOBULUS. There are in fact, my friend, many animals which surpass all men, not
only in bulk and swiftness, but also in keen sight and sharp hearing; but for all that man is
not blind or crippled or earless. We can run, if less swiftly than deer; and see, if less
keenly than hawks; nor has Nature deprived us of strength and bulk even though, by
comparison with the elephant and the camel, we amount to nothing in these matters. In
the same way, then, let us not say of beasts that they are completely lacking in intellect
and understanding and do not possess reason even though their understanding is less
acute and their intellect inferior to ours; what we should say is that their intellect is feeble
and turbid, like a dim and clouded eye.219

The phrase “feeble and turbid” in the final sentence is almost certainly intended as a
direct reference to Seneca’s use of a similar phrase (evoked several times in the previous
chapter) to discount the idea that rationality can exist in the animal mind. Remarkably,
however, Plutarch seems to be meeting his opponent halfway here, i.e., they can agree
that animal intellect is generally inferior to human intellect, but for Plutarch, a “dim and
clouded” engagement with the world does not necessarily imply that animals are
completely irrational, or, that humans surpass animals in all (or even most) capacities.
For instance, On the Cleverness of Animals contains an inspired discussion of how mad
dogs—like madmen—are, at least in part, cognitively impaired (insofar as
219
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“understanding” of the world is affected); their impairment is therefore not solely
perceptual.220 Plutarch is attempting to catch the Stoics in a double standard, to which
they could reasonably respond that calling dogs “mad” is just a popular turn of phrase; in
reality, rabies is a defect in temperament, not rationality. This would be a fair reply, but
Plutarch’s underlying purpose for raising this argument remains a viable critique of Stoic
dogma: reason, imagination, memory, phantasia, etc., are not “all or nothing” categories,
even among members of our own species.221 If the Stoics were to accept this basic point,
Plutarch would have nudged them closer to accepting the possibility of continuities and
overlaps between cognitive faculties across species.
Plutarch is challenging wholesale human exceptionalism, where all humans are
viewed as being superior to all non-humans in terms of possessing rational capacity X.
With good reason, he believes this to be an untenable position because however one
defines X, not all humans will possess it.222 Those familiar with the contemporary animal
ethics literature will recognize this as a nascent version of the “argument from marginal
cases,” which states that for any cognitive capacity argued to support human
exceptionalism (i.e., all human beings are worthy of an inherent dignity denied to other
species by virtue of their possessing X), one can point to human beings (“marginal
cases”) who lack capacity (or capacities) X that the exceptionalism claim is based on.223
The point of the argument from marginal cases is to break down categorical distinctions
between all human beings and all other sentient creatures by emphasizing similarities
rather than differences. There can be no doubt that this is Plutarch’s strategy. For
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example, in response to the Stoic claim (discussed below) that all humans are morally
bound together in kinship due to all humans being rational, Plutarch responds as follows:
“The followers of Zeno make this kinship the origin of justice” but “is it not irrational,
when we see many humans living by perception alone, without intelligence and reason, to
think that there is some bond of justice with such persons, and not with our plow animals
and with the dog that shares our house and with those beasts that provide us milk?”224 On
my reading, Plutarch is evoking the first use of the argument from marginal cases in the
history of philosophy in order to galvanize explanatory crises in the Stoic philosophy of
mind. He was not alone in identifying this double standard; Porphyry likewise claims that
animals deserve justice because “many of our own species live from sense alone, but do
not possess intellect and reason.”225
Curiously, one of the more progressive arguments put forth in Plutarch’s On the
Cleverness of Animals overlaps with a position attributed to Seneca in the previous
chapter. Recall that Seneca is arguably responsible for the first mention of consciousness
in the history of philosophy. Despite denying mental states to animals, Seneca claims that
animals and human infants alike develop non-reflective “knowledge” or “understanding”
(contrasted with reflective understanding) about the world. 226 I argued that Seneca’s
uncharacteristic reliance on epistemic language is indicative of explanatory crises in his
work, e.g., what philosophical or empirical basis is there to argue that a human baby and
a dog navigate their environments with fundamentally distinct mental operations? I have
shown how Aristotle, the Stoics, and the Neoplatonists alike—indeed, likely all ancient
philosophers—found this discontinuity hypothesis unlikely. The marginalized figures,
224
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however, are the only ones for whom this mutually agreed-upon idea in early
comparative psychology does not provoke defensive strategies in their general
philosophy of mind. By intentionally blurring the lines between the functions of so-called
perceptual and rational faculties, Plutarch is perhaps the first to state that psychology
(human or animal) need not be partitioned into (two) simplistic causal domains, e.g.,
“often, it is true, while we are busy reading, the letters may fall on our eyes, or words
may fall on our ears, which escape our attention since our minds are intent on other
things; but later the mind recovers, shifts its course, and follows up every detail that had
been neglected,” a fact which “proves that it is impossible to have sensation at all without
some action of the intelligence,” because “the impact on eyes and ears brings no
perception if the understanding is not present.” 227 Plutarch then draws the following
conclusion: “if we are so constituted that to have sensation we must have understanding,
then it must follow that all creatures which have sensation can also understand.” 228
Plutarch regards as antithetical to common sense the idea that a set of purely perceptual
faculties functions as the sole cause of animal behavior. This, recall, is precisely Plato’s
reason for attributing belief (doxa) to animals, i.e., raw perception alone is insufficient to
explain how animals navigate their environments. 229 Whereas Aristotle responded to
Plato by expanding the number of capacities that fall under the domain of “perception”
(allowing phantasia, memory, and so forth), the Stoics provide no such additional
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resources and are thus being rightly criticized by the Neoplatonists by means of a classic
idea from their namesake.
Presumably, like Seneca, Plutarch is referring to a limited sense of
“understanding” akin to associative learning, or, a combination of learning and memory
put into action, for he writes that an animal…
…could not survive for a moment if it had not learned to give [hostile animals] a wide
berth while freely mixing with [friendly animals]. It is, to be sure, sensation that enables
each creature to recognize both kinds; but the acts of seizing or pursuing that ensue upon
the perception of what is beneficial, as well as the eluding or fleeing of what is
destructive or painful, could by no means occur in creatures naturally incapable of some
sort of reasoning and judging, remembering and attending. Those beings, then, which you
[Stoics] deprive of all expectation, memory, design, or preparation, and of all hopes,
fears, desires, or griefs — they will have no use for eyes or ears either, even though they
have them. Indeed, it would be better to be rid of all sensation and imagination that has
nothing to make use of it, rather than to know toil and distress and pain while not
230
possessing any means of averting them.

Despite it being far from obvious that “some sort of reasoning and judging” is required
for these acts, the key point is that Plutarch’s account intentionally blurs the lines
between perceptual and rational faculties, thus closing the door on explanatory crises of
human exceptionalism by offering (perhaps) the earliest precursor of what are now
referred to as “minimal theories of rationality.”
Christopher Cherniak (1986: 3) opens Minimal Rationality with an accurate
historic claim: “Until recently, philosophy has uncritically accepted highly idealized
conceptions of rationality.” Fred Dretske (2006) argues that some learned behaviors
produced by operant conditioning can be considered “minimally rational,” in short,
because select animals are capable of forming “internal representations” of, and acting in
accordance with, particular types of objects in the world; in the above passage, Plutarch is
perhaps making a similar claim. Animals and humans form representations over time that
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discern types of objects and events in their environment as harmful or beneficial to them,
and then adjust their behavior accordingly. A radical interpretation of Plutarch would
paint him as suggesting, in line with William James, that what we call “intelligence” is a
highly advanced form of associative learning. James (1890: 360) was a discontinuity
theorist, i.e., humans alone make associations based upon abstract similarities, but he also
believed “genius” in humans to be associative learning in animals only to an “extreme
degree.” This interpretation might make Plutarch guilty of an over-intellectualized
account of instrumental learning. Nonetheless, Plutarch offers a more explanatorily
attractive account of functionally adaptive intentional behavior in animals than the purely
reflexive account tied to fixed behavioral repertoires that the Stoics advocate.
It is the nature of gradualist ontologies to be comparatively ambiguous next to
categorical or otherwise abrupt attempts at carving nature at the joints. In this sense, the
lack of details in Neoplatonist continuity-based comparative psychology is perhaps
excusable. After all, when considered beside Stoic psychology—where blunt simplicity
ultimately proves detrimental to its explanatory value—Plutarch’s approach to the animal
mind at least has the advantage of opening up more questions than it closes. The earliest
philosophical rustlings of less idealized, less anthropocentric conceptions of rationality
and mental activity are thus found in the marginalized tradition. Due to challenges
associated with explaining complex behavior with perceptual faculties alone, I’ve also
suggested that figures in the dominant tradition were—in tension with long-standing
exceptionalism claims—occasionally compelled to adopt similar gradualist approaches to
expand explanatory detail in comparisons of human and infant cognition. It is for these
reasons that the Stoic theory of animal consciousness is somewhat progressive.
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In the next section, I turn to another forward-thinking idea in Stoic psychology,
oikeiosis (“belonging”), which provides the foundation for the only attractive
exceptionalism claim in the Stoic canon: that humans alone are capable of transcending
self-interested impulses to develop a kind of impartial moral reasoning that applies not
only to kin, group, and citizenship, but to humanity as a whole. Despite broadly denying
uniqueness claims in favor of gradualist accounts, Darwin (1871) also forwarded this
exceptionalism claim, which is still defended—with good reason—in the contemporary
literature.231 This argument is the closest the Stoics come to Aristotle’s superior strategy
for dealing with explanatory crises of complex animal behavior, i.e., begin by positing
simple, widespread, biological capacities that allow organisms to survive and learn;
proceed to scaffold capacities allowing increasingly complex forms of behavior, until at
some level of comparative analysis, exceptionalism or uniqueness claims may become
appropriate. Ideally, such claims are then justifiable by appealing to simpler levels as
offering more parsimonious explanations for given animal behaviors than the level in
question, presumed to be uniquely or exceptionally human.
3. Oikeiosis: Illustration of a Progressive Foundation for Exceptionalism Claims
According to the Stoics, humans are exceptional in being able to understand,
appreciate, and act in accordance with oikeiosis, which means “belonging” or
“community” (Sorabji 1993: 77), “loving devotion” (Dierauer 1977: 199), “recognition
and appreciation of something as belonging to one” (Striker 1983: 145), or “an affective
disposition relative to the thing which is owned or belongs” (Long and Sedley 1990:
351). The term itself is “notoriously difficult to define” (Newmyer 2011: 28), but it is
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with this concept that the Stoics provide the first (somewhat) naturalistic account of the
evolution of morality—an account that appears to overlap in its early stages with other
species, and which then proceeds to explain uniquely human moral relationships in terms
of a uniquely human faculty: logos. According to the Stoics, without the joint capacity for
reason and speech, communication is meaningless, thereby making moral deliberation—
and thus membership in the moral community—impossible (Newmyer 1999: 99-110).
According to Cicero (106—43 BCE), the Roman politician and Stoic philosopher,
the first stage in the development of oikeiosis occurs “Immediately at birth” wherein “a
living creature feels an attachment for itself, and an impulse to preserve itself and to feel
affection for its own constitution and for those things which tend to preserve that
constitution; while on the other hand it conceives an antipathy to destruction and to those
things which appear to threaten destruction.”232 It is therefore natural that animals are
born with an attachment to their mothers.
In a move perhaps guilty of presentism, Sorabji (1993: 125-6) and Mary Midgley
(1983: Chs. 9-10) associate the first stage of oikeiosis with modern ideas of bonding and
imprinting mechanisms, demonstrated empirically by Douglas Spaulding (1841—1877)
in the 19th century. It is doubtful how seriously we should take this association.
According to both Zeno and Cleanthes, rational phantasia is defined in terms of
imprinting (tupôsis) where the soul is originally a blank slate: “a presentation (or mental
impression) is an imprint on the soul: the name having been appropriately borrowed from
the imprint made by the seal upon the wax.”233 This metaphor bears only a tangential
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relation to modern learning theories of imprinting/bonding.234 It is also unclear how far
this tabula rasa notion of the soul should be extended to animals, but presumably not
much further than identifying their specific mother. Although the behaviorists and
classical ethologists constructed models of imprinting without reference to thought or
primitive universals, it is difficult to make any notion of the term consistent with the
Stoic notion of constitution, from which it likely follows that animals do not learn from
experience. As Louise Barrett (2011: 74) notes, “Far from enabling individuals to arrive
in the world with their knowledge preformed […] and impervious to learning effects,
imprinting is a mechanism that absolutely requires a young animal to learn from
experience, both to trigger the predisposition, and to allow the imprinting onto the
specific idiosyncratic features of the mother.” Assuming Barrett is right, Stoic animal
psychology fails to clarify how their account of imprinting functions in the big picture.
The Stoics could avoid tensions of this sort by simply admitting continuity in
learning mechanisms among human infants and animals. Otherwise, Seneca’s view that
the development of morality begins with social instincts tailored toward particular kinds
of relationships is hardly controversial today. As Steiner (2005: 90) observes, “[t]he
initial stages of oikeiosis hold up animals as a mirror in which we catch sight of ourselves
as part of a larger cosmic whole” which the Stoics conceive of “in terms of a progression
through increasingly inclusive circles of belonging.”
Evidence of species continuity is also discernable in the second stage of oikeiosis,
which involves an expansion of one’s concerns to one’s kin and group-mates. Cicero
explains this process in terms of an impulse that “[e]ven in the lower animals nature’s
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operation can be clearly discerned.”235 This idea resonates with contemporary trends in
ethology, primatology, and the philosophy of biology that promote a “survival of the
friendliest” model of the evolution of pro-social behaviors and communicative ability.236
At this stage, Cicero goes so far as to detail mutually beneficial relations across species,
such as interactions between “sea-pens” (mussels) and pinotes—the latter being a species
of crab that lives on the sea-pen and warns it of threats.237 These sorts of observations
have become hot topics in recent years. A current example of this sort of relationship is
documented by Alex Vail and colleagues in “Referential gestures in fish collaborative
hunting” (2013), which provides evidence that groupers and coral trout make use of a
“pointing signal” (an “upside down headstand”) to indicate the whereabouts of prey to
larger “cooperative hunting partners” such as moray eels, octopuses, and Napoleon
wrasses, that reliably share in the bounty. Cicero provides other examples as well, noting
that “the ant, the bee, [and] the stork do certain actions for the sake of others besides
themselves,” but that “with human beings this bond of mutual aid is far more intimate,”
from which “it follows that we are by nature fitted to form unions, societies, and
states.”238 It is unclear whether early Stoics shared Cicero’s sentiments here, since Cicero
appears to be inferring that human social arrangements are natural parts of the human
constitution because we observe similar arrangements elsewhere in the animal kingdom.
It is only at the third and final stage that the Stoics mark a definitive categorical
distinction between humans and animals: it is the exceptional capacity for logos that
allows humans to extend the circle further, beyond their friends and family, to larger and
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larger groups, and ideally, to humanity itself. Interestingly, there is some overlap between
this theory and the core argument in Peter Singer’s book The Expanding Circle (1981),
which was inspired by Darwin’s (1871) evolutionary account of morality. Singer argues
that it is precisely our unique capacity for impartial moral reasoning that—combined with
social instincts shared with other species—has, since our hominid ancestors, naturally led
human societies to extend their “circles of moral consideration” from kin and nearby
groups to citizenship, race, sex, gender, and—for some—all sentient beings. The Stoic
Hierocles even uses the metaphor of an expanding circle: “The outermost and largest
circle of oikeiosis, which encompasses all the rest, is that of the whole human race. […] It
is the task of a well tempered man, in his proper treatment of each group, to draw the
circles together somehow toward the center.” 239 Singer and the Stoics alike offer
progressive accounts of moral development; the most significant difference (save for the
former being biologically and anthropologically substantive) being that, for Singer,
impartial moral reasoning logically takes us further than the global human community to
consider the interests of non-human animals (120). The argument from providence
central to Stoic philosophy makes this next step impossible. Neoplatonist thinkers,
however, encounter no tensions in making it.240
The nuanced thesis defended here, namely that oikeiosis provides a progressive
foundation for exceptionalism claims ultimately restrained by explanatory crises of
human exceptionalism, is present in the marginalized tradition. Note that the Stoics do
not attach any moral value to the first two stages of oikeiosis shared with animals, while
at the same time they must allow, by dint of common sense, that not all humans achieve
239
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the final stage of acknowledging cosmopolitan ideals. This critique is found in On the
Cleverness of Animals, where Plutarch expresses surprise that it does not “seem absurd”
to “those very opponents of ours” (the Stoics) that “while they postulate that love of
one’s offspring is the very foundation of our social life and administration of justice, and
observe that animals possess such love in a very marked degree, yet they assert and
hold that animals have no part in justice.”241 Porphyry also suggests that the levels of
oikeiosis detailed by the Stoics are susceptible to double standards, because the existence
of continuity in the early stages suggests the corollary that “the race of all other animals
would thus be akin (oikeion) to us and in all things related.”242 Porphyry attributes this
view to botanist and successor of Aristotle, Theophrastus (c. 371—287 BC), who wrote a
lost book entitled On the Intellect and Character of Animals. According to Porphyry…
Theophrastus employs the following reasoning: […] [we] conceive that those who derive
their origin from the same ancestors that we do, are allied to us. […] Thus also we must
admit that all men have an affinity, and are allied to each other. […] [T]he principles of
the bodies of all animals are naturally the same. […] I mean the seed, the flesh, and the
conascent genus of humors which is inherent in animals. [...] [T]hey have all of them the
same food and the same spirit, the same purple streams; and they likewise demonstrate
that the common parents of all of them are Heaven and Earth.243

Unfortunately, not a single original work of Theophrastus’ survived antiquity. This
passage, however, suggests a worldview of kinship between humans and other animals
far more pronounced than that of Aristotle. Elsewhere there is evidence that Theophrastus
argued in favor of cognitive continuity, rather than just hinting at “traces” of it, as his
teacher did. In On Piety, Porphyry attributes the following views to Theophrastus (as
summarized by Theodor Gomperz [1964: 495]):
Differences of degree [between human and animal capacities] no doubt occur on the most
extensive level; but there are no really qualitative distinctions with regard either to the
intellect or the emotions, and still less with regard to sense-perception. In the mental as in
241
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the physical sphere the ‘fundamental ingredients’ or elementary facts are the same.244

Before elaborating upon this ontological worldview as it emerged in the context of the
marginalized tradition, it is worth noting how strange it is that the Stoics—from Epictetus
to Cicero—go to such lengths to offer a fairly naturalistic description of oikeiosis, even
suggesting that certain behaviors within animal communities can serve as models for
humans,245 only to drive (arguably) the sharpest moral wedge between humans and other
species in the history of philosophy, i.e., “it is the Stoic doctrine that there can be no
question of right between man and the lower animals, because of their unlikeness.”246
Animals are denied membership in the moral community partially because they do not
communicate by means of logos endiathetos, i.e., “inner reason” or “thought” (Newmyer
2011: 164). Unlike contemporary versions of this argument (Clark 1984; Diamond 2004)
however, the Stoics deny that humans have any moral obligations to animals whatsoever.
Stoic discussions of oikeiosis nonetheless provide rare windows into what
responsibly posited exceptionalism claims can look like in ancient discussions of animal
minds. Few ancients realized that one can eschew “all or nothing” accounts of cognitive
capacities in favor of recognizing basic overlaps with other species, while at the same
time arguing that humans have “special” or “exceptional” or “more advanced” versions
of nascent capacities shared with other animals. As the Stoic theory of oikeiosis rightly
suggests, one can argue that there are degrees or stages of capacity X throughout the
animal kingdom, while still claiming that—perhaps at a certain level of complexity—
differences in X between humans and animals are so great as to indicate a difference in
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kind, e.g., the development of impartial moral reasoning from instinctive “fairness”
responses to social inequities (Brosnan and de Waal 2003), or, the evolution of a “sociocognitive infrastructure” for shared intentionality which gains explanatory value when
posited in the context of a phylogenetic history with the intentional, pro-social, “protocollaborative” behaviors of great apes (Tomasello 2008).
4. Natural Ontologies of the Early Marginalized Tradition
Unlike the hard-lined categorical distinctions so common to Stoic writings on
animals, “Platonists saw more subtly and nuances. According to them, the different
species of animals had virtues and intelligence in varying degrees” (Gilhus 2006: 61).
Plutarch does not offer anything akin to a positive account of uniquely human mental
capacities; he sees animal intelligence (of which “understanding” is an focal part) as
constituting a vast spectrum:
For as one capacity for seeing or flying differs from another (hawks and cicadas do not
see alike, nor do eagles and partridges fly alike), so also not every reasoning creature has
in the same way a mental dexterity or acumen that has attained perfection. For just as
there are many examples in animals of social instincts and bravery and ingenuity in ways
and means and in domestic arrangements, so, on the other hand, there are many examples
of the opposite: injustice, cowardliness, stupidity. […] Why, moreover, do we not say
that one tree is less intelligent than another, as a sheep is by comparison with a dog; or
one vegetable more cowardly than another, as a stag is by comparison with a lion? Is the
reason not that, just as it is impossible to call one immovable object slower than another,
so among all creatures to whom Nature has not given the faculty of understanding, we
cannot say that one is more cowardly or more slothful or more intemperate? Whereas it is
the presence of understanding, of one kind in one animal, of another kind in another, and
in varying degree, that has produced the observable differences.247

The central claims here are (1) there are multiple types of understanding and intelligence
found throughout the animal kingdom, specific to different species; (2) there is variation
within species as to how effective their degrees of “understanding” are in performing
their respective functions (in contrast to the Stoic view that “no animal is more skilled
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than any other” 248 ); (3) these gradations are clearly observable; and (4) animals and
humans belong on a spectrum of intelligence that plants and insentient objects do not.249
Plutarch never questions the fact that human beings are generally more rational than
individual members of other species. As he suggests in Gryllus, “I scarcely believe that
there is such a spread between one animal and another as there is between man and man
in the matter of judgment and reasoning and memory.” 250 As discussed in the next
chapter, Montaigne and Descartes echo precisely the same sentiment.251 This statement is
not inconsistent with Plutarch’s challenge to any claim suggesting that animals are
wholly irrational beings.252 On this Plutarch is clear: the Stoics “mistakenly believe that
creatures that were designed by nature to display perfect reason or have no reason at
all.”253 Plutarch prides himself on what he takes to be empirical basis for his views. Like
Aristotle, Porphyry, and Alexander, Plutarch’s On the Cleverness of Animals covers a
wide range of species for such a short work: “thirty-six different types of mammal,
twenty-five birds, five reptiles or amphibians, thirty types of fish, seven molluscs, five
crustaceans, four insects/spiders and two echinoderms—and also a swamp” (Gilhus 2006:
48) as well as nearly two dozen examples of animals apparently demonstrating abilities
for cooperation, altruism, emotional contagion, memory, and—of course—“cleverness,”
i.e., practical wisdom.254
Evoking a wide variety of “clever” animal behaviors is a common strategy for
figures in the marginalized tradition—a strategy that stands in stark relief with the
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writings of the Stoics and Christians, who rarely evoke specific examples or anecdotes to
defend exceptionalism claims. Consider the conception of nature promoted by another
key figure in the marginalized tradition: the Epicurean poet and philosopher Lucretius.
The worldview set forth in De rerum natura (c. 1st century BCE) can hardly be more
distinct from that offered by the Stoics:
Take a representative of any of these diverse species and you will still find that it differs
in from others of its kind. […] individuals of these species are mutually recognizable [to
each other] no less than human beings.255

Immediately following this passage, Lucretius recounts a poignant story of a cow
searching the pasture for her calf, unaware that her infant was sacrificed in the name of
human religion.256 The tale is affecting largely due to Lucretius’ stress on how the mother
is looking for her individual calf, who is the only one of its kind (quiddam proprium
notumque),257 and for whom the visual presence of other calves is inconsequential to her
state of mind.258 As Yamashita (2016) notes, this scene is one of many where “the motif
of ‘uniqueness’” is present in De rerum natura, as Lucretius “emphasizes the absolute
value of the lost calf.”259 Consider also the presence of genuine emotions in animals.
Several scenes in De rerum natura are indicative of “an idea almost unparalleled
otherwise in ancient texts, that is, the belief that animals are capable of emotions like
sadness and joy, and that they take simple pleasure in their own lives” (Newmyer 2011:
168).
No ancient text is more left field from Stoic and Christian human exceptionalism
than De rerum natura. According to Lucretius, humans are foolish for believing that their
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species represents the pinnacle of life on earth. Lucretius provides proto-evolutionary
accounts of the origin and development of language and rationality from animals to
human beings. Lucretius’ story is remarkably prescient and adds weight—in retrospect—
to his contention, shared with the Neoplatonists, that intelligence should be seen as a vast
tapestry spanning the animal kingdom, while still acknowledging that humans have
developed superior capacities for advanced forms of behavior. Lucretius’ worldview
stems from adherence to the atomism of Epicurus (341—270 BCE), of whom the former
was an ardent disciple.260
In cursory form, ancient atomism is a materialistic and anti-deterministic
ontology; its central tenets are diametrically opposed to teleological metaphysics.
Aristotle named Epicurus as one of the main competitors to his worldview (Berryman
2016). For the atomists, every tangible object in the universe was born of, and is
comprised of, chaotic interactions of atoms, which are indivisible, “strike against one
another, rebound and interlock in an infinite void” (ibid.). The abundant variation in the
world of organic and inorganic things is thus a result of large-scale variation in
arrangements of atoms,261 which Lucretius explicitly links to variation among species—
even noting that resemblances among individual members do not reflect absolute
similarity in bodies 262 and temperaments. 263 It is on this basis that Lucretius likewise
“countenanced the idea that animals have mind. He observes, for example (2.268), that a
racehorse at the starting gate cannot burst forth as quickly as its mind (mens) would like
to because the atomic substance of its body must be roused throughout its frame before it
260
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can follow the ‘urging of the mind’ (stadium mentis)” (Newmyer 2011: 168). In the sense
of what may be considered a minded being, humans are therefore not fundamentally
different from other animals. Book V of De rerum natura states that humans are not
divine creations; they are the products of lengthy temporal, environmental, and nonteleological processes. As Holmes (2003) notes:
Lucretius has an axe to grind in this book with Antiquity’s teleologists—the Platonists,
the Aristotelians, and, most of all, the Stoics. His stated aim is to disabuse his reader of
the idea that the nature of the universe is owed to any demiurgic blueprint. From the
outset, the most visible cost of this disenchantment—which for Lucretius, of course, is its
greatest gain—is the uncoupling of the human from any cosmic master plan.

Defenders of atomism oppose the notion of an intelligently designed universe, as well as
the idea of a divine being intervening and casting judgment on earthly affairs (Berryman
2016). According to Lucretius’ origin story, the original state of nature was far nastier,
brutish, and short for humans than Thomas Hobbes (1588—1679) imagined. Humans are
aliens in the natural world, not the masters of it.264 There are passages in De rerum natura
where Lucretius seems to relish in animals killing humans with their superior strength.265
Lucretius even suggests that the earliest humans almost went extinct due to domination
from other species.266 The argument from providence is “idiotic”267 since, as with other
all species, humans are no more than “a chance concatenation of atoms, of which our
desires are a chance off-shoot” (Holmes 2013).
Lucretius opposed the Stoic view that animals do not belong in the moral
community due to their lack of logos. According to both Lucretius and Epicurus, reason
and speech are not gifts specially ordained by the gods, discontinuous with other parts of
nature. Beginning with the former, Lucretius identifies reason not as something distinct
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from imprinting (as the Stoics do) but as a type of imprinting; reason is “something that
emerges, at the intersection of nature and desire, and is, therefore, an extension and
imprinting of the natural world on the human mind” (Holmes 2013). This position is
similar to the notion of “minimal rationality” I attributed to Plutarch, who saw associative
learning as a type of reason. Likewise, according to the Epicurean and Lucretian
worldview, behaviors that follow from reason are not separate from those explainable “by
nature” (as the Stoics are fond of saying), to the contrary…
Reasoning is an activity produced in the mind by means of atomic movements. To reason
is to arrange images; and this mental power is the result of images continually impinging
on the mind and establishing certain patterns within it. [...] This process gradually
becomes an ability of the mind to sort out images deliberately, that is, to perform acts of
reasoning. (Asmis 1999: 281)

Similar to Plutarch’s insistence that rationality must be discussed as a kind of activity (or,
as a background condition for particular activities), Lucretius held that reason is “an
instrument, not an end in itself;” it “serves the desire for pleasure” and humans are not
unique in this regard (Asmis 1993: 765-6). It follows that the formation of mental
concepts is not a uniquely human capacity either, as—similar to Aristotle’s talk of
“primitive universals”—Lucretius and Epicurus understood rudimentary concepts to be
necessary for perception.268
With respect to the other side of logos (language or speech), the story offered by
Lucretius, following Epicurus, is much the same. Meaningful speech is not a capacity
ordained by an anthropocentric god, but rather a faculty shared with other animals, which
developed over a long period of time. In the fifth book of De rerum natura, Lucretius
tells his “culture story” which begins with pre-historical times in the state of nature.
268
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Lucretius claims that the words that make up human language first appeared as
instinctive, meaningless noises, such as grunts, that were no different from the
vocalizations of animals, and that humans uttered thoughtlessly in response to
environmental stimuli; when humans eventually became aware of these reflexive
vocalizations in themselves and others, they attached vague meanings to these sounds,
using them as tools to communicate.269 In a striking resemblance to theories by Wilhelm
Wundt (1878) and Michael Tomasello (2008, 2010) about the origins of human
communication in animal gestures, Lucretius claims that the natural pointing behaviors of
babies are indicative of humanity’s inborn desire to connect and converse 270 —an
observation that led Tomasello to designate the intentional pointing gestures of great apes
as building blocks of human communication, rather than their vocalizations. Lucretius
never states that other species communicate as expertly as humans; his claim is that there
is not a qualitative difference between human and animal communication in their
formative stages. Perhaps the same holds for developed stages as well. As Holmes (2015:
4) puts it, the aim of “Lucretius’ lengthy comparison of proto-human expression to
articulate animal noises” is to show that…
…humans were once animals who made referential, meaningful noises in response to
their surroundings. […] It was reason and usefulness that brought us to language. The
diversity and contingency of the experiences that gave rise to the varieties of sounds—
and therefore to the varieties of words and languages.

One of Holmes’ more intriguing interpretations of Lucretius’ account of language is that
the nonsensical words that he makes up to describe the utterances of prehistoric humans
are intended to reflect the fact that early human language would appear to us—like
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animal vocalizations—as meaningless. The point being that just because humans cannot
understand animals does not mean that animal vocalizations are devoid of meaning.
A similar point is present in Porphyry’s On Abstinence from Animal Flesh: “For
the Greeks do not understand what is said by the Indians, nor those who are educated in
Attica the language of the Scythians, or Thracians, or Syrians; but the sound of the one
falls on the ears of the other like the clangor of cranes, though by others their vocal
sounds can be written and articulated, in the same manner as ours can by us.” 271
According to Porphyry, animal sounds are indicative of the externalization of internal
wants, desires, and emotions.272 A parallel view is found in Plutarch, who claims that,
“animals themselves have an understanding of the concept of justice and actively seek it
from human beings,” as evinced by their “cries for justice,” which, while they appear
“inarticulate” to humans, the reason for this is because humans lack the capacity to
decipher them.273 What Porphyry, Plutarch, and Lucretius do not consider, oddly perhaps,
is that the fact that humans cannot understand animal language does not entail that it is
meaningful either.
This was nonetheless an influential strategy in the marginalized tradition. Pierre
Gilles (1490—1555) uses a similar argument in his Ælian (1533), claiming he is
“convinced that the beasts reason and answers the objection, of which much was made in
the seventeenth century, that they cannot speak, by asserting that they can speak, only we
do not understand them. But for that matter, we don’t understand foreigners” (Boas 1935:
41). To his credit, Gilles also posits that some do understand animal signals by studying
the meaning of their cries and vocalizations (ibid.). While still dogmatic, at least Gilles
271

On Abstinence from Animal Flesh 3.3
Ibid.
273
On the Eating of Flesh, 994e. See also Newmyer (1997: 85-88).
272

146
defers authority to experts. Likewise, the epistemic claims of these two Neoplatonists
against Stoic skepticism about the meanings of animal sounds warrant some merit, but
their own certainty in this regard is unfounded, and seemingly rests entirely on the view
that humans are not alone in having a “silent discourse” running through the soul as they
perceive and interact with their environments,274 which is doubtful.
Having discussed alternative conceptions of the development of reason and
speech, I conclude with marginalized views on the role of animals in the origins of
morality. The purpose of Lucretius’ natural history is not merely to show how humans
are inconsequential, or how atomism created the world, but how human morality emerged
on the scene. Animals play pivotal roles in this story. First, humans are said to have
banded together into communities because they were too weak to survive amongst other
animals on their own. In contrast to Stoic restrictions on moral community membership,
Plutarch, Porphyry, and (arguably) Lucretius believed that humans could form contracts
with certain animal species for the purpose of safety and pleasure (Shelton 1995: 115121). Second, as a result of physical weakness, humans have more ruthless constitutions
than is typical of other species. Combined, these points offer a radically different picture
of the origins of ethical behavior than the Stoics’ story of the development of oikeiosis
among providentially ordained moral beings.

6. Concluding Thoughts
What the marginalized worldviews of Lucretius, Porphyry, and Plutarch
demonstrate is that there were ancient philosophers capable of both (1) acknowledging
that humans do indeed have exceptional capacities for language and morality, and (2) that
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one can make claims of this nature while at the same time remaining open-minded that
continuities may exist in the domains of communication, community, and reason more
generally. Aristotle’s overlaps with the marginalized figures on these points are what
make his strategies for defending exceptionalism claims about the human mind the most
progressive of the dominant tradition during antiquity.
One encounters fewer explanatory roadblocks accounting for similarities and
differences between humans and animals when inquiry is directed from ontological
assumptions shared by the marginalized tradition and—to a significant extent—Aristotle,
than from the widespread views of the dominant tradition. The repercussions of semantic
anthropocentrism, for instance, are felt not just in animal psychology, but in
developmental psychology as well. It has been known since antiquity that confabulating
the mental abilities of humans in comparison with those of animals never bodes well for
explaining the behavior and mental lives of human infants. In contrast, bottom-up models
of cognitive development (such as those offered by Lucretius) that begin with species
continuity provide firmer foundations for uniqueness and exceptionalism claims down the
line. Such is the case with the Stoics’ uncharacteristically nuanced notion of oikeiosis.
Nonetheless, explanatory tensions of the sort arising from the final stages of oikeiosis and
Seneca’s relatively progressive approach to animal consciousness are indicative of larger
explanatory crises in the ancient philosophy of mind tied to how the perceptual/rational
dichotomy informs traditional ontologies of mind and species.
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Continuity as Crisis:
Two Traditions of Theorizing about Animal Minds
Chapter Five
Renaissance Origins of Animal Minds Skepticism
1. Overview
How much, after all, does man amount to? Formally or informally, directly or indirectly,
the Renaissance is perpetually preoccupied with this question of scale, of valuation. It
tries to survey man methodically, sets him in balance with animals or angels, looks at him
from odd and unfamiliar perspectives, reduces, magnifies, inverts, and collapses him—
stunting with the nature of man, as with a new-model airplane, to see what extraordinary
feats he is capable of. Or, the game can be reversed…
-Robert Adams (1963: xlii-xliii)

After centuries of church sanctioned, Stoic-inspired dogma about the causes of
animal behavior, debates over human uniqueness come back into vogue with the revival
of ancient texts during the French and Italian Renaissance, culminating in the 17th century
with René Descartes’ “monstrous thesis” (Harrison 1992: 221) that animals are automata.
For the first time in history, the argument from providence—long central to the dominant
tradition in the philosophy of animal minds—begins to lose favor amongst intellectuals,
satirists, and those dedicated to fostering a new secular science. For those who found
wisdom in Saint Peter’s claim, “for God resisteth the proud, and giveth grace to the
humble,” 275 the argument that God bestowed exceptional capacities upon humanity
slowly acquired the antediluvian repute of an age far removed from the present. Michel
de Montaigne (1533—1592) opens his widely read Apologie for Raymond Sebond (1576)
berating the dominant tradition with an attitude already in vogue among poets, 276
humorists,277 and academics278 of 15th and 16th century Europe:
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Let him help me to understand, by the force of his reason, on what foundations he has
built these great advantages that he thinks he has over other creatures. […] Is it possible
to imagine anything so ridiculous as that this miserable and puny creature, who is not
even master of himself […] should call himself master and emperor of the universe, the
least part of which it is not in his power to know, much less to command? (399)

Accordingly, true faith in God is achieved only through the critical reevaluation of
humanity. Montaigne sets about this project by shifting debate over uniqueness and
exceptionalism claims from theological and/or ontological speculations about categorical
differences between human and animal minds, to epistemic concerns about how these
disparities can be known in the first place. The result is the emergence a new kind of
explanatory crisis not only in the philosophy of animal minds, but also in the philosophy
of mind generally.
In challenging the intellectual vanity of humans, Montaigne taps the epistemic
currents of the “nouveaux Pyrrhonism” present throughout 16th century thought, to
which Descartes would later respond in his celebrated quest for certainty and Bacon with
his championing of the scientific method. As Richard Popkin (1979: xvi, 1) observes,
“skepticism plays a special and different role in the period from the Reformation up to
the formulation of the Cartesian philosophy […] due to the fact that the intellectual crisis
brought on by the Reformation coincided in time with the rediscovery and revival of the
arguments of the ancient Greek skeptics”—arguments which “became part of the
philosophical core of the religious struggles then taking place.” The role that animals
played in this moment in history was threefold: by tearing down uniqueness claims,
animals were cast as (1) foils for human intellectual arrogance, e.g., other creatures also
reason; (2) foils for human cosmic vanity, i.e., as living proof of continuities in nature
278

Consider English polymath Sir Thomas Browne’s (1605—1682) Pseudodoxia Epidemica (1672), where
Browne uses the elephant as an example to “dispel each of the principal inhibitions traditionally understood
to disqualify animals from the exclusive human domain of language” (Cummings 2004: 164).
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and thus the hypothesis that “man” is but one animal of many; and (3) as provocative and
often humorous examples to motivate this “new” skepticism—after all, few hypotheses in
history have enjoyed as much agreement as exceptionalism claims against “the beasts.”279
Sextus Empiricus and the myriad of ancient and early-modern skeptics that he
influenced argued that since “our judgments about animals as objects of perception are
problematic,” “we must end in suspension of judgment about the way animals really are”
(Annas and Barnes 1985: 46). At his best, Montaigne is the first figure in what I have
called the marginalized tradition to adopt this epistemic stance, and one can sense the
pleasure he takes in his task: “How does he know, by the force of his intelligence, the
secret internal sittings of animals? By what comparison between them and us does he
infer the stupidity that he attributes to them?” (400)—later adding, “we, who have no
dealings with them except obedience?” (416). Montaigne then answers his own question
with a passage that embodies the open-mindedness characteristic of the marginalized
tradition, and also of the times: “All that seems strange to us, and what we do not
understand, we condemn. The same thing happens also in the judgment we make of
animals. They have several conditions like to ours; from those we may by comparison
draw some conjecture: but of those qualities that are particular to them, how know we
what to make of them?” (416) Note how Montaigne is not necessarily advocating
conclusions drawn from the argument from analogy here (as David Hume later would).
Rather, he is noting how positive analogies based on observation can be suggestive of
continuities; as I read this passage, Montaigne is telling his reader that there is too much
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Montaigne, for example, was influenced by the literary genre of paradoxes—“little essays against the
prevailing opinion of mankind” (Boas 1935: 11). For instance, in Theatre du Monde (1558: 27) P.
Boaystuau discusses the misery of humanity and allies himself with “many ancient Philosophers, have not
been ashamed to dispute, & to stand in doubt whether brute beasts be partakers of reason.”
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unknown about the animal mind to warrant uniqueness claims about humans—an attitude
present in an oft-quoted passage from the Apologie: “When I play with my cat, how do I
know that she is not passing time with me rather than I with her? We entertain ourselves
with mutual monkey tricks. If I have times when I want to begin or to say no, so does
she” (401). One can thus observe in Montaigne the combined influence of Sextus’
Pyrrhonian skepticism and the anti-anthropocentric, pro-continuity perspectives of
Plutarch and Lucretius, which, collectively, push the burden of proof of exceptionalism
claims onto those who take them for granted.280
2. The Rise of Epistemic Crises of Human Exceptionalism
The ancient philosophy of animal minds stressed what would become the central
point of contention for the dominant tradition: all complex animal behavior can be
explained in terms of instinct, learned behaviors, and the basic faculties of perception. By
the Renaissance, the question emphatically becomes: yes, but why should it? On what
epistemic basis is one justified in denying human cognitive capacities to animals?
Montaigne’s Apologie contains several passages demonstrating this outlook, e.g., “we see
[…] in our ruder performances that we there employ all our faculties and apply the
utmost power of our souls; why do we not conclude the same of [animals]? Why should
we attribute to some sort of natural and servile inclination these works which surpass all
we can do by nature and art?” (404). Again, note the repeated “why.” This attitude is was
also present among Renaissance zoologists who, like Pierre Gilles (1490—1555), were
“precursors of the empirical method,” who at once wanted to study animals as “they
actually are” (ibid.), while at the same time eschewing the dogmatic certainty of ancient
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Theodore Gaza (1398—1475), the great translator of Aristotle, also translated Plutarch’s theses on
animal rationality (Perfetti 2011: 163).
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and medieval uniqueness claims. Riding this wave of skepticism, Renaissance
philosophers often demand of their peers an unachievable level of certainty, of which
uniqueness and exceptionalism claims are hardly exempt.
In tandem with the “theological crisis” (Popkin 1979) described above, the
Renaissance brought about a “crisis of knowledge” (ibid.) provoked by “that type of
doubt engendered by the rediscovery of the great variety of points of view of ancient
thinkers” as well as “coupling the impact of the rediscovery of the ancient world with the
discovery of the New World. On the other side of the Atlantic Ocean another cultural
universe existed, with different standards and ideals. On what basis could we ever judge
whether the outlook of the noble savages was better or worse than our own?” (43) The
same can be said for the renewed interest in the variety of organisms that make up the
natural world. Indeed, skepticism about human uniqueness in these centuries is not
entirely based on epistemic concerns, it also arises from increasing empirical knowledge
that the natural world is full of marvels that are unknown, unappreciated, or just plain
mysterious. Montaigne (1576: 417) uses this fact to his advantage, writing that while
humans are presumably superior in some ways, animals “produce other effects much
beyond our capacity, to which we are so far from being able to arrive by imitation, that
we cannot so much as by imagination conceive them.”
For example, Montaigne marvels at the capacity of cephalopods to “actively
change” their colors “at will” as the occasion permits, which he contrasts with the
“passive” color changes that occur in chameleons and humans in various states of passion
(418). Montaigne’s conjecture has some contemporary merit. “It’s not easy to re-identify
animals that can change their color and shape at will,” observes Peter Godfrey-Smith
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(2016: 113). Individual cephalopods, distinctive in their palettes and behaviors, are
seemingly able to “actively produce the right color” as the situation requires (120).
Godfrey-Smith’s choice of language does not commit him to the view that octopuses,
cuttlefish, and the like are capable of making conscious choices of their colors. This is an
enigmatic, multi-faceted question. But Godfrey-Smith presumably agrees with Montaigne
that there is a difference between this capacity as expressed in chameleons—which is
easier to explain—and this capacity as manifest in cephalopods, perhaps due to the
relative intelligence of the latter. Like Montaigne, he writes, for instance, “I wondered
whether this might be a case of the ‘passive’ production of colors, reflecting the mix
coming in. But the movement through colors seemed more organized than that, and many
of the colors had no analogues outside. […] Perhaps the part of his brain that controls the
skin was turning over a sequence of colors of its own accord” (134). Though GodfreySmith’s open-mindedness about the mysteries of animal cognition is fairly characteristic
of animal scholarship today, Montaigne stands out historically in terms of both epistemic
humility and curiosity about non-human species for their own sake (rather than as
stepping stones to human cognition). As Montaigne’s cephalopods demonstrate,
explanations of the differences between human and animal cognition are not always
amenable to a single cognitive hierarchy in nature—nor would this be desirable.
The Renaissance ushered in a “crisis of scientific knowledge” that often arose
from squaring Aristotelian philosophy with new methods of empirical science (Popkin
1979). In The Advancement of Learning, Sir Francis Bacon (1605/1963: 228) wrote that
“in natural history we see there hath not been that choice and judgment used as ought to
have been, […] a great part not only untried but notoriously untrue.” The same was being
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said about the knowledge of animals inherited from antiquity. Scientists in the 15th and
especially 16th and 17th centuries were forced to come to terms with the fact that they did
not know much about animals, that is, beyond the writings of Aristotle, the medieval
bestiaries, and lengthy tradition of moralistic natural histories. “There is no description
here, only legend,” wrote Georges-Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon (1707—1788)
attacking Ulisse Aldrovandi’s (1522—1605) Historia serpentum et draconum (1640) as
—in the words of Foucault (1970: 39)—“an inextricable mixture of exact description,
reported quotations, fables without commentary.” Not only was Aristotle’s epistemic
worldview under attack (i.e., certain truths exist), but many of his specific views were as
well, including those on animals. The humanists and zoologists who translated Plato,
Aristotle, and Seneca were not interested in crises of continuity between human and
animal minds; they turned to Aristotle for foundations to a new, rigorous science of
zoology, and were ultimately disappointed. This led to a “drastic decrease” in Aristotelian
commentaries on De animalibus in the early to mid 16th century (Perfetti 2011: 154).
New Aristotelians such as Pietro Pomponazzi (1462—1525), for instance,
seemingly had no interest in the animal mind. Pomponazzi was professor of natural
philosophy at the University of Bologna, who in 1521 seemingly taught the first course
on Aristotle’s zoology in the Renaissance—yet as Stefano Perfetti describes the class, it
“is something of a program of reasoned skepticism, more than an exercise in progressive
naturalism” (152). In Pomponazzi’s own words, Aristotle lacked “true science,” instead
basing his arguments on “credulity and belief, since Aristotle did not see all these animals
(had he lived a thousand years, he would not have seen them); rather he trusted in those
who saw things;” Pomponazzi then makes a claim at home in Montaigne: “Aristotle had
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about [animals] the same knowledge that we Christians have about Christ: for we did not
see Christ, but we believe those who wrote about him.”281 For the first time, Aristotle was
widely critiqued for not being empirically rigorous. His complicated, often progressive
views on animal minds were all but overlooked during this era, presumably because
animal physiology first needed to be reestablished as a proper science.
Prior to the Cartesian turn in animal psychology, then, one must consider how the
lack of reliable knowledge about animals, combined with skepticism toward pretensions
of knowledge about anything, engendered a state of explanatory crisis in the Renaissance
quite distinct from the ontological questions about human exceptionalism that pervaded
antiquity. In terms of popular readership, these newfound epistemic and empirical
challenges were instigated by Montaigne, his protégé Pierre Charron (1541—1603), and
other marginalized figures discussed below. This is not to say that the principle basis of
ancient crises of human exceptionalism fades away. Like Plutarch, Montaigne targets the
utility of dichotomizing rational and perceptual faculties in humans and animals, i.e.,
“when we compare man with animals, we find he has no wonderful faculties that they
lack, and that his so-called rationality is just a form of animal behavior” (Popkin 1979:
45). It is to say, however, that due to prevailing epistemic currents in search of reliable
criteria for knowledge, the Renaissance allowed space for progressive philosophical
positions on the similarities and differences between human and animal minds. Inspired
primarily by Montaigne and Gilles, continuity hypotheses earned fresh champions,
including Estienne Pasquier (1529—1615), La Mothe le Vayer (1588—1672), Cureau de
la Chambre (1594—1669),282 and most famously, Charron, who like Montaigne adopted
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Expositio, 227; qtd. Boehrer (2011: 18).
E.g., Love and Hate of the Beasts (1667)
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the Lucretian stance of not being “interested in man’s place in relation to other creatures,
but only in the particular endowments of each” (Boas 1935: 50).
From his readings of ancient texts Montaigne lends much-needed credence to a
progressive, naturalistic worldview predating modern biological inquiry by at least three
centuries. As Montaigne sums up his influential attack on human exceptionalism, he
quotes Lucretius—who is cited seventy-six times in the Apologie (Hendrick 1979: 457)—
making explicit their most significant shared contribution to this critical genealogy:283
All this I have said [about animal life and intelligence] to prove the resemblance there is
in human things, and to bring us back and join us to the majority: we are neither above
nor below the rest. All that is under heaven, says the wise man [Lucretius], runs one law
and one fortune: “All things are bound in the same fatal chains.” There is indeed some
difference [between species]; there are orders and degrees; but ’tis under the aspect of
one same nature.284

Akin the Neoplatonic conception of the place of humans in the animal kingdom, all
creatures are said to have traits unique and fit to their species; humans excel non-humans
in some traits, while some non-human species excel humans in others; 285 despite
immense variation, there is continuity throughout nature (Montaigne even writes of
homosexuality in other species286); there are discontinuities to be found, but uniqueness
claims about humans hold no additional weight than uniqueness claims made about any
species (as one can infer from Montaigne’s discussion of “active change” in
cephalopods).
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The aims of these works are ultimately contrary: “Lucretius stresses the distance between man and the
gods in order to emphasize the dignity and independence of rational man. Montaigne creates as wide a gulf
as possible between God and man in order to abase human pride and presumption” (Hendrick 1975: 460).
284 Apologie, 408
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Ibid. 406
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Ibid. 421.
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3. Semantic Anthropocentrism in the Renaissance
In stark contrast to the worldview just described, the dominant tradition in the
philosophy of animal minds assumes an orthogenetic perspective about cognition in
nature, i.e., as a trajectory of “lower” to “higher” capacities culminating in the mental
faculties of Homo sapiens, sequestered by divisions in kind along the way.287 As with
Plutarch, Porphyry, and Lucretius, Montaigne was highly critical of systematic attempts
by any philosopher to “pick himself out” and “separate himself from the hoard of other
creatures” by “carving out” the best “shares for his fellows and companions,” thus
“distributing among them such portions of faculties and powers as he sees fit.” 288
Montaigne was aware of the argumentative strategies commonly used by adversaries in
defense of uniqueness claims. For example, skeptical of the claim that birds lack speech,
Montaigne accuses his opponents as “playing with words to go and attribute this great
effect to some natural ordinance, without the intelligence, consent, and reason of the
creature that produces it” (418). Montaigne likely borrowed this critique from Plutarch’s
challenge to the Stoics’ repeated use of “as if” rhetoric in the Gryllus.
Plutarch’s clever dialogue is, I suspect, largely responsible for Renaissance
acknowledgment of the dangers of semantic anthropocentrism. Two direct literary riffs
on Plutarch’s fable went through multiple printings and editions during this period:
Niccolò Machiavelli’s (1469—1527) The Golden Ass (1517) and Giovanni Battista
Gelli’s (1498—1563) Circe (1549)—both of which portray a baffled Odysseus struggling
to convince his fellow Greeks to accept Circe’s offer to relieve them of their animal
forms in favor of becoming human again. The arguments in the latter are often clever, but
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it is a mistake to represent Gelli as simply reiterating Plutarch’s arguments with
characteristic Renaissance flourish, as Boas (1935: 27) and Robert Adams (1963: xxiv)
tend to do. Rather, Circe is a superior text to Gryllus insofar as the key strategies of
dominant tradition are accurately and fiercely represented. Throughout its ten dialogues
(over 170 pages), Gelli’s Ulysses is a character who repeatedly employs the most
common strategy of the dominant tradition to date: when a species is suggestively argued
or shown to possess what is widely believed to be a uniquely human capacity, that
capacity undergoes constant semantic refinement and redefinition in order to defend and
reinforce the original uniqueness claim, often by adding the “true” prefix.
For example, Ulysses argues that animals lack “true friendship” because, “among
you beasts ‘friendship’ is nothing but instinct and natural inclinations” (Gelli 1963: 77).
Animals also lack “true judgment,” “true habits,” “true bravery,” and “true fortitude”—
all of which, despite being observed in animals, are uniquely human because they require
“right reason.” For my present purposes, what is important is not what Gelli’s Ulysses
means by “right reason,” or whether he is correct that animals lack these capacities; what
is significant are the incisive responses of Ulysses’ antagonists, the animals.
Representatives of several species accuse Ulysses of semantic anthropocentrism. In
defense of the argument that animals have no sense of morality, the Bullock, for instance,
accuses Ulysses of drawing upon “fantastic subtleties and hairline distinctions devised by
yourselves in order to maintain your superiority over us” (150). Similarly, the Lion
accuses Ulysses of repeatedly ‘moving the goalposts’ throughout their debate on these
subjects, even to a point where humans can very rarely be said to possess these virtues:
Ulysses, let me speak a plain word. As you describe the matter, so many circumstances
and considerations are required to make an action valiant, and so many rare ingredients
are necessary in the composition of a brave man, that I very much doubt if either can
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occur very frequently. Especially since they cannot be achieved till they have gained a
universal applause, which is supposed always to have due regard for truth and merit. But
you must not hope to make these sophistries prevail… (107-8 [emphasis added])

Elsewhere, in his discourse with the Dog, Ulysses attempts to defend the uniqueness
claim regarding prudence. This discussion is notable due to the Dog’s skepticism, which
proves to be more incisive than Montaigne’s. After providing a lengthy list of examples
of animals planning ahead, the following exchange ensues:
Dog: Why, will you deny that prudence is knowing how to govern our operations rightly
and how to employ them carefully about things which are good or useful for us? Surely
you will not contradict me in this.
Ulysses: No; but this is not sufficient. […] Prudence is a virtue of the practical
understanding, and its business is to know the general rules of the active life. These first
principles she learns from the understanding, and afterwards, by the help of reason,
applies them to particulars. But this whole process you can have nothing to do with
because you have no understanding.
Dog: How will you make it appear that prudence is in the understanding and not in the
sense? (130-1)

This final question is key, as the Dog is adopting somewhat of a proto-behaviorist
response—the same sort of skeptical attitude fueling the logical problem in contemporary
philosophy. Namely, how can one tell the difference between cases where an animal or
human is guided by a rational faculty, or, by instincts and/or operant conditioning?
Ulysses’ response is unconvincing. He cites Stoic dogma that animals lack capacities for
assent and judgment, both necessary for “true prudence” regarding the future, to which
the Dog immediately employs the same strategy again in order to back up his skepticism:
but do not animals also possess memory and phantasia, which serve the same function in
perceiving things that are not immediately present? (131). Again, how can one tell the
difference between prudent-looking behavior caused by reason, versus that caused by
memory and imagination? Ulysses dodges this question as well. Instead of providing
grounds for distinguishing analogous behaviors caused by two functionally equivalent
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capacities, in Stoic fashion Ulysses denies that animals possess both memory, “because
you are incapable of conceiving universals,” and learning, “because you have not the gift
of memory which treasures up particulars so that reason may afterwards consult and
examine them” (132) which means that animals “cannot possibly receive any new
intelligence” apart from what they are born with (172). The Dog replies: “Why do
pretend that we have no memory?” to which Ulysses falls again into the same linguistic
strategy, and consequently, the same earnest request for further clarification:
Ulysses: I deny that you have it, for yours is imagination, not memory.
Dog: And what real difference is there between them, if we remember things as well by
our imagination as you do by your memory? (132)

In response, Ulysses tightens up his definition even more: true “intellective” memory, he
says, requires the ability to understand time (173). As such, prudence is “nothing else but
a habit of acting reasonably upon those things that are either good or evil for us.” When
the Dog replies that animals also have habits based on practical understanding, Ulysses
replies that they are not “true habits” informed by reason. To this, the Dog gets fed up:
Dog: All these plausible reasons you have produced, Ulysses, seem to me nothing but
verbal distinctions, which you have been pleased to create to gratify your own self
esteem. Thus the very same thing which is called prudence or art in you, when it occurs
in us is called instinct and direction of nature. (173 [emphasis added])

Again the Dog is strategically donning his proto-behaviorist hat to contest the epistemic
basis for uniqueness claims about cognitive abilities. Interestingly, whereas in the 20th
and 21st centuries this mode of skepticism will be evoked primarily by the dominant
tradition to refute the epistemic legitimacy of continuity hypotheses (e.g., that animals
possess a theory of mind), here it is evoked to support the marginalized tradition. The
point is: regardless of perspective, the logical problem can be, and has been, used to
challenge any pretense of knowledge that animals do or do not possess a given capacity.
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This strategy appears once more in the text, which eventually leads Ulysses to
make what appears to be the first uniqueness claim pertaining to theory of mind in the
history of philosophy. Responding to Ulysses’ claim that animals lack judgment/assent,
the Elephant asks, “Could not sense and appetite perform the same function without
setting up this additional faculty in man?” (168) To which Ulysses replies, “yes, but
imperfectly,” as “true judgment” requires “separating or abstracting forms from matter,
considering their proper essence, and dividing it into its several parts, or composing their
predicates, substantials, and accidentals, along with their subjects, comes to have a most
certain knowledge of nature” (ibid.). To this, Ulysses and the Elephant get into an
argument about instances where animals appear to make judgments in their social lives.
Ulysses then essentially claims that animals lack a theory of mind, as they interact with
one another entirely by means of…
…a certain instinct of nature, by which means a sheep, seeing a wolf, without thinking at
all, takes immediately to his heels; whereas [humans] gather the like intentions of things,
not by natural instinct, but by a train of argument, guided by reason, which compares one
thing with another; hence this faculty in us is called cogitation […] for it considers the
intentions and properties of particular things, as the understanding does universals. And
therefore when a man happens to see a wolf, even though he takes him to be an enemy,
he does not forthwith run away on a natural principle [unless the wolf is] making
furiously toward him, howling and openmouthed, like one dying of hunger, then,
comparing all these things together, he is likely to conclude that the wolf approaches with
no friendly intentions, and so he beats a retreat. By this single instance you may perceive
how much more perfect these faculties are in us than in you. (167 [emphasis added])

As it turns out, theory of mind is the exceptionalism claim that wins the day. The book
ends with the Elephant conceding to Ulysses that humans are superior in this way,
leading him to be the only animal to implore Circe to change him back into a Greek.
Gelli’s Circe “had a great vogue and was often imitated,” being translated into
multiple languages through several pressings; it was even put into dramatic form a
number of times (Boas 1935: 35-6). Montaigne himself owned a copy (27). Most
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importantly, Circe embodies the open-mindedness of the times. The best example of this
is perhaps Ulysses’ discourse with the Doe, who offers a progressive defense of feminist
principles as her reason to remain an animal, rather than returning to her human form.289
Robert Adams (1963) aptly notes that Circe is the product of an age encountering
a “sense of crisis” pertaining to stature of humanity in nature (xlvii). Gelli’s work, Adams
continues, represents a marginalized approach to animals, for “[i]n the history of formal
philosophy, there is of course no place at all for the Florentine shoemaker; [except]
among the disciples of Democritus, 290 who have thought that crises might as well be
encountered with levity and mental agility as with somber desperation” (ibid.). Indeed,
amongst the “disciples of Democritus” is Plutarch, who, unlike Gelli’s final dialogue with
the Elephant, ends his Gryllus ends on a different note: “beasts are not entirely deprived
of rational discourse nor understanding, though of course their abilities vary. But the
same lack of uniform ability is found in men” (Boas 1935: 27). Ultimately, Gelli’s
primary concern is no different than that of Aristotle and the Stoics: addressing
explanatory crises wherein animal capacities appear equal to, or greater than, those of
humans. In this sense, Gelli is an example of the sort of open-minded figure who does not
fit neatly into either the marginalized or dominant tradition. He acknowledges that while
there are discontinuities between human and animal minds, it is also true that the types of
semantic strategies often employed to reinforce uniqueness claims tend to arise from
anthropocentric incentives.
289

Doe: “Alas! It is not being a reasonable creature that makes me so unwilling to return to my former
condition, but because I must be a woman again. We are so scorned that some of your wise men have
asserted that we are not of the same species” (84-5).
290
Democritus (c. 460—370 BC) belongs in the marginalized tradition. As Montaigne describes his
influence: “Democritus held and proved, that most of the arts we have were taught us by other animals, as
the spider has taught us to weave and sew, the swallow to build, the swan and nightingale music, and
several animals, in imitating them, to make medicines” (413).
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4. Animal Language: A Case Study in Healthy Skepticism
Satirists and philosophers have long evoked exceptionalism claims pertaining to
language as targets for attack.291 This topic likewise sets the scene for some of the most
progressive arguments in Montaigne’s Apologie. To begin, Montaigne evokes skepticism
to convincing effect by citing what is inferable from animal signals: “Even in the very
beasts that have no voice at all, we easily conclude, from the social offices we observe
amongst them, some other sort of communication; their very motions converse and
consult” (402 [emphasis added]). Montaigne’s approach recalls Aristotle’s frequent claim
that animals can be said to possess some human capacities “by analogy.” Indeed, there is
a relationship to be drawn between the biological functionalism that leads Aristotle to
largely eschew exceptionalism claims in favor of uniqueness claims, and Montaigne’s
perspective that “each species and each individual must have its own standards” for
comparison, entailing that “the worth of an individual consists not in riding high, but
fittingly” (Arbel 2017: 51). Montaigne, continues Arbel…
…was a solid believer in the plenitude of nature and the great chain of being—not a
vertical chain of being with links from low to high as in Ficino, but rather a horizontal
chain with links stretching across all creation. […] There is no question of one being
superior to another […] They are merely different, and in large measure the key to man’s
worth, as well as to the worth of other creatures, is to be found in variety itself.

Returning to accusations of semantic anthropocentrism, the mistake of
philosophers, argues Montaigne, is to define “language” strictly in terms of vocalizations,
whereas, in fact, there are “grammars in gestures” and “finger alphabets” that fulfill the
same roles (403). As noted in the previous chapter, this claim also appears in De rerum
291

For an example of the times, consider Desiderius Erasmus’s (1466—1536) Praise of Folly (1509),
which includes “reflections on the classical (and modern) claim that animals are inferior beings because
they lack the ability to speak and are ignorant of grammar. […] ‘The grammar of even one language is
more than enough to make life a perpetual agony.’ Thus the very characteristic singled out by philosophers
as an exclusive capacity of human beings is here presented as a source of misery” (Arbel 2017: 72).
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natura, and indeed, Montaigne quotes Lucretius four times in this section. In doing so, he
evokes human marginal cases—“mutes” who “dispute, contest, and tell stories by signs,”
children who cannot yet speak,292 as well as the case of “lovers” who, whether “angry” or
“reconciled,” are able to “entreat, thank, appoint, and, in short, speak all things by their
eyes.” Indeed, Montaigne describes in great detail and with dozens of adjectives the
multitude of meanings conveyable in human and animal communication with eyes alone,
hands alone, head alone, eyebrows alone, shoulders alone. There is, says Montaigne, “no
movement that does not speak both a language intelligible without instruction, and a
public language” (ibid.). He chastises humans for not relating animal communication to
“the variety and particular use of other languages,” and instead assuming that human
language “must rather be judged the one proper” (ibid.). This perspective is straight out
of Sextus Empiricus: “even if we do not understand the sounds of the so-called irrational
animals, it is nevertheless not unlikely that they do converse and we do not understand
them.”293
Montaigne then takes this opportunity to promote another key idea: we should not
be surprised that we do not understand other species, since there is immense variation in
cognitive capacities both throughout the animal kingdom, as well as within individual
species. He refers on the same page to Aristotle294 and Lucretius295 for examples of how
“the difference of language which is manifest amongst us, according to the variety of
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Montaigne is borrowing from Lucretius: “From no far different reason the want of language in children
seems to induce them to have recourse to gestures” (De rerum natura 5.1028).
293 Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 22.
294 “Aristotle, in proof of this, instances the various calls of partridges, according to the situation of places”
(Apologie 402)
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“Various birds make quite different notes; some their hoarse songs change with the seasons.” (Ibid.)
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countries, is also observed in animals of the same species” (ibid.). Montaigne’s
discussion of this topic is refreshing in historic context:
The defect that hinders communication between them and us, why may it not be just as
much ours as theirs? It is a matter of guesswork to determine where the fault lies that we
understand not one another—for we understand them no more than they do us; and by the
same reason they may think us to be beasts as we think them. […] We have some
mediocre understanding of their meaning; so do they of ours, in about the same degree.
They flatter us, threaten us, and implore us, and we them. As to the rest, we manifestly
discover that they have a full and absolute communication amongst themselves, and that
they perfectly understand one another, not only those of the same, but of divers kinds.
(402)

Despite ambiguities over what “full and absolute communication” is supposed to entail,
Montaigne’s key points are clear: (1) there are various means through which animals
appear to communicate with one another, (2) humans do not understand these means,
however (3) we can sometimes decipher “some mediocre understanding” of what is
communicated to conspecifics and, occasionally, to humans as well. In Pyrrhonian
fashion, Montaigne is imploring his readers to suspend judgment. As discussed in the
following chapter, such claims about the proper attitude to adopt toward animal language
are amongst those of which Descartes critically responds.
Having detailed the progressive features of Montaigne’s approach to animal
minds, I turn now to the regressive qualities. Despite the progressive anti-hierarchical
perspective, the celebrations of continuity and variation in the animal kingdom, and the
newfound skeptical attitudes toward token defenses of uniqueness claims, in the
Renaissance these positions often come part-and-parcel with anti-intellectualist and
“primitivist” trends of the day, for which Montaigne was very much a ring-leader.
Indeed, equally symptomatic of this epoch was not only that traditional exceptionalism
claims were dethroned, but that, often enough, they were re-directed and heaped upon
animals as our superiors. Unfortunately, this perspective was intimately related to
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progressive views of the place of humanity in the animal kingdom. What’s more, both
attitudes were often present in the same works (such as Montaigne’s Apologie), which is
surely one reason why figures like Montaigne and Charron are overlooked in histories of
the philosophy of animal minds. Most importantly for my purposes, Montaigne’s
“theriophily” leads him to make the most egregious, utterly credulous abuses of the
argument from analogy in the history of debates over animal minds.
5. Poisoning the Well: Theriophily and the Argument from Analogy
George Boas (1891—1980) refers to Renaissance figures in what I have called the
marginalized tradition as “theriophiles” (1933, 1935). Theriophily (etymologically:
“animal lover”296) signifies a Golden Age mentality. Its proponents typically—though not
always—critique human exceptionalism from the perspective of the superior lives and
virtues of early and/or indigenous humans (“primitivism”), and/or non-human animals. In
the latter case, A.O. Lovejoy (1873—1962) calls this related tradition “animalitarianism”
(1935: 32). Primitivism is an outmoded and fallacious worldview, forever condemned to
that tenuous realm between tawdry satire and earnest critiques of early capitalism (White
and Tierney 1987: 34). Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712—1778) remains arguably the most
read proponent of this worldview, yet it never had so many adherents as it did during the
Renaissance, including of course, Montaigne. At times, theriophily even worked its way
into science. Early zoologist Girolamo Rorario (1485—1556), for instance, authored a
book, apparently in earnest, entitled Animals Often Use Reason Better than Men
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(1647297). Despite its provocative title, this text is of interest only as a clear example of
the anti-intellectualist, primitivistic trends of the time. Rorario’s basic argument is, first,
that reason is not uniquely human (defended credulously with examples from Plutarch
and Aristotle), and second, that animals reason better than humans because their
actions—though predictable—are always in accordance with “nature.” In humans,
Rorario opines, reason inevitably leads to misery.
Just as I presented an “alternative Seneca” at the end of Chapter Three, it is
appropriate to highlight an “alternative Montaigne.”298 The Montaigne I have focused on
so far “was not interested in man’s place in relation to other creatures, but only in the
particular endowments of each. The idea of man’s being ‘above’ or ‘below’ other
creatures is one which Montaigne steadfastly refuses to discuss” (Arbel 2017: 50). While
Arbel’s first claim is true, his second is patently false: the Apologie is chock full of
exceptionalism claims heaped upon other species. 299 Most of these serve a common
purpose: to demonstrate how humans can learn from nature to improve their condition.
Montaigne quotes Pliny the Elder’s (23—79 CE) Natural History (c. 77 CE) in calling
nature “a merciless stepmother” to humanity,300 i.e., humans, unlike other species, are not
given innate knowledge on how to live well, and must “seek out by art the things
necessary for our preservation” (404). This theriophilic perspective is the source of many
of Montaigne’s most epistemically irresponsible uses of the argument from analogy.

Published posthumously by Gabriel Naudé (1600—1653).
Given that Montaigne was more a theriophile than a responsible proponent of animal minds skepticism,
it would perhaps be more appropriate to dub the Montaigne that I started with as the “alternative” version.
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I have argued that Montaigne often evokes the argument from analogy to promote
open-minded, yet skeptical, hypotheses about animal minds, e.g., in On Cruelty
Montaigne discusses “with how much probability [animals] are likened to us” (434-5).
There are, however, many examples in the Apologie where Montaigne reveals himself to
be as dogmatic as his opponents and as credulous with his sources as any figure in the
history of marginalized tradition in yielding to analogical reasoning: “Hence we try—
because of pride—to explain their talents as operations of blind instinct, but we ought to
conclude that, since the same effects have the same causes, such deeds as are the effects
of reason in beasts” (175). Conclude? This passage is highly reminiscent of Hume’s
problematic thinking about animal minds. 301 Despite Montaigne’s good intentions in
rooting out anthropocentric bias, his stance here is unambiguous: positive analogies based
on anecdotal observations of animal behavior used to infer similarities between human
and animal minds hold true.
Montaigne employs this argument constantly—far more often than the instances
where he uses analogical reasoning (as with animal language) to forward empirical and
epistemic challenges to claims of supposed human uniqueness. The Apologie contains a
lengthy spree arguing against potential answers to the following question: “what sort of
faculty of ours do we not recognize in the actions of the animals?” (403). By my count,
he takes aim at thirty-one uniqueness claims about humans (403-430). Montaigne is as
gullible with his sources as any philosopher discussed so far, e.g., he tells of a dog
following a thief through town to his home and then returning to lead the police there—
unbelievable perhaps, yet “Plutarch testifies to this story as a thing well confirmed and
“other creatures, in millions of instances, perform like actions, and direct them to like ends, all our
principles of reason and probability carry us with an invincible force to believe the existence of a like
cause” (A Treatise on Human Nature, I.3.16).
301
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happening in his time” (425). Whereas Pomponazzi, for instance, is highly critical of his
ancient sources, Montaigne presents most of them as fact.302
In Montaigne’s writings, then, the most progressive features of the marginalized
tradition to date are observable alongside its most regressive features—among them,
belief that “The tone of their voices or their bodily movements suffice to show us their
minds” (Boas 1935: 5). The best one can say about arguments arising from Montaigne’s
theriophily is that they collectively serve to forward a provocative philosophical
statement that Descartes also maintains (albeit for much different reasons303). Namely,
“that there is more difference between a given man and a given man, than between a
given man and a given animal” (415)—a claim also present in the writings of Charron.304
For the marginalized tradition during the Renaissance, the point is threefold: (1) those
species that “in several features come so near to human capacity” (ibid.), serve to
demonstrate (or at least suggest) that the cognitive variation observable throughout
humanity is only part of a vast spectrum of more basic capacities that, very often, are not
uniquely human after all. (2) While animals possess an “inferior” capacity for reasoning
than most humans do, according to Charron and Montaigne, this inferiority “is nothing
compared to some humans’ inferiority to other humans; and this serves to upset the
notion of animal inferiority” (Fudge 2006: 96-7). This is yet another instance of figures in
the marginalized tradition employing a nascent, mind-oriented version of the argument
302
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from marginal cases to challenge the human/animal dichotomy.305 (3) On the other hand,
the diverse and multifaceted skillsets of humans are sometimes unique in the natural
world—Montaigne and Charron grant this much—but this fact does not justify the
standard view that humans are somehow distinct from nature. Instead, the numerous
capacities that humans share with animals only validate the great potential for cognitive
variation that philosophers—biased by hubris—are presently unaware of and may never
fully grasp, even among those species they claim to know intimately. This general
attitude is, again, reminiscent of Aristotle’s (and Darwin’s) progressive stance toward
zoological inquiry. Montaigne asserts: “We more admire and value things that are
unusual and strange than those of ordinary observation; I had not else so long insisted
upon these examples [of small and/or ordinary animals], for I believe, whoever shall
strictly observe what we ordinarily see in those animals that live amongst us, may there
find as wonderful effects as those we fetch from remote countries and ages” (416).
6. Doorway to Descartes
In the two centuries preceding Descartes’ Meditations (which opens with a quote
from Montaigne306 ), the dominant tradition was under attack; due in large part to the
“historical accident” (Popkin 1979) of renewed interest in ancient skepticism, the
marginalized tradition was—for the first time in history—not so marginalized. Indeed,
the concluding pages of Montaigne’s Apologie function as a giant carrot on a stick to
figures like Descartes, straight from Sextus: knowledge of our senses is unreliable, the
idea of first principles is dubious, and there are no reliable criteria for rationality. In the
next chapter, I discuss how the pendulum is soon forced back in favor of the dominant
305
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tradition. This occurs largely on the back of Descartes’ vendetta as “conqueror of
skepticism” (Popkin 1979: 172), in tandem with new developments in anatomical science
in 17th century France. Throughout Part Five of the Meditations, “Descartes’s arguments
and examples cite without acknowledgment Montaigne’s famous demonstration of the
resemblance between humans and animals which aimed to bring humans down to join the
ranks of all living creatures” (Lampert 1993: 254). In brief, for Descartes there are
continuities between the “automatous” functions of human and animal bodies, but within
the “human machine” there is uniquely a mind and a soul. Despite downplaying the
historic importance of the theriophiles, Boas (1935: 4) nonetheless notes of the bête
machine doctrine, “this famous tenet of Descartes and the Cartesians […] historically
grew out of the attack on Montaigne’s disciple, Charron, who in the early XVIIth century
was the most prominent Theriophilist.”307 Indeed, the influence that Montaigne and his
followers had on Descartes has been widely commented on (Foglia 2014).
At their best, Montaigne and Charron bring about a decidedly “new” crisis that
should be understood as a progressive shift from the ontological parameters of the
original. In antiquity, the crisis revolved around whether the causes of animal behavior
should be classified under the banner of the “rational faculties,” or, under that of instinct
and the “perceptual faculties.” The fresh pairing of Sextus and Plutarch advanced this
debate by asking not only how one can tell the difference? but also, whether these archaic
dividing lines are actually helpful in the first place. For instance, when Charron (1607:
107) attacks those who “maliciously” reduce animal behavior to “servile and forced
inclination; as if beasts did perform their actions by a natural necessity, like things
307
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inanimate, as the stone falleth downward, the fire mounteth upward,” he provokes
empirically grounded responses from representatives of the dominant tradition in 17th
century France; most notably, Descartes. Montaigne and Charron treat the age-old idea of
animals being guided by “servile inclinations” with disdain—not because they believe it
to be false—but because there exists empirical (albeit anecdotal) evidence that it may be
false. As René Ferchault de Réaumur (1683—1757) claims in the 18th century, “These
two opinions […] are equally sound since there can be no way of finding out which is
true” by observation alone.308 In this chapter I have suggested that the logical problem, as
expressed here by Réaumur, first begins to take form in the Renaissance.
Pyrrhonian skepticism is undoubtedly the most extreme way to pose this dilemma,
but in historic context it is largely responsible for the emergence of epistemic challenges
to anthropocentric bias in philosophy. Fudge (2006: 115-6), for example, emphasizes “the
importance of skepticism to both Montaigne’s and Charron’s thinking about animals,”
referring to them as “skeptical Plutarchians” for whom “that thing labeled ‘instinct’ is not
the natural, truthful way of being in the world; it is an epistemological category worthy of
some detailed—and destructive—scrutiny.” Throughout both the present and the previous
chapters, I have argued that this willingness to challenge long-standing categories and
divisions is par for course in the marginalized tradition. The writings of Giovanni Battista
Gelli, for instance, offer the most engaging critical dialogue about semantic
anthropocentrism to this point, as well as what appears to be the first debate over theory
of mind in the history of philosophy—a dialogue that recognizes the crux of this debate
as it stands today: the logical problem.
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The writings of these philosophers combine the strengths and weaknesses of the
marginalized tradition into a digestible package that was controversial, widely read, and
practically begging for rebuttals from intellectuals in the 17th century: a far less credulous
age from when those ideas originated. While the theriophiles marveled at the unknowns
of the natural world, Descartes sought to eliminate them. Montaigne’s mountain of
examples of animal intelligence leads him to ask, rhetorically yet in earnest, “Can all this
be understood without reasoning and intelligence?”

309

Descartes’ response will

reestablish the dominant tradition’s seat at the head of the table.
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Continuity as Crisis:
Two Traditions of Theorizing about Animal Minds
Chapter Six
Crisis and Comparative Anatomy:
Animal Minds and the Scientific Revolution
1. Overview
The shapes of human exceptionalism vary over time, and thus we can distinguish preCartesian instances from later developments […] Early dispensations invoke and police a
very active border between man and beast, to be sure.
- Laurie Shannon (2013: 129)

Despite being arguably the most famous figure from the history of philosophy to
discuss the animal mind—or lack thereof—the influence of René Descartes was not a
boon to the dominant tradition. To the contrary, though extensively known by his
contemporaries, Descartes’ infamous bête machine hypothesis was not widely revered
during the Enlightenment; it was rarely, if ever, cited by scientists to justify animal
experimentation, and far more philosophers challenged the idea than accepted it,
including those who corresponded with Descartes directly.310 This chapter demonstrates
how the emerging discipline of comparative anatomy exacerbated philosophical crises of
human exceptionalism, particularly as Empiricists and self-styled “philosopherphysicians” like Julian Offray de La Mettrie (1709—1751) saw little reason not to extend
mechanistic forms of efficient causal explanation to the human animal. La Mettrie was at
the center of much controversy during this period, but his general claims that “Animals
certainly deserve to be compared with man” and that “Descartes did them wrong”
(1747/1994: 90-1) were not considered extreme.
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This is partially because of all the ancient texts that enjoyed resurgence during the
Renaissance, those of the Pyrrhonian skeptics were arguably the most influential on the
Enlightenment thinkers that followed (Popkin 1979). Literary and philosophic trends
leaned broadly toward epistemic and existential humility in the face of the unknown. The
result was an unexpected boon to the marginalized tradition, where human
exceptionalism became a popular subject of satire (e.g., Giovanni Battista Gelli, Michel
de Montaigne, La Mothe le Vayer), scientific scrutiny (e.g., Pierre Gilles, Cureau de la
Chambre), and skeptical theology (e.g., Pierre Charron, Estienne Pasquier). Despite
heavyweights like Francis Bacon (1561—1626) and Descartes opposing the resurgence
of Pyrrhonian skepticism on the basis that “it could be overcome by the employment of a
proper method,” i.e., the scientific method (Greenwood 2015: 74), the rise of comparative
anatomy during the Scientific Revolution was conducive to growing skepticism about the
uniqueness of the human mind. Throughout this chapter, I discuss the influence of
Oxford neurobiologist Thomas Willis (1621—1675), Abraham Trembley’s (1710—1784)
observations on the bizarre, category-stretching plant-animal: the freshwater polyp,
Albrecht Haller’s (1708—1777) work on pain perception and muscular irritability in
animals, among several other figures.311
The major explanatory crisis of the Scientific Revolution as it related to animals
was the problem of how the causes of human behavior could be responsibly distinguished
as different in kind from those of animal behavior. When Galileo Galilei (1564—1642)
abandoned the Aristotelian theory of final causation, where the movement of bodies was

311 F. J. Cole’s A History of Comparative Anatomy (1949) traces the origins of the discipline to Pierre
Belon’s (1517—1564) appraisal of the skeletons of human beings alongside cetacean (1551) and avian
(1955) species. Also central was the London Society for Improving Natural Knowledge in 1662 with its
journal Philosophical Transactions.
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long understood as teleological, i.e., as a motive principle guiding the object toward an
ultimate destination, a classic basis for human uniqueness claims was abandoned too. The
Stoic idea of animals as perceiving “turbid and confused” world but guided by a singular
cosmic hegēmonikon is one such example, 312 as is Aquinas’ theory of a “natural
prudence” or “natural estimate” lying behind all animal behavior.313 In its place was a
mode of explanation relatively conducive to continuity hypotheses: efficient causal
explanation, which “came to be characterized as mechanistic explanation and became
associated with the popular seventeenth-century conception of the universe as a giant
(usually clockwork) mechanism governed by fixed laws of nature” (Greenwood 2015:
72). The scope of William Harvey’s (1578—1657) mechanistic account of the circulation
of blood (1628) ranged over practically all of the animal kingdom—a point that was not
lost on David Hume (1748/1993: 69) and La Mettrie (1747/1994: 43), who, unlike
Descartes, gave like-consideration to the faculties of the mammalian brain. Studies in
animal cognition during the Scientific Revolution thus tend to emphasize efficient causal
principles of instincts, learned habits, or appetites for locomotion and/or reflexive
behavior (e.g., for finding food, mating, and signaling). While these terms made for ready
explanations of complex animal behavior, they could likewise theoretically explain any
human behavior as well, thereby ushering in a new era of explanatory crisis.
2.1 Descartes’ Bête machine Hypothesis and the Evolution of Stoic Strategies
A proto-Cartesian perspective on the differences between humans and animals
first appears in the work of Spanish physician Gomez Pereira (1500—1567), who, in
1554, claims that animals are appropriately described as automata, “capable of complex
312
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behavior, but wholly incapable of speech, reasoning, or, on some interpretations, even
sensation.” Descartes denied reading the Pereira’s writings (Gaukroger 1995: 271),
though he was likely aware of Giovanni Alfonso Borelli’s (1608—1679) work on
comparative anatomy, who Justin Lieber (1994: 64) considers an “early architect of the
Cartesian mechanistic approach to animal physiology.”
Cursory awareness of Descartes’ “monstrous thesis” (Harrison 1982: 221),
traditionally interpreted as affirming that animals are unconscious autonoma incapable of
pain (or any experience), is widespread among scholars of philosophy and animal studies
(Allen and Trestman 2017). Beginning in the late 1970s and early 80s, convincing
scholarship begins to emerge that paints a more “enlightened” portrait of Descartes’
views on animals, granting them not only consciousness in the form of subjective
experience (Cottingham 1978), but—remarkably, to the Old Guard 314 —capacities for
thought (Harrison 1982) and corporeal imagination (Gaukroger 1995). On the other
hand, contemporary theorists like Gary Steiner (2005: 134) argue that such interpretations
“are based on a selective reading of Descartes’s remarks about animals,” which “distort”
his views to make them “acceptable [to] contemporary standards.” Central to Descartes’
place in this critical genealogy, however, is not so much Descartes’ own understanding of
“autonoma,” but the philosophical backlash that his writings inspired. Many of
Descartes’ contemporaries (e.g., Henry More [1614—1687] and John Ray [1627—
1705]), after all, did interpret the bête machine hypothesis as entailing that animals do not
experience qualia (Guerrini 2011: 124). If my overarching thesis is correct—that the
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history of the philosophy and science of animal minds is a history of “explanatory crises”
set against a backdrop of figures repeatedly defending uniqueness and exceptionalism
claims in the face of empirical challenges to discontinuity hypotheses—then Descartes
himself plays a relatively small role. Descartes never quite acknowledges a “crisis” in the
first place, since he does not acknowledge the existence of an animal mind.
For Descartes, the very idea of the “animal mind” is dispelled a priori by virtue of
his understanding of what a mind entails: a rational soul, which is “of a nature entirely
independent of the body.”315 Animals are self-moving corporeal entities, lacking in mind.
Minded beings are ensouled beings, and—while animals may have “corporeal souls”316—
the souls of humans are immaterial, immortal, and the source of all mental faculties.317
Descartes assumes that immaterial souls are immortal souls, and as a Christian, he is
vocal in his abhorrence of granting animals the latter, equating the idea to atheism.318
These de facto ontological assumptions of categorical differences between humans and
animals evade the very notion of there being any “crisis” when animals produce humanlike behavior. As Katherine Morris (2011: 407 [emphasis in original]) writes, “within
Descartes’ framework, possession or non-possession of a rational soul is part of
something’s nature or essence,” and for Descartes, “[t]he nature of a creature is not
something to be empirically determined.” On this reading, it does not matter if members
of a non-human species behave in ways strongly indicative of possessing human mental
faculties; intelligent-looking behavior need not be the product of an intelligent being, and
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can be more parsimoniously explained in terms of mechanistic principles of efficient
causation. A tension arises here: why does Descartes defer to epistemic parsimony while
likewise denying the existence of the animal mind a priori?
The argument from parsimony forms the crux of the logical problem in the
contemporary literature, and Descartes provides two empirical arguments—which read as
statements of fact—in support of it: it is unconceivable that (1) animals could produce
meaningful language or (2) solve problems in contexts entirely novel to their natures.
These empirical arguments predate contemporary positions and methodologies in
comparative cognition, yet Descartes does not, if his a priori argument is sound, need
arguments of an empirical nature. Because automata—by dint of lacking a rational soul—
are without mind, Descartes’ strategy of dispelling crises of human exceptionalism is ad
hoc, i.e., “criticism of the beast-machine hypothesis that came from outside of the
metaphysical foundations of Descartes’s theory could straightforwardly be dismissed by
that theory” (Fudge 2006: 153). Likewise, Nicolas Jolley (2015: 35-6) observes that
Descartes’ “thesis that animals have no reason or intelligence is really a sub-conclusion;
given the extra premise about the necessity of having a faculty of pure intellect for any
mental states, he can validly infer that animals are bare machines.”
In the interest of painting a more nuanced picture of Descartes’ view than is
typical in the animal studies literature, Jolley’s choice of the phrase “bare machines” is
injudicious to what Descartes likely meant by the term automata. Descartes almost
certainly visited the famed Royal Gardens in Saint-Germain decked out with
hydraulically powered statues and an array of mechanical creatures that could dance, play
music, and produce vocalizations (Gaukroger 1995: 64). However, while Descartes’
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experiences with real machine creatures may have influenced his hypothesis, Descartes
“never considered animals to be literally machines” (ibid.). As was common during the
Scientific Revolution, Descartes is invested in an intellectual paradigm (effectively
beginning with Galileo) purporting that the natural sciences be aided by explanatory
principles derived from the mathematics of mechanical movement. The aim of the bête
machine hypothesis is to apply the principles of efficient causal explanation to the
internal and external movements of animals (including, to a large extent, humans).
Descartes “was the first to provide a detailed account of reflexive behavior,” arguing that
“the learned behavior of animals, and much of the learned behavior of humans, is as
automatic and involuntary as innate reflexes and instincts and can be explained without
reference to mentality or consciousness” (Greenwood 2015: 81, 83). As I discuss below,
Greenwood’s choice of the phrase “can be explained without reference to mentality” is an
under-appreciated, progressive aspect of Descartes’ attitude on the subject.
What Descartes actually meant by automata remains a subject of debate, e.g.,
centuries later, the jury is still out as to whether he maintained that animals could have
subjective experiences, and if so, whether he thought these experiences are analogous to
types of human experience.319 Descartes was well aware of the biological and anatomical
evidence for material continuity between species, “differ[ing] only a little” from the
views of William Harvey (Ibid. 228). In an early letter to Mersenne, Descartes writes that
in order to “explain all of [man’s] principle functions” he is turning from “those that
pertain to life, such as the digestion of food, the beating of the pulse, the distributing of
nutrients, etc., and the five senses. Now I am dissecting the heads of different animals in
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order to explain what imagination, memory, etc., consist of.” 320 Here again is the
aforementioned tension: Descartes both denies the possibility of psychological continuity
with animals, but is open-minded enough to dissect to the animal brain to explain the
workings of imagination and memory in humans. While it is easy to focus on the role
played by Descartes’ substance dualism in his uniqueness claims, Descartes is chiefly
concerned with mechanistic approaches to human and animal physiology as explanatory
principles, rather than dogmatic statements of human exceptionalism. The tension I have
raised here is somewhat quelled by turning to this aspect of Descartes’ thought.
Along with leading scientists of his day, Descartes conceived of the interior
movements of animal bodies (including those of humans) as automatically produced—an
idea which he then applied to all of the external movements of animals, as well as the
unconscious or reflexive behaviors that pervade much of human life:
When people take a fall, and stick out their hands so as to protect their head, it is not
reason that instructs them to do this; it is simply that the sight of the impending fall
reaches the brain and sends the animal spirits into the nerves in the manner necessary to
produce the movement even without any mental volition, just as it would be produced in
a machine. And since our own experience reliable informs us that this is so, why should
we be so amazed that the ‘light reflected from the body of a wolf onto the eyes of a
sheep’ should be equally capable of arousing the movements of flight in the sheep?321

One interpretation of this passage is that “fear” is nothing but a mechanical response in
sheep, like the blinking of eyes. In which case, the fear-response in animals is nothing
like the fear-qualia experienced by humans, since the human experience of fear includes
conscious awareness of the threat, and for Descartes, autonoma have “no consciousness
at all” (Beck 1987: 24) or “no experience of any kind” (Williams 1978: 284). Descartes’
example of the sheep fleeing automatically from the wolf is lifted directly from earlier

320
321

Philosophical Writings (Vol. 3: 479; qtd. Gaukroger 1995: 393)
Philosophical Writings (Vol. 2: 161).

182
purveyors of the dominant tradition: Avicenna and Aquinas.322 So too is Descartes’ use
of the clock metaphor to explain the inner-workings of corporeal bodies.323 Like Aquinas,
Descartes maintained that, when it comes to the movements of animals, non agunt sed
magis agunter (they do not act but are rather acted upon). Unlike Aquinas, Descartes
does not directly evoke God as an explanatory principle. For Descartes, animal behavior
is non-rational because, absent a mind, “their desires and their actions are determined by
the effects that external objects have on their bodily organs” (Steiner 2005: 150). Animal
behavior is explained by virtue of mechanistic bodily responses to the contingencies of
any given environmental situation—a view not terribly different from the Stoics, insofar
as the latter argue that animals are born with species-specific constitutions that
reflexively motivate actions catered to the context at hand (though, to be clear, this is not
Descartes’ position). Neither Descartes nor the Stoics grant animals freewill, and—as
demonstrated in Chapter Three—the Stoics likewise grant that automatic movements are
a necessary part of everyday human activities.324 But for Descartes, while animals lack
self-determination, they are not rational actors moved by a God-given hegēmonikon or
sensitive soul; animals are automata—self-moving machines.325 His rationale is rather
simple: human beings can devise complex machines that resemble animals, so why not
assume that an omnipotent God is all the more talented in this capacity?326
As for the ultimate source of organic movement, like Periera before him,
Descartes promotes a kind of “endogenous vitalism” which “provided a mechanistic
322
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account of biological functions in terms of an emergent force of organized matter [fn: “as
opposed to some exogenous or externally imposed force”], [which] stimulated a fertile
tradition of physiological research” later critiqued in the 19th century (Greenwood 2015:
86-7). For Descartes, vital processes of organized matter are the seat of life, not the
immaterial soul (Harrison 1992: 224), which is why animals are not literally machines. In
a Letter to Plempius, Descartes writes, “I accept that the brutes have what is commonly
called ‘life’, and a corporeal soul and organic sensation.”327 As noted above, whether or
not “organic sensation” entails feeling or qualia for Descartes is uncertain.
At the very least, Descartes does claim that, “animals do not see as we do when
we are aware that we see, but only as we do when our mind is elsewhere […] In such a
case we too move just like automatons.” 328 In this case, Descartes’ denial of
consciousness to animals presents a similar puzzle to that faced by the meaning of assent
in the Stoic arguments that animals lack “perception,” i.e., animals lack perception
because it requires the rational ability to assent to appearances. Indeed, as Fudge (2006:
170) describes Descartes’ follower Antoine Le Grand’s (1629—1699) views on the
matter: “an animal cannot reflect on what its eyes perceive because, by its nature, it has
no further—or higher—faculty of perception.” The puzzle presented in Chapter Three,
recall, is the following: either humans share a rudimentary capacity for sense experience
with animals that makes appearances roughly the same across species, or, humans
perceive the world in a fundamentally different way. Descartes and Seneca are both
ambiguous on this point; though they presumably agree that sense perception without
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“pure intellect” (or a rational hegēnomikon) is strictly corporeal or reflexive,329 despite
the animal displaying “skills” for executing intelligent-looking, apparently thoughtful
behavior.
Similarly, despite occasionally using the word memory in his discussions of the
bête machine hypothesis alongside basic physiological and psychological processes (e.g.,
the digestion of food, the beating of the heart, and the “retention or stamping of these
ideas in the memory” 330 ), it is unclear whether—like Aristotle—Descartes is fully
comfortable granting basic memory to animals, or—like the Stoics—whether he thinks
that “true” memory necessarily involves self-conscious reflection. In support of the proStoic interpretation, Descartes includes memory as one of the components of the rational
soul, alongside with language and volition.331 That said, presumably Descartes grants that
animals can learn from experience, which implies associative memory functions.332
Descartes’ place in the dominant tradition is therefore closer to the overarching
Stoic strategy than the Aristotelian strategy for positing uniqueness and exceptionalism
claims. Regardless of whether or not he grants sensation to animals, Descartes refuses to
grant them any of the other traditional “perceptual faculties” associated with mentality as
seen in Aristotle, i.e., phantasia and phronesis. Descartes’ ambiguous position on animal
sensation does not alter Bernard Williams’ (1978: 284) interpretation of Descartes as
putting forth an “all or nothing” view of mental faculties. Minded beings are in
possession of—or, like children, are capable of—all the mental capacities that come part
and parcel with a rational soul, e.g., language, metacognition, recollection, abstract
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reasoning, capital-R Reason, thought, and even consciousness.333 This “all or nothing”
package of uniqueness claims still leaves open the possibility that Descartes grants
sensation to animals. It also recalls the overarching Stoic strategy discussed in Chapter
Three, whereby figures such as Seneca argue that, because animals possess an
undeveloped hegēmonikon (denying them all the mental faculties granted to humans),
they navigate their environments entirely by impulse and appearance.
As I have shown in Chapters Three and Four, figures in the marginalized tradition
(such as Porphyry, Plutarch, Lucretius, and Montaigne) critique the Stoics on the ground
that that those who deny mind to animals trap themselves into denying mind to human
infants. Likewise, Descartes’ frequent interlocutor Henry More (1614—1687) presents
the same counter-argument, to which Descartes replies:
Infants are in a different case (ratio) from animals: I should not judge that infants were
endowed with minds unless I saw that they were of the same nature as adults; but animals
never develop to the point where any certain sign of thought can be detected in them.334

Descartes’ short reply—quoted in full—is clear yet unconvincing: unlike animals, human
infants develop into thinking beings. Jolley (2015: 36) critiques this response as
“question-begging” on the grounds that it assumes what it sets out to prove while
ignoring the issues at stake: Are infants minded beings? and, if not, When and how does
mind emerge? Neither of these questions is addressed in Descartes’ brief reply to More,
from which all Descartes is “entitled to claim on the basis of observation is that the
bodies of newborn infants are of the same nature as those of adults” (Ibid.) Descartes
then, like the Stoics before him, lacks substantive responses to these developmental
challenges that, as I have shown, can be directed at most uniqueness claims. Descartes
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seems intent on avoiding the rabbit hole of granting minds to ensouled human infants,
from which it follows that souls can exist without rational faculties, and that biological
and neurological development is necessary for the rational soul to emerge. If this is true,
then the activities of the rational soul are contingent upon development in the brain.
Descartes then has no clear answer for where development of the corporeal soul ends and
development of the rational soul begins.335
To his credit, Descartes continues the progressive trend in the dominant tradition
of being wary of the uncritical use of anthropomorphic language and arguments from
analogy. Responsible epistemic attitudes of this sort do not develop in the marginalized
tradition until the late 19th and early 20th centuries. In a letter to Henri Regnier, he writes,
“Most of the actions of animals resemble ours, and throughout our lives this has given us
many occasions to judge that they act by an interior principle like the one within
ourselves, that is to say, by means of a soul which has feelings and passions like ours. All
of us are deeply imbued with this opinion by nature.” 336 Descartes is claiming that
anthropomorphism is a part of human nature, and—in line with his skeptical
methodology—we should not be deceived by appearances. However, when viewed
alongside his a priori rationale for denying mentality to animals, Descartes fails to offer a
picture of what non-anthropomorphic descriptions of behavior might look like. We have
returned to the tension highlighted above. Presumably Descartes believes that any
ascription of mental faculties to animals (such as language) is anthropomorphic and
misguided, however he does offer empirical and epistemic—rather than ontological and
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metaphysical—reasons in defense of the uniqueness claim that only humans possess a
faculty for language, ostensibly open to experimental refutation:
...we can also know the difference between man and beast. For it is quite remarkable that
there is no man so dull-witted or stupid – and this includes even madmen – that they are
incapable of arranging various words together and forming an utterance from them in
order to make their thoughts understood; whereas there is no other animal, however
perfect and well-endowed it may be, that can do the like. This does not happen because
they lack the necessary organs, for we see that magpies and parrots can utter words as we
do, and yet they cannot speak as we do; that is, they cannot show that they are thinking
what they are saying. On the other hand, men born deaf and dumb, and thus deprived of
speech-organs as much as the beasts or even more so, normally invent their own signs to
make themselves understood by those who, being regularly in their company, have no
time to learn their language. This shows not merely that the beasts have less reason than
men, but that they have no reason at all.337

This argument is flawed for a number of reasons. To begin, the first clause of
Descartes’ second sentence is false. As per the argument from marginal cases, certainly
there exist humans that are incapable of making their inner lives understood, e.g., due to
severe brain damage, or severe end-of-life conditions. Second, Descartes’ generalization
that any animal in possession of the necessary organs for language fails to use them to
communicate with humans is hasty and anthropocentric. Descartes never considers the
fact that animals may communicate in creative (i.e., non-reflexive) ways with
conspecifics that humans fail to comprehend (this is the crux of what I call Gassendi’s
Challenge, discussed below). Third, the assumption that animals lack language so they
necessarily “have no reason at all” relies upon a highly exclusive—albeit common—
notion of what “Reason” entails. Noam Chomsky (1966) praises Descartes’ reasoning on
this subject due to the stress the latter places on “genuine” language being fundamentally
innovative, compositional, and/or creative in character. Like Chomsky, I find this to be a
progressive feature of Descartes’ thought. Since the signaling behavior of animals can be
explained by means of attributing them a pre-programmed inventory of vocalizations and
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movements, Descartes and Chomsky both defend this explanation as more parsimonious
than any assertion that the differences between human and animal communication are
mere matters of degree. In line with rhetoric common throughout the dominant tradition,
Descartes writes that while animals appear to communicate, they lack “real speech,”338
i.e., as defined exclusively by human ability.
The only way to quell the tension emphasized in this section is to maintain that, if
Descartes were to witness an animal constructing complex, creative sentences in a wide
variety of contexts, he would—by dint of the Scientific Method—grant them the
accompanying mental states attributed to humans in these contexts. For instance, it is
now common knowledge in primatology that—contrary to Descartes’ assumption that
animals are incapable of “inventing their own signs”—captive chimpanzees do develop
distinct modes of gestural communication never observed in their wild counterparts, and
that the emergence of these unique imperative (i.e., demanding/requesting) gestures is
most parsimoniously explained as the apes responding to novel problems of captivity that
do not exist in the wild: using human beings as instruments to attain desired objects like
food (Tomasello 2008). Both of Descartes’ empirically-grounded uniqueness claims,
then, arguably turn out to be false, as Descartes also argues that animals and machines
would “inevitably fail”339 if faced with “problem solving in the form of rational adaption
to novel situations” (Greenwood 2015: 85).
That said, Descartes’ a priori assertion about the limitations of animal signaling
was given empirical support in the 20th century by cross-fostering experiments with signlanguage trained chimpanzees (e.g., Terrace et al. 1979), as well as by Tomasello and
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colleagues’ experiments on chimpanzee gestural communication (Tomasello 2008). Both
Terrace and Tomasello found that apes can learn to produce imperative gestures (like
begging) but never declarative gestures (e.g., pointing out “look at that sunset!”) or iconic
gestures (e.g., scissoring one’s index and middle fingers to signify walking). Regarding
this point, there is little to no difference between Tomasello and Terrance’s claims and
what Descartes writes to William Cavendish in critique of the marginalized tradition:
“Montaigne and Charron may have said that there is a greater difference between one
human being and another than between a human being and an animal; yet there has never
been known an animal so perfect as to use a sign to make other animals understand
something which bore no relation to its passions.”340 Experimental history has largely
been on Descartes’ side here.
2.2. Descartes, Epistemic Parsimony, and the Roots of the Logical Problem
Justin Lieber (1994: 14) writes that there “are two Descarteses: the solipsist
Descartes of Meditations and the mechanistic experimentalist of Le Monde and many
other writings.” The chief difference, Lieber contends, is in epistemic attitude. The
animal studies literature rarely acknowledges the Descartes who understood the bête
machine hypothesis as an hypothesis—or, more accurately, as the hypothesis most likely
to be true in terms of explaining the causes of animal behavior. Recently, scholars have
suggested Descartes’ denial of mental faculties to animals is not as dogmatic as it
appears, since—so the argument goes—Descartes’ position is based on a “Morgan’s
Canon” type principle of privileging the most parsimonious explanation, which, for
Descartes, is the mechanical explanation (Harrison 1992; Lieber 1994; Gaukroger 1995;

340

Philosophical Writings (Vol. 3: 302); qtd. Fudge (2005: 154).

190
Steiner 2005; Jolley 2015). For instance, Jolley notes the existence of a “second
argument” in Descartes, “which is perhaps never explicitly spelt out,” that “turns on the
Principle of Parsimony or Ockham’s razor. According to Descartes’ new mechanistic
programme, there is no aspect of animal behaviour that cannot in principle be explained
in mechanistic terms” (37), so there is no empirical reason to ascribe to them
rationality.341
For example, when pressed by Henry More to explain his dogmatism that animals
do not think, Descartes replies with an intellectual humility largely foreign to the sections
on animals in his published books: “though I regard it as established that we cannot prove
there is any thought in animals, I do not think it can be proved that there is none, since
the human mind does not reach into their hearts.”342 That said, in another letter to More,
Descartes writes that the only reasons one might think that “dumb animals think” are that
they share similar bodily organs with us and that popular opinion encourages it, but that
“there are other arguments, stronger and more numerous, but not so obvious to everyone,
which strongly urge the opposite.”343 This suggests that Descartes’ position is based on
the model of an argument to the best explanation. As Harrison (1992: 226) describes this
under-appreciated aspect of Descartes views…
Descartes himself continually stressed the significance of the negative aspect of his case.
Thus, to More: ‘we cannot at all prove the presence of a thinking soul in animals’; to
Reneri: the behavior of animals ‘is not at all a sufficient basis to prove [that they have
souls]’; to the objections of Arnauld: ‘we have had no cause for ascribing anything more
to them [animals], beyond […] the principle depending solely on the animal spirits. […]
It needs to be emphasized that Descartes’ denial of animal souls must be understood in
the light of the available alternatives.
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What we see here is a nascent version of Morgan’s Canon in response to what is currently
called the logical problem. Descartes is the first figure in the dominant tradition to evoke
Ockham’s Razor to explain animal movements by means of principles of reflexive
behavior in response to “the problem of other minds” in animals.344 Perhaps Harrison
(1992: 227) is right when claiming that Descartes “merely recognized the limits of
philosophical speculation” when it came to animals.
One of Descartes’ core arguments that animals lack rational souls is that such an
attribution would imply that animals have immortal souls—an idea that he finds
outrageous, but nonetheless casts in terms of probability.345 Descartes puts forth a novel
strategy for the dominant tradition when discussing this subject: if animals had “thought
like we do, they would have an immortal soul like us. This is unlikely, because there is no
reason to believe it of some animals without believing it of all, and many of them such as
oysters and sponges—these creatures are too imperfect for this to be credible.” 346 In
Descartes’ hands, this is a weak argument (i.e., why must we generalize to all species?),
though it has epistemic potential. This defensive strategy becomes increasingly common
in the following centuries and can be stated as follows: if we grant one species a humanlike mental faculty, what then are the implications for our positions on the cognitive
capacities of other species? There exists an analogous argument in contemporary
personhood debates in animal ethics, i.e., if we grant personhood to chimpanzees, what is
stopping us from granting all animals personhood? It is easy to identify analogous
arguments in the animal minds literature. For instance, Beckers and colleagues (2006: 92)
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claim to demonstrate that forward blocking in rats (a token case of Pavlovian
conditioning) “is flexible and sensitive to constraints of causal inference […] This
suggests that complex cognitive processes akin to causal inferential reasoning are
involved in a well-established Pavlovian animal conditioning phenomenon commonly
attributed to the operation of basic associative processes.” If casual judgment is ascribed
to rats, one might argue that mollusks and even spinal cords—which likewise utilize
blocking mechanisms (Hochner 2016; D’Mello and Dickenson 2008)—deserve the same
or similar ascriptions.347
On one hand, whether it appears in the animal minds literature or the animal
ethics literature, this argument is flawed because its rhetoric is implicitly normative and
anthropocentric. A legitimate response is simply: What of it, then? It is far from unusual
that challenges to presumed double standards in classification may require large-scale
reorientations of conceptual schemes. Descartes’ Christianity and his “all or nothing”
account of mental faculties make him unwilling to seriously consider such a
reorientation. Contrary to Harrison’s point, then, it is more reasonable to claim that
Descartes established “a theoretical framework by which the behavior of animals could
be (pre)judged” (Fudge 2006: 154) than that he was “cautiously agnostic” about animal
cognition.348 I also disagree with Harrison that Descartes’ experimental attitude toward
the animal mind is “not a case of a double standard, nor did it betray an unwillingness to
live up to the implications of his own philosophy” (227). Christianity is clearly offering
grounds for double standards here, and, as I argue below, La Mettrie builds a much
stronger empirical case for expanding the bête machine hypothesis to promote the
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likelihood of psychological continuity between humans and animals than Descartes does
for restricting it to non-human species.

2.3 Gassendi’s Challenge (and other responses to Descartes)
In addition to Henry More’s critical dialogue with Descartes, the bête machine
hypothesis was likewise the subject of Descartes’ ongoing correspondences with Marin
Cureau de la Chambre (1594—1669), William Cavendish (1592—1676), and Pierre
Gassendi (1592—1655). In terms of motivating the crisis at the heart of this dissertation,
Gassendi is Descartes’ most significant interlocutor. The following passage contains the
heart of what I refer to as Gassendi’s Challenge:
You say that brutes lack reason. Well, of course they lack human reason, but they do not
lack their own kind of reason. So it does not seem appropriate to call them irrational
except by comparison with us or with our kind of reason; and in any case […] reason
seems to be a general term, which can be attributed to them no less than the cognitive
faculty or internal sense. You may say that animals do not employ rational argument. But
although they do not reason so perfectly or about as many subjects as man, they still
reason, and the difference seems to be merely one of degree. You may say that they do
not speak. But although they do not produce human speech (since of course they are not
human beings), they still produce their own form of speech, which they employ just as
we do ours.349

There are two major claims to unpack here. First, Gassendi is defending a nascent version
of Frans de Waal’s (2016: 158) call for discussions of mental ability that are amenable to
“all the various cognitions found in nature” (see also Bekoff and Pierce [2009]). Second,
Gassendi is sympathetic to concerns of double standards in comparative cognition
brought about by highly exclusive and anthropocentric definitional limitations on what
constitutes a given mental faculty.
Combined, Gassendi’s Challenge relies upon two intuitions that open-minded
philosophers of varying opinions might mutually accept: (1) that there are varieties of
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mentality throughout the animal kingdom, and (2) that something is lost when the sole
lens by which we evaluate and study mentality is not only how they differ from human
cognition (which is a natural and perhaps necessary vantage point) but how they are
inferior to forms of human cognition, i.e., what animals lack in terms of mental faculties.
Gassendi’s Challenge is deficit in terms of putting forth a positive research program, but
it partially makes up for this by suggesting the need for one, namely, a research program
that rejects the de facto vantage point of evaluating animal cognition through a lens of
species hierarchy. The framework that Gassendi has in mind is non-orthogenetic, i.e., it is
not framed in terms of a “a single evolutionary trajectory culminating in Homo sapiens”
(Bekoff and Pierce 2009: 49)—or, in pre-Darwinian terms, that rejects the study of the
animal mind from the starting point of humanity’s place in a scala natura. The pith of
Gassendi’s Challenge is clear enough: everyone acknowledges that there is tremendous
variation in physical attributes spread throughout the animal kingdom, so why not assume
(at least some) like-variation in psychological attributes as well? Perhaps the human mind
is not the best model for theorizing the minds or dolphins, octopuses, insects, or the
proverbial bat (Nagel 1974).
As Steiner (2005: 93) interprets Gassendi, “subjective experience can take many
forms, and that the seeming lack of capacities for language, logic, mathematics, and the
like in animals is no bar in principle to their having their own forms of communication
and ways of reckoning with the contingencies of life.” Despite the fact that “Gassendi
offers no argument in support of his claim” (140), his point is forward-thinking in that
such considerations were likewise present in the early years of comparative psychology,
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e.g., Lloyd Morgan (1894: 39) noted it was “likely that we much under-estimate the
capacity in animals to communicate with each other by a language of their own.”350
The challenges that Gassendi presents to Descartes have an Aristotelian character
to them. Recalling arguments made in Chapter Two, Aristotle remains the most
progressive figure in the dominant tradition up to the Enlightenment due to his
acknowledgment of the possibility of multifarious cognitive abilities in nature that are
functionally analogous (in Aristotle’s terms: “by analogy”) to like-capacities in humans,
and which, crucially, may be just as complex, unique, or exceptional as human capacities
in their own ways. Aristotle does subscribe to a scala natura, but recall how he rarely
makes exceptionalism claims about human beings, opting instead for uniqueness claims
lacking in the anthropocentric normativity clearly on display in the arguments of the
Stoics, Christians, and Cartesians. Gassendi is more of a continuity theorist than
Aristotle, but alongside Aristotle, Gassendi expresses genuine interest in studying
animals for their own sake, explicitly viewing human beings as animals themselves (145).
Like La Mettrie after him, Gassendi strengthens his Challenge by adding several
empirically informed arguments implying inference from material and behavioral
analogies to psychological analogies. Gassendi presses Descartes as follows: Humans and
animals alike flee from danger and chase food, so “[y]ou must consider whether the
sense-perception which the brutes have does not also deserve to be called ‘thought’, since
it is not dissimilar to your own. […] The brutes have nerves, animal spirits, and a brain,
and in the brain there is a principle of cognition that receives the messages from the
spirits” analogously to human perception.351 In response, Descartes writes:
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I do no not see what argument you are relying on when you lay it down as certain that a
dog makes discriminating judgments in the same way we do. Seeing that a dog is made of
flesh you perhaps think that everything which is in you also exists in the dog. But I
observe no mind at all in the dog, and hence believe there is nothing to be found in a dog
that resembles the things I recognize in a mind.352

First, Descartes is correct that physiological continuity does not necessarily entail
psychological continuity and is thereby justified in pushing back against Gassendi on this
point. Descartes is arguing that Gassendi’s assumption of a plurality of overlapping
cognitions throughout animal kingdom is not grounded in anything but speculation and
analogical reasoning, but it must be noted that the behavioral criteria that Descartes
himself evokes for “mind” is also based on an argument from analogy, namely that
humans as minded beings act in certain ways, so all minded beings must naturally act the
same, e.g., possessing language and adapting to novel situations. Second, Gassendi never
says that dogs (or any animal) have powers of discrimination—or any powers—in the
“same way” as humans do. Descartes has made a straw man of Gassendi’s statements. As
Steiner (2005: 145) notes, like Plutarch, “Gassendi’s point is that any being that has a
sensation (a visual image, a feeling of hunger, pain, or whatever) must in principle be
aware of that sensation, or it simply would not be a sensation.” Gassendi does not claim
that humans and dogs perceive the world in the “same way.” Rather, he is challenging
(what he took to be) Descartes’ assertion that animals are not conscious beings at all.353
Another frequent interlocutor with Descartes on animals, William Cavendish
(1743/2000: 13), situates Descartes within a tradition of what might be called “anthroimperialism,” i.e., “[t]he learned will hardly be brought to allow any degree of
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understanding to horses; they only allow them a certain instinct, which no one can
understand; so jealous are the schoolmen of their rational empire.” A similar critique is
present in Montaigne’s follower Cureau, who is highly critical of the “liberty” taken by
Descartes “to assign to every thing the rank and order which they ought to hold in the
world, and to prescribe them the function they are to exercise.” 354 Here again,
Aristotelian functional biology is adopted by a figure from the marginalized tradition to
combat the bête machine hypothesis. As Cureau (1647) responds to Descartes, “the
faculty of reasoning universally […] is the true difference of Man, which marks the
spirituality and immortality of the soul;” nonetheless, “beasts reason” in context of
achieving ends in particular instances and in relation to their specific needs and
faculties.355 Indeed, Fudge (2006: 162) notes that, “It was to Aristotelianism that Cureau
returned to make his case for animal capacity.”
In their opposition to the bête machine hypothesis, Cavendish and Cureau adopt
the common thread of the marginalized tradition: there exists a tapestry of cognitive
capacities in the animal kingdom—even within individual species—making categorical
differences along species-lines difficult and unnecessary to draw. Cavendish (1743: 12)
appeals to his personal experience with animals to argue that the bête machine hypothesis
must be wrong because it cannot explain how complicated it is to train a horse—a point
that reflects the tension raised above about the role of memory in Descartes’ view of
animals. Cavendish relies upon two points. First, memory is a kind of thought or inner
experience that “forms a judgment by what is past of what is to come,” and second, one
cannot train an animal that lacks sensations such as pleasure and fear (ibid.). This focus
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on the like-development of animal and human minds from infancy is common to the
marginalized tradition. As Fudge (2006: 165) describes Cavendish’s contribution, “While
Descartes had assumed a similarity of oyster to monkey and dog to sponge, Cavendish
recognizes that there are vast differences of capacity and of character within one species.”
This distinction recalls the “singularity of causation” underlying Stoic explanations for
animal behavior (Chapter Three) in contrast with Aristotle’s more nuanced account of the
various perceptual capacities granted to the “sensitive soul” and the views of innerspecies variation by figures in the marginalized tradition (Chapter Four).
Taking stock, the irony of Descartes’ place in a critical genealogy of human
exceptionalism is that, despite being its most famous historic proponent, his influence
was not a boon to the dominant tradition. Like Aristotle, the Stoics, and the Christians,
Descartes ultimately attempts to dispel explanatory crises by means of a priori
uniqueness claims—a strategy necessarily in tension with any progressive ideas about the
cognitive gap between humans and animals also brought to the table. It is also ironic that
Descartes champions a substantive hypothesis about animal and human bodies that would
instead—as in the writings of La Mettrie—add fuel to empirical crises of human
uniqueness alongside the emerging, continuity-friendly sciences of comparative anatomy
and evolutionary biology. The tension emphasized above between competing epistemic
attitudes of the “two Descartes’” is indicative of growing pains in the dominant tradition.
Descartes’ “all or nothing” approach to mental faculties echoes the Stoic strategy that has
guided the dominant tradition up to the Enlightenment. At the same time, his emphasis on
epistemic parsimony and his willingness to provide empirical criteria for mental faculties
in animals suggest progressive steps for discontinuity theorists.
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3.1 Hobbes: Intersecting Traditions and the Origins of Associative Psychology
Somewhat indirectly, the philosophy of animal minds was also ushered into the
Scientific Revolution by Thomas Hobbes. Despite defending uniqueness and
exceptionalism claims, Hobbes’ strict materialism led him to an empiricist framework for
cognitive continuity between human and animal minds that would be later adopted with
refinements by John Locke, David Hartley (1705—1757), and David Hume (1711—
1776), among others. While there exist substantive differences between these
philosophers, their respective positions on animal cognition can be expressed fairly
concisely. The core of this two-part section is spent discussing the associative psychology
of Hobbes and (especially) Locke, the latter of whom responds directly to Descartes’
views on animal minds.
Neither Hobbes nor Locke fit neatly into the dominant tradition. As informed by
the scientific paradigm of their day, the Empiricists reject the “all or nothing” Stoic
strategy that defined the dominant tradition up to Descartes, and, in doing so, effectively
resort back to the Aristotelian strategy of couching uniqueness claims amid what is
otherwise a broad overlap of cognitive ability, ranging from simple to complex iterations
of mental faculties, refusing to sit comfortably amid dichotomies of the rational and the
perceptual. Rejecting Descartes’ notion of innate ideas, the Empiricists seek the
foundations of human knowledge in sense experience, which serves as the building
blocks for ideas and concepts. As Greenwood (2015: 94) notes of Hobbes, and which
holds equally well for Locke and Hume, the “difference between cognition and sense
perception is a matter of degree (of intensity), but not a fundamental difference in kind.”
Calling to mind the idea of a sparrow, for instance, is not fundamentally different from
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the perception of a sparrow, only fainter and/or less vivid in orientation. The Empiricists
thus largely dismiss ontological explanatory crises regarding whether animal behavior is
caused by perceptual or rational faculties.
As a consummate materialist, Hobbes argues that “life is but a motion of limbs”
and that behavior is explainable by the movement of “so many wheeles, giving motion to
the whole body.”356 In consequence, Hobbes claims that mental states can be reduced to
brain states, i.e., that such processes are “nothing really, but motion of some internal
substance in the head,”357 and that human and animal behavior alike can be reduced to
appetitive motivations to seek pleasure and nourishment and to avoid pain. The latter
point stands in contrast to traditional theories of the will, which Hobbes understood to be
nothing but a nebulous metaphysical concept that—like the idea of final causation358—
has no place in scientifically-informed philosophy, nor in theories of human nature.
The relevant facets of Hobbes’ thought are the consequences of his contention—
singular in the dominant tradition to date—that animals think. Like humans, animals form
“ordered chains of thought,” 359 namely, sequences of images stored in memory,
stimulated by present environmental conditions, and structured by an ability to grasp—at
some level—relationships of cause and effect recalled from past experience. Similar to
Aristotle’s discussion of phantasia, Hobbes refers to this ability as imagination, which is
“common to Man and Beast”360 and which he refers to as a form of “understanding”, e.g.,
“a dog by custom will understand the call […] of its master.” 361 This type of
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understanding equates to the retention of images formed by prior experience, which are
capable of producing—if not expectations of future experiences—then associationist
aversions (or desires) to stimuli that previously caused the animal pain or discomfort (or
pleasure). While Hobbes does occasionally use mentalistic words like understanding,
deliberation, prudence or anticipation to describe the machinations of animal
cognition, 362 is it not necessary for him to do so given his more foundational
associationist psychology. Hobbes likely holds that imagination in animals, as in humans,
automatically forms associations between objects of cause and effect, which produce
movements based on previously experienced links to desires and aversions. 363 For
different reasons, then, both Descartes and Hobbes allow that animal behavior can be
explained with explanatory principles also applicable to everyday human life.
Hobbes’ work is not devoid of uniqueness claims. As Hobbes writes, the
difference between understanding in humans and animals are the former’s capacity to
form “conceptions and thoughts, by the sequel and contexture of the names of things into
Affirmations, Negations, and other forms of speech.”364 In short: the effect of language
on cognitive ability, which leads to a singular ability for humans to reason abstractly,
share knowledge, and express intentions (Steiner 2005: 156). Note that instead of using
the “all or nothing” strategy common to the dominant tradition, Hobbes opts for an
Aristotelian “scaffolding” strategy of sorts, 365 constructing uniqueness claims from
constituent parts explainable within his associationist psychology.
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Hobbes’ uniqueness claims about communication situate his thought in historic
relationship with the Stoic notion of oikeiosis (Chapter Four). Like the Stoics, Hobbes
denies animals membership in the moral community because, like “fooles” and
“madmen” animals “never had power to make any covenant, or to understand the
consequences thereof.”366 Unlike the Stoics, his position is not speciesist, as in addition to
excluding human “marginal cases,” he also lists “children” as those who remain—until
they develop the power to form and understand covenants—outside the moral
community. 367 Ultimately, it is the strength of communal humanity in a dog-eat-dog
world that justifies humans’ dominion over animals, and—often enough—other humans
as well.
In both his First Treatise of Government (1689) and Second Treatise of
Government (1689), Locke makes the same exceptionalism claim: animals are incapable
of access to the social contract because they cannot engage in language and abstract
reasoning. 368 In making his argument, Locke evokes a long-standing fixture of the
dominant tradition, the argument of providence: “Inferior creatures” were made for
human use by God,369 and may be “destroyed” when necessary.370 With few exceptions,
Locke’s ties to the dominant tradition stop here, and there is no concrete evidence that—
unlike the Stoics, for instance—the argument from providence plays any role in Locke’s
views on animal cognition.
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3.2 Locke contra Descartes: Rekindling the Aristotelian Strategy
Writing a generation after Hobbes, Locke retains many of his predecessor’s
foundational ideas about human and animal minds. Locke maintains that all knowledge is
forged of simple and complex Ideas derived from perceptual experience(s); humans and
animals form associations of cause and effect between particular experiences stored as
images in memory. Animals are incapable of constructing complex ideas, but experience
strongly suggests that they do possess mental lives above and beyond mere sensation. For
instance, Locke writes that “Birds learning […] tunes, and the endeavors one may
observe in them, to hit the Notes right, put it past doubt with me, that they have
Perception, and retain Ideas in their Memories, and use them for Patterns.” 371
“Perception” is defined as…
…the first step and degree towards knowledge, and the inlet of all the materials of it; the
fewer senses any man, as well as any other creature, hath, and the fewer and duller the
impressions are that are made by them, and the duller the faculties are that are employed
about them.372

Locke thus identifies varying degrees of cognitive ability throughout the animal kingdom,
including amongst human beings. Locke uses the common strategy of the marginalized
tradition of evoking the mental lives of human “marginal cases” to demonstrate that, if
children and those of “decrepit old age” have mental lives, then it is likely that animals
do as well.373 Like Hobbes, however, humans are said to possess singular capacities for
language and forming abstract ideas; in arguing as such, Locke “reproduces the thread of
reasoning that persists throughout the tradition from Aristotle to Descartes: Language and
abstract rationality are inseparable, so that any being lacking one must necessarily lack
the other” (Steiner 2005: 158). Yet to claim, as Kristin Andrews (2016) does, that “Locke
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agreed [with Descartes] that animals cannot think, because words are necessary for
comprehending universals,” is too hasty and does disservice to the nuances of Locke’s
attitudes toward animal cognition. I argue that Locke plays a more substantive role in
fueling the epistemic crisis of challenging assumed differences between human and
animal cognition than either Hobbes or Descartes.
Unlike Hobbes, Locke is genuinely interested in questions of animal minds, both
in terms of their place in his own theory of mind, and also in terms of his desire to
critique Descartes’ bête machine hypothesis and the uniqueness claims he derived from
it, i.e., “if [animals] have any ideas at all, and are not bare Machins (as some would have
them) we cannot deny them to have some Reason. It seems as evident to me, that they do
some of them in certain Instances reason, as that they have sense; but it is only in
particular Ideas, just as they received them from their senses.” 374 This passage is
remarkable in terms of how cavalier Locke is about the possibility of granting “some”
reason to animals. Locke’s dismissal of the traditional role of Reason is unsurprising, as
the Empiricists generally sought to explain the machinations of knowledge without
recourse to vague mentalistic terminology. Locke is aware of Reason’s customary role,
defining it in anthropocentric terms: a “faculty in Man, That faculty, whereby Man is
supposed to be distinguished from Beasts, and wherein it is evident he much surpasses
them.”375 The inclusion of the phrase supposed to be is quite telling here; I read it as
indicating Locke’s acknowledgment that he diverges from the dominant tradition. While
Locke claims that humans “much surpass” animals in reason, he does not deny it to them,
for he sees no empirical reason to do so. It was customary of scholars of the Scientific
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Revolution, after all, to adhere to the Baconian method of questioning and dispelling the
jargon and arguments of past centuries in favor of what can be directly observed.
Like Hobbes, Locke denies animals the power of forming generalized ideas (e.g.,
“sphere” or “predator”) abstracted from particulars. Where Hobbes and Locke differ on
the animal mind is primarily in epistemic attitude; Locke comes across as at last willing
to grant animals this capacity if they were to demonstrate evidence of it. “The having of
general ideas,” he writes, “is that which puts a perfect distinction between Man and
Brutes. […] For it is evident, we observe no foot-steps in them, of making use of general
signs for universal Ideas; from which we have reason to imagine, that they have not the
faculty of abstracting, or making general Ideas, since they have no use of Words, or any
other general Signs.”376 Consequently, Locke grants animals “ideas of sensation” but not
“ideas of reflection”377 because (1) there is no empirical evidence of the latter, which may
be explained by (2) Locke’s biologically informed functional psychology (discussed
below) wherein the psychological faculties of different species are proportioned to the
needs of their environments as distributed by God.
Much of Locke’s discussion of animal cognition takes place in tacit or explicit
dialogue with Descartes. While agreeing that “animals are imprisoned in the concrete
present and the immediate future” (Steiner 2005: 159), Locke denies that animal behavior
can be comprehensively explained by means of mechanistic principles alone, e.g., birds
often sing, writes Locke, in contexts that are “no use to the Bird’s Preservation.”378 Like
Descartes, Locke is concerned with adhering to the most parsimonious explanation for a
given phenomenon, but unlike Descartes, Locke remains open-minded about how new
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evidence can shift the scales of what is to be considered the most parsimonious
explanation. Locke is skeptical of the claim, for instance, that “Dogs or Elephants do not
think, when they give all the demonstration of it imaginable, except only telling us, that
they do so.”379 Locke thus acknowledges the historic crisis of positing uniqueness and
exceptionalism claims in the face of empirical evidence to the contrary.
Writing to his friend, the materialist Anthony Collins (1676–1729), Locke
chastises proponents of Cartesian philosophy who, “against all evidence of sense and
reason decree Brutes to be machines only because their hypothesis requires it.” 380 In
making mentality an “all or nothing” phenomenon by identifying it with an immaterial
soul denied to animals, “the Cartesians have exploited the thesis that immateriality entails
immortality to argue for the beast-machine doctrine” (Jolley 2015: 48). Locke supposes
no contradiction in denying animals immaterial souls while likewise allowing them
mental lives, since an omnipotent God can surely imbue matter with the faculty of
thought.381 As such, Locke argues that perception is “in some degree, present in all sorts
of animals,” even “oysters and cockles”—creatures that possess, at least, “some small
dull perception.”382 Like Aristotle and La Mettrie, Locke explains the reasons for there
being degrees of cognitive ability in disparate species: cognition is proportioned to
biological needs; 383 even oysters, he writes, presumably require some phenomenal
capacity to detect sustenance and predators. This is also clear in Locke’s contention that
there is a distinction to be made between “dull perception” and “perfect insensibility,” of
379
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which “we have plain instances even in mankind itself” such as the mental faculties of
young children384 and persons of “decrepid old age”…
How far [a human in “decrepit old age”] (notwithstanding all that is boasted of innate
principles385) is in his Knowledge and intellectual Faculties, above the Condition of a
Cockle or an Oyster I leave to be considered. And if a man had passed Sixty Years in
such a State, as ’tis possible he might […] I wonder what difference there would have
been, in any intellectual perceptions between him, and the lowest degree of Animals.386

Locke’s suggestion is that it would be a double standard to grant mentality to human
“marginal cases” but not to animals—an argumentative strategy that has been a fixture of
the marginalized tradition since antiquity.
Taking stock, by (1) denying the Stoic/Cartesian claim that “either a creature has
a full range of mental faculties or it has no such faculties at all” (Jolley 2015: 38), (2)
expanding the cognitive powers associated with “perceptual” faculties far into the animal
kingdom (indeed, to oysters!), and (3) accounting for cognitive variation in terms of
functional biology, Locke is employing an Aristotelian strategy of allowing continuities
between humans and animal cognition as well as a small number of (related) uniqueness
claims: abstract reasoning and language. Indeed, as Jolley (2015: 42) likewise notes,
“Locke can thus agree with Descartes and indeed with the Aristotelian tradition that
animals are incapable of scientia [knowledge of universals], but he refuses to infer from
this that they lack mental faculties in general.” And, like Plutarch, Lucretius, Montaigne,
and Hobbes, Locke conscientiously dissolves the traditional boundaries between “rational
faculties” and “perceptual faculties,” openly granting animals some of the former. In
these ways, Locke straddles the line between the most progressive strategies of the
dominant tradition and the marginalized tradition.
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4.1 La Mettrie: The Crisis Naturalized
The animal kingdom costs no more than the vegetable kingdom, the loftiest genius no
more than a head of wheat. We should judge, then, by what we can see of what is hidden
from our eyes and our research, and not make anything up beyond that. Let us follow the
performances of the ape, beaver, elephant, etc. If they obviously cannot operate without
intelligence, why refuse it to them?
- L’Homme machine (1747/1994: 74)

La Mettrie was the most progressive representative of the marginalized tradition
to arise from the Scientific Revolution. Armed with a markedly confrontational rhetorical
style, epistemic humility, and evidence from the emerging sciences of comparative
neuro- and physical anatomy, La Mettrie denounces the substance dualism of the
Cartesians in favor of a strictly materialist ontology wherein all things are composed of a
single “diversely modified substance” that emerges in various “organizations” throughout
nature. Descartes’ evocation of a uniquely human “rational soul” as the harbinger of
human exceptionalism is but an outmoded referent for workings of the brain, from which
it follows—according to La Mettrie—that there is both material and psychological
continuity between the inner-workings of human and animal minds. La Mettrie’s
assumption that evidence of material and behavioral analogies between humans and
animals entails evidence of psychological analogies is problematic (Greenwood 2015:
90). However his emphasis on improving the probability of analogical arguments being
valid or sound by adding increasing evidence from the natural sciences so as to construct
an argument to the best explanation remains a progressive epistemic model. “The only
recourse remaining for our adversaries,” challenges La Mettrie, “is to deny thousands of
facts that anyone can easily verify” (1747/1994: 61). Indeed, much of L’Homme machine
(1747) reads as a series of empirical challenges against uniqueness and exceptionalism
claims; the final sentence is a case in point: “So there is my system, or rather the truth,
short and simple, if I am not very much deceived. Deny it if you can!” (76) Whereas
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Descartes largely rejects the empirical and epistemic import of crises of psychological
continuity, La Mettrie revels in them.
While agreeing that “animals are machines,” and consenting that Descartes was
“the first to demonstrate fully” this conjecture, La Mettrie observes, “I think Descartes
would have been a respectable man in all respects […] if he had known the value of
experience and observation, and the dangers of straying from them” (70-1). For La
Mettrie, simple and unbiased application of the scientific method is the only responsible
way to mitigate explanatory crises. La Mettrie thus shifts the marginalized tradition away
from anecdotal evidence and uncritical analogical reasoning from human to animal
minds, to acknowledgment that positive analogies are strengthened with a “concilience of
inductions” (Whewell 1840) drawing credibility from a multitude of sources, e.g.,
biology, behavioral research, and comparative neurology and physiology. “Philosopherphysicians” are the only individuals “who have the right to speak here,” declares La
Mettrie against the “obscure studies” and “fanaticism” of theologians, which have led “to
a thousand prejudices” about other animals (29-30). After Aristotle,387 La Mettrie is thus
the next major figure in history to naturalize the crisis. Insofar as the spirit of the
Enlightenment is to dispel the “wretched hotch-potch of traditional error” affecting even
those most “advanced in wisdom and learning,”388 La Mettrie does more to shoulder this
responsibility regarding human exceptionalism in mental faculty than anyone until the
mid-to-late 19th century.
As Greenwood (2015: 70-1) notes, the scientific revolution “amounted to a fullscale revolution in intellectual attitude” largely by means of “adjudicate[ing] between
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competing theoretical explanations of the same range of empirical data.” La Mettrie is not
only the first proponent of the marginalized tradition to employ this epistemic model, he
is the first figure in the history of either tradition to employ it with an anti-speciesist
attitude. In Enlightenment spirit, La Mettrie chastises “Descartes and all the Cartesians”
for making “the same mistake. They said man consists of two distinct substances, as
though they had seen and counted them” (27). For La Mettrie, the term reason—like
“soul”—is hardly deserving of the tremendous reverence that is has long held in the
history of natural philosophy. Employing the token strategy of the marginalized tradition
of critiquing problematic rhetoric in defense of uniqueness claims, La Mettrie writes that
“[t]he excellence of reason does not depend upon its immateriality, a big word empty of
meaning, but from its power, extent, and clear-sightedness” (28). La Mettrie makes this
strategy more effective by combining it with a principle of epistemic parsimony.
Consider the following attack on the “abuse of language” undergirding Cartesian dualism
as a foundation for uniqueness claims:
…why do we divide the sensitive principle that thinks in man’s mind? Is this not a
manifest contradiction for advocates of the simplicity of the mind? If you divide
something, it is absurd to continue to claim that it is indivisible. The abuse of language
leads to such nonsense, as does the use of those big words spirituality, immateriality, etc.
that even intelligent people scatter about without understanding them. (43)

The principle thesis of L’homme machine is that the behavior of humans and
animals alike can be explained by means of efficient causal mechanistic explanation
(including human language, thought, and reason). It is by attempting to demonstrate the
likelihood of this hypothesis that the text is largely dedicated to attacking those who erect
categorical (or otherwise “philosophical,” i.e., non-empirical, as La Mettrie uses the term)
distinctions between the cognitive faculties of human and non-human animals. La Mettrie
has no qualms distinguishing himself from Descartes on this point:
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…even though [Descartes] harps on the distinction between two substances, it is obvious
that this is only a shrewd move, a clever stylistic trick to make theologians swallow a
poison hidden behind an analogy [i.e., human organization to animal organization] that
everyone sees but them.389 This impressive analogy forces all scholars and meticulous
investigators to admit that however greatly these proud and vain beings desire to exalt
themselves, they are at bottom only animals, perpendicularly crawling machines, more
distinguished by their pride than by the name of man. (71)

While Descartes remained committed to the theological backbone of his substance
dualism, La Mettrie was in agreement with his contemporary David Hume that the
existence of God is highly unlikely. The advancement of science in the study of nature,
he writes, “consequently cannot help but produce unbelievers, as witnessed by the ways
of thinking of its most successful investigators,” and “if there is a God,” it makes little
sense why this being would implore us “to distrust the knowledge we can draw from
animated bodies” (ibid.). Leaving behind Cartesian doubt, La Mettrie moves on to
demonstrate his case for cognitive continuity in the spirit of a strictly scientific enterprise.
4.2 Biological Functionalism, Scala Natura, and the Origins of Mind
The transition from animals to man is not abrupt. […] A man is distinguished from the
ape and other animals only as the ape himself is distinguished from the other animals,
that is, by a physiognomy that shows more discernment than theirs. (41)

La Mettrie’s beliefs were largely informed by the emerging field of comparative
anatomy spearheaded by Oxford neurobiologist Thomas Willis (1621—1675), whose The
Anatomy of the Brain (1664) and Two Discourses Concerning the Soul of Beasts (1672)
he was familiar with (Greenwood 2015: 90). In the vein of a proto-Carl Sagan (1977), La
Mettrie reasoned from these texts that brain-body mass ratio correlates to intelligence and
the size of each creature’s brain is proportioned to its biological and environmental needs,
which is the reason why “man has a very large annular protuberance; this diminishes by
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degrees in the ape and the other animals…” (1748/1994: 37). This hypothesis led La
Mettrie to a relatively enlightened stance on the traditional notion of a scala natura.
The same year L’Homme machine was released, La Mettrie published a shorter
text in his “Natural History of Man” entitled L’Homme plante (1748/1994), the argument
being that although “men and plants differ more than they resemble one another” (87),
there are nonetheless more material “analogies between the plant and animal kingdoms”
than had formerly been considered (77).390 In both texts, La Mettrie conceives of life in
terms of “a ladder so imperceptibly graduated that nature climbs it without ever missing a
step through all its diverse creations” whereby “one goes from white to black through an
infinite number of nuances or degrees that render the passage infinitely agreeable. Man
and plants are the white and black. The quadrupeds, birds, fish, insects, and amphibians
are the intermediary shares that soften that striking contrast” (89). Despite rarely being
read today (or, indeed, during the 19th and 20th centuries) passages such as this and the
arguments—discussed in this section—that they are based on, “presaged a fundamental
principle of evolutionary theory” (Greenwood 2015: 93).
La Mettrie contends that humans are the “king of the animals,” as they are, “the
only animal suitable for society, the only one to produce language, the only one with the
wisdom to establish laws and morality” (91). But he immediately qualifies this statement
in two ways. First, human exceptionalism is true only in the limited sense that human
material complexity allows them to confront the greater number of “needs” they are faced
with in comparison to the relatively fewer “needs” of other species. Akin to the
functional biology of Aristotle and Locke, La Mettrie evokes a scala natura in a
descriptive sense, with little-to-no normativity implicit in higher rungs, i.e., “because
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[humans] have infinitely more needs, it follows necessarily that man must have infinitely
more mind” (90). For La Mettrie, “mind” is an emergent property of complex brains and
bodies. He dismisses the Lockean notion of mind as a tabula rasa, which “suggests both
the perfectibility of human beings and their complete malleability” instead opting for an
account of mind, “both in individuals and in species” that can account for “a range of
inherited and inborn anatomical and neurological features, compulsions and limitations”
(Lieber 1994: 4). The extent to which a scala natura is present in La Mettrie is thus
dictated by his biological functionalism: the more needs an organism has, the more
complex its organization will be to accomplish said needs. If one species has more needs
to sustain itself than another species, this does not make the cognitive capacities of the
former species are inferior, just less complex (85).
Despite chastising philosophers, La Mettrie knew a good philosophical question
when he saw one. In L’homme plante, when considering the material relationship
between organisms belonging to the “entire cycle of kingdoms” from “the bottom-most
of these bodies to the first genius,” La Mettrie perceptively asks, “Does mind disappear
here?” (89). Instead of answering the question as a metaphysician, La Mettrie adopts a
theory of functional emergence: “I might introduce here a curious bit of natural history to
demonstrate that intelligence has been given to all animals in proportion to their needs”
(89). “Beings that have no needs,” he writes, “have no minds” (85). In a somewhat
perplexing statement, La Mettrie claims that plants do not possess minds because they
“have no needs” due to being rooted in the earth which nourishes them. La Mettrie’s
point seems to be that—unlike animals—plant life is naturally maintained by the earth
and the sun, with minimal problem-solving work on the part of the plant itself.
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Though never explicitly defining the word “mind”, on my reading, La Mettrie
holds a materialist view of mind as an emergent problem-solving mechanism for living
bodies to address their varying kinds and degrees of needs. While this is a vague and
unsatisfactory account of mind, it does open up the gate for La Mettrie to attribute a
breadth of uniquely distinctive cognitive capacities throughout the animal kingdom. In a
critique of the dominant tradition reminiscent of Aristotle’s insistence that we speak of
diverse animal capacities “by analogy” with human capacities, La Mettrie writes that
theologians “ought to be content to observe that throughout the animal kingdom the same
acts of seeing are carried out by an infinity of different means…,” e.g., “[ears] have a
striking diversity in form, without humans, animals, birds, and fish using them
differently. All ears are made in such a mathematical way that they all serve the same
purpose, that of hearing” (55). La Mettrie thus follows Aristotle’s and—to a certain
extent—Locke’s penchant for making uniqueness claims rather than exceptionalism
claims about the human mind, an attitude that follows from their collective appreciation
for explanations drawn from functional biology (though not Aristotelian teleology).
La Mettrie also seeks to destroy categorical distinctions between plant and animal
kingdoms, largely by evoking Trembley’s (1744) discovery of the fresh-water polyp as
an organism that fits into both. Although reproducing through shoots like a plant, it uses
tentacles to attain food, which is then directed toward a “mouthlike opening that leads to
a stomach” (Lieber 1994: 9). La Mettrie draws the following lesson from this discovery:
Polyps do more than move after being sectioned. In eight days, they reproduce into as
many whole animals as there are separate parts. This makes me feel sorry for the
naturalist’s system of generation, or actually, this discovery pleases me, because it
teaches us never to make conclusive generalizations, even from all the best known and
most decisive experiments! (61)
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This passage shows La Mettrie’s open-mindedness and willingness to suspend judgment.
The question still confronting modern philosophers of science and biology—what are the
origins of mind?—is left unanswered by La Mettrie, and he is content with future
scientists to figure it out. The key point is: just as La Mettrie saw degrees of overlaps
between the plant and animal kingdoms, he saw no reason to deny overlaps and degrees
between humans and other animals. The same sentiment drawn from L’homme machine
above can be found in L’homme plante: “How can a scrupulous physician, a supposed
follower of experience alone, dare conclude on the basis of a few observations of a single
species that the same phenomena are to be found in another that he has, on his own
confession, not observed?” (81).
This line of questioning leads to the second way in which La Mettrie qualifies his
statement that humans are the “king of animals.” La Mettrie argues that, just as the freshwater polyp challenges the tenuous dividing line between the plant and animal kingdoms,
so too does the great ape for the place of humanity in the animal kingdom. Most notably,
La Mettrie suggests teaching apes the then-new method of sign language, with the same
methods recently developed by J. C. Amman (1669—1724), to challenge long-standing
exceptionalism claims about language (38-9). Note the confrontational tone La Mettrie
adopts in presenting this idea of teaching apes “a multitude of signs” to communicate
with humans…
Not only do I defy anyone to cite any truly conclusive experiment that proves my project
impossible and ridiculous; but the structure of the speech organs in apes are so similar to
those in man that I have almost no doubt that if one trained this animal perfectly, one
would finally teach it to articulate and, thus, to learn a language. Then he would be no
longer either a wild man or a man manqué. He would be a real man, a little man about
town, as well set up or muscled as we are for thinking and profiting from his education.
(40-1)

216
As discussed above, such experiments did indeed become popular in the 20th century
(e.g., Gardner and Gardner 1969; Terrace et al. 1979). Despite La Mettrie’s sardonic
humor in the final two sentences, his reasoning—in addition to citing similar “speech
organs”—is again based on the contention that the brain-body size ratio dictates learning
ability and general intelligence, and that the ratio is roughly the same in humans and
chimpanzees (38-41).
La Mettrie’s critical emphasis on uniqueness claims pertaining to language is
intentional. According to La Mettrie, language, along with reason and morality, all derive
from principles of reflexive learning—or, as he puts it: “mimicry.” Mimicry is an
instinctive and (often) involuntary process shared by all sentient beings. “Consequently,”
writes Greenwood (2016: 206), La Mettrie “held that the same form of reflexive
explanation that accommodated sensory-motor reflexes could be extended ‘all the way
up’ to higher cognitive capacities,” explaining why he believed—as evinced by his
proposal to teach sign language to apes—“that animals could be trained in the higher
cognitive capacities commonly held to be exclusively human.” La Mettrie is arguably the
first philosopher to staunchly defend an “all the way up” hypothesis with the aid of
scientific knowledge; even Hobbes and Locke draw the line somewhere, and Hume’s
continuity hypotheses are not explicitly based in comparative anatomy. La Mettrie thus
agrees with Descartes that human linguistic ability has yet to be observed in the animal
kingdom, and that language is the root of abstract thought and advanced social
organization. In contrast, La Mettrie predates 20th century behavioral psychologists in
explaining the development of human language with principles of reflexive learning
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common to human and animal behavior.391 La Mettrie even goes so far as to suggest that
the apes in question should be taught sign language from infancy for a greater chance of
success, and that “language” itself is not restricted to the province of vocalizations, lest
our investigations of its presence in other species be biased (41).
Like Lucretius and Montaigne, La Mettrie emphasizes that human and animal
communication is multi-modal insofar as it can be manifest in posture, eyes, lips, and a
variety of gesticulations (ibid.). Although he does not say it outright, the implication is
that uniqueness claims pertaining to language and communication have traditionally been
constructed on anthropocentric foundations, i.e., defined in terms of complex (human)
vocalizations. La Mettrie claims that “education” is that “which alone draws us up from
the level of animals,” and in making this claim he is explicitly anti-speciesist: “But will
we say the same about the deaf, those born blind, imbeciles, madmen, wild men, or those
raised in the woods by wolves, those whose imagination is corrupted by hypochondria,
and finally all those creatures in human shape who have only the coarsest instincts? No.
All these men in body, but not in mind, merit no particular classification” (48). This
passage is contentious not only for the epoch in which La Mettrie is writing, but also for
the 21st century. La Mettrie’s claim is that the boundaries of intelligence—or any
cognitive capacity—should not be set at the level of species; if we follow the dominant
tradition of defining “the human” as a being with capacities X, Y, and Z, there will
always be some humans which lack these capacities and some animals which possess
them to some degree. This is, recall, the crux of the argument from marginal cases. Either
human marginal cases are not, strictly speaking, classified as “human” or else “an ape full
391

“Similar accounts of imitative learning formed the basis of the theories of social behavior developed by
Gustav Le Bon (1841—1931) and Gabriel Tarde (1843—1904) in the late 19th century, which played a
major role in shaping the development of twentieth-century social psychology” (Greenwood 2015: 92).
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of intelligence is just a little man in another form” (75). La Mettrie even goes so far as to
suggest that apes have the same chance of success at learning sign language—or perhaps
better chance—than human marginal cases with perceptual and cognitive disabilities
“because of the great analogy between ape and man” (39).
La Mettrie largely employs the argument from analogy as it should be employed,
namely (1) by drawing from as many disparate sources as possible to strengthen the
probability of positive analogies between the causes of like-behavior in human and nonhuman animals, and (2) with epistemic humility: “Doubtless the most extended analogy
leads the mind to believe that all the differences between animals and man are produced
by the causes I have mentioned, although I must admit that our feeble understanding,
limited to the grossest observations, cannot see the ties between causes and effects. That
relation is a sort of harmony that philosophers will never understand” (38). Epistemic ties
to Humean skepticism are evident here. La Mettrie’s perspective on the problem of
ultimate causes comes across in the form of an attempt to provide a more parsimonious
explanation than anything offered by theologians. He implores his readers to “grant me
only that organized matter is endowed with a motive principle,” which “alone
differentiates it from what is not so organized […] everything in animals depends on the
diversity of this organization, as I have sufficiently proved, and this is enough to solve
the riddle of substances and that of man” (68). In short, there is no riddle: “Man is to apes
and the most intelligent animals what Huygen’s planetary pendulum is to a watch of
Julien le Roy. If more instruments, wheelwork, and springs are required to show the
movements of the planets than to mark and repeat the hours…” then this should be
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expected (69). It is this motive principle, La Mettrie claims, that provides the explanatory
backbone for understanding the efficient causes of all plant, animal, and human behavior.
With the exception of what Descartes took for an anomaly—the human mind—
this picture is not radically different from bête machine hypothesis (66). The disparity
rests in the scope of application. According to La Mettrie’s theory of psychological
emergence, “the material unity of man” (64) is forged from some “inborn force in our
bodies” that is found not in any particular organ, but in “the organization of the entire
body, and that, consequently, each part contains in itself springs whose forces are
proportioned to its needs” (61). La Mettrie is aware that such a picture opens more
questions than it answers (e.g., what is this inborn force? Is this a nascent theory of
embodied cognition?), but he earnestly sees it as the best hypothesis to explain “this illunderstood teeming swamp” that is the human and animal body (62).
Another key figure in the rise of La Mettrie’s materialism is Albrecht Haller,
whose writings on muscular irritability (1757—1766) led to the view that muscles are not
passive chunks of meat that require “animal spirits” for animation; “muscles have an
animation of their own; the nerves transfer a signal to this mechanism” (Lieber 1994: 8).
In short, thought and feeling no longer require explanatory principles divorced from the
machinations of corporeal bodies; individual muscles are mechanisms working within a
larger mechanism, as is the brain, which functions as “the point of origin of the nerves
through which it exercises its rule over all the rest of the body” (64) and is therefore the
material cause of all conscious and unconscious movement, ranging from the rate of
palpitation of the heart from sexual arousal or the threat of danger, to the depths of moral
conscience and remorse.
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4. Concluding Thoughts on the Enlightenment
The dominant tradition encounters growing pains during the Enlightenment. As
evinced by Cartesians and Empiricists alike, this tradition at once holds onto vestiges of
classic defenses of uniqueness and exceptionalism claims, while also contending with its
largest opponent to date: the Scientific Revolution. The result is that the marginalized
tradition is given a breadth of new tools to work with—largely suggesting cognitive
continuity—and that the dominant tradition must now adapt. This pattern of adaptation is
observable in Descartes, Hobbes and Locke, where the Aristotelian strategy—rarely
evoked after Aristotle himself—now comes into favor, and the more regressive “all or
nothing” Stoic strategy largely falls into obscurity after Descartes, who struggles to
effectively combine empirical arguments about animal behavior with traditional, a priori
claims with respect to the limitations (or absence) of animal cognitive ability.
There is at least one crucial area where La Mettrie should have been more
cautious in following Aristotle: like many ancient and medieval philosophers, Aristotle
accepts material continuity between the bodies of all species, but nonetheless understood
that this does not in itself entail psychological continuity (Greenwood 2015: 91). La
Mettrie, on the other hand, naïvely took for granted that “all forms of human psychology
and behavior may be re-identified in other animals, albeit in attenuated form, because
human psychology and behavior are merely more complex forms of animal psychology
and behavior” (ibid). Despite serious flaws, La Mettrie offers the strongest sustained
argument for cognitive continuity in intellectual history prior to Charles Darwin. Like
Darwin, the former’s retrospective stature is that of an unapologetic figure whose
reasoning about the long-dominant human-animal divide evoked the ire of theologically-
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minded intelligentsia. La Mettrie faced genuine danger in his life. His conclusions were
to the emerging fields of biology, neurology, and comparative anatomy what Galileo’s
writings were to astronomy: more empirically tangible than the predominant alternatives
and markedly dangerous to the argument from providence. Descartes made famous the
bête machine hypothesis; La Mettrie made a crisis out of it.
Despite being ignored in Thomas Huxley’s (1825—1895) writings on animals as
automata (1874), La Mettrie’s works went through multiple printings and translations
during the Enlightenment. Even when his name was not evoked, as in Denis Diderot’s
(1713—1784) amusing D’Alembert’s Dream (1830)—clearly inspired by L’homme
machine—and multiple articles in his popular Encyclopedie (1751—1772), the
empirically-grounded challenge to human exceptionalism raised in L’homme machine
struck at the heart of the dominant tradition in an age largely willing to grant it some
consideration. Consider the entry on “Animal” written by Louis-Jean-Marie Daubenton
(1716—1800) for the Encyclopedie: “it will be very difficult for us to fix the two limits
between which animality, if it is permitted to express itself thus, begins and ends. A
definition of the animal will be too general, or will not be extensive enough, will embrace
beings that perhaps should be excluded, and exclude others that it should embrace.”
Many scholars consider La Mettrie’s work to exemplify not only the culmination
of the bête machine hypothesis, but also “the decisive climax of a major chapter in human
thought” (Lieber 1994: 13).392 In my view, this is both true and false. On one hand, the
bête machine hypothesis did not survive the Enlightenment—at least not in one piece. On
the other hand, La Mettrie can be said to effectively open the chapter on the role that
392
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evolutionary theory and behaviorist psychology will play in fueling the crisis at the turn
of the 20th century.
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Continuity as Crisis:
Two Traditions of Theorizing about Animal Minds
Chapter Seven
Anthropomorphism and Analogy:
Methodological Crises in Early Animal Psychology
1. Overview
Only a few persons now dispute that animals possess some power of reasoning. Animals
may constantly be seen to pause, deliberate, and resolve.
Charles Darwin (1871: 66)

From antiquity to the present, the dominant tradition in the philosophy of animal
minds has been rightly skeptical of a popular sentiment about that which is only
ostensibly observable: many non-human species perform complex and human-like
behaviors; often, this appears to imply possession of human-like minds. While the first
clause cannot be doubted, incredulity toward the inference that follows—which
beginning in 19th century is referred to as “the argument from analogy”—largely captures
the essence of the “explanatory crises” discussed in all previous historic periods, i.e.,
when evidence of mental continuity is predictably met with challenges in defense of
human uniqueness and exceptionalism. In the modern era, the argument from analogy
was popularized in the writings of David Hume (1711—1776), who famously claimed
that “the minds of men are mirrors to one another” (T II.2.5) and that when we see “other
creatures, in millions of instances, perform like actions, and direct them to like ends, all
our principles of reason and probability carry us with an invincible force to believe the
existence of a like cause” (T I.3.16).393 But clearly, just because the behavior of another
species is observed to be similar to the behavior of our own in similar circumstances,
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such an argument does not allow us to conclude an additional similarity, namely that both
sets of behavior were caused by the same motivation or cognitive mechanism/process.
Opposition to the argument from analogy is commonplace among philosophers
and scientists who have, by-and-large, been highly defensive of uniqueness claims and
exceptionalism claims pertaining to faculties and/or processes of the human mind. In
contrast, the weakest feature of what I have referred to as the marginalized tradition is
their largely uncritical acceptance of analogical arguments of the above type. This form
of argumentation, traditionally based on a combination of introspection and anecdotal
evidence, is present in varying degrees of credulity from Plutarch to Montaigne, La
Mettrie to Darwin, Huxley, and Romanes, and Donald Griffin to Frans de Waal. Indeed,
in her popular textbook, The Animal Mind (1908/1917), Margaret Washburn (1871—
1939) notes that in “recent times, we find argument very like those of Montaigne used by
the earlier evolutionary writers,” to which she cites an example of the argument from
analogy from Darwin’s Descent of Man (1871: 169): “As dogs, cats, horses, and probably
all the higher animals, even birds, have vivid dreams, and his is shown by their
movements and the sounds uttered, we must admit that they possess some power of
imagination”—an argument borrowed directly from Montaigne.394 The most vocal animal
minds skeptic of the past twenty-five years, Daniel Povinelli (2000: 12), is correct that
“Comparative psychology was born with the argument by analogy” and that “[e]ven
today, the invisible tentacles of this assumption run deep and tangled in our efforts to
understand the minds of other species.”
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“Even brute beasts are seen to be subject to the power of imagination; witnesse some Dogs […] whom
we ordinarily see to startle and barke in their sleep” (Apologie 277).

225
Povinelli is wrong, however, to cast all forms of analogical reasoning in animal
psychology as outmoded and dangerous to scientific methodology; quite the contrary,
exaggerated focus on ridding the animal minds literature from (what is presumed to be)
anthropomorphic analogical reasoning leads to idealized and confused epistemic
aspirations that, I suggest, invite more tough-minded “logical problems” than they dispel.
“Escaping the argument from analogy,” writes Povinelli (2000: 2), “allows us to take a
fresh look at the mental lives of other species, a look which may one day allow us to see
them without the fog of our own way of thinking about the world shrouding their true
natures.” This passage is based on two claims that are regressive for the dominant
tradition: (1) anthropomorphism can be eliminated with proper experimental conditions,
thus opening the door for knowledge of the “true natures” of animals, and (2) the
argument from analogy is something that can be “escaped”. Povinelli’s caricature of the
argument from analogy stems from his Thorndike-like obsession with idealized
laboratory conditions, which in turn informs his skepticism about what can be known of
animal minds. Indeed, Povinelli’s deference to principles of cognitive simplicity, the
promise of objectivity through crucial experiments, and his vocal rejection of any belief
about animals attained outside these conditions (including all field research), has much in
common with late 19th century trends in the nascent science of animal psychology.
In contrast, late-19th century figures like Washburn, Thomas Huxley (1825—
1895), Wesley Mills (1847—1915), Leonard Hobhouse (1864—1929), and Robert
Yerkes (1876—1956) share strategies for mitigating methodological crises in animal
psychology that remain relevant to contemporary efforts to confront the logical problem.
This chapter challenges the predominant attitude that analogical reasoning about animal
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minds suffers from a “logical weakness” (71) leading skeptics to believe that the logical
problem will always exist whenever analogical reasoning about animal minds occurs.
This is an overly skeptical attitude that must be rejected in order to revive the problemsolving abilities of the dominant tradition. The logical problem is not endemic to
analogical reasoning. Following a line of reasoning that extends into the following
chapter, I argue instead that the assumptions underlying the logical problem stem from
various historic conditions. These include what were indeed legitimate tough-minded
attitudes tied to the origins of experimental animal psychology in the 19th century. While
there will always be a place for scientific incredulity about animal minds, toughmindedness in the 21st century need not emulate tough-mindedness in the 19th century.
2. The Logic of Analogy
In one of the most oft-cited examples of analogical reasoning, Thomas Reid
(1710—1796) presented an argument for the existence of life on other planets. Using the
astronomical science of his day, Reid (1785/2012: 24) drew a series of inferences from
presumed similarities between the Earth and other planets in our solar system, concluding
that it is “not unreasonable to think, that those planets may, like our earth, be the
habitation of various orders of living creatures.” A brief discussion of the structure of
Reid’s argument and the serious flaws inherent in its justification will help setting the
groundwork for Hume’s analogical argument about animal minds.
Mary Hesse (1966) distinguishes “material analogies” from “formal analogies.”
The former identifies analogies based entirely on similarities identified by experience
(whether first-hand or in the natural sciences), and may be exemplified by Reid’s
argument. In the latter, two domains are said to be formally analogous if their relevant
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similarities can be interpreted under the same mathematical theory or physical law, e.g.,
“heat and fluid flow exhibit formal analogy because the relevant physical laws have a
common mathematical form” (Bartha 2013). In what follows, I assume that all arguments
about animal minds exist in the form of material analogy, wherein support for hypotheses
about “target” systems that are beyond observation is formulated by drawing a series of
“positive analogies” between the target system in question and a “source” system that is
observable and taken to be homogenous to the target (Hesse 1966). The strength of
positive analogies must be weighed against the existence of any relevant “negative
analogies,” i.e., observable dissimilarities between the source and the target systems.
The arguments of Reid and Hume are similar insofar as both cite “accepted
similarities between two systems to support the conclusion that some further similarity
exists,” thus belonging in the category of inductive or abductive reasoning, “since their
conclusions do not follow with certainty but are only supported with varying degrees of
strength” (Bartha 2013). This is typical of arguments from analogy. Consider, for
instance, Darwin’s (1860) acknowledgment that his argument for evolution by natural
selection is based on analogical reasoning:
…why may I not invent the hypothesis of Natural Selection (which from the analogy of
domestic productions, and from what we know of the struggle of existence and of the
variability of organic beings, is, in some very slight degree, in itself probable) and try
whether this hypothesis of Natural Selection does not explain (as I think it does) a large
number of facts…395

Darwin demands a reason why he cannot employ analogical reasoning as a heuristic
device to formulate hypotheses to help “explain a large number of facts.” Indeed,
Darwin’s analogical argument from the direct observation of several cases of artificial
selection (the source domain), to his theory of evolution by natural selection long
395
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predating the existence of our species (the target domain) is also rightly recognized as a
scientific discovery. Any argument for the theory of evolution by natural selection—and,
I argue, for animal minds—will rest on abductive reasoning, i.e., it will purport to offer
the best explanation, based on a far-ranging set of facts from various disciplines, of what
has been observed in order to explain the unobserved processes which brought it about.
Unfortunately, neither Hume nor Reid take into account relevant dissimilarities
between the source and target—a point that opponents of “the argument from analogy”
about animal minds seize upon (Povinelli 2000, Andrews 2015). There is no reason why
this should be the case. Below, I argue that Povinelli (2000: 71) creates a strawman out of
arguments from analogy about animal minds by selectively using examples that paint the
argument as entailing the following three points: (1) it does not take into account relevant
dissimilarities, (2) it relies wholly on anecdotal evidence, and (3) it is based on naïvely
presumed certainties drawn from common sense.
3. Hume’s Analogical Argument about Animal Minds
Although the analogical argument for belief in other minds may be traced back to
Hume and La Mettrie, its first explicit exposition appears in John Stuart Mill (1865), who
used it to deflate the problem of other minds with an inference from common sense. Like
Hume, Mill acknowledges that belief in other minds is natural for human beings, but he is
dissatisfied with grounding that belief on intuition. His argument has two premises. First,
other humans have similar anatomical properties as I do, which seem to be antecedent
conditions for my own mental events. Second, other humans exhibit behavior similar to
mine, which by introspection I believe to be the effect of certain mental operations that
cause them. Similarly, Hume writes…

229
‘Tis from the resemblance of the external actions of animals to those we ourselves perform,
that we judge their internal likewise to resemble ours; and the same principle of reasoning,
carry’d one step farther, will make us conclude that since our internal actions resemble each
other, the causes, from which they are deriv’d, must also be resembling (T I.3.16).

Hume’s argument ultimately stems from his belief in the continuity of associative
learning across animal minds. But as Hume was writing over a century before Darwin,
his argument was never really about drawing conclusions concerning what we can know
about animal minds; Hume was making claims about the way other animals reason
largely in order to prove his claims about the inner-workings of the human mind. In
particular, Hume’s “analogical proof” about animal minds is intended to “demonstrate the
veracity of Hume’s claim that beliefs concerning matters of fact are derived from
‘custom’ rather than abstract, demonstrative reasoning grounded in a ‘real connexion
among objects’” (Boyle 2003: 8).
Hume maintained that all of our beliefs about the world originate from an
instinctive, non-rational faculty that he refers to—sometimes interchangeably—as
custom, habit, and imagination—a faculty shared by pre-linguistic children and other
animals. Human beings, like other species, learn to navigate their environment and form
expectations about its contents solely from their experiences. It is only through living
alongside, and interacting with, the objects of a given environment—including one’s own
body—that one can come to know the attributes of, and relationships between, these
objects. A pre-linguistic human infant only learns the attributes of a stove after a
sufficient number of like-experiences, allowing her to draw inferences about the
attributes of all stoves and stove-like objects in the future. Likewise…
An old greyhound will trust the more fatiguing part of the chase to the younger, and will place
himself so as to meet the hare in her doubles; nor are the conjectures, which he forces on this
occasion, founded in any thing but his observation and experience (EHU 70).
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All sentient creatures possess a common faculty for “experimental reasoning” to
infer that like-events follow from like-causes, which, according to Hume, “is not only a
true species of reasoning, but the strongest of all others” (T I.3.7). Recalling the above
epigraph from Darwin, according to many figures in the marginalized tradition “Reason”
identifies a multi-faceted and gradualist—as opposed to “all or nothing”—faculty in
humans and animals alike. Hume also refers to this faculty as analogical reasoning (EHU
69) because it allows us to infer beyond our immediate and past experience to the
unobservable, thereby informing us “of existences and objects, which we do not see or
feel” (T I.2.3). According to Hume and Huxley (1878), human beings are no different
from other animals in this regard. “The whole conduct of life,” writes Hume, “is nothing
but a species of instinct or mechanical power, that acts in us unknown to ourselves; and
in its chief operations, is not directed by any such relations or comparisons of ideas, as
are the proper objects of our intellectual faculties (EHU 72). Hume is opposing the
Cartesian and/or rationalist conception of Reason as a distinctive, species-unique faculty
where manipulating “relations of ideas” in abstract representations is taken to be the
ultimate basis for human knowledge. As discussed below, this idea was hardly radical
amid the current of associative learning theories in the 19th century.
Like most figures in the marginalized tradition, Hume uses developmental
psychology to support his claims about animal minds. Human infants and non-human
animals, he argues, are capable of being educated and disciplined precisely because they
learn to draw inferences from what are initially arbitrary sounds to expectations of
punishment and reward (EHU 70). The early comparative psychologist Wesley Mills
(1898: 12-3) makes a similar point, describing the development of kittens as “nothing
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more than the conduct of a child of unusual determination and intelligence—in fact, just
the sort of child that I should expect to succeed in the world, no matter what the obstacles
in its path.” The most basic conclusion of Hume’s analogical argument, contrary to
popular opinion, is hardly controversial: “from all the rules of analogy” one would be
applying a double standard to assume that humans and animals do not share this
fundamental faculty for associative learning. Just as animals need not use “any process of
argument or reasoning” to make inferences based on cause and effect, nor is this
necessary for infant or adult humans in their ordinary affairs, who, upon introspection,
clearly do not consistently and consciously think in terms of demonstrative reasoning in
daily life—though they sometimes do after the fact (EHU 70). In line with Hume’s
argument, and the related argument from marginal cases, Huxley (1878) claims:
Whatever cogency is attached to the arguments in favor of the occurrence of all the
fundamental phenomena of mind in young children and deaf-mutes, an equal force must
be allowed to appertain to those which may be adduced to prove that the higher animals
have minds. (102)

The instinct of custom is therefore not only the most parsimonious explanation for
like-behavior between humans and animals; it is—for Hume and Huxley (1878: 101)—
the only answer: “since it is highly probable and cannot be disproved, we are quite safe in
accepting it as, in any rate, a good working hypothesis.” Hume, Mill, and Huxley alike
are clear that all arguments from analogy admit of degrees of certainty. According to
Hume, all reasonings concerning our experiences of the world, including animal
psychology and indeed the entire edifice of the natural sciences, are “founded on a
species of analogy” wherein…
…when the causes are entirely similar, the analogy is perfect, and the inference, drawn from it,
is regarded as certain and conclusive […] But where the objects have not so exact a similarity,
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the analogy is less perfect, and the inference is less conclusive; though still it has some force,
in proportion to the degree of similarity and resemblance (EHU 69).396

Similarly, Mill (1843/1930: 333) writes that, “there can be no doubt that every
resemblance affords some degree of probability, beyond what would otherwise exist, in
favour of the conclusion.” The claim here is that increasing the strength of a positive
analogy by adding more relevant similarities between the source and target systems
increases the probability that a conclusion is justified; importantly, the converse is also
true—a far cry from the strawman of Hume’s argument painted by Povinelli. In a
material analogy an hypothesis is, at best, more likely to be true than known alternatives.
I argued above that La Mettrie defends a similar epistemic attitude about animal minds.
Hume’s analogical argument can be read in two ways: (1) a limited application
that applies only to associative learning, and (2) an extended application wherein likebehavior is a justifiable indicator of “complex” faculties, e.g., theory of mind, empathy,
metacognition. When Kristin Andrews (2015: 30) claims that the “argument from
analogy to other minds is flawed enough to be reasonably rejected,” she is presumably
referring to the latter. Contrary to popular belief, Hume might have agreed. Since he
defends an Empiricist account where all or most mental faculties are extensions of
associative reasoning, the question is somewhat moot, but Hume never applies his
argument to suggest demonstrative reasoning in animals—likely because he found this
improbable due to lack of evidence. The emerging picture is that Hume’s argument from
analogy is not as irresponsible as history has painted it.
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4. The Argument from Analogy: From Hume to Huxley
The obvious issue with the argument from analogy comes from cases—e.g., in
artificial intelligence—where fundamentally different types of cognitive processes cause
the same or similar behaviors (Searle 1992). Particularly in its extended form, one would
be hard pressed to find an argument for the continuity of human and animal minds that is
more prone to anthropomorphism than the one that Hume offers. For this reason, it is
surprising that Hume found his greatest 19th century ally in a figure no less esteemed than
Thomas Huxley—Darwin’s confrontational “bulldog” who wore his particular affinity
for the apostle Doubting Thomas on his sleeve (Boakes 1984: 17). Indeed, Boakes
describes Huxley’s influence as “the main source, partly through his student Lloyd
Morgan (1852—1936), for the very skeptical attitude which first came to permeate
animal psychology” (ibid.). Huxley’s skepticism is responsible largely because it has
much in common with Hume’s (1748) mode of response to apparently insoluble
problems like the problem of other minds.
Although Hume and Huxley are widely considered “skeptics” in their approaches
to epistemology, both distance themselves from “the skeptics [who] end in the infidelity
which asserts the problem to be insoluble…” (ibid.). Hume and Huxley reject global
skepticism in favor of a fallibilistic theory of knowledge wherein the process of “solving
problems” does not entail arriving at evidence deemed “conclusive.” One must work with
as much evidence is currently available in proportion to how strong said evidence appears
to be, and how thus likely it is to add up to a “true” state of affairs—assuming that future
findings may always contradict those of the past. For instance, in Man’s Place in Nature
(1863: 36), Huxley suggests that it will be merely a matter of time before evidence
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appears to refute explorer, anatomist, and evolutionary theorist Alfred Russel Wallace’s
(1823—1913) discontinuity hypothesis that the human mind has a supernatural origin.397
It is largely because of his confidence in science that Huxley’s views on animal
minds come across as dogmatic. Here is, for instance, one of many like-quotes from
Huxley’s (1878: 104) little-known book on Hume: “it seems hard to assign any good
reason for denying to the higher animals any mental state, or process, in which the
employment of the vocal or visual symbols of which language is composed is not
involved.” Indeed, Huxley’s (1878) chapter “Mental Phenomena in Animals” cites with
approbation practically all of Hume’s major claims about animal cognition, though—
unlike Hume—Huxley has additional evidence from comparative anatomy, evolutionary
theory, and the discovery of fossils of hominid ancestors. Fifteen years before Huxley
wrote his book on Hume, and four years after Darwin’s Origin of Species (1859), Huxley
(1863: 103) intentionally describes his rationale as a naturalistic “updating” of Hume’s
original argument: “It is not merely that the observation of the action of animals almost
irresistibly suggests the attribution to them of mental states, such as those which
accompany corresponding actions in men.” Indeed, the “minute comparisons” of
anatomists and physiologists between “the organs we know to constitute the apparatus of
thought in man” and those of animals, reveal the “closest similarity,” “not only in
structure, as far as the microscope will carry us, but in function, as far as functions are
determinable by experiment” (102). As such…
Whatever reason we have for believing that the changes which take place in the normal
cerebral substance of man give rise to states of consciousness, the same reason exists for

397

Co-discoverer of evolution by natural selection, Wallace (1889: 23) nonetheless argued “Man’s body
may have developed from that of a lower animal form under the law of natural selection; but […] we
possess intellectual and moral faculties that could not have been so developed, but must have another
origin.”
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the belief that the modes of motion of the cerebral substance of an ape, or of a dog,
produces like effects. (103)

As with analogical arguments based on evolutionary theory (discussed below),
Huxley’s claim about the relative ease of drawing conclusions about comparative
psychology from findings in comparative anatomy is deceptively attractive. Both fields,
he argues, one much younger than the other, point “to the same conclusion,” namely—as
La Mettrie argued a century earlier—that both the physical and mental processes of
humanity are “but the last term of a long series of forms, which lead, by slow gradations,
from the highest mammal to the almost formless speck of living protoplasm, which lies
on the shadowy boundary between animal and vegetable life” (104). Most of Huxley’s
evidence in Man’s Place in Nature is based on analogical reasoning from anatomical
analogies: skulls, teeth, bones of all sorts, and embryonic development from various
species demonstrates “beyond all doubt the structural unity of man with the rest of the
animal world, and more particular and closely with the apes” (83). Of course, evidence
from comparative anatomy might play a role in supporting mental continuity hypotheses,
but only as part of a larger, less-conclusive argument than Huxley’s. One can accept
Huxley’s claim about “the impossibility of erecting any cerebral barrier between man and
the apes,” and nonetheless accept hypotheses that there are mental faculties possessed by
humans that do not exist in other apes (115).
To be fair to Huxley, there is one passage in Man’s Place in Nature where he
acknowledges the problem of inferring mental similarities from anatomical similarities.
Huxley draws an analogy between different musical instruments and the minds of various
species, suggesting that, “Art and industry may get much music, of a sort, out of a penny
whistle; but, when all is done, it has no chance against an organ. The innate musical
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potentialities of the two are infinitely different” (111). I assume that Huxley is referring
to innate disparities in brainpower. Indeed, contemporary neuroscience can assist in
extending analogical arguments about animal minds. As Andrews (2015: 53) notes,
“neurological research relies heavily on analogy,” citing in particular the “Cambridge
Declaration on Consciousness” (2012) as based on “a form of argument from analogy” as
the “search for neural correlates to conscious experience” requires “looking for
similarities in neurological structure and activity between humans and other animals.”
Hume would have approved. Against modern-day detractors like Povinelli (2000),
there is no evidence that Hume believed his argument from analogy to be “complete”
with behavioral analogies alone. To the contrary, Hume maintained that the methodology
employed in philosophical inquiry should be continuous with the physical sciences,
thereby maintaining that the “experimental method of reasoning” that he employs in
investigating the mind, i.e., “human nature,” could serve as an analogue to contemporary
developments by Newton in the field of physics. Namely, begin from a wealth of
particular experiences and proceed from these observations to form “principles as
universal as possible” (EHU 8). Just as William Harvey’s (1628) principles explaining
the circulation of blood have proven true when observed in many animals, the same likely
holds of all animals (69). Turning then to the mind, Hume states that…
These analogical observations may be carried farther, even to this science, of which we are not
treating; and any theory, by which we explain the operations of the understanding, or the origin
and connexion of the passions in man, will acquire additional authority, if we find that the
same theory is requisite to explain the same phenomena in all other animals (EHU 69).

It is in forward-thinking passages like this one—which applies equally to evidence for
biological evolution—that one can sense Huxley’s (1878: 105) adoration for “Hume’s
sagacity” in that “he perceived the importance of a branch of science which, even now,

237
can hardly be said to exist; and that, in [this] remarkable passage, he sketches in bold
outlines the chief features of comparative psychology.”
5. Attacking the Citadel: In Defense of Indirect Knowledge of Mind
At age 29, Darwin (1838) wrote in his notebook that “To study Metaphysics, as
they have always been studied appears to me like puzzling at astronomy without
mechanics.—Experience shows the problem of the mind cannot be solved by attacking
the citadel itself—the mind is a function of the body.” Washburn (1908: 14) likewise
notes that knowledge of the minds of others “must always be indirect, a matter of
inference,” i.e., in terms of bodily anatomy and behavior. And, as George Romanes
begins Animal Intelligence (1877: 1), “in our objective analysis of other or foreign minds
we have no such immediate cognizance; all our knowledge of their operations is derived,
as it were, through the medium of ambassadors—these ambassadors being the activities
of the organism.” Philosophers of animal minds in the late 20th and 21st centuries rarely
speak this way, but our situation has not changed. The fact that the mental lives of others
are, at the most basic level, inferred by analogy with introspective awareness of our own
mental states and their respective patterns of behavior is, of course, a classic problem of
philosophy. It need not be a scientific problem though.
The logical problem has historically been interpreted in two ways, often
simultaneously: (1) the normal state of affairs in science, where “complementary” (i.e.,
behaviorally indistinguishable) hypotheses compete to offer the best explanation of a
given phenomenon, or (2) the classic “problem of other minds” dressed up to
accommodate arguments from analogy about the mental lives of non-human animals,
where—in the interest of responsible science—associative learning hypotheses are
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preferable to mentalistic hypotheses. These problems are legitimately more pronounced
in the animal minds literature than in developmental psychology, but there is no “unique
problem” to the former foreign to the latter worthy of debilitating skepticism (Halina
2015). As the early comparative psychologists rightly acknowledged, the study of
consciousness and mental states in animals need not, and should not, be debased by fears
of traditional “other minds” skepticism, such as the sort lingering in Behaviorist critiques.
As Watson (1913) notes in his watershed paper on Behaviorism, traditionally,
behavioral data “must have at least an analogical or indirect reference to belong to the
realm of psychology,” however, he writes, this “emphasis upon analogy in psychology
[…] will inevitably force us to the absurd position of attempting to construct the
conscious content of the animal whose behavior we have been studying.”398 In contrast,
the early comparative psychologists do not conceive this position as “absurd” since,
unlike the positivist, the fallibilist need not view the problem of other minds as an
epistemic roadblock to scientific progress. As Hume and Huxley imply, it is precisely
because knowledge of other minds is indirect that the likelihood of conclusions about
them is strengthened with each additional source from a variety of research programs.
Leonard Hobhouse (1904), for instance, states the Hume/Huxley position as entailing
responsible skepticism and analogical reasoning based on a consilience of inductions:
At no point, perhaps, is the evidence [for animal psychology] conclusive, but it is to be
remembered that these functions are indicated so that evidence of capacity for one is
indirect evidence of capacity for another. We have, therefore, a set of independent
arguments all pointing in the same direction, and it is on this convergence of evidence
rather than on decisive proof at any point, that our hypothesis must rest.399

The same perspective is present in Morgan (1903: 37), who writes that “we have direct
and immediate acquaintance with no other psychical processes than those which we can
398
399

This “inevitability” recalls Povinelli’s (2000) talk of a “logical weakness” in the argument from analogy.
Qtd. Mills (1904: 751)
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study by the introspective method in ourselves.” In practical response to this situation,
Morgan echoes Hume, Huxley, and Hobhouse:
When he compares and correlates his own results with those of other introspective
observers, he becomes so far a comparative psychologist, and by widening his basis
renders his conclusions more comprehensive. A further stage of the comparative method
is reached, when he endeavours to correlate the results of introspective psychology with
the conclusions reached by the physiological study of those nervous processes which are
the concomitants of psychical states. (36 [emphasis added])

For Hobhouse and Morgan, rather than rejecting analogical reasoning about other minds,
the right position is to advocate strong, pluralistic arguments from analogy in the
necessarily “indirect” study of other minds. One more figure from the marginalized
tradition will suffice to demonstrate how widespread this anti-skeptical attitude was.
According to Robert Yerkes (1905: 142-3)…
Human purposes well may be material of science, albeit we know only our own directly;
and in precisely similar fashion the mental life of an insect, a fish or a monkey may be
studied indirectly. […] Certainty of the truth of these inferences there is none, nor can
there be; but neither is there certainty of the truth of any of our inferences concerning the
states of consciousness of our fellow beings. […] Consequently our knowledge of the
mental life of animals must vary, for all practical purposes, with our knowledge of their
anatomy, physiology, habits, instincts and reactions.

These historically marginalized responses to animal minds skepticism remain
progressive: arguments from analogy must be strengthened from as many disparate
research programs as possible to forge arguments to the best explanation. The same
attitude was present in La Mettrie, who was well aware of the problem of mental
attributions being “indirect”, and the “solution” of strengthening arguments from analogy
with various evidential sources. 400 It is largely in this spirit that Romanes (1883: 13)
claims that we must be careful not the “abuse” analogical reasoning (ironic given his
reputation), because it is “the only instrument available.” To be clear, one does abuse
analogical reasoning if the extent of one’s rationale is Hume’s basic argument that like-

400
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behavior implies like-mentality, which Darwin and Romanes often and uncritically fall
into. That said, none of these figures, including Morgan, advocate the expenditure of
intellectual resources on crucial experiments capable of shouldering the weight of
mentalizing hypotheses alone, as has been widely advocated over a century later.401
6. The Logical Problem and Tabular Representation
In response to apparently debilitating skeptical problems such as the logical
problem, Hume’s strategy is to convert such inquiries into questions that we can say
something about pertaining to the role our experience plays in forming such ideas (Biro
2005: 39). There will never be a conclusive answer to whether chimpanzees have a
theory of mind, but evidence on this subject can be swayed in one direction or another by
increasing the number of positive and/or negative analogies; that is all one can ask for,
and there is nothing unusual about this method that is worthy of skepticism. One possible
avenue for representing situations like the logical problem is inspired by Hesse (1966),
who famously provided a visual aid to representing analogical arguments by

representing their similarities and differences in the form of tabular representation:
SOURCE (S) TARGET (T)
P

P*

[positive analogy]

A

~A*

[negative analogy]

~B

B*

Q
Q*

(plausibly)

According to Bartha (2010: 16), the above argument may thus be summarized: “It is
plausible that Q* holds in the target because of certain known (or accepted) similarities
with the source domain, despite certain known (or accepted) differences.”
401

E.g., Povinelli and Eddy 1996; Povinelli and Vonk 2004; Lurz et al. 2014
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Consider the following tabular representation of an analogical argument assessing
the evidential strength for attributing empathy to chimpanzees and rhesus macaques,
respectively. Empathy is defined here as requiring a theory of mind to represent the
mental states of others, which is contrasted with more basic and widespread (though
behaviorally-indistinguishable) reflexive acts of emotional contagion, i.e., social animals
become emotionally distraught when observing others in pain, but not necessarily
because they are adopting the perspective of that individual. This argument is intended
for heuristic purposes only.
Humans (S)

↑

Known
similarities:

Chimpanzees (T1)
D

Relevant

Rhesus macaques (T2)

Differences:

Von Economo neurons (associated with
making self/other distinction)

Von Economo neurons (only
found in apes and humans) 402

No Von Economo
neurons

Passed Gallup’s (1979) “mirror
recognition test” for self-awareness.

Passed Gallup’s (1979) “mirror
test” for self-awareness (very
rare in animal kingdom). 403

Have not passed Gallup’s
mirror test for selfrecognition.

Chimpanzees are our closest living
evolutionary ancestors

Humans are one of their closest
living evolutionary ancestors, far
closer than T2404

Humans are a close
evolutionary ancestor, but
less close than T1

Likely has capacity to empathize;
much more likely than T2

Capacity to empathize far
less likely than T1

Inferred
similarity:

Has capacity for empathy

⇒

402

Jackson and Decety (2004) claim to have found “a window into the neural processes involved in
empathy” by discovering parts of the prefrontal cortex activated only when humans dissociate their own
actions from similar actions in others. Allman et al. (2005) found here a set of mirror neurons called “Von
Economo neurons” or “spindle cells” are active only in social emotions (e.g., shame, pride, etc.). Dense
networks of these neurons exist only in humans and great apes—not monkeys—suggesting the ability to
differentiate between one’s own perspective on the world and that of others in social contexts.
403

An animal is placed in front of a mirror with a painless mark on its forehead. If the animal recognizes
and attempts to remove the mark, this behavior is viewed as a basic level of self-awareness. There is debate
over what this test measures. Nonetheless, the fact that chimpanzees and humans—but not monkeys—pass
counts as a positive analogy for chimps (and a negative analogy for monkeys) since self-recognition
appears relevant to making a self/other distinction.
404

Not a particularly strong reason (see Section 7, below) since distantly related species display similar or
identical behaviors in response to comparable environmental problems, suggesting convergent selection
pressures and not because they are closely related.

242
This argument could be strengthened with more positive analogies and—importantly—
made more critical and nuanced with the addition of negative analogies.
It is particularly frustrating that Povinelli (2000: 71) acknowledges this point in
his criticism of the argument from analogy: “It is an inherent aspect of arguments by
analogy that their strength depends not simply on the extent of the similarities under
scrutiny, but even more so on the relevance of those similarities. Likewise, of course,
such arguments are weakened by relevant dissimilarities.” This is exactly right. After
sixty-four pages of argumentation in which Povinelli promises to uncover the “logical
weakness” of analogical arguments as used in the animal minds literature, his conclusion
is merely a caricature of the term “argument by analogy” based on the assumption that
contemporary philosophers widely believe the extended version of Hume’s argument to
be justified—which is wrong (Andrews 2015: 9-11) and, as I have shown in the previous
section, Povinelli is over a century late in pronouncing this. Povinelli has thus created a
strawman and—as one of the most widely read scholars in the literature—done
unnecessary damage to the idea of analogical reasoning from human to animal minds.
Lest my reader think I am myself making a strawman of Povinelli, in his highly critical
review of Folk Physics for Apes (2000), Colin Allen (2002: 6) describes the “carelessness
of about what exactly the argument from analogy is arguing for” in Povinelli and
Giamboni’s chapter, noting that…
…the fact that arguments by analogy are not deductively valid is hardly news, but it is far
from clear what they mean by “logical weakness” if it is not the failure of the premises to
imply the conclusion, especially given their own use of the word “implies”. Things get
murkier still when their exact target of their attack seems to shift, just two sentences later.
They assert that they “are not indicting arguments by analogy in general” but that their
target is “‘the argument by analogy’ for the existence of other minds” (9). However, the
question of whether other minds exist is rather different from the question of whether the
minds of other animals are like ours. […] Far from pointing out a special “logical
weakness” in the argument by analogy, what we learn is that the more behavioral
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information we have, the more accurate our assessments of cognitive similarity are likely
to be. No news there.

Here is why my criticism of Povinelli’s discussion is important: even a simple
analogical argument of sort I just provided for empathy could be instrumental in
determining how serious the logical problem should be taken on a case-by-case basis.
What contemporary skeptics do not consider is that, in order to be grounded in scientific
method rather than philosophical skepticism, the logical problem itself must be
recognized as arising in degrees, e.g., given the tentative conclusions in the above
example (again, for heuristic use only), one should be more skeptical of the claim that
monkeys possess empathy than the claim that chimps do. The modern logical problem is
not treated with this nuance; nor is it amenable to arguments to the best explanation;
those like Lurz et al. (2014) who dwell on this problem state the “challenge for
researchers” as follows: “to design protocols for which positive results cannot be
plausibly explained by the behavior-reading theory but can be explained by the
mindreading theory” (431 [my emphasis]). As discussed below, late-19th century
philosophers and scientists were correct that practically any behavior can be “plausibly
explained” with associative mechanisms; indeed, it is difficult to imagine a complex
human behavior—without evoking introspection—that satisfies this same criterion. These
points were present in Hume (1748) and Huxley (1874), who argued that experience
suggests “Reason” to be an advanced form of associative learning.
The future of the study of animal minds (more generally) and the strength of a
given analogical argument about animal minds (more specifically) depends upon forming
analogical arguments to the best explanation forged from various areas of inquiry, e.g.,
evolutionary biology, comparative cognition, comparative anatomy, neuroscience,
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linguistics, ethology, anecdotal evidence, statistical field reports, anthropology,
developmental psychology, and the philosophy of mind. The processes and contents of
animal minds should thus be conceived of as abductive rather than—as Hume thought—
inductive in character. The term abduction was originally coined by Charles Sanders
Peirce (1839—1914), who—according to Bernstein (1983: 69)—offered the following
revisionary account of scientific justification that is highly relevant here:
Peirce criticizes the picture of scientific reasoning that represents it as a linear movement
from premises to conclusions or from individual ‘facts’ to generalizations [i.e., induction]. In
its place he emphasizes the multiple strands and diverse types of evidence, data, hunches, and
arguments used to support a scientific hypothesis or theory. Any one of these strands may be
weak in itself and insufficient to support the prosed theory, but collectively they provide a
stronger warrant for rational belief than any single line of argument.

With respect to topics in the animal minds literature related to longstanding uniqueness
claims about humans, this is by no means an easy task. The disciplines that I briefly
consider in this chapter—comparative anatomy and evolutionary theory—are relevant to
these ends, but do not offer as much support to analogical arguments for species
continuity as they may originally appear.
7. Evolution and Arguments from Analogy
If two species are closely related in evolutionary time, and behave in similar
ways, is such evidence sufficient to claim that they possess similar cognitive faculties?
Despite evolution by natural selection offering the best theoretical reasons to support
mental continuity hypotheses, arguments utilizing facts about common decent to prop up
analogical reasoning about animal minds rest upon a precarious empirical foundation.
In a paper entitled “Can evolution explain how minds work?” Bolhuis and Wynne
(2009) claim that “Biologists have tended to assume that species with shared ancestry
will have similar cognitive abilities, and that the evolutionary history of traits can be used
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to reveal how we and other animals perform certain mental tasks.” However, they note,
“evolutionary convergence may be more important than common descent in accounting
for similar cognitive outcomes in different animal groups.” In other words, many
distantly related species have demonstrated similar or identical behaviors in response to
comparable environmental tasks and problems, suggesting that they arrived at these
behaviors and cognitive skills due to convergent selection pressures and not because they
are closely related.
Bolhuis and Wynne provide a number of examples to demonstrate their point.
They note, for instance, that many avian species “are capable of feats that match or even
exceed those reported in monkeys and apes.” Magpies, for example, have recently passed
Gallup’s (1979) “mirror test” for self-awareness, a feat only accomplished by great apes,
dolphins, and elephants. Bolhuis and Wynne identify a bias in this literature wherein
when apes and elephants pass the test this behavior is typically taken as evidence of “selfconsciousness,” but magpies are seen only to have evinced a degree of “self-recognition.”
The fact that it is surprising to us that magpies can pass this test while monkey species
never have, reveals the seductive nature of this dangerous foundation for arguments from
analogy. It would likewise be irresponsible to deny Langford et al.’s (2006) claim that
certain pro-social behaviors of mice are suggestive of empathy, on the basis that our
species is “more evolved” than mice. This very sentiment is hugely outmoded in biology.
In contrast to Jean-Baptiste Lamarck (1744—1829) and Herbert Spencer (1820—
1903), who maintained that life on Earth (including mental phenomena) is explainable in
terms of a directional, progressive movement from simple to complex forms of
organization, Darwin rejected teleological accounts of the origin and evolution of species.
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According to Darwin (and Wallace), in addition to Lamarckian principles of inheritance,
of equal importance to evolutionary theory are individual variation and selection
pressures acting like a generational sieve on populations of a given species. The
Malthusian result of this evolutionary recipe (i.e., inheritance, variation, selection) is not
a Great Chain of Being. It is a picture of natural history akin to an irregularly branching
tree, where the survival of each species is appropriately explained in relation to the
disparate survival of its individual members owing to selection pressures acting on
particular phenotypes over others in relation to specific environments; species themselves
are not, therefore, “higher” or “lower” in relation to one another. This is nomenclature
that, while used occasionally by Darwin, has no proper place in his understanding of
species differences.
8. Darwin as a Marginalized Figure
Many authors have insisted that man is divided by an insuperable barrier from all the
lower animals in his mental faculties. I formerly made a collection of above a score of
such aphorisms, but they are almost worthless, as their wide difference and number
prove the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of the attempt.
Charles Darwin (1871: 54)

In the introduction to her recent textbook, Sara Shettleworth (2013: 2) states that,
“What unifies this diverse field is the overarching question with which the modern study
of comparative cognition began, how true is Darwin’s (1871) assertion that humans’
‘mental powers’ are different in degree but not in kind’ from those of other species?” Is
there a fundamental discontinuity or “gap” between the kinds of capacities and behaviors
exhibited by other species when compared to those of our own? Do there exist qualitative
differences between our species and the rest of the biological world that make some of
our cognitive capacities truly unprecedented amongst those of other extant creatures? In
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line with his own rejected list of potential uniqueness claims, Darwin himself wanted
very little to do with these sorts of questions. He was well aware of their historical
tenacity; he understood their large-scale interest to the scientific community, the religious
orthodoxy, and the general public. Nonetheless, contrary to the dominant research
tradition before, during, and after his lifetime, Darwin was chiefly and unapologetically
concerned with understanding the similarities between species rather than their
differences. Darwin remained transfixed by the behavioral ingenuity of non-human
species, placing little emphasis on the uniqueness of his own. He was markedly
unconcerned with respect to an animal’s size or apparent stature in the animal kingdom,
not-so-famously spending years observing and conducting detailed experiments on the
behavior of earthworms, attributing them rudimentary forms of consciousness and even
intelligence (1881). As such, when Darwin (1871) did turn his eye squarely toward our
species, he mostly adopted a “bottom up” view of the building blocks of human cognition
in context of our shared evolutionary history with other animals.
This approach stands in stark relief to the far more prevalent “top down” mode of
inquiry that begins with (1) questions as to why—and to what extent—other species seem
to lack certain human abilities, and (2) controversial questions arising from evidence
suggestive of the need to expand exceptional features of the human mind to the minds of
other animals. Darwin had little interest in the lengthy tradition of those concerned with
distinguishing the mere appearance of X, from “genuine” or “true” X, i.e., as humans do
X, thus implicitly evoking orthogenetic hierarchies in the animal kingdom, culminating in
the de facto superiority of human mental faculties.
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Despite this difference in emphasis, Darwin is in many ways a paragon of the
marginalized tradition, embodying the majority of characteristics (positive and negative)
discussed in earlier figures. As with Lucretius and La Mettrie, Darwin defends a nonhierarchical, naturalistic account of the evolution of mind, conceiving of mental faculties
as arising in degrees of complexity throughout the animal kingdom. Darwin likewise
condemned “all or nothing” definitions of mental faculties, e.g., “‘conscience’ was by no
means some fixed mental attribute, which was either possessed or not possessed;” so too
can rudiments of language and the moral sense be identified in a diverse array of species
(Boakes 1984: 7). Darwin (1871: 51) also set himself the task of breaking down
categorical barriers defended by the dominant tradition, most importantly between reason
and instinct.405
The regressive aspects of Darwin’s approach to the animal mind are also par for
the course in the marginalized tradition; indeed, Povinelli’s opposition to “the argument
from analogy” is at home in much of Darwin’s work. Alongside Plutarch, Montaigne, and
La Mettrie, Darwin’s writings on animal minds—particularly in Descent of Man
(1871)—suffer heavily from “methodically anthropomorphic analysis” of animal
behavior (Mitchell et al. 1997: 17), further problematized by “the dubiously anecdotal
nature of the evidence” from which Darwin supported his biological conclusions about
mental continuity (Boakes 1984: 8).406 That said, although Darwin (1971: 404) often tells
stories like “that old baboon, who, descending from the mountains, carried away in
triumph his young comrade from a crowd of astonished dogs,” he also occasionally
makes cautious claims about anthropomorphism, e.g., “Blushing is the most peculiar and
405

Chapter Eight, Section 3.2
To be clear, not all of the anecdotal evidence in Darwin’s Descent of Man (1871) is problematic; he was
arguably the first to popularize the fact that chimpanzees use tools to crack nuts (1871: 51-2).
406
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most human of all expressions. Monkeys redden from passion but it would take an
overwhelming amount of evidence to make us believe that any animal can blush” (310).
Regardless of Darwin’s undeniable significance today, his influence throughout
the period under discussion in this chapter was marginal indeed. At the turn of the 20th
century Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection was “widely held to be of
historical interest only,” as “it was not until the 1930s that natural selection re-acquired,
and has since maintained, its central role in evolutionary theory” (Boakes 1984: 4). This
was because (1) Darwin’s (1859) estimate that the Earth has supported life for a
thousand-million years was, by 1870, widely rejected by leading physicists in favor of
shorter span of twenty to thirty million years dictated by principles of thermodynamics,
(2) Darwin lacked a theory of heredity, and (3) much hostility and confusion arose over
whether the mechanisms discussed in Origin of Species and Descent of Man could
actually explain the origins of humanity. As such, “although animal psychology
developed against the evolutionary background provided by Darwin, it did so at a time
when his major theoretical contribution was thought to be of decreasing importance”
(ibid.). The result was that Darwin was not nearly the boon to the marginalized tradition
as were the plethora of learning theorists to the dominant tradition. Regardless of the fact
that Thorndike and Watson, among others, defended large-scale continuity between
species in terms of learning processes, learning theories ended up providing the strongest
empirical foundation to date for denying mental processes to animals.
9. Theories of Associative Learning and the Dominant Tradition
Despite his interest in the development of habitual behaviors, Darwin was not
terribly concerned with the second major trend in 19th century animal science: the sheer
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explanatory power of associative learning hypotheses (Bekoff 2019: 44)—already hinted
at by the Empiricists, but now experimentally demonstrable. By observing the first few
hours of a lamb’s life, Alexander Bain (1818—1903) noted that what began as a series of
random, spontaneous actions became increasingly purposeful as particular movements
slowly became associated with sensations of pleasure and pain. Bain (1859: 349)
believed that he was documenting a developmental process, based on trial and error,
ubiquitous throughout the animal kingdom (including humans), i.e., “throughout all the
grades of sentient existence, wherever any vestiges of action for a purpose are to be
discerned, this link [between pleasure/pain and ‘active instrumentality’ to achieve ends]
must be presumed to exist.” Although Bain was wholly uninterested in defending human
uniqueness (indeed, quite the opposite), what came to be known as the “Spencer-Bain
principle” would play an important explanatory role in the origins of comparative
psychology, particularly in an intellectual climate increasingly skeptical of describing
animal behavior as thoughtful.
The influence of Bain (and Darwin) is palpable in the second edition of Spencer’s
Principles of Psychology (1870). By applying Bain’s ideas to evolutionary biology,
Spencer argued that associative learning mechanisms are not only ontogenetically critical
in the development of individual intelligence; they also play a key phylogenetic role in
the evolution of species. In short, Spencer uses Bain’s ideas to postulate “a fundamental
principle of nature,” reasoning via Lamarck’s principle of inheritance the existence of “a
single process of learning, based on the principle of association, which ensured
development along a single route” (Boakes 1984: 13 [emphasis added]). Far from
Darwin’s picture of evolutionary history as a branching tree, Spencer wrote of the
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evolution of the nervous system or the mind, therefore erecting epistemic and biological
foundations not only for uniqueness claims, but for statements of human exceptionalism:
the very word evolution had a normative connotation, i.e., “better” or “more evolved”. It
was on this basis that Spencer (1870) infamously hypothesized that those of European
decent had superior mental capacities than members of so-called “lower races.”
Most relevant to the history I am telling is Spencer’s influence as part of a
contingent of learning theorists responsible for an intellectual climate whereby practically
any animal behavior (and for the Behaviorists, any human behavior) can be fully and/or
satisfactorily explained by means of a single principle or law. For those skeptical or
tough-minded about ascriptions of “higher” human-like mental abilities to animals, there
was no want of “simpler” complementary explanations—now behaviorally demonstrable
by experimentation—for any apparently mentalistic action. In this way, aside from
coining the term imprinting (experimentally demonstrated by Douglas Spaulding [1841—
1877], the father of ethology), the Stoics are relevant to 19th century discussions of
animals because they were the first to postulate a simple explanatory apparatus, based on
the link between the brain and the nervous system, capable of explaining all animal
behavior (Long 1996: 243). I am not suggesting a conceptual history here. My point is
that the dominant tradition became a philosophical force with the Stoics and Cartesians
on the basis of a similar idea, i.e., any crisis of human exceptionalism can be resolved
quickly by means of the explanatory potential of associative mechanisms tied to the
nervous system rather than the mind.
Indeed, citing Bethe, Loeb, and Thorndike, Washburn (1908: 17) notes with
concern this “revival” during her time, “in an altered form, of the Cartesian doctrine” that
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animal behavior can be thoroughly explained without any reference to “unaccompanied
by any consciousness whatever.” She continues that comparative psychologists must
resist “the tendency to make purely biological concepts suffice as far as possible for the
explanation of animal behavior and to assume the presence even of consciousness in
animals only when it is absolutely necessary to do to” (ibid.). Young Thorndike’s
speculative suggestion that “apes are no more capable of thought than cats of dogs”
(Boakes 1984: 179) was based on these growing theoretical and methodological
foundations, as was “his general proposal that all non-human intelligence was to be
explained on the simple basis of stimulus-response connections established during trialand-error learning” (177)—an idea that, I have suggested, shares a spiritual history with
Stoic deference to a “singularity of causation” in the animal kingdom in response to any
and all explanatory crises of human exceptionalism.
9. Anthropomorphism and Clever Hans Errors
Dogs get lost hundreds of times and no one ever notices it or sends an account of it to a
scientific magazine. But let one find his way from Brooklyn to Yonkers and the fact
immediately becomes a circulating anecdote.
Edward Thorndike (1898:4)

The origins of experimental psychology in the 19th century were largely defined
by crises of methodology. If psychological inquiry would come to merit the designation
of a “proper” science, then strictly anecdotal or introspective forms of evidence would
find no home among those epistemic virtues tied to experimental control and pools of
quantitative, behavioral data. The extent to which comparative psychology could aspire
to be more than the study of behavior relied on a foundational level on agreeing that—
given proper conditions—one could reason analogically from observable behavioral
patterns to the unobservable mental states presumably related to them. Philosophical
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quandaries like the problem of other minds provided all the more reason for early
psychologists to stress the necessity of detailed and careful experimentation and to throw
away the rest. This general attitude held course whether the subjects were human or nonhuman. If progress was to be made in animal psychology, a healthy dose of tough-minded
methodological skepticism was necessary. So when, as the century came to a close,
George Romanes (1883) claimed to have taught a chimpanzee whom he had little
experience with to count, Lloyd Morgan’s (1894) skepticism was both important and
predictable.407 By far the most iconic case of warranted skepticism towards apparently
complex animal behavior would occur less than a decade later.
At the turn of the 20th century, news spread internationally of a horse in Germany
who could not only count, but also perform arithmetic functions, read, spell, and discern
musical intervals. “Clever Hans” would respond to questions of this sort by repeatedly
tapping his hoof a given number of times (e.g., five times for 2+3) or by nodding his head
toward one of several objects or cards to signal the right answer. Having gained
credibility by deceiving over a dozen respected skeptics, animal trainers, and zoologists,
these feats were not seen as parlor tricks, but as possibly overthrowing long-dominant
claims of human exceptionalism. Carl Stumpf, the Director of the Psychological Institute
at the University of Berlin, and his student Oskar Pfungst, performed a series of
experiments that “read, even now, like a textbook illustration of how to apply
experimental methods to a psychological problem” (Boakes 1980: 78). Without going
into the detail, the results of these experiments—which went on for some time and
involved controlled laboratory conditions—led to the conclusion that Herr von Osten,
407
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Hans’ owner, had “unwittingly […] established a chain of stimuli and responses of the
kind that both [William] James and Thorndike had described” (ibid.). Unsurprisingly,
Stumpf and Pfungst’s (1904) paper received a glowing review from Watson (1908).
As the most famous explanatory crisis in the history of animal psychology, the
significance of this precautionary story to this critical genealogy cannot be understated.
Clever Hans was a boon to the dominant tradition because, for the first time, and to a
wide audience, an explanatory crisis was definitively resolved by objective scientific
methods, as opposed to otherwise “philosophical” or rhetorical means of refuting the
appearance of complex animal behavior discussed in previous chapters. One could hardly
be blamed for citing this story as crucial to the origins of “proper” animal psychology. To
leave it there, however, would be to miss what makes it significant in historic context.
Clever Hans is well at home within the deep history of “crisis-inducing” stories of
“clever” animals, attractive to the general public, which challenge human uniqueness and
exceptionalism in mental faculty. Before the experimenters arrived at their conclusions,
the story of Clever Hans was but a modern analogue to famous anecdotes like
Chrysippus’ Dog, Thales’ Mule, the Thracean Fox, and dozens of like-stories peppered
throughout the most famous historic compendiums of animal behavior, e.g., Aristotle’s
History of Animals (4th century BCE), Pliny the Elder’s Naturalis Historia (77—79 CE),
Aelian’s De Natura Animalium (3rd century CE), Conrad Gessner’s Historia Animalium
(1551), and Comte de Buffon’s Histoire Naturelle (1749)—all of which faced valid
criticism due to credulous acceptance of (often fantastical) anecdotal evidence and
anthropomorphism. The oldest and most direct analogue to the story of Clever Hans’
numerical abilities can be found in Aelian, cited as fact by Plutarch (c. 100 CE) and
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Montaigne (1580). In one story, a herd of cattle from the city of Susa were assigned to
draw precisely one hundred buckets of water a day, and “not even threats of beatings
[could] induce the cattle to exceed their daily quota,” which Plutarch interprets as the
animals possessing “a knowledge of number and a capacity to count” (974E). Anecdotal
reports of animals acting with human-like “cleverness” have long been used as fodder for
figures in the dominant tradition critical of the credulity of their opponents, often eliciting
responses in terms of “as if rhetoric”; 408 they have also, more often, been used as
evidence of mental continuity for figures in the marginalized tradition. In historic context,
it is difficult not to view Clever Hans as the definitive demonstration of the credulity of
latter tradition.
The moral of the story was broader than Hans, of course; it signaled what many
saw as the promise of improved experimental procedures being able to objectively reveal
that what appear to be complex forms of behavior can properly explained by the
operations of rudimentary cognitive mechanisms shared by humans and animals alike.
This leads us to another major contribution to the tough-minded intellectual culture from
which the logical problem originally emerged: laws of epistemic parsimony.
10. The Logical Problem, Laws of Parsimony, and Anthropodenial
The current iteration of the logical problem is indebted to the normative epistemic
conventions underlying Morgan’s Canon (1903) and Wilhelm Wundt’s (1832—1920)
law of parsimony (1863). Meketa (2014) describes The Principle of Cognitive Simplicity
(PoCS) common to these ideas as follows: “barring compelling evidence to the contrary,
the default hypothesis should postulate the simplest cognitive ontology (mechanism,
408
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process, or structure) consistent with the animal’s behavior” (731). Put differently, if the
behavior of a non-human animal can be explained in terms of a ‘lower’ or ‘less complex’
cognitive capacity, then the behavior should be explained in terms of that capacity.409 In
this section, I demonstrate the historic and conceptual interrelatedness of the PoCS and
the logical problem, particularly through the writings of Wundt, arguably the first person
to refer to himself as a psychologist and, in 1879, the first to open a laboratory dedicated
exclusively to psychological experimentation (Carlson and Heth 2010).
In his effort to establish psychology as a scientific discipline, Wundt (1863: 350)
pushed against the anecdotal-anthropomorphism of Darwin and Romanes, allowing
“recourse to be had to complex principles of explanation [only] when the simpler ones
have proved inadequate.” Precursors to Wundt’s principle can perhaps be found as early
as Aristotle, 410 and—certainly—William of Ockham (c. 1287—1347), though it first
came to prominence as part of sound scientific methodology in the Enlightenment with
the likes of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646—1716) and Isaac Newton (1643—1727),
who inspired Descartes to apply it to competing mechanistic and mentalistic accounts of
the animal mind. As Wundt suggests, the directness of the Law of Parsimony naturally
lends itself as a crucial tool to address the logical problem: “mental activities are so
complex and multifarious, that practically every objective action is capable of more than
one interpretation” (346).
The logical problem likewise forms the backbone of Morgan’s (1852—1936)
most enduring contribution to animal psychology, which he referred to as his Canon: “In
no case may we interpret an action as the outcome of the exercise of a higher psychical
409
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faculty, if it can be interpreted as the outcome of the exercise of one which stands lower
in the psychological scale” (1894: 53). It is well documented that 20th century scholars
did Morgan a disservice by consistently misinterpreting the Canon as a justification to
dismiss any mentalistic interpretation of animal behavior.411 Indeed, shortly after laying
out the Canon, Morgan considers the counter-argument that there are many instances in
history where the “simplest explanation is not the one accepted by science” (55), to
which he agrees, and warns readers against a dogmatic application of his Canon: “it
should be added, lest the range of the principle be misunderstood, that the canon by no
means excludes the interpretation of a particular activity in terms of the higher processes,
if we already have independent evidence of the occurrence of these higher processes in
the animal under observation” (59).
As with Morgan’s Canon, Wundt’s Law of Parsimony does not purport to reject
all mentalistic explanations of animal behavior. Yet for Wundt, application of the
principle to animal psychology offers a predictable outcome highly relevant still in the
21st century: “it seems the entire intellectual life of animals can be accounted for on the
simple laws of association” (350). In his Introduction to Comparative Psychology (1894:
308), Morgan agrees: “I am very far from wishing to occupy the false position of
dogmatic denial of rational powers to animals. I think it is a subject for further and fuller
investigation. But I do express the opinion that the fuller and more careful the
investigation, the less is the satisfactory evidence of processes of reasoning and that,
though the question is still an open one, the probabilities are that animals do not reason.”
Wundt (1863: 362-3) and Morgan (1894: 305) defend uniqueness claims
pertaining to language and abstract thought, but neither fall neatly into the dominant or
411

e.g., Costall 1993; Sober 2000, 2006; Fitzpatrick 2008; Andrews 2015

258
marginalized traditions described in earlier chapters. They both perceive the popularity of
Romanes’ Animal Intelligence as a threat to their discipline (Boakes 1984: 40), but not
because they disagree with Romanes’ conclusions (though they did largely disagree with
them); rather, because they view them as arrived at by unscientific avenues: anecdotal
evidence based on the argument from analogy. In this sense, the significance of Wundt
and Morgan in the history animal psychology is not that of skeptics but of responsible
philosopher-scientists hoping to unite their discipline under reasonable methodological
principles, and against hasty anthropomorphic judgments.
A common reason for evoking a PoCS when interpreting animal behavior is the
presumed naturalness of anthropomorphic judgment in humans. For instance, in
criticizing Darwin on grounds of anthropomorphism, G. H. Lewes (1860: 385) alleviates
some of the blame, noting that after all, “we are incessantly at fault in our tendency to
anthropomorphise, a tendency which causes us to interpret the actions of animals
according to the analogies of human nature.”412 Descartes made the same point against
Montaigne.413 Two-hundred and fifty years later, Wundt (1863: 342) developed his Law
of Parsimony in response to…
…the inclination of animal psychologists to see the intellectual achievements of animals
in the most brilliant light. This, of course, is due to the natural pleasure which the objects
of our observation always give us, and which is the most effective spur to continuous
devotion to a particular subject.

According to Wundt, then, anthropomorphism is not inherently bad. Indeed, as
noted above, practically all the founders of the discipline agree that using the human
mind as a model for the animal mind is practically unavoidable. The quality of evidence
for ascribing mental states to animals varies on a case-by-case basis, but the dominant
412
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assumption that anthropomorphism entails bad evidence is historically a case of guilt by
association, e.g., the anecdotalism of Montaigne, Darwin, and Romanes. In the 18th and
19th centuries, anthropomorphism—in any guise—becomes the central evil to be purged
from the discipline—a task seen as more important than concerns over underestimating
the complexity of animal minds. Indeed, this bias (deference to parsimonious explanation
over all else) has engendered a form of close-mindedness in the dominant tradition that
Frans de Waal (1999) has called “anthropodenial” and that Cecilia Heyes (2012) critiques
as “simple-mindedness” in animal psychology. The default position when observing
human-like behaviors in animals is that the source of those behaviors is not akin to that
which functions in humans; the mechanism under discussion is assumed to be “simpler”
and perhaps different in kind. Anthropodenial should be understood in terms of the false,
but historically preferred, understanding of Morgan’s Canon: if an animal behavior can
be explained in terms of a simple mechanism, than it should be explained as such.
Morgan’s Canon is a necessary tool, but it is insufficient on the grounds that
anthropomorphism is not the only prejudice that pervades the literature. Wundt and
Morgan agreed. In the next and final section, I show how both were concerned that
comparative psychologists have a tendency to overestimate human cognitive abilities,
and/or use them as a base-level from which to evaluate the existence, sophistication, and
complexity of analogous features of animal cognition. Ignorance of this prejudice can
lead to anthropocentric double standards when applying Morgan’s Canon, because in
order to fairly apply a PoCS, terms like “parsimonious” must apply evenly to analogous
cases of human behavior, i.e., if we overestimate the mechanism at play when humans do

260
X, we are more likely to set an unfair or unattainable standard to ascribe X to animals
(Heyes 2012, 2015).
11. Morgan’s Challenge and Huxley’s Challenge
To interpret animal behavior one must learn also to see one’s own mentality at levels of
development much lower than one’s top-level of reflective self-consciousness. It is not
easy, and savors somewhat of a paradox.
Conwy Lloyd Morgan (1930: 250)
While Morgan’s Canon is taught to all students of comparative cognition, Morgan’s
Challenge is not, though meeting it is a requirement for doing good comparative work in
psychology.
Kristen Andrews (2015: 44)

Nearly thirty years after publishing his Introduction to Comparative Psychology,
Morgan (1930: 250) wrote the above passage, which Andrews (2015) has recently
referred to as Morgan’s Challenge. It appears in a curious piece that that Morgan
published—to some chagrin, at the behest of his friend Carl Murchinson—as his short
“Autobiography” to be featured in the second volume of Murchison’s The History of
Psychology in Autobiography. Whereas Morgan’s Canon “serves to balance the natural
human tendency to interpret observed behavior in terms of complex psychological
processes” (Karin-D’Arcy 2005: 190), the impetus for Morgan’s Challenge, on the other
hand, is to balance an equally dangerous tendency that Buckner (2013) has recently
called anthropofabulation: “our tendency to tie the competence criteria for cognitive
capacities to an exaggerated sense of typical human performance,” which is a “distinct
bias that loads the deck against animal mentality.” Yet next to a brief mention in
Andrews’ recent primer The Animal Mind (2015), Buckner (2013) appears to have
published the only paper that explicitly explores this bias in contemporary comparative
psychology. If Buckner (2013) is right that “our tendency to exaggerate our own
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intelligence, rationality, and reflective prowess is a feature of human psychology as wellestablished as our tendency to anthropomorphize,” this is a problematic state of affairs.
Uniqueness and exceptionalism claims grounded on anthropofabulation threaten
the integrity of the dominant tradition. This bias is most readily seen in examples of
semantic anthropocentrism, which I have identified as early as Aristotle’s Davidsonian
definition of “belief”,414 and practically every cognitive capacity discussed by the ancient
Stoics (e.g., for whom all processes of “memory” are defined as “recollection”). The
clearest contemporary example of this prejudice can be seen in standard definitions of
theory of mind, which some have argued—correctly, in my estimation—to be a rarely
used, specialized capacity in humans, rather than constantly functioning somewhere
behind our social interactions.415 The standard definition of theory of mind very likely
“overly intellectualizes what is involved in our basic encounters with others” (Hutto et al.
2011: 15), thus stimulating progressive shifts toward “minimal” theories of mind in the
past decade (e.g., Butterfill and Apperly 2013).416
Morgan’s Challenge is relevant to contemporary debates insofar as both the
logical problem and Morgan’s Canon rest upon one’s ability to effectively distinguish
simple/lower from complex/higher mechanisms—an aptitude that Morgan rightly calls
into question as far more difficult than it appears. According to Andrews (2015: 44),
Morgan’s Challenge tempers the uncritical, anthropofabulous use of these terms to
identify historic divisions between cognitive processes in humans and animals:
The apparent variety and complexity of associations undermines claims that associative
learning is always simpler than reasoning, planning, or insight. Rather, these so-called
414
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higher cognitive mechanisms may be fancy versions of associative learning. As Morgan
reminds us, the mere fact that we introspect fancy mechanisms for our own behaviour
doesn’t mean that there are fancy mechanisms at work. And we should be wary of simple
explanations of animal behaviour, be they explanations in terms of associative learning or
insight, without a full understanding of what exactly the mechanism at stake looks like.
The worry is that such accounts [of animal behavior] do nothing more than gesture
toward the existence of an explanation, rather than provide one.

The “complementary behavioral rule” hypothesis in mindreading debates should be
critiqued along precisely these lines, i.e., because “it is too under-specified to make
determinate predictions, and hence there is no risk of it turning out to be wrong,” these
hypotheses are “unfalsifiable in a quite straightforward way” (Fletcher and Carruthers
2013: 461). The assumption undergirding the logical problem in mindreading debates is
that behavioral rule hypotheses provide more parsimonious explanations for animal
behavior than any given mindreading hypothesis, but as an increasing number of
commentators have pointed out,417 the apparent associative processes upon which these
hypotheses are based are vague insofar as “an explanation in terms of the animals’
deployment of some or other behavior rule can always be constructed after the fact”
(ibid.). This is precisely the state of affairs fueling the logical problem: “distinguishing
between the behavioural predictions of cognitive […] and associative accounts is not
straightforward because associative theory can mimic rational and inference-driven
explanations” (Dickinson 2012: 2734). The crux of Morgan’s Challenge in this context is
that explanations in terms of associative mechanisms should not be applied to animal
behavior until they can provide empirically tractable explanations for analogous human
behaviors, which demands that “students of animal cognition should be sensitive to
current developments in associative learning theory” (ibid.).
Though marginalized in the contemporary and historic literature, these concerns
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and suggestions are hardly new. Neither Buckner nor Andrews trace awareness of
anthropofabulation—and the requirement to engage with it (Morgan’s Challenge)—to its
earliest explicit appearance, which appears to be in Wundt’s Lectures on Human and
Animal Psychology (1863). According to Wundt, one of the major roadblocks to
comparative psychology is an exaggerated picture of human psychology:
When we began our consideration the mental life of animals, we condemned the tendency
of animal psychology to translate every manifestation of ‘intelligence’ into an intellectual
operation. The same reproach could be made against certain more or less popular views
of our own mentality. The old metaphysical prejudice that man ‘always thinks’ has not
yet entirely disappeared. I myself am inclined to hold that man really thinks very little
and very seldom. Many an action which looks like a manifestation of intelligence most
surely originates in association. Besides this, man is constantly translating acts of logical
thought back again into customary associations, and so increasing the sphere and the
intellectual consequences of the associational processes. By practice we can reduce
anything to association. (363 [emphasis added])

With respect to the history of explanatory crises of human exceptionalism, the most
important idea in this passage is contained in the sentence that I have italicized, which
highlights one of the most regressive features of the dominant tradition. Mindreading
debates, for instance, are still widely reliant upon an exaggerated definition of what a
theory of mind likely entails. Wundt goes on to cite Hume and the Empiricists as early
figures who were ahead of the curve in this regard, i.e., as those who not only refuse to
draw lines between “intellectual” and associative processes, but who acknowledge “the
fruitfulness of this interaction,” in contrast to those who “translate all mental activity into
logical reflection” ignoring or downplaying the fact that “ready-made thought-forms
furnished by association play no small part in the whole process” (ibid).
Though Wundt and Morgan are not, strictly speaking, parts of the marginalized
tradition, they share a deep concern over double standards between human and animal
psychology. In recent years, scholars have legitimately questioned whether unjustified
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anthropocentric bias informs applications the PoCS in animal psychology. 418 Such
concerns have existed since the origins of the discipline, e.g., writing in response to
Morgan’s Canon, Mills (1906: 9-10) warns that this principle runs the risk of…
…reduc[ing] the mental life of the animal very considerably […] But is there not a
danger of cutting down the possibilities of animal intelligence too much, and of assuming
that in the mental life of the great mass of mankind there enter more of those higher
intellectual processes […] than there really are.

Likewise, even before Morgan had formulated his Canon, Romanes responded to
Morgan’s incredulity about ascribing mentality and consciousness to animals as follows:
In whatever measure [Morgan] is on principle a skeptic touching the inferences which
this science [of comparative psychology] is able to draw as to the existence and nature of
animal psychology, in that measure I think he ought in consistency also to be a skeptic
with reference to the same points in the science of human psychology.419

What prompted this response was Morgan’s (1884) insistence that inferences about the
mental states of human beings were justifiable due to verbal confirmation, to which
“Romanes objected that acceptance of verbal reports of other people is just another form
of inference on the basis of observed behavior,” 420 and therefore “Morgan could not
consistently endorse inferences about the mental states of other humans but not animals,
given obvious similarities in their adaptive and intelligent behavior” (Greenwood 2016:
226). Another token member of the marginalized tradition, Robert Yerkes (1905: 527),
similarly argued that “human psychology stands or falls with comparative psychology. If
the study of the mental life of lower animals is not legitimate, no more is the study of
human consciousness.” More recently, Heyes (2015: 313) has likewise suggested that it is
imperative to uncover more information about the behaviors of our own species in order
to prevent potential bias against the cognitive abilities of other animals.
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Often, anthropocentric bias is so engrained in terminology that it is difficult to
recognize. Huxley (1863: 109), for instance, provided a strong critique of the explanatory
power of the word “instinct”, effectively stating that the vagueness of the term does not
amount to a scientific explanation, since (1) it is “wholly impossible to draw any line of
demarcation between reflex actions and instincts,” and (2) practically all human and
animal behaviors can, in theory, be “explained” by reference to this term:
It is ‘instinct’ which leads a chicken just hatched to pick up a grain of corn; parental love
is said to be ‘instinctive;’ the drowning man who catches at a straw does it ‘instinctively;’
and the hand that accidently touches something hot is drawn back by ‘instinct.’ Thus
‘instinct’ is made to cover everything from a simple reflex movement, in which the organ
of consciousness not be at all implicated, up to a complex combination of acts directed
towards a definite end and accomplished by intense consciousness. (109)

Huxley (1863: 110) goes on to suggest a conceptual history between 19th century uses of
the word “instinct” and the Rationalist notion of “innate ideas, in the most extended sense
ever imagined by Descartes,” who “illustrates what he means by an innate idea, by the
analogy of hereditary diseases or hereditary mental peculiarities, such as generosity.”
Following a train of thought reminiscent of La Mettrie, Huxley (1874: 14) asks: “As
actions of a certain degree of complexity are brought about by mere mechanism, why
may not actions of still greater complexity be the result of a more refined mechanism?”
I’ll henceforth refer to this passage as Huxley’s Challenge. While Morgan’s Challenge
encompasses a much wider set of concerns related to anthropofabulation, the question
that Huxley presents is certainly relevant to the ontological and epistemic challenges for
doing good work in comparative psychology emphasized by Wundt and Morgan.
Both challenges tacitly emphasize cross-disciplinary research between associative
psychology, animal psychology, and developmental psychology. Wundt, recall, notes that
“we can reduce anything to association” because, as Hume and Huxley also suggest,
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“[t]rains of thought which at first involved considerable intellectual labour are completed
with increasing certainty and mechanical facility the oftener they are repeated.”
Therefore, philosophers and scientists concerned with whether capacities like theory of
mind are present in other species should not use as a point of reference an adult human
theory of mind. This is because the more we “exercise” our mental faculties, the more
automated they become, and thus the more difficult it is to experimentally discern when
we ourselves are relying upon so-called “behavioral rules” when interacting with others.
In this sense, more explicit “clues” or indications of what mindreading entails will likely
be present when the faculty first develops in infants. Likewise, experiments designed for
pre-linguistic human infants will likely be more effective in revealing these clues—a
point demonstrated by the fact that false-belief tests (the long-time “litmus test” for
theory of mind [Lurz 2011: 10]) initially designed for pre-linguistic infants have been
more effective at demonstrating theory of mind in apes than the classic “Sally-Anne test”
designed for older children (Krupenye et al. 2017; Buttelmann et al. 2017).421
These suggestions are present in Morgan’s Challenge, which as Morgan claims,
“savors somewhat of a paradox.” The “paradox” is that reflective self-consciousness is
necessary to imagine experience without it. 422 This same sentiment is found in Mills
(1898: 3, 5), who notes how history has viewed the animal mind “in a distorted fashion,”
which can in part be tempered as follows: “In the understanding of the lower animals we
must each become as a little child…” The idea is not to promote imaginative
introspection as proper methodology in animal psychology; it is that developmental
psychology presents opportunities to level the playing field in terms of evaluating
421
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uniqueness claims. Wundt, Morgan, and Mills all believe that there is a vast difference
between humans and animal cognition, and that continuity and discontinuity hypotheses
have strong points in their favor, but they also agree that “Nothing is to be gained for any
cause, however, by overstating the case” for human exceptionalism (Mills 1898: 16).
Taking stock, Morgan’s Challenge and Huxley’s Challenge serve to temper
Morgan’s Canon (and the logical problem) by bringing to the forefront complications that
arise in classifying mechanisms as either “simple” or “complex”. The logical problem
asks, how can one choose between competing explanations? Morgan’s Canon replies:
choose the simpler one. Morgan’s Challenge then provides a necessary additional step:
before we apply laws of parsimony to hypotheses about animal minds, the comparative
psychologist should apply them to the mechanisms in question as they function in human
cognition. When humans perform behavior X, what are the various means of explaining
that behavior? Could a “simpler” mechanism explain this (human) behavior? Over a
century before Andrews’s (2015) The Animal Mind, Washburn (1908: 2-3) offered the
following suggestion, akin to both Morgan’s Challenge and Huxley’s Challenge, in her
book of the same name: “The nervous systems of many animals vary widely from our
own. We have, perhaps, too little knowledge about the functions of our own to conjecture
with any certainty what difference this must make in the conscious life of such animals.”
Dispelling logical problems in the current literature demands taking this advice.
12. General Conclusions
While Darwin retroactively accomplished more than anyone in history to open the
door for continuity hypotheses, he was not a boon to the marginalized tradition during the
formative years of animal psychology. Instead, 19th century developments in psychology
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brought to the forefront widespread agreement that (1) anything akin to Humean
“arguments from analogy” are recipes for credulous, anthropomorphic explanations of
animal behavior, that (2) laboratory conditions are necessary for making any substantive
claims about the operations underlying animal behavior, and (3) that in the absence of
laboratory studies, the only scientifically responsible explanations of animal behavior are
those evoking stimulus-response mechanisms. It was the laboratory, after all, which
ultimately resolved the Clever Hans crisis; anecdotal field reports fooled an international
coterie of skeptics. The fact that Stumpf and Pfungst’s (1904) findings were consistent
with attitudes championed by Thorndike and Morgan engendered a quick and easy
response to explanatory crises of human exceptionalism, still ubiquitous today: deferring
any and all continuity hypotheses in the name of waiting for “further evidence”.
The uniqueness claims of the dominant tradition, where “animals may be studied
scientifically as part of the natural world, but their philosophical importance lies in what
they lack” (Radner and Radner 1996: 7), henceforth gained additional traction due to an
increased atmosphere of incredulity about presumed causes of complex animal behavior.
This state of affairs is very much present in the contemporary literature, where automatic
skepticism toward field research is common, “complementary” behaviorist explanations
remain both ubiquitous and vague, and where many scholars see crucial experiments as
the only means to resolve logical problems when interpreting animal behavior.
The argument from analogy is not, as Povinelli (2000) suggests, the root cause of
the logical problem, which should—following Hume, Huxley, Wundt, and Morgan—be
conceived as a normal state of affairs in the natural sciences, rather than an epistemic
problem inherent to analogical reasoning about animal minds. Povinelli’s attitude has a
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deep historic precedent and serves to encourage skeptical trends that have largely
stalemated the current literature. As practically all the original comparative psychologists
emphasize, analogical reasoning is a fundamental part of studying the animal mind, and
“with proper safeguards” (Washburn 1917: 24) it is clearly possible to strengthen
arguments from analogy by a consilience of inductions (Whewell 1840) from various
sources. I have suggested tabular representation (Hesse 1966) as one way to model these
arguments and to mitigate skeptical gridlocks in the animal minds literature.

270
Continuity as Crisis:
Two Traditions of Theorizing about Animal Minds
Chapter Eight
Theory of Mind: A Degenerating Research Program
1. Overview
…the social structure of research on animal mindreading has changed. In earlier years
there were a number of active research groups, each publishing a significant volume of
empirical work and voicing their own theoretical perspectives. More recently, […] these
researchers now express doubts (Seyfarth & Cheney 2012; Whiten 2013) or outright
scepticism (Penn & Povinelli 2007, 2013). […] So, in these respects, research on animal
mindreading has declined.
- Cecilia Heyes (2015: 317)

Despite forty years of empirical research, animal minds skeptics contend that little
progress has been made in terms of answering Premack and Woodruff’s (1978) landmark
question: Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? In this chapter, I blend
terminology from Irme Lakatos (1970) and Larry Laudan (1977) to conceptualize the
animal mindreading research program as degenerative, i.e., unable to solve the problems
it poses for itself, due to reasons traceable to the research tradition to which it belongs.
Following the popular commentaries to Premack and Woodruff’s paper,423 the
mindreading research program has been motivated by the hypothesis that theory of mind
is uniquely human. This is a worthwhile project, but although the mindreading research
program started out promising, it has developed into another chapter in a long-running
research tradition mired in what I have referred to—following Sorabji (1993)—as
explanatory crises of human exceptionalism. In line with my reading of this history, Lori
Gruen (2011: 9, 12) describes a “bar-raising dialectic” throughout debates over human
uniqueness in the late-20th and early 21st centuries as “misguided attempts by those who
cling to the idea of an insurmountable divide between humans and other animals to
423
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establish human exceptionalism—even in the face of clear evidence establishing
continuities between human skills and the skills used by some non-humans.” Throughout
this genealogy I have unearthed and critiqued argumentative strategies commonly used to
buttress the authority of age-old uniqueness and exceptionalism claims. The present
chapter recaps these strategies, identifies their presence in modern theory of mind
debates, and analyses the present state of the logical problem in relation to them.
The logical problem is a conceptual problem masquerading as an empirical
problem. According to Laudan (1977: 45), “If empirical problems are first order
questions about the substantive entities in some domain, conceptual problems are higher
order questions about the well-roundedness of the conceptual structures (e.g., theories)
which have been devised to answer the first order questions.” Put differently, conceptual
problems rarely arise from the subject matter itself (the domain of empirical problems),
but from the basic assumptions, constraints, and methodologies from which researchers
approach that subject matter. Empirical problems are usually easier to identify and
contend with, but they often stem from conceptual problems that are so engrained in a
tradition that they become simply matter-of-course.
The situation of 21st century mindreading debates within the dominant tradition is
a perfect example. In addition to empirical questions concerning the relevance of the
behavioral, biological, and neuroanatomical facts about chimpanzee and human social
behavior, there is the epistemic (conceptual) question here as to how much, and what
kind, of evidence will suffice to demonstrate the conclusion that apes attribute mental
states to others (pending further evidence). In a progressive research program there can
be large-scale disagreement over what the evidence tells us and how much is sufficient,
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and there can be—should be, ideally—competing hypotheses to explain the data/behavior
in question. This is the nuts and bolts of a normal, healthy situation in the natural
sciences, but this is not the case in the mindreading literature, where “the worry arises
that no experiment can in principle avoid these alternative explanations” (Andrews 2015:
147). This “worry” is centuries old, and it is not resolvable by empirical means—at least
not on the scale to which it arises; I suggest here that this worry owes more to the
problem of other minds than it does to problems of underdetermination. To suggest, as
Robert Lurz (2011) has, that resolution of the logical problem in mindreading debates is
contingent on designing crucial experiments is wishful and ahistorical thinking.
The logical problem can be viewed as an empirical problem, of course, but in
order to revitalize the problem-solving effectiveness of mindreading debates, it should
first be recognized as emerging from conservative epistemic values and research
constraints endemic to the dominant tradition—a tradition wherein, “even in the face of
clear evidence establishing continuities between human skills and the skills used by some
on humans, skeptics either deny it actually happened or minimize the significance of that
activity” (Gruen 2011: 12). Conceptual problems and argumentative positions associated
with the current theory of mind debate are not unlike those historically tied to debates
over the presumed uniqueness of belief, judgment, language, abstraction, foresight, and
the perennial Reason. This chapter concludes by drawing from the marginalized tradition
to offer progressive strategies for engaging explanatory crises of human exceptionalism,
thus promoting healthy terms of debate in the dominant tradition.
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2. Human Exceptionalism as a Research Tradition: The Problem Determining Role
According to Laudan (1977: 86-90), research traditions perform three roles: (1) a
“problem-determining role,” which influences the range and weighing of empirical and
conceptual problems, (2) a “constraining role” which “establishes a general ontology and
methodology for tackling all the problems of a given domain or set of domains,” and (3)
a “heuristic role” which provides ready-made means for dealing with empirical anomalies
or challenges. The dominant tradition in animal minds research is no different, where
exceptionalism and uniqueness claims occupy central seats in the problem-determining
role. That said, those features of this tradition that I identify as degenerative are not a
result of this problem-determining role, but rather of the problem-solving capacities
isolated to the constraining and heuristic roles. Framing things in this way allows me to
identify unproblematic features of the dominant tradition and to isolate problematic
features. My aim is not, after all, to advocate the rejection of this tradition.
The problem-determining role can be distilled into the following four claims that
collectively stimulate inquiry within research programs in the dominant tradition:
Uniqueness claims: Humans are the only beings that do or have X (where X is some
activity or capacity). X has no parallel amongst extant species in the animal kingdom.
Exceptionalism claims: X is a superior (i.e., more advanced, complex, etc.) capacity to
any X-like capacities or X-like activities of non-human species. By relying upon scala
natura language (“higher” and “lower”), exceptionalism claims presuppose cognitive
hierarchies in the animal kingdom. Within the dominant tradition, these hierarchies are
orthogenetic, i.e., presented in terms of “a single evolutionary [or teleological] trajectory
culminating in Homo sapiens” (Bekoff and Pierce 2009: 49). Importantly, exceptionalism
claims can admit of differences of degree between species, though this is not the case—of
course—when coupled with uniqueness claims.
Challenge claims: Certain non-human species perform X-like behaviors, or behaviors
that appear to demonstrate an X-like capacity.
Parsimony claims: X-like behaviors of non-human animals can be explainable in terms
of alternative, simpler mechanisms than those responsible for X in humans.
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Think of these four claims as providing the problem-determining recipe for the dominant
tradition. Every research program will include all four.
According to Descartes, for example, humans alone possess a rational soul
granting them singular capacities for reason and language (uniqueness claims). Animals,
in contrast, are referred to as “dumb”424 and are said to lack “real speech,”425 i.e., as
defined exclusively by human ability, due to their lack of immaterial souls
(exceptionalism claims). Like Chomsky (1966), the perspective from which Descartes
writes of the innovative, compositional, and/or creative character of human language is
orthogenetic insofar as human communication is contextualized as more complex,
developed, or otherwise superior to the communicative capacities of other species.
Turning to Cartesian challenge claims, Descartes provides two empirical arguments—
which read as statements of fact: it is unconceivable that (1) animals could produce
meaningful language or (2) solve problems in contexts entirely novel to their natures.
Finally, Descartes relies on the parsimony claim that “we too move just like automatons”
throughout much of our daily lives, and just as we have no issue navigating the world
“when our mind is elsewhere,” why assume that animals need a mind at all?426 Descartes’
membership in the dominant tradition thus boils down to the interrelation of these four
types of claims, which constitute the problem-determining role of the Cartesian animal
research program.
With this example in mind, a few clarifying points should be made. First,
challenge and parsimony claims are as essential to this tradition as the uniqueness and
exceptionalism claims. Second, sometimes all four claims emerge in the same article or
424
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book, and other times they emerge dialectically and/or discursively in response to new
arguments and empirical discoveries; they need not arise in any particular order. Third,
exceptionalism and uniqueness claims collectively constitute default hypotheses within
the dominant tradition. It is the constraining and heuristic roles of this tradition that make
it difficult for evidence to be accepted suggesting these default hypotheses to be false.
To see how these four kinds of claims function together to determine problems in
the dominant tradition today, consider the development of chimpanzee mindreading
debates. Premack and Woodruff (1978) instigated the mindreading research program with
a challenge claim: “In this paper we speculate about the possibility that the chimpanzee
may have a ‘theory of mind,’ one not markedly different from our own. […] If we
succeed with that claim, we may later seek to determine how accurate and complete his
inferences are” (515). Based on their experiments, they conclude that chimpanzees are
mindreaders in the sense of attributing goals and intentions to others. “Are we to
believe,” they ask, “that we are the only species in which it is natural?” (526). The
mindreading research program was therefore born of a challenge, from which uniqueness,
exceptionalism, and parsimony claims were continually fleshed out and reinforced in the
aftermath, i.e., until we can show that “complementary behavior-reading hypotheses”
cannot equally explain the data (the parsimony claim), stage 1 and/or stage 2 mindreading
should be thought of as uniquely human (uniqueness claims). Furthermore, stage 1 and/or
stage 2 mindreading are largely responsible for more advanced social groups and forms
of communication that explain the complexity of human culture, i.e., the social
intelligence hypothesis (exceptionalism claims). 427 I turn now to how the chimpanzee
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mindreading program is a token example of how a once-progressive research program
within the dominant tradition can start out healthy and turn degenerative.
Positions on whether chimpanzees have a theory of mind, and—if they do—what
kind of theory of mind they may possess, have continuously shifted in response to
experiments suggesting radically different responses to these questions. Much of the
mindreading research in the 1990s was highly critical of Premack and Woodruff’s
original hypothesis. A series of famous experiments by Povinelli and Eddy (1996), for
instance, demonstrated that chimpanzees beg for food indiscriminately from a human
with a bucket covering their head, and from a human without. But a critical sea change in
experimental paradigms for assessing mindreading in chimpanzees occurred around the
turn of the 21st century. In an attempt to design experiments in such a way that closely
represented scenarios chimpanzees regularly experience in the wild, experimenters began
to garner results highly suggestive of mindreading hypotheses. The most powerful
evidence came from a series of experiments based on food-competition paradigms.
Rather then testing chimpanzees’ ability to cooperate for food, which is a rarity in their
natural habitats, these ingenious experiments gave chimpanzees competing for the same
food the ability to employ deceptive tactics by placing various occuluders between them,
controlling what each chimpanzee could and could not see. Experimenters found that
during competitive trials, the actions of subordinate chimpanzees are affected by what
dominant chimpanzees can and cannot see, as well as whether their opponent possesses
or lacks prior knowledge of the food source (e.g., Hare et al., 2000; 2001).
In the aftermath of Hare’s experiments it became increasingly clear that (1) the
general problem solving abilities of the chimpanzee mindreading research program were
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degenerating and that (2) two very distinct groups of researchers had formed: those—like
Hare—who saw this study as suggestive evidence for mindreading, and those—often
called “killjoys” or “skeptics”—for whom Hare’s experiments failed to make a dent in
the twenty-year old challenge claims posed by Dennett (1978), Harman (1978), and
Bennett (1978). While the emergence of the logical problem is often tied to these initial
commentaries to Premack and Woodruff’s paper (Hurley and Nudds 2006; Lurz 2011), I
offer a different reading of the history. The original parsimony (e.g., complementary
behavior-reading hypotheses) and challenge (e.g., can chimps pass a false-belief test?)
claims have evolved in such a way that they are—unlike the late 1970s—no longer
widely viewed as amenable to empirical resolution.
Consider Povinelli and Vonk’s (2004) claim that “the problem we face is not
primarily an empirical one. Instead, the most pressing problem is to come to grips with
the fact that the experimental results from the kinds of techniques that are currently in
vogue cannot add a single bit of evidence in unique support of the conclusion that
chimpanzees reason about mental states—any mental states” (11 [emphasis in the
original]). Povinelli and Vonk are correct. The logical problem is not an empirical
problem, at least not anymore. Regardless of whether or not it turns out that chimpanzees
do indeed possess a theory of mind, from the perspective of the logical problem, twenty
extant studies suggestive of mindreading abilities—so long as they all admit of
complementary behavior-reading hypotheses—are ultimately as valueless as a single
such study. This state of affairs explains the widespread presumption that crucial
experiments are necessary to progress the literature. Lurz et al. (2014: 450), for instance,
claim that “the best way forward at this point is neither to believe nor to deny the
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existence of animal mindreading, but to suspend judgment on the issue until tests have
been carried out that overcome Povinelli’s problem.”428
The “agnostism” advocated by Lurz and colleagues includes Call and Tomasello’s
(2008) claim, on the 30th anniversary of Premack and Woodruff’s article, that the
collective experimental literature strongly suggests that chimpanzees “understand others
in terms of a relatively coherent perception–goal psychology in which the other acts in a
certain way because she perceives the world in a certain way and has certain goals of how
she wants the world to be” (191). Call and Tomasello thus respond to Premack and
Woodruff’s original question in the affirmative, at least in terms of a “broad construal of
the phrase ‘theory of mind’,” noting that the jury’s still out on a “more narrow definition”
involving “a fully human-like belief–desire psychology in which they appreciate that
others have mental representations of the world that drive their actions” (ibid.). In
contrast, for Lurz (2011) even the minimal claim that chimpanzees are capable of
attributing of perceptual mental states to others, like seeing, is worthy is great skepticism.
Chimp social behaviors indicative of such attributions can be more parsimoniously
explained, argues Lurz, by ascribing to them learned behavioral rules wherein others’
behavior is predicted entirely by means of inferences drawn from past and present bodily
and facial orientation, e.g., instead of chimps holding the propositional attitude X sees Y,
the same behavior(s) can follow from them making inferences of the sort X has a “direct
line-of-gaze” to Y, which does not entail mental state attribution.
Lurz et al. are correct to advocate scientific fallibilism about belief in animal
mindreading, but their position is not standard in at least three respects. First, they portray
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these debates as if one must either totally affirm or totally deny chimpanzee mindreading
hypotheses (450), rather than viewing them in terms of varying probability based on
evidence. Second, they place far too much emphasis—indeed, all their emphasis—on the
success of crucial experiments as the only motivator of progress in mindreading debates,
whereas the history of science suggests that crucial experiments rarely fill this role
(Lakatos 1974; Laudan 1979). Third, in adopting strict “agnostism”, they implicitly reject
how progress is most often made in the history of science: arguments to the best
explanation drawn from a consilience of inductions, such as the wealth of evidence
informing Call and Tomasello’s (2008) more progressive position, decades after the
debate began, that chimps arguably possess abilities for stage-1 mindreading.
The source of this impasse in the mindreading literature had nothing to do with
the problem-determining role of the dominant research tradition. As the early years of the
mindreading debates show, the recipe of exceptionalism claims, uniqueness claims,
challenge claims, and parsimony claims can motivate promising research programs.
3.1 Human Exceptionalism as a Research Tradition: The Constraining Role
It is the primary function of a research tradition to establish a general ontology and
methodology for tackling all the problems of a given domain or set of domains. As such,
it acts negatively as a constraint on the types of theories which can be developed within
the domain. There are also many occasions where the methodology of a research tradition
rules out certain sorts of theories. […] The research tradition within which a scientist
works precludes him from adopting specific theories which are incompatible with the
metaphysics or methodology of the tradition (Laudan 1977: 89 [emphasis in original]).

The constraining roles of the dominant tradition are the key players responsible
for the amount of undue skepticism in comparative cognition today. This point is most
easily introduced by returning to the reaction against Darwin in late 19th and early 20th
centuries. As noted in Chapter Seven, responses to the “anthropomorphic anecdotalism”
(Griffin 1978) of Darwin and Romanes were quick and forceful, and by no means limited
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to those positing and defending exceptionalism claims. Loeb (1918), Morgan (1903),
Washburn (1908), Jennings (1906), Mills (1889, 1905), and Holmes (1911) among many
others, all reacted forcefully to what came to be what I think of as the three original sins
of the literature: (1) anecdotalism, (2) anthropomorphism, and (3) analogy from
introspection. The dominant responses to these three sins resulted in an intellectual
climate of exacting epistemic and methodological values. This climate influenced the
acceptable (and unacceptable) language with which to write about animals, the acceptable
(and unacceptable) environments within which to study animals, and the acceptable (and
unacceptable) epistemic grounds for drawing mentalistic conclusions about the causes of
animal behavior. Though once indicative of legitimate concerns at the birth of
comparative psychology, it is evident over a century later that this conservative research
climate demands renewed consideration.
3.2 Ontological Constraints
Cecilia Heyes, once a proponent of animal minds skepticism (e.g., 1993, 1994,
1998), has recently expressed her growing concerns with the “current of opinion in the
study of comparative cognition suggesting we should assume that animals have simple
minds,” arguing that an ontology informed by “simple-mindedness” has not aided the
discipline, as “[i]n the most extreme cases, the claim that animals have simple minds
amounts to the claim that associative learning is the only way in which animals can think
about the world” (2012: 2695). The de facto acceptance of “simple-mindedness” in
animal research is a prominent feature of the dominant tradition. It is present not only in
the form of the default hypothesis that animals lack mental lives, but also as a basic
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ontological assumption influencing linguistic, methodological, and epistemic constraints
on responsible comparisons between human and animal minds.
John Greenwood (2016) has clarified an historical pattern between two traditions
in psychology that I take to be indicative of opposing ontological assumptions shared by
the majority of figures in the dominant and marginalized traditions, respectively, in
animal minds research. Greenwood begins by noting that there are two general positions
regarding what he calls strong psychological continuity and strong psychological
discontinuity: (1) between cognitive and associative processes, and (2) between human
and animal psychology and behavior. According to Greenwood, these “two positions
have tended to be affirmed of denied together,” namely…
Those who hold that higher cognitive processes are strongly discontinuous with lower
associative or reflexive processes hold that cognitive and associative or reflexive processes
are fundamentally different in kind; those who hold that “higher” cognitive processes are
strongly continuous with “lower” associative or reflexive processes hold that cognitive and
associative or reflexive processes differ only in degree of complexity and not in
fundamental kind. [What’s more] [t]hose who hold that human psychology and behavior is
strongly discontinuous with animal psychology and behavior hold that human and animal
psychology and behavior differ in fundamental kind [e.g., Descartes]; those who hold that
human psychology and behavior is strongly continuous with animal psychology and
behavior hold that human and animal psychology and behavior differ only in degree of
complexity and not in fundamental kind [e.g., La Mettrie].

While there is no intrinsic reason why these positions should be affirmed or denied
together, and while the views of Aristotle and Locke on human uniqueness are arguably
too nuanced to be captured in this way, I have shown how historic figures from the
dominant tradition (e.g., the Stoics, Aquinas, Descartes, Wallace) clearly fall into the
former category of ontological assumptions, while those in the marginalized tradition
(Plutarch, Montaigne, La Mettrie, Hume, Darwin) generally fit into the latter.
The Stoics, for instance, held (1) that animal behavior is motivated by the
irrational hegēmonikon acting through associative processes in the central nervous
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system, while also (2) maintaining an “all or nothing” view of cognitive capacities—a
position that naturally leads to hypotheses of strong discontinuity in mental
faculties/processes, as well as tenacious automatic responses to behavioral evidence of
mental continuity like those that fuel the logical problem. In contrast, the gradualist
accounts of mental capacities historically defended by figures in the marginalized
tradition are less amenable to the dualistic, ontological basis of the logical problem,
wherein explanations of animal behavior are constrained by their basis in either “simpleminded” perceptual or non-mentalistic faculties or rational/mentalistic (human) faculties.
Hume, for instance, saw his brand of associative reasoning as the common basis for both
human and animal behavior, which led him to assert strong psychological continuity.
I am not claiming that this ontological distinction between traditions is neat and
tidy. Few in marginalized tradition today, for instance, defend the view that strong
associationism “all the way up” (Greenwood 2016) can explain behaviors from the
smallest of animals to those of human beings, such as were the positions defended by the
likes of La Mettrie (1748), Huxley (1874), Watson (1908, 1913), and Hull (1943). What’s
more, not all figures in the dominant tradition maintain this strict relationship between
cognitive discontinuity and species discontinuity, e.g., consider Aristotle’s not-quitecognitive accounts of phantasia and phronesis, or Edward Tolman’s (1932) “purposive
behaviorism”, based on the idea that stimulus-response mechanisms are explanatorily
insufficient for the psychologist’s toolkit, which should acknowledge that animals strive
toward goals and—Tolman thought—act on and modify beliefs about their environments.
As demonstrated in Chapters 2-4, explanatory concerns over the ability of
“simple-minded” ontologies to account for complex forms of animal behavior are nearly
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as old as are philosophical discussions of the mind. This is most evident in the anti-Stoic
arguments of the Neoplatonists, who argue from the perspective that, just as explanations
of human behavior require blurring the lines between the rational and the perceptual, so
too should explanations of animal behavior. This attitude is also present in Montaigne
and Charron,429 as well as the comparatively minor Renaissance figure of Giovanni Gelli
(1963: 130-1), who—in response to traditional uniqueness claims about prudence—raises
the pertinent question: “How will you make it appear that prudence is in the
understanding and not in the sense?”
In the contemporary literature, Heyes (2015) pegs explanatory constraints tied to
either/or dichotomies between association and cognition as a major reason for the
“decline” in the mindreading research program. A variety of disciplines are now
considering more than ever the apparent fact that “complex” or “intelligent” behavior in
human beings—perhaps even the majority of such behavior in daily life—is the product
of mechanisms once thought to be “simple.” Shannon Spaulding (2010), for instance,
convincingly argues that, “mindreading is a rarely used, specialized skill,” and as Kristin
Andrews notes, “if other species predict, manipulate, deceive, compete, and so forth
without mindreading, then we have no reason to think that humans need to do so. While
it is true that evolution is not a tidy process, we should avoid postulating the development
of a unique cognitive process to make better predictions of behavior when the current
mechanisms work just fine” (2012: 219 [my emphasis]). Heyes (2012: 2697), then, is
correct that the slowly emerging picture entails that “Associative learning is ubiquitous”
and “plays an important role in guiding complex human behaviour, in spite of the many
ways in which our lives differ from those of all other animals.” The irony is that the chief
429

Chapter 5, Sections 2 and 4

284
ontological assumption behind the traditional denial of human-like cognitive mechanisms
to animals is also that which also makes it difficult to prove how humans are exceptional.
Increased emphasis on blurring the lines between associative and cognitive
mechanisms is not good news for those hoping to “solve” the logical problem in research
programs like theory of mind. This debate has traditionally relied upon rigid distinctions
of this precisely this kind, i.e., mindreading hypotheses evoke cognitive mechanisms
while behavior-reading hypotheses evoke “simple-minded” associative mechanisms.
Further, if we cannot even tell when humans are using a theory of mind—the traditional
assumption in the literature being that humans almost always do in social
interactions430—then how can we convincingly argue when other species are, or are not,
mindreading? This is a problem endemic to the dominant tradition. For figures in the
marginalized tradition, the line between cognition, reason, and intelligence (on one side),
and instinct, emotion, and associative mechanisms (on the other) is blurry;431 very often,
figures from this alternative tradition explicitly note this, e.g., consider La Mettrie’s
(1747: 43) critique of Descartes’ substance dualism: “why do we divide the sensitive
principle that thinks in man’s mind? Is this not a manifest contradiction for advocates of
the simplicity of the mind?” Like La Mettrie, Darwin (1871: 51) likewise claimed that “it
is often difficult to distinguish between the power of reason and that of instinct,”
providing suggestive examples to argue his case. 432 As we look into the future,
Greenwood (2016: 212) is in line with Heyes (2012) and Dickinson (2012) in
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emphasizing that, “the degree to which cognitive explanations in terms of comparative
causal judgment can be extended to encompass associative processes in other animals
remains an open and empirical question,” and that “[t]he theoretical possibilities […]
include the possibility that some animals have cognitive capacities superior to humans”—
a possibility long-entertained by figures in the marginalized tradition.
My overarching claim in the following subsections is that the traditional ontology
of tying “lower” associative/instinctive mechanisms with animals and “higher”
cognitive/mentalistic mechanisms with humans is a key background condition motivating
the logical problem. Long before this problem came into vogue, it was par-for-the-course
for ancient, medieval, and Enlightenment figures to adopt the aforementioned ontological
constraints on comparative explanations of human and animal behavior. Sedimentations
of this ontological framework are present in the 19th, 20th, and 21st centuries, informing
influential, tough-minded attitudes in the form of (1) popular readings of Morgan’s
Canon as a skeptical device, (2) parameters on what should be dismissed as
anthropomorphic descriptions of animal behavior, and—out of fear of committing Clever
Hans errors—(3) a research climate indicative of a “demand for perfect evidence” that
has stunted progress in the contemporary literature (Griffin 2001: 32). I refer to these
points as epistemic constraints, linguistic constraints, and methodological constraints.
3.3 Epistemic Constraints
The most widely acknowledged constraints on research in animal psychology are
principles of cognitive parsimony. As discussed in Chapter Seven, Morgan’s Canon and
the logical problem share common ontological assumptions. Both are motivated by the
ontology of “simple-mindedness” that rests upon tangible divisions between associative
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and cognitive mechanisms, despite the fact that “distinguishing between the behavioural
predictions of cognitive […] and associative accounts is not straightforward because
associative theory can mimic rational and inference-driven explanations” (Dickinson
2012). Morgan’s Canon plays both methodological and epistemic constraining roles in
animal minds research: experiments must be designed to distinguish between competing
explanations of “higher” and “lower” faculties, and it is always epistemically responsible
to choose the latter if experiments cannot accomplish this task. While principles of
epistemic parsimony are necessary in animal minds research, they have traditionally been
applied too conservatively to address empirical problems such as “Does the chimpanzee
have a theory of mind?” This position is in line with a growing number of commentators
suggesting “that the Canon has often served as a convenient justification for a priori
resistance to attributions of mental states to animals” (Fitzpatrick 2008: 225).433
Arguably the most famous critique is Elliot Sober’s (2000, 2005) view that—
contrary to popular belief—the ontological assumptions that follow from Morgan’s
Canon clash with evolutionary theory and do not, strictly speaking, rest upon principles
of parsimony. As Sober (2005) notes, parsimonious explanations are those that postulate
comparatively fewer entities than competing explanations, but Morgan’s Canon does not
preference theories of this nature; it preferences theories that postulate comparatively
“lower” faculties or processes in terms of a scala natura (or otherwise hierarchical view)
of cognitive complexity. What’s more, a close reading of Morgan himself suggests that
he “did not think that his Canon could be justified by appeal to simplicity. Not only did
Morgan reject the idea that simplicity was an appropriate criterion for theory choice in
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science, he also argued that the simplest explanation for an animal’s behaviour is the
most anthropomorphic one” (Fitzpatrick 2008: 230; Morgan 1894: 53-54).
Principles of Cognitive Simplicity (PoCS) encourage researchers to adopt two
ontological positions consistent with the cognition/associative mechanism dichotomy
underlying the logical problem; first, that “simplicity” entails associative mechanisms
and that “complexity” entails cognitive mechanisms, and second, that there exists a
relatively unproblematic cognitive hierarchy wherein all associative mechanisms are
necessarily at the bottom, i.e., “for a given behavior, the possible cognitive systems
driving the behavior can be ordered by complexity” (Meketa 2014: 731).
Relevant to both of these assumptions, Laudan (1996: 79) describes a particularly
damning set of conceptual problems that arise when “basic categories of analysis are
vague and unclear.” And indeed, according to Meketa (2014: 731), “Crucially, the notion
of a scale of cognitive complexity guides scientific decisions despite the fact that
concepts like complexity and cognition are often left vague or ambiguous,” and that,
“without a clear sense of how cognitive ontologies are to be carved up at the joints—and
which tools are appropriate for the job—PoCS rests on shaky conceptual ground.” In
precisely the same way, conceptual problems arising from vaguely defined cognitive
faculties/processes fuel explanatory crises related to the logical problem. The presence of
ambiguities in defining and distinguishing cognitive processes decreases their empirical
tractability and, at worst, leads to hypotheses that cannot make novel predictions, and are
therefore unfalsifiable. As discussed in Chapter Seven, the role played by the behaviorreading hypothesis in chimpanzee mindreading debates offers a clear example: unlike
mindreading hypotheses, it is (1) “too under-specified to make determinate predictions,
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and hence there is no risk of it turning out to be wrong,” and (2) ad hoc, i.e., “an
explanation in terms of the animals’ deployment of some or other behavior rule can
always be constructed after the fact,” which is how Povinelli and colleagues use it
(Fletcher and Carruthers 2013: 461).
This evaluative process is not empirical; rather, it constitutes an ongoing game of
positing hypothetical non-mentalistic explanations for animal behavior, none of which
are capable of predicting novel behaviors distinct from the competing mindreading
hypotheses, which do have a robust research program behind them:
What Povinelli and colleagues have ranged against them […] is a regular scientific
research program of good standing, which generates determinate predictions capable of
falsification when combined with auxiliary assumptions (e.g. concerning the animals’
other forms of knowledge). Moreover, it is a progressing research program, issuing in a
stream of positive results and increasingly precise theories. The behavior-rule hypothesis,
in contrast, is too indeterminate and ad hoc to qualify as a scientific research program at
all. (Fletcher and Carruthers 2013: 461)

In these ways, routine deference to the illusory simplicity of the behavior-rule hypothesis
has foreclosed empirically tractable hypotheses about chimpanzee social cognition.
In practice, then, the logical problem does not simply describe an impasse
between competing sorts of theories; the logical problem is related to the PoCS in that the
former is constrained by arguments from parsimony and bears normative weight, i.e.,
because there is no functional difference between theory of mind and behavioral rules,
and because the latter are assumed to be far less cognitively taxing,434 it is scientifically
irresponsible to conclude that animals possess a theory of mind (e.g., Shettleworth 2012).
In line with Sober’s critique of Morgan’s Canon, when the logical problem adopts this
normative role it assumes outmoded assumptions about evolutionary biology. My point is
not that the logical problem, like the Canon, necessarily assumes cognitive hierarchies in
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the animal kingdom. In its most abstract sense, it does not. Rather, what I am suggesting
is that the logical problem emerged from an intellectual milieu in which outmoded
assumptions of this nature were commonplace, and when evoked as an epistemic
constraint to restrict the import of empirical challenges to exceptionalism claims, the
logical problem is presented in terms of the same orthogenetic perspective from which
exceptionalism claims themselves are posed.
In the dominant tradition, the logical problem uses human cognitive capacities as
the model for what qualifies as “complex” or “cognitive” means of responding to
environmental problems; when evidence for that model is underdetermined by
complementary behavior-reading hypotheses, exceptionalism claims are preserved by the
assumption that the human-like behaviors of the animal in question are caused by
“simpler” mechanisms than similar behaviors when humans perform them. As a result,
unique skills that other species may use to solve similar problems, and which may entail a
high degree of complexity in their own right, are ignored. This is the same issue that
Louise Barrett (2011: 220) notes with respect to the influence of Morgan’s Canon:
Morgan’s canon implicitly assumes a scala naturae in terms of the expected distribution
of cognitive endowments across the animal kingdom. […] The assumption of a ladderlike process of steady improvement in cognitive abilities from lower to higher faculties
represents an outmoded view of how evolutionary processes work. Assuming that, for
example, chimpanzees will show many of the precursors to human cognition because
they are our closest living relatives assumes that […] we moved up the ladder and left the
chimpanzee stuck on a lower rung. […] Such assumptions […] pervade comparative
studies. The possibility that these creatures may possess some unique skills [or cognitive
processes] of their own is rarely, if ever, entertained.

In this way, the ontological and epistemic constraining roles informing the logical
problem can readily lead to semantic anthropocentrism. Consider the way in which, in the
theory of mind literature, mindreading is traditionally defined exclusively in terms of
attributing propositional attitudes to others (Andrews 2012), rather than “Ask[ing]
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ourselves ‘What kind of a theory of mind is adaptive for chimpanzees to acquire?’ and
‘When do they use it?’” (Boesch and Boesch-Achermann: 2000: 243). By virtue of
dropping the orthogenetic perspective, these sorts of questions immediately relieve some
of the logical problem’s force. Recalling a passage from Peter Godfrey-Smith (2016: 50),
when comparing the brainpower of different species, “there is no single scale on which
intelligence can be sensibly measured.” Without such a scale, new interpretive
possibilities emerge that transcend the theory of mind or “simple-mindedness” dichotomy
endemic to traditional formulations of both the PoCS and the logical problem. Namely,
while chimpanzees may not attribute proposition attitudes to others, this does not entail
that they are not engaging in other “complex” forms of social cognition.
In the concluding section of Do Apes Read Minds?, Kristin Andrews usefully
suggests the need for “a new research program” that, in contrast with the sorts of
questions motivated by the dominant cognitivist framework of the past sixty years (such
as the title of her book), urges researchers and philosophers alike to largely abandon the
program of understanding apes as “containers for sets of propositional attitudes,” and—
instead—view them “holistically” with personalities, life-histories, “smells, tics, cultures,
status, and various idiosyncrasies” (2012: 206-211). Such a perspective is “consistent
with a developmental picture” wherein, as the “social domain expands,” “psychological
profiles” are formed by means of a “combination of automatic processes” and “general
principles […] generated from previous individual personality profiles.” In short, whereas
“Mindreading accounts miss the richness and variety in our social interactions,” Andrews
is proposing a research program that views apes in a way that “better reflects the way we
relate with other people.”
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The ontological assumptions upon which the logical problem rests make it
inimical to such a project. First, it assumes the same rigid dichotomy between associative
and cognitive mechanisms as the PoCS. Second, like the PoCS, it assumes not only that
“simplicity” entails associative mechanisms and that “complexity” entails cognitive
mechanisms, but that the later should be defined in terms of the mechanisms that humans
use, with little to no regard for broader ecological considerations. Third, it assumes that
“for a given behavior, the possible cognitive systems driving the behavior can be ordered
by complexity” (Meketa 2014: 731) and that this ordering is done from an orthogenetic
perspective, likewise dismissive of ecological considerations. These critiques of the
logical problem are in line with Meketa’s claim that “The pervasiveness of PoCS-like
thinking can be explained historically. Animal cognition researchers have long been wary
of an illicit overattribution of complex (sometimes ‘human-like’) abilities and faculties to
nonhuman animals” (732). The way the logical problem acts as an epistemic constraint in
the dominant tradition can be explained as part of the same story, and this leads us to the
impact that the second “original sin” in the literature, anthropomorphism, has had on
fostering the intellectual climate responsible for the logical problem.
3.4 Linguistic Constraints
But it is also true that words retort and turn their force back upon the understanding; and
this has rendered philosophy and the sciences sophistic and unproductive. […] When a
sharper understanding, or more careful observation, attempts to draw lines more in
accordance with nature, words resist.
Francis Bacon (1620/2000: 48)

Tacit scala natura assumptions are historically aroused by the placement of scare
quotes around mentalistic, subjectivist, or otherwise “anthropomorphic” terms, e.g.,
“knowing” that, “angry” toward, which function “as markers of skepticism” thereby
“exonerate[ing] the writer from a full commitment to the language,” which, “far from
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being simply a useful, neutral tool for inquiry, plays a formative part in how animals are
depicted” (Crist 1999: 1, 16-17). Unlike Bacon, Laudan (1977) does not mention the
constraining role of language, however the ontological assumptions discussed above have
long been reinforced by linguistic constraints in animal minds research.
Eileen Crist (1999: 28) describes a telling moment where Samuel Barnett—“a
quintessential representative of a skeptical critic of Darwin’s use of mental concepts for
animals”—objects to Darwin’s description of a “cat in an affectionate frame of mind.”
According to Barnett (1958: 225), “cutaneous stimulation” is a more scientifically
appropriate term. Crist rightly identifies this sort of linguistic constraint as a common
“move of displacing a mental concept with a technical term under the auspices of
achieving ostensibly greater objectivity,” noting—in line with ontological constraints
discussed above—that “[t]he assumption that fuels this move is that mind and body are
separate realms, such that the [animal’s] behavior might be rendered completely in terms
of body—for example, ‘cutaneous stimulation.’” In this sense, semantic anthropocentrism
can result from linguistic constraints on presumed anthropomorphic language: restricting
mentalistic language-use to explanations of human behavior creates an unrealistic picture
of how necessary mentalistic processes may be to the causes of behavior indicative of—
for example—a theory of mind.435 At worst, the result is an unwarranted “all or nothing”
view of mental capacities, whereby linguistic constraints engender a default attitude of
anthropofabulation (Buckner 2013; Andrews 2015), i.e., an inflated perspective of
human mental capacities relative to other species of great ape.
Indeed, linguistic constraints emerged in the wake of Premack and Woodruff’s
(1978) seminal paper and functioned in much the same way in subsequent chimpanzee
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mindreading research. As Burghardt (1985: 905) claims, “Today the dilemma facing
researchers reopening questions concerning nonhuman animal ‘mental states’ is still to
avoid rash anthropomorphism. Uncompromising attacks on chimp language studies (e.g.,
Umiker-Sebeok & Sebeok, 1981) illustrate the problems in generating publicly verifiable
evidence for phenomena counter to both Cartesian mind-body dualism and the fading, but
still potent, behavioristic Zeitgeist.” The “dilemma” that Burghardt is referring to is
clearly the logical problem. His claim mirrors my own. The traditional fear of
anthropomorphism is partly responsible for creating this problem. This is because the de
facto ontology of “simple-mindedness” common to Descartes, the Behaviorists, and the
mindreading literature alike (Heyes 2012) makes any non-mechanomorphic interpretation
of animal behavior potentially anthropomorphic due of the difficulty of providing
“publically verifiable evidence” in its favor.
3.5 Methodological Constraints
Broadly speaking, there has long been a “history of conflict” in the animal minds
literature between those disciplines engaged in laboratory experimentation and those that
specialize in field research.436 This division is not clear-cut, but it exists. I submit that this
history can largely be divided along the lines of the dominant and marginalized traditions.
In the marginalized tradition, field reports are given more importance and—for some—
are more legitimate sources than captive studies (e.g., Boesch 2007, 2008). As a result of
heightened skepticism about analogical reasoning from human and animal behavior to
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human and animal minds, the dominant tradition typically holds the opposite position,
and as a result, more conservative constraints on what passes for acceptable research.437
The efforts of Darwin and Romanes were justifiably criticized for their reliance
upon anecdotal evidence, and to this day, the dominant view remains that anecdotal
evidence is “officially unusable” in responsible animal minds research (Dennett 1987:
250). Curiously, despite vast improvements in collecting data from the field, the line
between the epistemic value of “anecdotal evidence” and “field research” largely
remains—for Povinelli, Heyes, and others in the dominant tradition—a difference in
kind. Only a marginalized few today—most notably, Christophe Boesch—defend
positions such as those advocated by Tinbergen, Lorenz, and other European ethologists
in the 1970s who were highly critical of artificially controlled experimental studies of
animal behavior.438 In contrast, the dominant view is that captive environments bring a
level of ‘epistemic legitimacy’ that field studies can never hope to provide (see Allen and
Bekoff [1997] and Boesch [2007, 2008, 2015] for reviews). This is strange insofar as
field experiments are standard in general psychology, e.g., Latané and Darley’s (1970)
classic experiments on ‘bystander apathy.’439
I have noted Povinelli’s (2000: 15) contention that “questions about the internal
architecture of chimpanzee psychology are virtually impossible to address in the rain
forest.” Heyes (1987: 124) has likewise suggested that the time has come for researchers
in comparative cognition to “hang up their field glasses” if they hope to justify causal
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explanations of animal behavior. Even Andrew Whiten (2002: 386), who performs
research in both the lab and the field, claims that, “to probe underlying cognitive
processes, an experimental approach would be necessary.” Echoes of Thorndike’s views
on proper methodology in animal psychology still pervade the contemporary literature.
As such, detailed reports on wild chimpanzees suggestive of, for instance, theory of
mind, 440 intentional communication, 441 culture, 442 innovation, 443 and extended altruism
towards unrelated group members, 444 find themselves at odds with conflicting results
from privileged laboratory studies that are accompanied by the promise of inimitable
opportunities for “complete control” (Allen and Bekoff 1997; Boesch 2007, 2008).
Consider a relatively recent example. In the wake of a series of experiments
undertaken by Povinelli and researchers at the New Iberia Research Center, the following
hypothesis rose to popularity in the comparative cognition literature: “extended altruism,”
i.e., altruism towards unrelated group members, is a unique feature of human societies.445
This hypothesis was quickly put to a variety of uses: (1) forming evolutionary hypotheses
about the minds, economies, and cultural practices of our hominid ancestors; 446 (2)
positing ‘socio-cognitive mechanisms’ that make human brains unique; 447 thus (3)
supporting arguments that “empathy” is a uniquely human trait; 448 and (4) adding
justification to ethical and legal claims that chimpanzees are not equal members of the
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“moral community.”

449

Only a few years later, however, this widely accepted

exceptionalism claim came to be provocatively challenged in a paper entitled “Altruism
in Forest Chimpanzees: The Case of Adoption,” where Boesch et al. (2010) reported “18
cases of adoption, a highly costly behavior, of orphaned youngsters by group members in
Tai forest chimpanzees,” that “can last for years and thus imply extensive care towards
the orphans.” Accordingly, Boesch et al. conclude that:
In strong contrast with these captive studies, consistent observations of potentially
altruistic behaviors in different populations of wild chimpanzees have been reported in
such different domains as food sharing, regular use of coalitions, cooperative hunting
and border patrolling. These observations reveal that, under the appropriate socioecologic conditions, chimpanzees do care for the welfare of other unrelated group
members and that altruism is more extensive in wild populations than was suggested by
captive studies.

The Povinelli group never responded to the Boesch group. One can only guess
why, but presumably Povinelli and colleagues are dismissive of these findings given their
aforementioned views on field research. Did the Povinelli group assert their uniqueness
claim about extended altruism too quickly? Arguably, yes (it was based entirely on two
near-identical studies on the same population of captive chimpanzees [Silk et al. 2005,
2007]), but that is not my point. Conservative methodological constraints of the sort
embodied by the Povinelli group that disparage field research are inimical to the
problem-solving capabilities of their parent research programs.
Throughout the twentieth century to the current day, for those in the dominant
tradition the import of avoiding weak analogical reasoning is cashed out in terms of
designing experiments capable of discriminating between competing interpretations of
animal behavior in terms of cognitive and associative mechanisms. The crucial idea here
is that because it is more difficult (or impossible [Povinelli 2000; Heyes 1987]) to
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distinguish associative from cognitive explanations in the field, the resulting “quest for
complete experimental control” (Allen and Bekoff 1997: 17) to distinguish them—or
what Griffin (2001: 32) describes as a “demand for perfect evidence”—have led to a
“paralytic perfectionism” (62) in the literature that has certainly influenced the climate
fueling the logical problem. In as much as the logical problem is an epistemic problem, it
is also a methodological control problem. Ironically, traditional constraints of the
dominant tradition have contributed to an intellectual climate where no experimental
environment seems fit to solve the logical problem.
4. Human Exceptionalism as a Research Tradition: The Heuristic Role
According to Laudan (1977: 92 [his emphasis]), “Any sound research tradition
will contain significant guidelines about how its theories can be modified and
transformed, so as to improve its problem-solving capacity.” Emphasis on the important
role played by such “guidelines” is also present in Lakatos’s (1970) work, whose notion
of “positive heuristics” more accurately captures the relevance of this particular role to
the dominant tradition in animal minds than Laudan’s discussion does. Lakatos saw that
every research program frequently faces anomalies and refutations, and thus requires a
ready-made “strategy both for predicting (producing) and digesting them” (135).
Throughout this project I have used the phrase “defensive strategies” to describe patterns
of argumentation employed in the dominant tradition in response to philosophical and
empirical challenges to uniqueness and exceptionalism claims. The aim of this section is
to summarize these strategies—here, heuristics—and briefly discuss their merits and
faults in responding to explanatory crises of human exceptionalism.
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As Musgrave (1976: 457) describes them, the “heuristics of a research programme
can anticipate empirical refutations and can give directions, in advance, about how they
are to be handled.” Often, heuristics lead to good research; other times, they have a
degenerative effect with respect to creating more conceptual and empirical problems than
they divert. Some of the following heuristics of the dominant tradition are corollaries of
constraints discussed above. In certain cases, they can be traced to the ancients. They are
here listed loosely by frequency of occurrence.
1. Cognitive Simplicity Heuristic: In order to demonstrate the presence of capacity X in
a non-human species, it must first be shown that their X-like behaviors could not be also
caused—or, that it is less likely that they are caused—by “simpler” (i.e., less advanced,
complex, etc.) capacities, i.e., Clever Hans Errors.
2. Disparate Contexts Heuristic: In order to demonstrate the presence of capacity X in a
non-human species, members of that species must perform a wide variety of different
types of behaviors in different contexts associated with X.450 The number and/or types of
contests need not be stated.451
3. Redefinition Heuristic: In order to demonstrate the presence of capacity X in a nonhuman species, it must first be shown that the behavioral repertoire of the species in
question can accommodate a more refined definition of X.
4. Human Ability Heuristic: In order to demonstrate the presence of capacity X in a
non-human species, it must first be shown that the species in question can perform token
behaviors commonly associated with X when humans do X. 452 This heuristic tends to
discredit field studies in favor of comparative research with human actors or infants.453
5. Evolutionary Distance Heuristic: The ability to demonstrate the presence of capacity
X in a non-human species decreases “the more distant the animal is in relation to human
beings, even if the behavioral evidence remains compelling” (Crist 1999: 47).
6. Inaccessibility Heuristic: Because the subjective experiences of others are
inaccessible, there are certain cognitive capacities that are inaccessible to scientific study.
This heuristic emerges on a spectrum, with one pole indicative of global skepticism about
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animal psychology 454 and the other focusing on the utter inaccessibility of specific
capacities seemingly requiring access to subjective states.

Recalling terminology from the problem-determining role, these heuristics always
emerge when an exceptionalism claim is confronted with a challenge claim, and they are
always justified—whether tacitly or explicitly—by deference to the responsible
avoidance

of

anthropomorphic

over-interpretations

of

animal

behavior.

The

Inaccessibility Heuristic is rarely used in the modern literature. The Evolutionary
Distance heuristic was once extremely popular, but is used less and less due to stinging
critiques popularized by Sober (2000, 2005) of its outmoded biological assumptions. The
Cognitive Simplicity, Disparate Contexts, Human Ability, and Redefinition heuristics, on
the other hand, are staples of the 20th century literature. For each heuristic listed it is
possible to provide examples of constructive and non-constructive uses.
A positive example of the Inaccessibility Heuristic in action can be observed in
long-standing debates over episodic memory. Despite the fact that great apes have
satisfied the same behavioral criteria for “mental time travel” as human infants, the
dominant view remains that they possess “episodic-like memory” because, though they
may possess “autonoetic consciousness,” that hypothesis should be rejected because “it
will always remain impossible to prove its truth” (Tulving 2005: 5; Clayton and
Dickinson 1998). While I have reservations about their choice of language, this might be
a reasonable supposition because, as Godfrey-Smith (2016: 197) puts it, “episodic
memory in humans has such a vivid element of subjective experience,” and we “don’t
know whether this is true of […] other animals.” On the other hand, it seems that episodic
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memory is not especially “impossible to prove” in contrast to other hypotheses about the
mental lives of animals, e.g., empathic perspective-taking, or stage 2 mindreading. After
all, arguments to the best explanation can be forged based on a consilience of inductions
of evidence about animal memory that is available from comparative neurology (Morris
et al. 2001), new experimental paradigms (Eacott et al. 2005, Templer and Hapton 2013),
and intersections between developmental and comparative psychology, as young children
also cannot be interrogated about their mental lives (Clayton and Russell 2009). I have
been arguing that the major inhibitory issues facing the contemporary animal minds
literature stem from conceptual rather that empirical problems, and this is a case in point.
The Disparate Contexts heuristic is an extremely valuable tool in comparative
cognition, and is likewise used to positive and negative effect in the service of uniqueness
claims. The former point hardly requires demonstration. The ability to provide suggestive
evidence for a hypothesis across a wide variety of—ideally novel—experimental contexts
is an experimental virtue not only in the animal minds literature, but also in scientific
method more generally. As Penn and Povinelli (2013: 73) reasonably assert,
“demonstrating that a nonverbal subject possess an explicit mental state concept requires
‘triangulating’ across disparate protocols and showing that the subject cognizes the
common causal role played by a given mental state across perceptually disparate task
contexts.” If a challenge claim is raised that cannot demonstrate these conditions, this
heuristic functions in a very simple, effective manner: collect more evidence to eliminate
confounding variables. However, due to the tenacity of the logical problem, it is also
evident that this heuristic can be overused and turned into a go-to mode of skepticism to
shoot down practically any experiment or compilation of evidence. Consider the history
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of mindreading debates. How many distinct experimental contexts is enough to
demonstrate a mindreading hypothesis? What types of contexts will suffice? These are
crucial questions that those who take the logical problem seriously rarely have answers
for; Penn and Povinelli (2013) are a clear case in point.
I refer to Chapter Seven for discussions of Cognitive Simplicity and Evolutionary
Distance heuristics, and conclude with a brief discussion of the Human Ability and
Redefinition heuristics. It is easy to imagine cases where an animal satisfies criteria for
possessing a characteristic, e.g., culture, only to have that concept redefined in light of
the fact that there do seem to be relevant differences between, say, human and
chimpanzee material culture (McGrew 2015). In such cases, redefinitions can push the
literature forward if it is fair to assume that the original definition was insufficient to
capture those salient differences. In the same way, it is clear that the Human Ability
heuristic can be a productive tool as well. Namely, if our goal is either to determine (1)
the origins of a human characteristic, or (2) whether or not a species possesses a human
characteristic, it can be reasonable to set the criteria for attributing concepts indicative of
human cognition to other species at the human level of complexity. These two heuristics
can be teased apart, but they are often used collectively.
To see how these two heuristics can be problematic in action, consider popular
debates over whether “truly joint joint attention” (Carpenter and Call 2013) is uniquely
human. The concept of shared intentionality has played a fertile role in many disciplines
as a description of the logic underlying what is arguably the most complex form of
human communication: recursive mindreading, i.e., A understands that B understands
that A wishes B to attend to C. Put as such, C represents a “the human capacity to
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establish common ground between interlocutors,” and this third piece of the “referential
triangle” is “a crucial aspect of human cooperative communication” (Gentry et al. 2016).
Under this definition, to engage in joint attention is to engage in shared intentionality.455
Similar to the aforementioned critiques of overly exclusive definitions of “theory of
mind”, commenting on this view, Skyrms (2009: 145) claims that “cooperation often
involves various kinds of feedback mechanisms, but recursive mind reading, higher-order
intentions, and mutual belief are only relevant concepts in very special cases” (145 [my
emphasis]). Skyrms is right to oppose Tomasello here. To posit a single ‘socio-cognitive
mechanism’ responsible for all joint attentional activities, and then to define that
mechanism in terms of the most complex form of human cooperation is a clear case of
both anthropofabulation and semantic anthropocentrism. The intimate relationship
between these terms—and between the Human Ability and Redefinition heuristics—is
highlighted in Griffin (1981: 11-2), who identifies a common “double standard” in
comparative cognition wherein definitions for concepts in animal minds are often derived
from “the most complex levels of understanding known to human thinkers,” however
“meeting these requirements would eliminate many members of our own species.”
With respect to the Human Ability heuristic, the argument of Tomasello and
colleagues amounts to the following. While apes appear to engage in collective activities
indicative of joint attention, their presumed lack of faculties for recursive mindreading
necessitates that we relegate these behaviors to qualitatively different kinds of
interactions than those that humans are presumed to engage in when they similarly
collaborate (e.g., active teaching among chimpanzees [Pruetz 2010; Boesch 2012]) or
455
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enforce social norms (Lorini 2018). This problematic uniqueness claim is simply taken
for granted by the Tomasello group by virtue of their use of the Human Ability heuristic.
With respect to the Redefinition heuristic, Tomasello and colleagues have
modified the standard definition of joint attention to exclude chimpanzees, making it a
uniquely exceptional human ability. 456 This move is questionable, in part, because it
overintellectualizes many human activities that qualify as joint attentional, e.g., if you
and I are having a conversation and I direct your attention to a speedily approaching bus
with my finger, I do not, at least consciously, run through the logical process that Grice
(1989) offers as an explanation of the phenomenon (or even unconsciously). After the
fact I might reflect back on the situation and run through the recursive logic that could be
said to explain it, but this hardly entails the original presence of a uniquely human “sociocognitive infrastructure” (Tomasello 2008). Humans clearly have the ability for recursive
mindreading, but Tomasello assumes that recursive mindreading is occurring somewhere
beneath every interaction indicative of joint attention. Shared intentionality is no longer a
description of human communication (as Grice [1989] intended); it is now “reified” into
a unique “adaptation” or “cognitive machinery” that makes possible, i.e., plays a causal
role in, the phylogenetic and ontogenetic development of these communicative abilities
(Racine 2012). While the Redefinition Heuristic can drive research forward, here it has
driven Tomasello’s exceptionalism claim onto precarious conceptual foundations.
Tomasello and colleagues are investigating worthwhile questions about the
origins of human communication. There is nothing inherently wrong with using the
456

In an influential paper, Bates et al. (1975) define joint attention as the ability for two or more individuals
to “co-orient” towards a shared goal or locus, is necessary for effective pointing. Pointing gestures only
acquire their meaning if both participants “share” a common focus of attention. Insofar as they utilize
pointing gestures as means to reach desired ends, apes do point effectively (Pika 2008; Leavens and Racine
2009). If effective pointing requires joint attention, it appears, then, that apes engage in joint attention.
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observation that our closest living ancestors appear to lack X as an explanatory device for
identifying major differences in their X-related skill sets and ours. The above issues stem
from background assumptions that lead Tomasello et al. to employ potentially useful
heuristic devices to problematic ends by (1) using orthogenetic rhetoric to draw
differences in kind between humans and apes, e.g., “truly joint joint attention,” and (2)
discounting conflicting field research by evoking a cognitive hierarchy where chimps can
only be said to possess joint attention if they satisfy conditions for the most complex
forms of joint attention in humans.
Taking stock, the dominant research tradition in comparative cognition can be
cashed out in terms of (1) exceptionalism claims, uniqueness claims, challenge claims,
and parsimony claims (the problem determining role), (2) a series of interrelated
ontological, epistemic, linguistic, and methodological constraints (the constraining role),
and (3) at least six heuristics which have traditionally been used to ward off challenges to
exceptionalism claims, thus explaining their adaptability over time (the heuristic role).
5. Progressive Strategies for the Dominant Tradition
The history of crisis pervading the animal minds literature is tied to long-running
scala natura assumptions and “all or nothing” ontologies of mind motivating uniqueness
and exceptionalism claims. These characteristics still inform conceptual problems in the
literature, and progressive steps toward revitalizing the problem-solving capabilities of
research programs like chimpanzee mindreading require bringing them to the forefront.
There is nothing inherently wrong with adopting an orthogenetic perspective as a
starting point for inquiry into animal minds. To the contrary, there are clearly questions
that are best approached in this way. Typically, however, orthogenetic perspectives are
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adopted when positing continuity arguments. Consider, for instance, Preston and de
Waal’s (2002) “perception-action model” for understanding the evolution of empathy.
The authors offer a “Russian doll”-style account of how all species with mirror neurons
(amongst other neuroanatomical features)—from rodents to humans—possess a basic
capacity for “emotional contagion,” while only those species that additionally have a
theory of mind possess the capacity for empathy. Despite disagreement over details (e.g.,
Kitcher 2006), no one seems to deny that Preston and de Waal’s orthogenetic approach to
the question, “Is empathy uniquely human?” is consistent with evolutionary biology and
does not tacitly evoke outmoded scala natura implications of “higher” (empathy) and
“lower” (emotional contagion) capacities. Preston and de Waal’s goal is not to defend
exceptionalism or uniqueness claims, but they are evoking a cognitive hierarchy of sorts
that explains a facet of human exceptionalism. Elsewhere, de Waal evokes Darwin and
“explicitly advocates a research strategy in which complex cognition is explained by
identifying the conserved, taxonomically general ‘building blocks’ from which it is
constructed” (de Waal and Ferrari 2010: 201). Despite somewhat resembling a scala
natura in its own right,457 this is a responsible use of the orthogenetic perspective as it
opens up more questions of potential continuities than it closes off, e.g., “what are the
rudiments of a theory of mind?” rather than “do chimpanzees lack (an adult human)
theory of mind?”
One of the principle lessons from this genealogy is that beginning inquiry from an
orthogenetic perspective is more problematic when the impetus for erecting a cognitive
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John Greenwood (in conversation) refers to this approach as resembling a “scala natura lying down” or
“on its side.” This image of the natural world is central to the marginalized tradition, e.g., Abraham Keller
(1957: 52) describes Montaigne’s worldview as “not a vertical chain of being with links from low to high
as in Ficino, but rather a horizontal chain with links stretching across all creation.”
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hierarchy is to defend uniqueness claims. We need to be far more cautious when
attempting to explain the lack of (what appears to be) a uniquely human behavior in other
species in terms of their lack of (what appears to be) a uniquely human mechanism. Much
can go wrong by drawing this sort of inference, not the least of which being that just
because a chimpanzee, for example, does not perform behavior X (which is associated
with mechanism Y in humans), this does not necessarily imply that Y is absent in chimps,
i.e., perhaps chimps use Y for other purposes and there are ecological, societal, or
anatomical reasons for why they do not do X. It is precisely this argumentative move that
rests at the crux of the aforementioned joint attention debates, where “top down”
orthogenetic approaches readily lend themselves to semantic anthropocentrism and
anthropofabulation. I have been arguing that rhetoric of the form “true X” or “genuine X”
or “real X” has no place in comparative cognition. By unnecessarily evoking scala natura
assumptions, expressions like “truly joint joint attention” and “real language” are inimical
to the clarity of gradualist or minimalistic approaches to mental processes that, for
instance, focus on the comparative development of joint attention in infant humans and
chimpanzees (e.g., Okamoto and Tomonaga 2006).
There do exist progressive strategies for positing uniqueness and exceptionalism
claims. As informed by figures in the marginalized tradition, before we say that animals
lack X and navigate their environment with minimal to no cognitive tools, one should
ask: Has X been defined too exclusively? Does X arise in degrees in human development,
and if so, how might this influence our discussions of X’s possible presence in nonhuman animals? Does X have functionally analogous counterparts in the animal
kingdom, and if so, might it be more accurate to say that humans have one kind of X—a
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particularly complex one—rather than argue that non-human animals lack X entirely?
The vast middle ground between the heights of human cognition and automata has not
been as important to figures in the dominant tradition as have been claims to the effect
that animals lack X. This is largely why the dominant tradition is defined by explanatory
crises: philosophers would not have such a hard time explaining that X is uniquely human
if they had more options waiting in the wings to explain animal behavior without X. The
root of explanatory crises of human exceptionalism is not the inaccessibility of the animal
mind, it is the challenge of explaining minute differences between human and animal
behavior without first charting out the similarities implicit in these grey areas.
Thankfully, skeptics are beginning to recognize what marginalized voices have
argued for centuries: comparing the cognitive capacities of humans and animals based
upon rigid dichotomies can lead to impoverished accounts of the similarities and
differences between human and animal minds. During their most active and influential
years, Povinelli and colleagues were ringleaders in emphasizing the “complementary”
nature of mindreading and behavior-reading hypotheses. 458 In response to this thorny
situation, Penn and Povinelli (2013: 2) now claim that “both alternatives [to the logical
problem in ToM research] are equally implausible and the entire dichotomy is specious—
or, as Papineau and Heyes (2006) aptly put it, “just Descartes dressed up in modern
garb.” I agree. But despite advocating for “a vast and largely unexplored middle ground
between construing animals as nothing more than operant learners and claiming that they
have a mentalistic appreciation of other minds” (Penn and Povinelli 2013)—which I also
agree with—Penn and Povinelli’s response to this dilemma is unattractive insofar as it is
458

Povinelli & Eddy 1996; Povinelli 2000; Povinelli & Vonk 2004; Penn & Povinelli 2007
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just as empirically intractable as the position defended in their earlier articles.
First, they argue what they have been arguing for nearly twenty years: that there is
“no evidence” that chimpanzees represent the “internal goals” or mental states of others,
and that chimps “do not appear to possess anything remotely resembling a mentalistic
understanding of others’ perceptual acts” (ibid.). Penn and Povinelli’s rationale for these
claims stems from their position that “one can always reinterpret mindreading as the
ability to reason about observable regularities” (Halina 2015). In response to critiques
that their position is one of “derived behaviorism”, they emphasize that many species
likely navigate their environments with more complex sets of cognitive processes than
allowed by Pavlov or Thorndike. According to their “Reinterpretation hypothesis” …
…both human and nonhuman animals possess a rich suite of heuristics, biases, top-down
knowledge and inferential mechanisms that allow them to pick out the causally relevant
relations in the world amidst all the salient but spurious correlations and to form
syntactically-structured mental representations about these relations that can be used in a
flexible, reliable and ecologically rational (i.e., adaptive) fashion. (ibid.)

Just as Tomasello and colleagues posit a unique adaptation in evolutionary history to
explain why captive chimps do not point declaratively, the crux of the Reinterpretation
hypothesis is adaptationist. Penn and Povinelli’s basis for chimpanzees being unable to
conclusively display behavior indicative of mindreading is to construct an evolutionary
just-so story told from an orthogenetic perspective.
According to Penn and Povinelli, as a result of the complexities of social
organization, those chimps who were politically and thus sexually successful were those
most adept at identifying acute observable regularities when predicting the social
behavior of conspecifics; they were, as the story goes, very talented in behaving as if they
possessed a human theory of mind. As Halina (2015) summarizes their view: “only
humans evolved the additional ability to reinterpret these observable regularities in terms
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of the unobservable cognitive states underlying them.” Penn and Povinelli (2013: 12)
claim that, most of the time, humans interact with other humans based on the sort of
unthinking “inferential mechanisms” and behavioral-rules described above, and that “the
role of explicit mentalistic theorizing in human affairs is more post-hoc than we folk
would like to admit,” as “our species’ cognitive system for reasoning about higher-order
symbolic relations does not merely subserve our unique linguistic, logical, causal
reasoning and mentalistic abilities. It also subserves our inveterate predilection to
reinterpret the behavior of heterospecifics in mentalistic terms.”
On one hand, the Reinterpretation hypothesis is a step in the right direction as it
breaks down traditional divisions between behavior-reading and mindreading hypotheses,
however these divisions are now replaced with another one: those with a unique cognitive
infrastructure for reinterpreting behavior in terms of higher-order representations, and
those without. Like Tomasello (2008), the whole basis for positing this unique adaptation
is the absence of behaviors in chimps indicative of advanced mindreading in humans:
There is no evidence that any nonhuman animal recognizes that another agent’s goaldirected behaviors are sensitive to that agent’s representation of the current value of the
goal and to that agent’s representation of the instrumental efficacy of a given action as
distinct from the subject’s own representations of the goal’s value and the instrumental
efficacy of a given action. (ibid.)

Penn and Povinelli do not postulate what behavioral evidence to this effect might look
like, and since “one can always reinterpret a successful mind reader as a complementary
behavior reader” (Halina 2015) their rejection of the cumulative evidence of forty years
of chimpanzee mindreading studies remains the same as before. What’s more, instead of
clarifying what they mean by the “rich suite of heuristics” presumed to play functionally
analogous roles in chimpanzee social cognition as mindreading hypotheses do for human
cognition—thereby perhaps making behavior-rule hypotheses empirically tractable—
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their uniqueness claim about mindreading now rests on the presumption of a unique
adaptation somewhere in the evolutionary history of our species. As Tim Racine (2012)
notes in response to Tomasello, this is not an explanation likely to impress biologists.
Fortunately, empirical progress is being made in mindreading debates. Ever since
Dennett’s (1978) critical response to Premack and Woodruff (1978), non-linguistic
iterations of the false belief test (or “Sally-Anne” test)—a litmus test for theory of mind
in human infants—have been proposed to evaluate mindreading ability in other
species.459 In comparative psychology, non-verbal variations on the false belief test have
been conducted on great apes (e.g., Call and Tomasello 1999; O’Connell and Dunbar
2003), which they have consistently failed (Krachun et al. 2010). This changed in 2017
with two empirical studies highly suggestive that great apes are capable of attributing
false beliefs to others (Buttelmann et al. 2017; Krupenye et al. 2017).
Krupenye et al. (2017) claim to have shown that three ape species (bonobos,
chimpanzees, and orangutans) pass a clever version of the false belief test—a result that
they rightly describe as potentially “overturning the human-only paradigm of the theory
of mind.” Krupenye and colleagues were inspired by the success of anticipatory looking
models used by, among others, Cheney and Seyfarth’s (1993, 2008) pioneering studies of
social cognition in monkey species. These models rest upon the following supposition:
we can make inferences about what a subject is thinking (including what predictions they
are making about others’ behavior) based on where and how long they look. In one of
459

Children are introduced to dolls named Sally and Anne. They are told a simple story involving these
characters as it is simultaneously acted out. In this story, Sally hides a treat in a box while both dolls are
present and then leaves. When Sally is gone, Anne moves the object from its original location to another
box. Sally returns to the scene and the test subject is asked, “Where will Sally look for the treat?” When the
children tested are four to five years old, they answer the question correctly: the original box. When
children under the age of four—as well as most autistic children—are asked the same question, they almost
always answer incorrectly: Sally will look in the new location where the treat actually is. (See 2017b)
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their experiments, apes watch the following scene: a human dressed as an ape (“Kong”)
forcefully steals a rock from a man, then—in front of this man—“hides” the rock under
one of two boxes. Kong then scares away the man and moves the cherished rock to a new
hiding place under a different box. When the man returns to the scene, over half (17/30)
of the apes looked to the place where the man last saw the rock being hidden, only 5 apes
looked to the other box, and 8 seemed disinterested in the whole scenario. In a similar
experiment, the disparity of apes who (presumably) attributed a false-belief to this man
about the whereabouts of the rock was even greater: 20/30. The other empirical study
suggesting that (a different group of) apes attribute false beliefs to others (Buttelmann et
al. 2017) is fairly similar and does not require summary in the present context.
As de Waal (2017: 40) writes in his commentary on the Krupenye group’s study,
“The results contain a lesson for those who jump on negative outcomes regarding animal
mental capacities as proof of human distinctiveness. As the old mantra goes, absence of
evidence is not evidence of absence.” The reaction from skeptics to new studies of this
nature is predictable. While Penn and Povinelli (2007: 891) once argued—in line with the
views of many others—that passing a false belief test would provide “compelling
evidence” for a theory of mind, they have claimed more recently that “all of the
experiments to date that purport to show that nonhuman animals can reason about ‘false
beliefs’ lack the power, even in principle, of showing that subjects are reasoning about
the epistemic contents of others’ mental states as distinct from observable behavioral
cues” (2013: 14). While there are reasons to doubt that Krupenye et al.’s study is
indicative of a “genuine breakthrough” (de Waal 2017: 40), the standard Povinelli
approach is not one of them. Criticism of Krupenye group’s experiments should be

312
oriented toward improving their methodology (an empirical problem), rather than
asserting that the whole experimental paradigm is flawed “in principle” (a conceptual
problem) without offering alternatives. For instance, Ben-Yami (2017) is skeptical that
the Krupenye group demonstrated that apes attribute false-beliefs to others, but his
skepticism is based on what he views as a flaw in their methods in comparison to similar
false-belief tests used for pre-linguistic human infants:
Unlike related experiments that were conducted with children [Baillargeon et al. 2010;
Perner et al. 2005], Krupenye and his colleagues did not show that any violations of
expectations were involved in the apes’ case when an agent first looked at where an
object is and not where he falsely believed it to be. The experiments show that the apes
ASSOCIATE a location with an agent, but they contain no measure to indicate that they
anticipate any action consequential on this association.

This is a reasonable critique urging the authors to tighten up methodological controls; the
logical problem is waiting in the wings, but Ben-Yami does not focus on it. And indeed,
Krupenye et al. (2017) do “acknowledge that all change-of-location false-belief tasks are,
in principle, open to an abstract behavior rule–based explanation—namely, that apes
could solve the task by relying on a rule that agents search for things where they last saw
them.” They correctly note, however, that, “this explanatory framework [i.e., behavioral
rules] cannot easily accommodate the diversity of existing evidence for ape [theory of
mind].” The Krupenye group’s rejection of the import of the logical problem is based on
deference to arguments from the best explanation and a “concilience of inductions”
(Whewell 1840) based on a plurality of sources. This represents a much-needed attitude
in contemporary debates that the marginalized tradition has long brought to the table.
6. General Conclusions
A young Charles Darwin (1838) acutely described the history of crisis presented
in this critical genealogy as a history of “attacking the citadel.” Indeed, one gets the
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feeling that, to this day, there is something sacred about the presumed uniqueness of the
human mind relative to the cognitive abilities of other species. Of course, as was
emphasized by Morgan, Washburn, and others at the birth of comparative psychology,
there is an important sense in which we are “forced to interpret the psychology of animals
in terms of human psychology” (Morgan 1904: 38). Where the dominant tradition has
consistently gone wrong is to interpret the analogical reasoning demanded by this
situation in terms of a conceptual problem requiring severe skepticism, or, by
“responding to the discovery of boundary-threatening abilities in non-human animals by
contentious re-reconceptualization of human-definitive powers (such as language) so as
to keep the boundary in place” (Horigan 1988; qtd. Benton 1993: 17).
As with the histories of biology and zoology, we should expect ontological,
linguistic, epistemic, and methodological crises of explanation to regularly emerge
alongside increased knowledge of the place of humanity in the natural world, i.e.,
traditional ontologies of nature and mind are redrawn, traditional terminology is
abandoned, traditional forms of evidence are deemed insufficient, and the successes and
failures of experimental models are taken into account. This is indeed what the history of
animal minds philosophy demonstrates; the problem at stake is therefore how these crises
are dealt with, not their presence. As seen in the chimpanzee mindreading debates,
anthropocentric research programs only become regressive when conservative values and
constraints function as obstacles to the consideration of new evidence and as unknowing
promoters of double standards derived from outmoded ways of carving up the world.
The corrosive influence of the logical problem is best seen in how it monopolizes
attention away from the specifics of individual studies, meeting each empirical challenge
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with the same boiler-plate demands for animal behaviors that cannot be accounted for
with non-mentalistic hypotheses. It is unclear the extent to which this demand can be
satisfied in human psychology, but the problem of distinguishing cognitive from
associative mechanisms hardly has the debilitating and ubiquitous presence in the
literature pertaining to pre-linguistic human infants as it does, for instance, in chimpanzee
mindreading debates that have long been “fraught with controversy” (Shettleworth 1998)
on this same point. Is this controversy related in large part to the fact that the subjects are
non-human animals? Undoubtedly. In order to appraise the value of future challenges
associated with whether traditional “simple-minded” accounts of animal cognition
(Heyes 2015) suffice to explain complex, seemingly thoughtful forms of animal behavior,
traditional argumentative strategies for responding to explanatory crises must be critically
evaluated. This has been my aim. Conceptual problems afflicting modern research
programs can be productively contextualized within a common research tradition linking
past and present discourse about differences between human and non-human minds—a
tradition that has, ironically, played an obstructive role in finding empirical solutions to
worthwhile questions about what makes the human mind exceptional.
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